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Mangalsen v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 12, 2012
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant owned land in Khasra Nos. 296, 534, 535 and 559, Village Haru Nagla, Tehsil Bareilly. After the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“1976 Act”) came into force in Uttar Pradesh, he filed a declaration under Section 6(1). The competent authority issued a draft statement proposing 7,337.39 sq m as surplus land, considered the appellant’s objections (including an application for exemption under Section 20) and, on 18-5-1982, confirmed the draft under Section 8(4).

Subsequently:

  • Notifications under Sections 10(1) (24-8-1982) and 10(3) (17-7-1985) were issued, declaring the surplus land vested in the State.
  • A notice under Section 10(5) (20-2-1986) required the appellant to deliver possession within 30 days; its service on the appellant is unclear.
  • After a gap of 3 years 4 months, a possession certificate (dakhalnama) dated 30-1-1990 recorded that possession had been taken in the presence of a witness.
  • Ten years later, notice under Section 11(8) was issued to determine compensation.

In 2008 the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 23229/2008 in the Allahabad High Court, asserting continued physical possession and challenging the 8(4) order. The Division Bench dismissed the petition on 15-2-2011, holding that possession had been taken in 1990 and, hence, the 1999 Repeal Act did not aid the appellant. The present appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the proceedings initiated under the 1976 Act abated because physical possession of the declared surplus land had not been taken from the appellant.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in accepting the possession certificate dated 30-1-1990 without evidence of service of notice under Section 10(5) or proof of actual delivery of possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Physical possession never left the appellant; certified khasra entries (year 1398 Fasli) show cultivation in 1991.
  • The possession certificate lacks the appellant’s signature and was prepared 3 years 4 months after the Section 10(5) notice, undermining its authenticity.
  • Because possession was never taken, all proceedings abated automatically on enactment of the 1999 Act.
  • The pending Section 20 exemption application meant acquisition proceedings should have been stayed.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Upon the Section 10(3) notification, the land vested in the State; therefore the 1999 Act offers no relief.
  • The writ petition was barred by laches and by availability of an alternate appeal under Section 33 of the 1976 Act.
  • Possession was taken on 30-1-1990; any subsequent re-entry by the appellant was unauthorised and cannot confer rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of U.P., (2007) 11 SCC 90 Interpretation of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1999 Repeal Act regarding abatement of pending proceedings. Referenced by the High Court; Supreme Court noted but did not rely on it because factual possession was disputed.
Babu Chand v. State of U.P., (2009) 75 ALR 873 Similar issue of possession and abatement under the Repeal Act. Cited by the High Court; Supreme Court distinguished on facts and emphasised absence of proof of possession in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised whether possession had in fact been taken:

  • Queried respondents repeatedly on proof of service of Section 10(5) notice and evidence of actual possession; respondents conceded no such material existed.
  • Observed the unexplained delay of 3 years 4 months between notice and possession certificate, and a further decade before compensation proceedings, indicating administrative laxity.
  • Compared signatures on the dakhalnama with the appellant’s signature on vakalatnama and found they differed, lending credence to the appellant’s claim of continued possession.
  • Criticised the High Court for assuming possession without demanding supporting evidence.
  • Concluded that, absent proof of lawful dispossession, possession remained with the appellant and, by operation of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1999 Act, all proceedings under the 1976 Act had abated.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed – High Court judgment set aside.

The Court declared that, with the commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, proceedings against the appellant under the 1976 Act stood abated. Each party was left to bear its own costs.

Implications are confined to the parties: the State cannot pursue acquisition of the appellant’s land under the repealed Act. The decision reiterates that, for proceedings to survive the Repeal Act, the State must demonstrate actual, lawful taking of possession before 18-3-1999; mere paperwork is insufficient.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Leave granted. Whether the proceedings initiated by the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short “the 1976 Act”) for determination of the surplus land of the appellant abated with the coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short “the 1999 Act”) because possession of the surplus land had not been taken is the question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against the order dated 15-2-2011 (2011) 86 ALR 421, (2011) 2 All LJ 752 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 23229 of 2008.

