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All India J.D Educational Society v. Director General Of Income-Tax (Exemptions)

Delhi High Court
Nov 19, 2010
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Summary of Opinion — Manmohan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 28 November 2008 of the Director General of Income-tax (Exemptions) (DGIT(E)) which rejected the petitioner-society's claim for exemption under section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The petitioner is a registered educational society running J.D Ayurvedic Medical College and Hospital at Aligarh. The petitioner initially applied for exemption under section 10(23C)(iv) and 10(23C)(via) but subsequently confined the application to section 10(23C)(via) (exemption for hospitals or other institutions for reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness).

DGIT(E) examined documents and submissions and passed the impugned order dated 28 November 2008 rejecting the exemption. The petitioner challenged that order on grounds including violation of principles of natural justice, failure to consider replies dated 21 October 2008, 7 November 2008 and 25 November 2008, and urged that delay in filing the application should have been condoned. The respondent opposed the petition, asserting adequate opportunities had been given, that the application was time-barred, and that the DGIT(E) had found manipulation of accounts and non-genuine charitable activity.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the DGIT(E) violated principles of natural justice by passing the impugned order without affording a proper opportunity to the petitioner-society.
  2. Whether the petitioner-society's application for approval under section 10(23C)(via) was barred by limitation and, if so, whether the DGIT(E) ought to have condoned the delay.
  3. Whether the activities of the petitioner-society were genuine charitable activities and whether the income of the society was applied wholly and exclusively to its objects (as required by sub-clause (via) and the third proviso to section 10(23C)(via)).
  4. Whether the principle of res judicata prevents the DGIT(E) from refusing or withdrawing approval where earlier exemptions or registrations (under sections 12A and 80G) had been granted in earlier years.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-society (Appellant)

  • Contended that the DGIT(E) passed the impugned order without affording an opportunity of being heard, thereby violating principles of natural justice.
  • Argued that although there was delay in filing the application and no statutory provision for condonation, the DGIT(E), in exercise of his judicial power in granting approvals under section 10(23C), should have condoned the delay in the interest of justice because sufficient cause was shown.
  • Submitted that the DGIT(E) failed to consider replies/clarifications dated 21 October 2008, 7 November 2008 and 25 November 2008 addressing discrepancies in records.
  • Pointed out that the society's activities had earlier been examined by the Income-tax Department when granting exemption under section 12A (2004), registration under section 80G (2007) and while framing assessment under section 143(3) for AY 2005-06 (in 2007), implying prior acceptance of accounts/activities.

Respondent (Revenue)

