Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sunder Lal Khatri v. Delhi Development Authority

Delhi High Court
Sep 1, 1994
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an objection application filed by the respondent (Delhi Development Authority, referred to as "respondent-DDA") under Sections 30 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, challenging an arbitral award dated 11.10.1991. The award arose from a dispute under an Agreement between the petitioner (a contractor) and the respondent-DDA for construction of 88 L.I.G. and 144 M.I.G. houses at Shalimar Bagh, New Delhi. The estimated cost of the work was Rs. 1,01,84,875/-. Pursuant to Clause 25 of the Agreement, an arbitrator was appointed to decide the disputes between the parties.

The respondent objected to multiple aspects of the award, contending (inter alia) that the award was non-reasoned or perverse; that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to award certain claims (particularly those under Clause-10C of the Agreement) because Clause-2 and the decision of the Superintending Engineer were final and binding; and that certain awards were unsupported by evidence or contrary to the contract terms. The Court heard submissions and considered documentary evidence and authorities cited by the parties. The objections were dismissed and the award was made rule of the Court; a decree was passed in terms of the award, with interest directions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitral award is a non-reasoned award or perverse (i.e., whether the arbitrator failed to give reasons or gave perverse reasons).
  2. Whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award claims under Clause-10C of the Agreement (price/wage/escallation claims) when Clause-2 and the decision of the Superintending Engineer were said to be final and binding on compensation for delay.
  3. Whether awards for damages (including overheads/establishment expenses and price escalation of materials) were permissible in light of the General Clause‑1 of the specifications and conditions and whether sufficient evidence supported those awards.
  4. Whether pre-suit interest (and the basis for awarding interest) was awarded in accordance with the Interest Act, 1978 (including notice requirements under Section 3 of that Act) and whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award pendente lite interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The award is non-reasoned; the arbitrator did not provide reasons for allowing certain claims, or if reasons were given they were perverse.
  • The arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to award claims under Clause-10C because Clause-2 of the Agreement (and the Superintending Engineer's compensation determination) was final and binding; the Superintending Engineer had adjudicated compensation for delay and therefore the arbitrator could not grant additional relief.
  • The arbitrator failed to appreciate that the respondent had rectified defects and thus should have claimed the amounts spent for rectification; the arbitrator ignored relevant materials and documents, vitiating the award.
  • Under General Clause‑1 of specifications and conditions, the contractor has no claim for extras or compensation for site non-availability or delay in supply of materials; therefore awards for delay-related damages were contrary to the Agreement.
  • The awards (particularly for damages) were based only on cost index or insufficient evidence; Kochar Constructions Co. v. UOI was cited to argue insufficiency of evidentiary basis.
  • Pre-suit interest award was not in accordance with mandatory provisions of the Interest Act, 1978; no notice under Section 3 of the Interest Act was given as required, or Ex.C-1 was not a proper notice.
  • Letter dated 7.1.85 (invoking Clause-2) was relied upon to argue respondent had already invoked Clause-2 and levied compensation, thus ousting arbitrator's competence on delayed-execution claims.
  • Authorities cited in support included R.S. Rana v. DDA and Bharat Furnishing Co. v. DDA (to support jurisdictional and contract interpretation arguments), and other authorities on evidence and contract clauses.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The arbitrator gave cogent reasons and relied on documentary evidence and admissions by the respondent; the award is a reasoned award and should not be disturbed.
  • Clause-10C applies where price of materials or wages increase due to statutory notifications and is distinct from Clause-2; because no notice of rescission or compensation was given within the stipulated completion period (work started 25.5.79; stipulated completion 24.5.80; contract rescinded on 1.9.84), the arbitrator correctly awarded sums under Clause-10C.
  • The arbitrator relied on respondent's own figures (Ex.R-30) and correspondence (Ex.C-50) admitting that delay was not attributable to the contractor and recommending payment under Clause-10C.
  • Damages and overheads were computed on the basis of material on record, including three alternative methods and the cost index (Ex.C-53) which was a government-published wholesale price index; other supporting documents included Ex.C-30 to C-36, C-53 and C-54, and records of establishment verified by respondent's site staff.
