Anjani K. Verma v. State Of Bihar And Another

Order

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court whereby petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the appellant for expunging the remarks against him as contained in the judgment of learned Sessions Judge dated 7-2-1998, was dismissed.

2. At the outset, we may observe that a judicial officer who exceeds the limits of propriety and conduct and does not render justice in accordance with the facts of the case and the law, needs no protection from the superior courts. But, at the same time, while passing strictures against a member of the subordinate judiciary utmost care and caution is required to be taken, also having regard to the stress and conditions under which, by and large, the judicial officers have to render justice. It would be appropriate to remember what was said a long time ago by Justice Gajendragadkar, as noticed in the decision of this Court in Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India (1997) 4 SCC 65 in the following words:

“12. A quarter of a century ago Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for a Bench of three Judges of this Court, in the context of dealing with the strictures passed by a High Court against one of its subordinate judicial officers (suggesting that his decision was based on extraneous considerations) stressed the need to adopt utmost judicial restraint against using strong language and imputation of corrupt motives against lower judiciary more so ‘because the Judge against whom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicate his position’ (Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohd. Isa AIR 1963 SC 1728). This Court had to repeat such words on subsequent occasions also. In K.P Tiwari v. State of M.P 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540 this Court came across certain observations of a learned Judge of the High Court casting strictures against a Judge of the subordinate judiciary and the Court used the opportunity to remind all concerned that using intemperate language and castigating strictures at the lower levels would only cause public respect in judiciary to dwindle. The following observations of this Court need repetition in this context:

‘The higher courts every day come across orders of the lower courts which are not justified either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside. That is one of the functions of the superior courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the judges and hence provides for appeals and revisions. A judge tries to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing so, sometimes, he is likely to err. … It has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks — more correctly up to their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every error, however, gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive.’ ”

3. In the same judgment an earlier decision in Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar (1996) 4 SCC 539 has been referred to the following effect:

“7. It cannot be forgotten that in our system, like elsewhere, appellate and revisional courts have been set up on the presupposition that lower courts would in some measure of cases go wrong in decision-making, both on facts as also on law, and they have been knit up to correct those orders. The human element in justicing being an important element, computer-like functioning cannot be expected of the courts; however hard they may try and keep themselves precedent-trodden in the scope of discretions and in the manner of judging. Whenever any such intolerable error is detected by or pointed out to a superior court, it is functionally required to correct that error and may, here and there, in an appropriate case, and in a manner befitting, maintaining the dignity of the court and independence of judiciary, convey its message in its judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear, and result-orienting, but rarely as a rebuke. Sharp reaction of the kind exhibited in the afore-extraction is not in keeping with institutional functioning. The premise that a judge committed a mistake or an error beyond the limits of tolerance, is no ground to inflict condemnation on the judge-subordinate, unless there existed something else and for exceptional grounds.”

4. Reverting to the present case, the appellant as a judicial officer (Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhanbad), by judgment dated 6-5-1997 trying a case under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, acquitted the two accused who had been charged for the said offence giving them benefit of doubt. It is a detailed judgment setting out the evidence in the case and recording reasons for the order of acquittal. The order of acquittal also records that virtually no investigation has been done by the investigating officer and charge-sheet was submitted against the accused without taking any pain for bringing the truth before the court. In this view, conclusion was reached that the entire prosecution story of alleged torture and demand of dowry was surrounded with shadow of doubts, on account whereof the benefit of doubt was given to the accused.

5. The Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, trying altogether a different case for offences under Sections 364, 302 and Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, by judgment dated 7-2-1998 convicted one of the accused and acquitted the other. In the course of the judgment, the Sessions Judge made observations in respect of order of acquittal above-referred which had been passed by the appellant. The Sessions Judge though observed that it was not the proper forum to make observations against the Magistrate, that is to say, the Sessions Judge was trying an altogether separate case and the Magistrate had decided an altogether separate case. It was not an appeal against the order of Magistrate. It may also be noted that against the order dated 6-5-1997, neither an appeal was filed by the State nor was that order challenged by the complainant. Further, it is nobody's case that any notice was issued to the appellant before passing the strictures against him. In his judgment the Sessions Judge observed that the appellant was not at all justified in recording acquittal of the accused. The conviction of the accused could have very well been based on the evidence brought on record. It does not appear that the evidence that had been led in the case decided by the appellant was before the Sessions Judge in the case in which these strictures were passed. Only a copy of the judgment was placed on the record of the sessions trial by the accused by way of defence. We are at a loss to understand how the Sessions Judge without record and evidence of the case came to the conclusion that the acquittal by the appellant was not justified and the accused should have been convicted. Be that as it may, it is further evident that soon after passing the judgment, learned District and Sessions Judge by issue of notice dated 3-3-1998 to the appellant, asked him to furnish explanation as to the circumstances under which the order of acquittal was passed. In that notice it has been stated that the order of acquittal was based on extraneous considerations. In this appeal, however, the question is not about the validity or otherwise of that notice but is about the correctness of the strictures passed and the order of the High Court declining to expunge the remarks when a petition under Section 482 is filed by the appellant. The only reason given by the High Court is that the case does not require interference. The petition was dismissed in limine without issuance of notice to the respondents. Further, it appears that the observations in the impugned judgment of the High Court that no show-cause notice had been issued to the appellant, are also not correct, since, as abovenoticed, the show-cause notice dated 3-3-1998 had been issued. A perusal of petition under Section 482 CrPC shows that the notice dated 3-3-1998 had been annexed thereto. Moreover, issue of notice was not very relevant to decide the correctness of order passing strictures against the appellant.

6. In view of the aforesaid factual position, ordinarily, we would have remanded the case to the High Court for fresh decision of petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But, having regard to the long pendency of the matter and having perused the material placed before us, we have no doubt that on the present facts and circumstances, there was no justification for passing the strictures against the appellant. In this view, we expunge the strictures passed against the appellant in para 20 of the judgment dated 7-2-1998 rendered in Sessions Trial No. 364 of 1995 by the Sessions Judge, Dhanbad.

7. The appeal is accordingly allowed.