  • Maintained that the petitioner-society was granted sufficient opportunities to be heard and there was no violation of natural justice; records show hearings on six occasions (13 Oct, 21 Oct, 31 Oct, 4 Nov, 7 Nov and 25 Nov 2008) and the petitioner itself sought adjournments on three occasions.
  • Argued that the amended provisions of section 10(23C) (effective 1 June 2006) prescribed the last date for filing for AY 2007-08 as 31 March 2007, and the petitioner's application of 5 November 2007 was beyond the prescribed limit.
  • Contended that the memorandum of society (clauses 4, 8 and 11) showed aims and objects other than a hospital as prescribed under section 10(23C)(via), and that the DGIT(E) had examined books, donation receipts and salary registers and found manipulation indicating activities not genuine or charitable and operation for profit with siphoning off of funds.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision in American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT ([2008] 301 ITR 86 (SC)) to submit that even if earlier approvals existed, the prescribed authority may refuse renewal or withdraw approval in case of violation of the Act; thus res judicata did not apply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT, [2008] 301 ITR 86 (SC) Authority to refuse renewal or withdraw approval under section 10(23C); supports that res judicata does not bar denial/withdrawal of approval on violation. The respondent relied on this authority; the court recorded the reliance and treated it as supportive of the proposition that prior approvals do not preclude later denial/withdrawal where statutory conditions are not met.
Municipal Corporation of City of Thane v. Vidyut Metallics Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 688 Principle that res judicata (strict rule under section 11 CPC) generally does not apply in taxation matters; each assessment year is independent. The court referred to this decision to support its conclusion that findings in earlier years do not automatically entitle approval in subsequent years and that res judicata does not govern tax assessments.
Maharana Mills P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1959] 36 ITR 350 (SC) Illustrative authority cited in support of the proposition that previous assessments do not operate as res judicata for subsequent years. Included among the authorities relied on to demonstrate the settled position that tax matters are yearly and res judicata is generally inapplicable.
Raja Bahadur Visheshwara Singh v. CIT, [1961] 41 ITR 685 (SC) Illustrative authority on non-application of res judicata in taxation matters. Cited as part of the line of authorities supporting the court's proposition regarding finality limited to each assessment year.
Instalment Supply P. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1961] 12 STC 489 (SC) Illustrative authority cited in the same context regarding res judicata principles in tax law. Relied upon as part of the jurisprudential support for the court's position that prior findings do not bind later assessments.
New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR (SC) 137 Illustrative authority on non-applicability of res judicata to subsequent tax years. Referenced among the cases that establish the rule cited by the court.
Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013 Illustrative authority in the res judicata discussion for taxation matters. Referred to as part of the authoritative support for the court's res judicata analysis.
Devilal Modi v. STO, [1965] 16 STC 303 (SC); AIR 1965 SC 1150 Illustrative authority cited on the same principle. Counted among the precedents confirming the general rule regarding assessments being year-specific.
Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai v. CIT, [1967] 63 ITR 416 (SC) Illustrative authority on non-application of strict res judicata in tax matters. Included in the list of authorities supporting the court's position.
M.M Ipoh v. CIT, [1968] 67 ITR 106 (SC) Illustrative authority on the same principle. Referred to as part of the jurisprudence relied upon by the court on res judicata in taxation.
Kapurchand Shrimal v. TRO, [1969] 72 ITR 623 (SC) Illustrative authority cited in the res judicata context. Listed among the precedents supporting the court's view that each assessment year is independent.
Cit v. Durga Prasad More, [1971] 82 ITR 540 (SC) Illustrative authority in support of the res judicata principle addressed. Used as part of the body of case law cited to show the settled position.
Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC) Illustrative authority concerning tax assessments and related principles. Cited among authorities confirming the court's statement on res judicata in taxation.
Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope (Valuation Officer), [1960] AC 551 (HL) Illustrative non-Indian authority referenced in the res judicata discussion. Included in the list of foreign and domestic authorities demonstrating the general proposition about res judicata.
Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill, [1926] AC 94 (PC) Illustrative authority referenced regarding res judicata principles. Referred to as supportive precedent in the court's discussion of res judicata in taxation matters.
Turner on Res Judicata, second edition, para. 219, p. 193 Textual authority on the doctrine of res judicata. Relied upon as part of the textual support for the court's statement about res judicata and taxation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of findings and legal analysis strictly based on the record before it:

  1. Limitation: The court noted that the application for approval under section 10(23C) was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed date (the application dated 5 November 2007 for AY 2007-08 whereas the amended provision required filing on or before 31 March 2007). The petitioner's sole explanation—that the provision was new—was held to be unavailing, the court observing that "ignorance of law is not an excuse." The court stated that whether the DGIT(E)'s power is judicial or administrative was immaterial given the unconvincing explanation; consequently the application was barred by limitation. Nonetheless, the court chose to decide the matter on merits as well.
  2. Natural justice: The court rejected the petitioner's contention of violation of the principles of natural justice. The record showed that the petitioner-society had been granted hearings on six occasions (13 Oct, 21 Oct, 31 Oct, 4 Nov, 7 Nov and 25 Nov 2008). The petitioner itself sought adjournments on three occasions and filed submissions/letters dated 21 Oct, 7 Nov and 25 Nov 2008 which were on record. The court found that the petitioner had placed on record the evidence it possessed and thus had opportunities of being heard.
  3. Res judicata and prior approvals: The court agreed with the respondent that earlier acceptance/grant of exemptions or registrations (under section 12A and section 80G and previous assessments) did not automatically entitle the petitioner to approval under section 10(23C) in subsequent years. Citing Municipal Corporation of Thane and a line of authorities, the court reiterated that tax assessments are year‑specific and the strict rule of res judicata generally does not apply in taxation matters.
  4. Scope of DGIT(E)'s powers and factual findings: The court observed that DGIT(E) acted within the ambit of the second proviso to section 10(23C) (which permits the prescribed authority to call for documents, including audited accounts, and make such inquiries as it deems necessary to satisfy itself about the genuineness of activities). The impugned order recorded findings of manipulated books, absence of donation receipts corresponding to entries, salary payments shown even after resignations, and contradictions between witness statements and records. The court reproduced portions of the impugned order and accepted that the DGIT(E) had cross‑examined witnesses and reached factual findings after appreciation of evidence.
  5. Limitations of writ review: The court emphasized that in writ jurisdiction it would not re-evaluate evidence, and absent contravention of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, gross unreasonableness or arbitrariness, it would not substitute its own view for that of the DGIT(E). The writ jurisdiction is not an appellate jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court found the application for approval under section 10(23C)(via) to be time‑barred and, on merits, found no violation of principles of natural justice and no basis to interfere with the DGIT(E)'s factual findings.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the impugned order of the DGIT(E) dated 28 November 2008 stands, and the petition to quash that order was dismissed.
  • The court recorded that the DGIT(E) acted within the powers conferred by the second proviso to section 10(23C) in calling for documents and making inquiries and that, on the record, the DGIT(E) found manipulation of accounts and non-application of income wholly and exclusively to charitable objects.
  • The court reiterated that res judicata principles do not generally bar the revenue from examining each assessment year afresh; earlier grants of exemption/registration do not automatically guarantee later approvals. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel law beyond applying established principles; no new precedent was created by this dismissal.
  • The court ordered the petition dismissed with no order as to costs (i.e., no costs awarded).
Show all summary ...

Manmohan, J.:— The present writ petition has been filed under articles 226 and, 227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of writ of certiorari quashing the order dated November 28, 2008, of the Director General of Income-tax (Exemptions) (in short, “the DGIT(E)”) passed under section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for brevity, “the Act”).

2. The facts of the present case are that the petitioner is a registered educational society (hereinafter referred to as “the petitioner-society”) with its registered office at Delhi. The petitioner-society has been running an Ayurvedic Medical College, namely, J.D Ayurvedic Medical College and Hospital situated at Bhankari, G.T Road, Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner-society had made an application before the DGIT(E) seeking exemption under section 10(23C)(iv) and 10(23C)(via) of the Act. Later on at the petitioner-society's request the application was confined to seeking exemption under section 10(23C)(via) of the Act which provides exemption in respect of hospital or other institution for reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness. The DGIT(E,) after examining the relevant documents and other submissions of the petitioner-society, rejected the grant of exemption under section 10(23C)(via) of the Act by his order dated November 28, 2008. Dr. Rakesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner-society, submitted that the DGIT(E) had passed the impugned order without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner-society and thus violated the principles of natural justice. Mr. Gupta further submitted that though there was a delay in filing the application on the part of the petitioner-society and there being no provision for condonation of delay in filing the application, yet the DGIT(E) in exercise of his judicial power of granting approval under section 10(23C) of the Act should have condoned the delay in the interest of justice as sufficient cause was shown by the petitioner-society.

3. Mr. Gupta further submitted that the DGIT(E) had failed to consider the replies of the petitioner-society, vide letters dated October 21, 2008, November 7, 2008, and November 25, 2008, wherein the clarifications sought by the DGIT(E) in regard to discrepancies in the records of petitioner-society were provided.

4. Lastly, Mr. Gupta submitted that the DGIT(E) had failed to appreciate the fact that the activities of the petitioner-society had already been examined by the Income-tax Department thrice, viz., while granting exemption under section 12A of the Act in 2004, granting registration under section 80G of the Act in 2007 and while framing of assessment under section 143(3) of the Act for the assessment year 2005-06 in 2007.

5. Ms. Prem Lata Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner-society was granted sufficient number of opportunities of being heard and it was not a case of violation of the principles of natural justice.