2. The appellant is the owner of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 296, 534, 535 and 559, Village Haru Nagla, Pargana and Tehsil Bareilly. After enforcement of the 1976 Act in the State of Uttar Pradesh, he filed a declaration under Section 6(1) of that Act. The competent authority prepared draft statement and issued notice under Section 8(3) proposing to declare 7337.39 sq m as surplus land. The appellant filed objections dated 16-12-1981 in the form of an affidavit along with a copy of an application made by him under Section 20 for grant of exemption on the ground that he and his family is solely dependent on the agricultural operations being undertaken by them. After considering the same, the competent authority passed the order dated 18-5-1982 under Section 8(4) and confirmed the draft statement. However, the officer concerned stayed the acquisition proceedings on the premise that the application filed by the appellant under Section 20 of the 1976 Act was pending consideration.

3. The order passed by the competent authority under Section 8(4) of the 1976 Act was followed by Notifications dated 24-8-1982 and 17-7-1985 issued under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) respectively. By the second notification, it was declared that the surplus land will be deemed to have vested in the State. On 20-2-1986 the competent authority issued notice to the appellant under Section 10(5) requiring him to hand over possession of the surplus land within 30 days with an indication that if he fails to do so, proceedings will be initiated under Section 10(6). It is not clear from the record whether or not the notice was served upon the appellant, but this much is evident that after a long time gap of three years and four months, the Tahsildar, Bareilly prepared a possession certificate (dakhalnama) dated 30-1-1990 to show that possession of the surplus land had been taken in the presence of one Horilal. After another 10 years, the competent authority issued notice under Section 11(8) of the 1976 Act for the purpose of determining the compensation payable in respect of the surplus land.

4. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 23229 of 2008 for quashing the order dated 18-5-1982. He pleaded that even though the competent authority had passed an order under Section 8(4), possession of the surplus land continued with him and it was only in April 2008 that an attempt was made by the Revenue officials to dispossess him compelling him to approach the Court. He further pleaded that the dakhalnama dated 30-1-1990 does not bear his signatures and the land was still in his possession. Another plea taken by the appellant was that the provisions of the 1976 Act could not have been invoked by the competent authority because he was using the land for agricultural purposes and the application filed by him under Section 20 of that Act was still pending.

5. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents it was pleaded that the appellant was guilty of laches inasmuch as he had approached the Court after 26 years of the passing of order under Section 8(4) of the 1976 Act. They also pleaded that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed because the appellant had failed to avail the statutory alternative remedy of appeal available under Section 33 of the 1976 Act. The respondents controverted the appellant's assertion that he was still in possession of the surplus land and pleaded that after the issue of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act, the competent authority had taken possession on 30-1-1990.

6. The Division Bench of the High Court adverted to the factual matrix of the case, noticed Sections 3 and 4 of the 1999 Act, referred to the judgment of this Court in Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of U.P (2007) 11 SCC 90 and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Babu Chand v. State of U.P (2009) 75 ALR 873, and declined to entertain the appellant's prayer by making the following observations:

“From a perusal of the record it appears that after due Notification under Section 10(1) dated 6-4-1985 and declaration under Section 10(3) on 6-11-1985 a notice for possession under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 20-2-1986 and an authorisation to the Tahsildar by the competent authority was also given in this regard on 17-7-1985 itself (sic). So the procedure prescribed under Section 10 of the Principal Act has been fully complied with. The possession has been taken without any resistance by the petitioner, obviously under the cover of dakhalnama (possession memo) signed by a witness and the authorised officer concerned on 30-1-1990.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that according to the procedure prescribed the circle has been completed and the proceeding for declaration of the excess land and taking over possession, deemed as well as actual physical possession also stood concluded much before the Repeal Act came into force.”

7. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the proceedings held under the 1976 Act will be deemed to have abated because even though order dated 18-5-1982 was passed under Section 8(4), the physical possession of the surplus land continued with his client and he has been cultivating the same. The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the certified true copy of khasra of the year 1398 Fasli to show that the appellant had cultivated 2 parcels of land in 1991 and argued that the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by holding that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the 1999 Act because possession of the surplus land had been taken on 30-1-1990.