  • As to interest, petitioner relied on Ex.C-1, Ex.C-9 and Ex.C-44 as notices demanding interest; the arbitrator awarded simple interest @12% p.a. from 22.10.83 to 26.10.88 (first arbitration hearing). The arbitrator correctly declined to award pendente lite interest given the law at that time; the petitioner requested the Court to consider but the Court did not award pendente lite interest.
  • The petitioner highlighted that other contractors were paid at significantly higher rates during the relevant period, supporting the position that prolonged execution increased costs and justified the damages awarded by the arbitrator.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.S. Rana v. DDA, 1993 (2) ALR 165 Cited by respondent to support the contention that arbitrator could not award under Clause-10C where compensation under Clause-2 had been determined by the Engineer/Superintending Engineer. The Court held this authority inapplicable to the facts of the present case and rejected the submission based on it.
Bharat Furnishing Co. v. DDA, 1991 (4) Delhi Lawyer 35 Cited by respondent in support of the same jurisdictional/contract interpretation argument as R.S. Rana. The Court found the authority not applicable to the circumstances of the case and did not rely on it.
Ishwar Singh & Sons v. DDA, 1994 II Apex Decision (Delhi) 477 Interpreted General Clause‑1 and held that where parties have contractually excluded claims for damages, arbitrator awarding damages would be misconducting the proceedings. The Court distinguished Ishwar Singh: in that case materials were to be supplied by respondent; in the present case the arbitrator did not award sums for materials not supplied by respondent but awarded damages for prolongation attributable to respondent. The Court held Ishwar Singh not controlling here.
Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, 1991 (2) AIR 180 Cited by respondent (no specific rule recited in text beyond general support for respondent's position). The Court stated this authority was of no help to the respondent's case and did not base its decision on it.
Kochar Constructions Co. v. Union of India, 1994 (1) ALR 269 Held that where claimant produced only internal cost charts without adequate corroboration, there was insufficient evidence to award compensation based on cost analysis. The Court accepted the legal principle but distinguished the facts: here the arbitrator relied on an objective published cost index and additional corroborative material, so Kochar did not assist the respondent.
G.K.N. Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd., (1976) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555 Principle that weight of evidence and inferences are matters for the arbitrator; courts should not routinely upset arbitral awards for perceived insufficiency of evidence. The Court cited this authority to emphasize judicial deference to the arbitrator's appraisal of evidence and to support refusal to disturb the award on evidentiary insufficiency grounds.
Continental Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1988) 3 SCC 82 : AIR 1988 SC 1166 Interpreted a clause prohibiting compensation in the absence of contractor's written claim to the Engineer-in-Charge within one month; established the arbitrator cannot ignore such a contractual precondition. The Court observed that no analogous clause existed in the present Agreement; therefore Continental Construction did not apply and did not invalidate the arbitrator's award here.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 : AIR 1987 SC 2316 Affirms that arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality and quantity of evidence; courts should not substitute their view of evidence for the arbitrator's. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the arbitrator's appraisal of evidence should be respected and his award not easily interfered with.
Hind Builders v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 338 : AIR 1990 SC 1340 Where contract terms are open to two plausible interpretations, arbitrators may adopt one and the Court should not interfere merely because it prefers the other interpretation. The Court used this authority to reinforce that the arbitrator's interpretation, made by an expert arbitrator, could not be set aside unless an error was apparent on the face of the award.
M/s Salwan Construction Co. v. Union of India, ILR 1977 (2) Delhi 748 Measure of damages where contractor continues work despite employer's breach: the loss of profit or increased expenses; damages recoverable for delay caused by employer even when extension of time granted. The Court cited this authority in support of the normal rule for computing damages and as supportive of awarding damages for increased expenses due to employer-caused delay.
International Engineering Consultancy v. Himachal Pradesh Mineral & Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd., 1992 (2) Delhi Lawyer 336 Cited by respondent regarding whether a particular letter amounted to a demand for interest (i.e., whether notice constituted a notice under interest law). The Court found this authority not particularly helpful; it noted the factual distinction (in that authority a letter was held not to be a demand) and relied instead on the arbitrator's factual finding that Ex.C-1, Ex.C-9 and Ex.C-44 were notices demanding interest.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a clause-by-clause and evidence-focused analysis. Key steps in the Court's reasoning were:

  1. Jurisdiction under Clause‑10C versus Clause‑2: The Court examined the textual scope of Clause‑10C (allowing variation if the price of materials or wages increases as a direct result of a fresh law/statutory rule) and Clause‑2 (making time of essence and enabling the Superintending Engineer to fix compensation for delay attributable to the contractor). The Court held these clauses address different contingencies: Clause‑10C deals with statutory-driven price/wage escalation, while Clause‑2 addresses delay attributable to the contractor. Because no notice of rescission or compensation had been given within the stipulated contract completion period (work started 25.5.79; completion date 24.5.80) and the contract was rescinded only on 1.9.84, the arbitrator was entitled to award sums under Clause‑10C for statutory increases.
  2. Evidence and admissions: For Claim No. 3 (wage rise), the arbitrator awarded Rs. 70,548.45 (petitioner had claimed Rs. 1.5 lakhs). The Court emphasized that the arbitrator relied on respondent's own statement/figures (Ex.R-30) and Ex.C-50 (a letter from the respondent's Executive Engineer to its Superintending Engineer indicating delay was not on account of the contractor and recommending payment). Given the respondent's admissions and the material before the arbitrator, the Court found no infirmity in the award for Claim No. 3.
  3. Claim No. 4 (price rise of bricks): The arbitrator's award of Rs. 9,287/- was similarly sustained because it was made on the basis of statutory notifications and the material before the arbitrator.
  4. Claim No. 7 (damages/overheads): The Court addressed respondent's contention that General Clause‑1 prohibited claims for extras or compensation arising from site non-availability or delay in supply of departmental materials. The Court parsed Clause‑1: it applies where "part of the site is not available" or there is "unavoidable delay in supply of materials stipulated by the Department." The Court observed that (a) the clause does not naturally extend to situations where the entire site is not made available after contract award and (b) the word "unavoidable" limits the clause's scope. Here, the arbitrator awarded damages for prolongation attributable to the respondent (non-availability of site, non-laying of conduit pipes by other divisions, short supply of materials, delayed payments, pending municipal decisions, etc.), relying on Ex.C-50 and other evidence. The Court accepted the arbitrator's quantitative methodology: three alternative methods were considered, and Ex.C-53 (index numbers of wholesale prices published by Government) was treated as reasonable and was used to compute damages after deducting costs of materials issued by the respondent.
  5. Sufficiency of evidence: The Court stressed deference to the arbitrator on evidentiary evaluation, citing G.K.N. Centrax and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar. It distinguished Kochar Constructions (where internal cost charts alone were inadequate) by noting that the arbitrator here relied on an objective published cost index and corroborative material, and that establishment records were verified by respondent's site staff. The arbitrator's award for overheads/establishment (Rs. 9,27,750/-) was supported by those records and was not objected to by the respondent during execution.
  6. Challenge based on prior invocation of Clause‑2 (letter dated 7.1.85): The Court found this letter to be of no consequence since it was issued after the stipulated completion date and the contract had been allowed to run until rescission on 1.9.84. Accordingly, the argument that Clause‑2 had ousted arbitrator's competence failed.
  7. Interest (Claim No. 8): The respondent argued the arbitrator's grant of pre-suit interest was not compliant with the Interest Act, 1978 (and Section 3). The Court observed that in the objections application the respondent had not specifically taken the ground under 'Ground-G' and, on the merits, the arbitrator found Ex.C-1 (21.1.83), Ex.C-9 and Ex.C-44 (both 30.3.82) to be notices demanding interest. The arbitrator awarded simple interest @ 12% p.a. from 22.10.83 to 26.10.88 (first arbitration hearing). The arbitrator did not award pendente lite interest, stating it was outside his jurisdiction under the then-prevailing law; the petitioner asked the Court to award pendente lite interest but the Court declined to do so.
  8. Reasoned award issue: The Court considered the allegation that the award was non-reasoned. It concluded that the arbitrator — an experienced engineer and former Additional Director-General (Works) of the C.P.W.D. — had provided cogent reasons, had considered relevant materials and indexes, and that the award was not vitiated for lack of reasoning. The Court reiterated that in matters of evidence and technical assessment (particularly when an expert arbitrator was chosen), awards should not be lightly interfered with and that alternate plausible interpretations do not justify setting aside an award.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Objections of the respondent are dismissed; the arbitral award is made rule of the Court.

