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Sunil Gangadhar Karve v. State Of Maharashtra And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 11, 2014
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner lodged four complaints (1-2-2012, 2-2-2012, 15-2-2012 and 2-3-2012) with the Mumbai police alleging the commission of serious offences by Respondents 8-13. When no action was taken, he approached the Bombay High Court. During that proceeding the State submitted that the matter fell under the Bombay Public Trust Act, and Respondent 8 and his family were permitted to intervene. The Supreme Court, by order dated 22-11-2013 in Sunil Gangadhar Karve v. Chagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (SLPs (Cri) Nos. 4264-66 of 2013), set aside the High Court’s order and directed the police to consider the four complaints in light of the principles laid down in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1.

Subsequently, the Senior Inspector of Police, Economic Offences Wing, issued an order dated 16-1-2014 summarising the petitioner’s grievances but concluding that no cognisable offence was disclosed and therefore closed the enquiry. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking (a) quashing of the 16-1-2014 order and (b) transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the police order dated 16-1-2014 closing the enquiry should be quashed.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances alleged, the investigation should be entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation instead of the Maharashtra police.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Senior Inspector’s order ignored the Supreme Court’s earlier direction (22-11-2013) to evaluate the complaints in accordance with Lalita Kumari, thereby necessitating quashing of that order.
  • Because the accused are influential, an investigation by the State police would not be impartial; therefore an independent agency such as the CBI should investigate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sunil Gangadhar Karve v. Chagan Chandrakant Bhujbal, SLPs (Cri) Nos. 4264-66 of 2013 (order dated 22-11-2013) Directed the police to examine the petitioner’s four complaints in accordance with the law. Court noted that this earlier order formed the basis of the petitioner’s expectation that his complaints would be investigated.
Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 Mandates prompt registration of FIRs and preliminary enquiry only in limited circumstances. Referenced to emphasise the standard that the police were expected to apply while considering the petitioner’s complaints.
Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India (2007) 6 SCC 171 Holds that if police refuse to register or investigate, the complainant can invoke remedies under the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Magistrate. Relied on to show that alternative statutory remedies are available to the petitioner.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 Affirms the importance of the accused’s right of appeal. Cited to stress the need to protect the rights of the accused if the matter proceeds before a Magistrate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified two principal obstacles to granting the reliefs sought:

  1. Availability of Statutory Remedy: Relying on Aleque Padamsee, the Court observed that when the police decline to act on a complaint, the complainant may seek recourse under the Criminal Procedure Code by approaching the jurisdictional Magistrate. Hence, a writ under Article 32 was not the appropriate first forum.
  2. Protection of the Accused’s Rights: Citing A.R. Antulay, the Court emphasised that the accused are entitled to appeal against any unfavourable determination, a right that could be undermined if the Supreme Court were to bypass the normal procedural safeguards.

Additionally, the Court noted that the specific prayers—quashing the police order and seeking a CBI investigation—are matters routinely entertainable by the High Courts under Article 226. Upon this clarification, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner sought leave to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to approach the Bombay High Court. The Court recorded this statement.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED AS NOT PRESSED

The petition was withdrawn, allowing the petitioner to seek relief before the Bombay High Court, which the Supreme Court expressed confidence would consider the matter expeditiously. The order sets no new precedent; its immediate effect is to end the Supreme Court proceedings while preserving the petitioner’s right to pursue remedies before the High Court.

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Order

1. Heard Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of this writ petition. This writ petition is filed with lots of agony and it is submitted that in spite of an order passed by this Court on 22-11-2013 in Sunil Gangadhar Karve v. Chagan Chandrakant Bhujbal SLPs (Cri) Nos. 4264-66 of 2013 recording the willingness of the State of Maharashtra that the complaints lodged by the petitioner will be looked into in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P (2014) 2 SCC 1, the appropriate order is not passed.

2. The petitioner contends that he has lodged serious complaints with respect to various offences against Respondents 8 to 13 with the authorities of the police in Mumbai and since no appropriate action was being taken he went to the High Court earlier. It was submitted by the State before the High Court that the matter had to be proceeded under the Bombay Public Trust Act. Respondent 8 and his family member were allowed to intervene in the matter. That order passed by the High Court was set aside by this Court by its order dated 22-11-2013 SLPs (Cri) Nos. 4264-66 of 2013. The order passed by this Court recorded that the four complaints made by the petitioner dated 1-2-2012, 2-2-2012, 15-2-2012 and 2-3-2012 will be gone into and the police officer concerned will take decision on those complaints in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P (2014) 2 SCC 1

3. We are informed that thereafter an order has been passed by a Senior Inspector of Police, Economic Offences Wing dated 16-1-2014 which essentially records whatever are the grievances of the petitioner in substance, but ultimately holds that this enquiry has not disclosed the commission of any cognizable offence which requires further action through the office concerned and hence the enquiry was closed. Mr Rohatgi learned Senior Counsel submits that it is therefore that the present writ petition has been filed invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. He stresses the first two prayers of this writ petition. Prayer (a) is to quash and set aside the aforesaid decision and Prayer (b) is to direct the investigation to be conducted by CBI. This is basically because as stated by the petitioner, the accused concerned are quite powerful and therefore it is necessary that the complaints be investigated by an agency other than the investigating agency of the State of Maharashtra. This is stressed particularly on the background of the order that has been passed by the police officer concerned.

4. We have noted this submission of Mr Rohatgi. There are, however, two difficulties in his way. Firstly, that if the police officers decline to look into the complaint, the ordinary procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code is available to the complainant as held by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India (2007) 6 SCC 171. Besides, apart from the rights of the complainant, the rights of the accused also have to be safeguarded, and the accused has a right of appeal against any such determination if the complainant chooses to approach the Magistrate concerned. The right of appeal has been held to be a very important right of the accused by this Court in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602.

5. That apart the two prayers which the petitioner is seeking are prayers which can be gone into by the High Court and there is no reason why such prayers should not be pressed before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Having noted this position, Mr Rohatgi has stated that he is not pressing this petition any more. He states that he is seeking to withdraw this writ petition, and that the petitioner will move the Bombay High Court for appropriate relief. He makes a further request that in the event such a petition is filed, the same may be taken up at the earliest for consideration. We are sure that the High Court will do the needful in that manner.

6. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed as not pressed.