6. Ms. Bansal further submitted that the provisions of section 10(23c) were amended with effect from June 1, 2006, and as per the amended provision, the application under section 10(23C) of the Act for the assessment year 2007-08 could have been filed by the petitioner-society on or before March 31, 2007, and, therefore, the application dated November 5, 2007, was beyond the prescribed time limit.

7. Ms. Bansal further submitted that clauses 4, 8 and 11 describing the aims and objects of the petitioner-society under the memorandum of society were other than for hospital as prescribed under section 10(23C)(via) of the Act. She submitted that according to third proviso to section 10(23C)(via) of the Act, the prescribed authority granting exemption, had to ascertain as to whether the applicant applied its income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which it was constituted or established. She further submitted that in the present case the DGIT(E) examined the books of account including the donation account and salary registers and found them to be manipulated. She submitted that the DGIT(E) had rightly arrived at the finding that the activities of the petitioner-society were not genuine and charitable and the petitioner-society was being run for profitable purposes with huge siphoning off money of the petitioner-society.

8. Lastly, Ms. Bansal relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 9 American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT, [2008] 301 ITR 86 (SC) to submit that even in cases where approval has already been granted, the prescribed authority is empowered not to renew or even withdraw the approval in case there is a violation of the provisions of the Act. She submitted that, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply to the facts of the present case. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, we find that the application was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed date and the sole explanation of delay given by the petitioner-society in the letter dated October 21, 2008, was that the provision was a new one. It is a settled position of law that ignorance of law is not an excuse. The question whether the DGIT(E)'s power of approval under section 10(23C) of the Act is judicial or administrative in nature is immaterial in view of the unconvincing explanation offered by the petitioner-society. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the application filed by the petitioner-society was barred by limitation. But having regard to the fact that we have heard the matter, we are disposing of the case on the merits also.

9. We are of the considered opinion that the petitioner-society's contention that there was violation of principles of natural justice is baseless. We gather from the records that the petitioner-society was in fact granted opportunities of being heard on six different occasions, namely, October 13, 2008, October 21, 2008, October 31, 2008, November 4, 2008, November 7, 2008, and November 25, 2008. Out of these, the petitioner-society itself sought adjournment on three occasions and the submissions of the petitioner-society on the other three hearings are on record, vide letters dated October 21, 2008, November 7, 2008, and November 25, 2008. In fact, the petitioner-society in its letter dated November 25, 2008, submitted as under:

“In view of the above explanation, affidavits submitted by the employees and their personal presence here before your goodself for cross-examination, it is humbly submitted that the society has discharged its onus and have reasonably established that the salary was paid to the employees and the signatures were appended by the employees while accepting the salary from the society. All the employees have owned the signatures appended in front of their name in the salary registers.

It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the no adverse inference may be drawn out of the alleged irregularities in the salary registers as the society has established and substantiated its claim of salary been paid to the employees.”

10. From the aforesaid quotation, it is apparent that the petitioner.-society had placed on record before the DGIT(E) all the evidence it had in its possession.

11. Further, we are in agreement with Ms. Prem Lata Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent, that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the facts of the present case. We believe that not finding any discrepancy or inconsistency in earlier years while granting exemption under section 12A and registration under section 80G of the Act would not automatically entitle the petitioner-society to have approval under section 10(23C) in subsequent years. In income-tax matters, each assessment year is an independent year and the principle of res judicata, in general is not applicable. We may refer with profit the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Thane v. Vidyut Metallics Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 688, 694; [2007] 9 RC 521, 527, wherein it has been held as under:

“18. So far as the proposition of law is concerned, it is well settled and needs no further discussion. In taxation matters, the strict rule of res, judicata as envisaged by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has no application. As a general rule, each year's assessment is final only for that year and does not govern later years, because it (determines the tax for a particular period. It is, therefore, open to the Revenue/taxing authority to consider the position of the assessee every year for the purpose of determining and computing the liability to pay tax or octroi on that basis in subsequent years. A decision taken by the authorities in the previous year would not estop or operate as res judicata for the subsequent year (vide Maharana Mills P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1959] 36 ITR 350 (SC); AIR 1959 SC 881, Raja Bahadur Visheshwara Singh v. CIT, [1961] 41 ITR 685 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 1062, Instalment Supply P. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1961] 12 STC 489 (SC); AIR 1962 SC 53, New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR (SC) 137. Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013, Devilal Modi v. STO, [1965] 16 STC 303 (SC); AIR 1965 SC 1150, Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai v. CIT, [1967] 63 ITR 416 (SC), M.M Ipoh v. CIT, [1968] 67 ITR 106 (SC), Kapurchand Shrimal v. TRO, [1969] 72 ITR 623 (SC), Cit v. Durga Prasad More, [1971] 82 ITR 540 (SC), Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC), Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope (Valuation Officer), [1960] AC 551 (HL), Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill, [1926] AC 94 (PC) and Turner on Res Judicata, second edition, para. 219, p. 193).”