Consequential orders and immediate implications:

  • A decree in terms of the award is passed.
  • The petitioner is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the decree until realisation.
  • The Court declined to grant pendente lite interest despite the arbitrator having not awarded it (the arbitrator had found such an award to be outside his jurisdiction under the law then prevailing).
  • The suit stands disposed of in accordance with the order.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasizes judicial deference to arbitrators, especially where parties selected an expert arbitrator and where the arbitrator's reasoning is supported by documentary material and objective indexes. The Court distinguished authorities relied upon by the respondent on factual and contractual differences and did not treat this decision as establishing new legal principles beyond applying existing authorities on deference to arbitral fact-finding and interpretation of contractual clauses. No new precedent was announced; the effect is primarily to enforce the specific award between these parties.

Award made rule of Court.
Show all summary ...

Mr. Vijender Jain, J.— This is an objection application filed on behalf of the respondent under Sections 30 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The award is in relation to an Agreement entered into between the petitioner and the respondent-DDA for construction of 88 L.I.G and 144 M.I.G houses at Shalimar Bagh, New Delhi. The estimated cost of work was Rs. 1,01,84,875/-. Pursuant to Clause-25 of the Agreement Arbitrator was appointed, the award is dated 11.10.91 Ms. Ansuya Salwan, learned Counsel for the respondent-DDA, has argued that the award is a non-reasoned award and the Arbitrator has not given reasons for allowing certain claims of the petitioner, in alternative, she has argued that if this Court comes to a conclusion that reasons are given, the same are perverse. Assailing the award under claim Nos. 3 and 4, Ms. Salwan has argued that the Arbitrator cannot in law award any claim under Clause-10C of the Agreement as that would be squarely hit by Clause-2 of the Agreement. In the objections filed by the respondent the finding of the Arbitrator on this claim has been assailed staring inter alia that the bulk of flats had been completed during 1986 and the rectification of the defects was done upto January 1988 and the Arbitrator has failed to appreciate that if the defects had been got rectified by the respondent, respondent was entitled to claim for the amount spent by it for carrying out of the rectification of the defects and the Arbitrator has failed to consider the said materials and documents and, therefore, the award is vitiated. However, in ‘Ground—J’ of the objections application, the stand of the respondent on claim under Clause-10C of the Agreement is as under:—

“The a ward in any case is contrary to Clause-3 whereunder the decision of the Engineer-in-Charge that the petitioner failed to execute the work within the stipulated time is final and binding.”

2. Learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that the Superintending Engineer has determined compensation in terms of Clause-2 of the Agreement on account of work not done in the stipulated period of contract, the adjudication of compensation by Superintending Engineer, whose decision is final and binding, therefore. Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award any claim under Clause-10C of the Agreement. In support of her arguments, she has cited the case of R.S Rana v. DDA, 1993 (2) ALR 165 and Bharat Furnishing Co. v. DDA, 1991 (4) Delhi Lawyer 35. The submission urged before me by the learned Counsel for the respondent on the face of it is devoid of any force. Clause-10C specifically provides that if during the progress of work the price of any material incorporated in the works, and/or wages of labour increases as direct result of law coming into force of any fresh law, or statutory rule or order shall accordingly be varied. The only exception is that if in the opinion of Superintending Engineer (whose decision shall be final and binding) delay in the execution of the contract is attributable to the contractor or within the control of the contractor. Whereas, Clause-2 provides that the time allowed for carrying out the work shall be strictly observed by the contractor and shall be deemed to be essence of the contract and if the same is not done with due diligence the contractor shall be entitled to pay compensation as fixed by Superintending Engineer, DDA.