8. Shri Ranjit Kumar pointed out that the possession certificate (dakhalnama) does not bear the signatures of the person who is said to have delivered the possession and argued that the document prepared by the Revenue officials after 3 years and 4 months of the issue of notice under Section 10(5) could not have been relied upon by the High Court for recording a finding that possession of the surplus land had been taken in 1990, more so, because the respondents did not produce any evidence to show that the appellant unauthorisedly occupied the land after 30-1-1990. The learned Senior Counsel then argued that the exercise undertaken by the Revenue officials for preparing the possession certificate should be treated as farce because notice issued by the competent authority under Section 10(5) was not served upon the appellant. Shri Ranjit Kumar also referred to the concluding paragraph of the order dated 18-5-1982 and submitted that possession of the surplus land could not have been taken by the respondents because the application filed by the appellant under Section 20 of the 1976 Act had not been decided till 30-1-1990 or any time thereafter.

9. Shri S.R Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents supported the impugned order (2011) 86 ALR 421, (2011) 2 All LJ 752 and argued that the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the 1999 Act because with the issue of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act, the surplus land automatically vested in the State. The learned Senior Counsel argued that the appellant's challenge to the order dated 18-5-1982 was highly belated and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to nullify the proceedings held by the competent authority under the 1976 Act. Shri Singh submitted that possession of the surplus land was taken after issuing notice to the appellant under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act and he cannot take advantage of the delay which occurred in the taking of possession of the surplus land. The learned counsel then submitted that the appellant appears to have unauthorisedly taken possession of the surplus land after 30-1-1990 i.e the date on which possession certificate was prepared by the Revenue officials and argued that such an illegal act cannot clothe him with a right to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

10. In the context of the submissions/argument made by the learned counsel for the parties, we repeatedly asked the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents to show when the notice issued under Section 10(5) was served upon the appellant and whether any intimation was given to him by the Revenue officials that they were intending to take possession of the surplus land on 30-1-1990. We also asked the learned Senior Counsel whether any evidence is available with the respondents to prima facie prove that the appellant had illegally taken possession of the surplus land after 30-1-1990. In reply, Shri S.R Singh very fairly stated that the record made available by the respondents does not contain any evidence to prove that the notice issued under Section 10(5) had been served upon the appellant or that he had illegally occupied the surplus land after 30-1-1990.

11. In our view, the Division Bench of the High Court should have called upon the respondents to produce evidence to show that the notice issued by the competent authority under Section 10(5) had been served upon the appellant and also explain the long time gap of 3 years and 4 months between the issue of notice under Section 10(5) and preparation of the possession certificate and also produce some evidence to show that the appellant had illegally/unauthorisedly taken possession of the surplus land after 30-1-1990. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court did not undertake that exercise and dismissed the writ petition by erroneously assuming that possession of the surplus land had been taken on 30-1-1990.

12. A reading of the xerox copy of the possession certificate, which has been placed on record along with the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 shows that signatures of the same person appear at two places. We have tallied these signatures with the appellant's signatures on the vakalatnama and are satisfied that neither of the two signatures on the possession certificate are of the appellant. This give sufficient credibility to the appellant's assertion that he had not given possession of the surplus land on 30-1-1990 and continued to cultivate the same.

13. In view of the above discussion, we hold that possession of the surplus land had not been taken on 30-1-1990 or anytime thereafter and with the coming into force of the 1999 Act, the proceedings held by the competent authority under the 1976 Act abated.

14. We may add that the manner in which the competent authority and the respondents exercised power under the 1976 Act leaves much to be desired. Till the stage of issuing notification under Section 10(1), the authority concerned had acted with sufficient promptness but, thereafter, everybody went in slumber. The notification under Section 10(3) was issued after a gap of almost 3 years. The notice under Section 10(5) was issued after another 7 months but was not served upon the appellant. The possession certificate was prepared after a time gap of 3 years and 4 months and notice under Section 11(8) was issued after more than one decade. Not only this, the application filed by the appellant under Section 20 was not decided till the filing of the writ petition in the year 2008.

15. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order (2011) 86 ALR 421, (2011) 2 All LJ 752 is set aside and it is declared that with the coming into force of the 1999 Act, the proceedings held by the competent authority under the 1976 Act, in relation to the appellant's land, stood abated. The parties are left to bear their own costs.