(emphasis1 supplied)

12. In addition, we find that the DGIT(E) has acted within the ambit of 14 second proviso to section 10(23C) of the Act. The second proviso reads as under:

“Provided further that the prescribed authority, before approving any fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution, under sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (via), may call for such documents (including audited annual accounts) or information from the fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution, as the case may be, as it thinks necessary in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the activities of such fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution, as the case may be, and the prescribed authority may also make such inquiries as it deems necessary in this behalf.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. From a perusal of the papers and in particular the impugned order, it is apparent that the petitioner-society has neither maintained proper books of account nor proper receipts of donations. Also salaries are shown to-have been paid to the employees even though they had resigned. Also the DGIT(E) cross-examined the persons presented as witnesses by the petitioner-society and found their statements contrary to the records of the petitioner-society. Some of the relevant observations in the impugned order are reproduced hereinabove:

“3… Thus, the Mittal family has been shown to give donation to the society on 16 occasions. But, the donation receipt books of the applicant did not show a single receipt issued by the society to anyone in the Mittal family for the donations received…

4. Considering all these facts, it was obvious that the applicant's, books of account were manipulated and its activities were not genuine and charitable…

6. However, the applicant filed the affidavits of the following persons but did not produce them for examination:

(i) Dr. Anurag Dixit

(ii) Sh. Sarvesh Kumar

Further, it did not file any affidavit in the case of Sh. Dinesh Kumar Yadav and also did not produce him for examination. The evidence filed in respect of these three persons and the facts found from the salary registers of the applicant are discussed hereafter.

7… As per his appointment letter (annexure B3 and B4) filed by the applicant, he was appointed to the post on May 17, 2005, and as per his resignation letter filed before me (annexure B5 to the order), he resigned, with effect from July 31, 2005. However, the examination of the salary register reveals that he was shown to have been paid salary as under:

SI. No. in the salary register Month/Year Pay in Rs. 11 April, 2005 8,500 11 May, 2005 8, 500 11 June, 2005 8,500 11 July, 2005 8, 500
SI. No. in the-salary register Month/Year Pay in Rs. 11 August, 2005 8,500 11 September, 2005 8,500 11 October, 2005 8,500 11 November, 2005 8,500 11 December, 2005 8,500 12 January, 2005 8,500 11 February, 2006 8,500 11 March, 2006 8,500 9 April, 2006 8,000 10 May, 2006 8,000 10 June, 2006 8,000 8 July, 2006 8,000 8 August, 2006 8,000 7 September, 2006 8,000 7 October, 2006 8,000

10. Thus, comparison of the affidavits, appointment letters, resignation letters of these persons filed by the applicant on November 25, 2008, with the salary registers of the applicant clearly shows that the society is run for profit and not for charitable purpose as the books of account are heavily doctored to siphon off money of the society. It is apparent that the income of the applicant-society was not applied wholly and exclusively to the objects for which it was established.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. Moreover, we are of the opinion that this court in its writ jurisdiction 16 cannot re-evaluate the evidences presented before the DGIT(E). The DGIT(E) has reached the factual finding after appreciation of the evidence and cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioner-society was given opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned order. In the absence of any contravention of fundamental rights or violation of the principles of natural justice or gross unreasonableness or arbitrariness, this court would neither interfere nor substitute its own views in place of the decision taken by the DGIT(E). The writ jurisdiction is not intended to be an appellate jurisdiction.

15. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed 17 but with no order as to costs.