3. In the matter before me 25.5.79 was the starting date of the work and the stipulated date of completion was 24.5.80 No notice of rescission of the contract was given after stipulated date of completion of work nor any compensation on account of delay attributable to the contractor was levied during the period in which work was stipulated to be completed. The contract was rescinded by the respondent only on 1.9.84 Therefore, in the absence of anything on record, the Arbitrator was right in holding that the respondent is under obligation in terms of Clause-10C of the Agreement to pay a sum of Rs. 70.548.45 paise to the petitioner towards rise in wages of labour which has come into force by virtue of a statutory notification. The claim by the petitioner in this regard was for 1.5 lakhs and the Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 70,548.45 paise on the basis of evidence, material and record before him as it reflected in the paragraph of the award under challenge. The learned Arbitrator has awarded the said sum as the respondent-DDA itself had stated that the amount, which would be payable to the contractor, would work out to Rs. 70,548.45 paise as per details given in ‘Ex.R-30’. Further more the Arbitrator relying upon ‘Ex.C-50’ dated 24.2.83 addressed by the Executive Engineer of the respondent to the Superintending Engineer of the respondent in which it had been stated that delay was not on account of the contractor and had further recommended for payment of increase rate in terms of Clause-IOC of the Agreement. In view of the admission of the respondent, I see no infirmity with the award in relation to Claim No. 3 in favour of the petitioner. The authorities cited before me by learned Counsel for the respondent are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

4. On the basis of above reasoning the Arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs. 9,287/- under Claim No. 4 which was a claim for an amount of Rs. 25,000/- under Clause-10C of the Agreement on account of rise in price of bricks which has come into force from time to time by virtue of statutory notification. For the reasons stated above the award of a sum of Rs. 9,287/- by the Arbitrator is valid and there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the Arbitrator regarding this claim.

5. The main thrust of the argument advanced by Ms. Salwan is against award of Claim No. 7 by the Arbitrator in favour of the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the respondent has assailed the award of the Arbitrator on the ground that in terms of Clause-25 of the Agreement, the award is an unreasoned award. Another arguments advanced by the learned Counsel is that in view of the provisions of clause-1 of general clause under specifications and conditions, the Arbitrator had misconducted the proceedings by awarding claim on account of damages and thereby the Arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings. The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the Arbitrator has ignored the clauses of the Agreement and relied on the exhibits which according to learned Counsel for the respondent constitute misconduct. Let us deal with the arguments pertaining to specifications and conditions, General Clause-1 of the Agreement is as follows:—

“The contractor must get acquainted with the proposed site for the works and study specifications and conditions carefully before tendering. The work shall be executed as per programme approved by the Engineer-in-charge. If part of the site is not available for any reason or these is some unavoidable delay in supply of materials stipulated by the Departments, the programme of construction shall be modified accordingly and the contractor shall have no claim for any extras or compensation on this account.”

(Emphasis supplied)

6. The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that if the site was not available or there was some delay in supply of materials stipulated by the Department the contractor shall have no claim for extras or compensation on this account. She has argued that most of the damages which has been awarded by the Arbitrator is in relation to delay in handing over the site or delay in supply of the materials and in view of the General Clause-1, Arbitrator had given the award which is not in consonance with the terms of the Agreement. She has cited in support of this argument a decision of this Court in Ishwar Singh & Sons v. DDA, 1994 II Apex Decision (Delhi) 477. This Court while interpreting Clause-1 of the General Clauses of specifications and conditions was dealing with a matter where materials, admittedly, were to be supplied by the respondent whereas in the present case before me the Arbitrator has not awarded any sum on account of materials not supplied by the respondent. The Arbitrator has awarded damages on account of damages suffered by the petitioner on account of non-completion of the project as the delay was attributed to the respondent. What has been observed in Ishwar Singh's case (supra) is that once the parties have agreed to a specific clause in the contract that they will not claim any damages and if damages are awarded by the Arbitrator then the Arbitrator would be misconducting the proceedings and award made, if any, would be without jurisdiction. The sum awarded under this head is on account of the fact that duration of the work was prolonged because of non-fulfilment of the obligation on the part of the respondent. The learned Arbitrator has taken into account ‘Ex.C-50’ which is a letter written by the Executive Engineer of the respondent to its Superintending Engineer inter alia mentioning the reasons for delay not attributable to the contractor rather the admitted reasons of delay were non-availability of site, non-laying of conduit pipes in RCC roofs by the electrical division, short supply of materials, short/non-release of payment when due, timely decisions not given, certain decisions pending with Municipal Authorities etc. and after holding that the adequate evidence has been placed on record that the delay is most attributable to the respondent, the Arbitrator awarded compensation/damages as permissible under Section 73 of the Contract Act.

7. Learned Counsel for the respondent has also cited the case of Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, 1991 (2) AIR 180. I do not see that this authority is of any help to the case of the respondent. Reverting back to Clause-1 of the General Clauses of specifications and conditions, it would be seen that the contractor is precluded to have any claim for extras or compensation if part of the site is not available and there is some unavoidable delay in supply of materials. To come within the purview of Clause-1 of General Clauses of specifications and conditions, two things have to be specified. First, part of the site is not available that is to say that some part of the site could not be made available on account of certain factors. But can this stipulation be stretched in a case where Agreement is executed, work awarded, but the site where the work has to be executed is not made available and in view of the aforesaid clause latter in the day respondent can turn round taking recourse to aforesaid Clause-1, and say that the contractor cannot be awarded any compensation even though he might have incurred expenditure on mobilisation of man materials and resources. Court cannot give a loose interpretation which is not intended by the terms of the Agreement between the parties. Secondly, with regard to non-supply of materials the words occurring in the Clause is not ‘delay in supply of materials’ but ‘unavoidable delay’. The use of word ‘unavoidable’ before ‘delay’ is not without meaning. However, in this case the damages which have been a warded by the learned Arbitrator is not in relation to the materials which was to be supplied by the respondent but with regard to the materials which the contractor had to purchase at a higher rate on account of escalation in prices because of extension of stipulated period of contract on account of non-performance of the obligation on the part of the respondent. The Arbitrator has specifically dealt with this aspect of the matter in the following manner:—

“The amount has been worked out in this method by taking into consideration the quantum of work executed in a particular period interval and applying percentage increase on the basis of index number after deducting the cost of materials issued by the respondent.”(emphasis supplied)

8. Another argument which was advanced by learned Counsel for the respondent, that there was no sufficient evidence before the Arbitrator to show that the petitioner has suffered actual damages and Arbitrator has based his award only on the basis of cost index. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent this was a case of complete lack of evidence and insufficiency of evidence and therefore, the Arbitrator has erred in awarding damages to the petitioner which is apparent on the record of the case. In support of this argument Ms. Salwan has cited the case of Kochar Constructions Co. v. UOI, 1994 (1) ALR 269. I am afraid that this authority is not of much help to the respondent. I am in respectful agreement with the la w laid down by the Division Bench in Kochar Construction Co.'s case (supra). The Court held that there was no evidence led by the claimant except filing of the chart containing cost of analysis and on that basis the Court held that there was no sufficient evidence before the Arbitrator for awarding any compensation on account of cost analysis. There is marked difference in cost analysis given by a party and cost index published by State periodically basing on scientific data The Cost index. Even otherwise, I would like to mention what Lord Denning said about evaluating of evidence by the Arbitrator:—

“The weigh t of evidence and the inferences from it are essentially matters for the Arbitrator. I do not think that the award of Arbitrators should be challenged or upset on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence or that it was too tenuous or the like. One of the very reasons for going to arbitration is to get rid of technical rules of evidence and so forth…..Questions of evidence are essentially matters for the Arbitrator and not matters for the Court.” [G.K.N Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd., (1976) 2 Lloyod's Rep. 555(575)]

9. The respondent also relied on the case of Continental Construction Co. Ltd v. State Of Madhya Pradesh., (1988) 3 SCC 82 : AIR 1988 SC 1166. While interpreting Glause-3.3.15 specifically in the case of Continental Construction Co. (supra) which prohibited any compensation to the contractor in the absence of contractor having submitted the claim in writing to the Engineer-in-Charge within one month of the cause of such claim occurring. The Supreme Court held that Arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable. In the case before me there is no such clause of the Agreement which prohibits the award of compensation on account of delay attributable on the part of the respondent.

10. Mr. O.N Vohra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, had argued that the normal rule for computing damages for breach of contract is the difference between the contract price and market price of goods at the time when the contract is broken. To make good his proposition, he relied upon the case of M/S. Salwan Construction Co…Plaintiffs v. Union Of India…Defendant ILR 1977 (2) Delhi 748 in which it was held:—

“The builders' claim was that the Government was in breach of the contract. They were entitled to stop the work. Instead they went on with the work and did not treat it as a repudiation of the contract. The measure of damages is that loss of profit arising out of the reduced profitability or added expenses of the work carried out and completed by the builders. Where the contractor treats the breach as partial and continues the work, the most usual circumstances which give rise to claims are delay in giving the contractor possession of the site or in the supply of drawings, or suspension of the work caused by some act or omission of the employer and a consequent increase of expenses in the performance of the works; and the contractor may be able to recover damages for delay caused by the employer, notwithstanding that an extension of time for completion has been granted in respect of such delay.”

11. The contention raised by the respondent regarding sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence, therefore, cannot hold good. The Arbitrator in his award has given detailed reasons. The Arbitrator was a former Additional Director-General (Works) of the C.P.W.D and an engineer himself. He has also taken into consideration the quantification of the claims which has been given by the claimant in ‘Ex.C-30 to C-36’ and ‘C-53 and C-54’ and after taking into consideration the three alternative methods adopted for working out the price increase, method adopted in ‘Ex.C-53’ based upon index numbers of whole-sale prices published by the Ministry of Industry, Udyog Mantrayala, Government of India was considered to be reasonable by the respondent during the proceedings (emphasis supplied) and the damages were worked out on the basis of quantum of work executed after the expiry of stipulated period of contract only. Whatever materials which were issued by the respondent due credit for the same was given, proper indexes were made for arriving at damages. Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 : AIR 1987 SC 2316, held:—

“In this case, there was no violation of any principles of natural justice. It is not a case where the Arbitrator has refused cogent and material factors to be taken into consideration. The award cannot be said to be vitiated by non-reception of material or non-consideration of the relevant aspects of the matter. Appraisement of evidence by the Arbitrator is ordinarily never a matter which the Court questions and considers. The parties have selected their own forum and the deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of the evidence. In the instant case, there was no evidence of violation of any principle of natural justice. The Arbitrator in our opinion is the sole Judge of the quality as well as quantity of evidence and it will not be for this Court to take upon itself the task of being a Judge of the evidence before the Arbitrator. It may be possible that on the same evidence the Court might have arrived at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the Arbitrator but that by itself is no ground in our view for setting aside the award of an Arbitrator.”

12. In the present case, the Arbitrator, who was chosen a person who, was presumably, an expert or well-versed in civil engineering. The Arbitrator was selected by the agreement of the parties and the selection of a Chief Engineer shows that the parties wanted to appoint a person who was an expert in the line. An award made by such a person should not, therefore, be lightly interefered with. I am also supported in my view by Hind Builders v. Union Of India., (1990) 3 SCC 338 : AIR 1990 SC 1340 in which Supreme Court held as under:—

“This may be right or wrong but this is also a plausible view. Unfortunately, this was an aspect not urged before, or considered by, the Arbitrators. There was no evidence before the Arbitrators or material adduced before the Court as to the nature of these operations. It is difficult to say, by merely reading the terms of contract that the Arbitrators have erroneously interpreted the terms of the contract. It is not without significance that the departmental officers did not dispute the rate of the claim. Equally, the Arbitrators were experienced engineers and would not have passed, what is now said to be, an astounding claim without thought. It is difficult to assume that all these persons have overlooked that the contractor had already been paid at Rs. 18 under item 4.09(a) especially when it is so stated on the face of the claim. This, therefore, is not a case where the Arbitrators can be said to have ignored or overlooked a term of the contract; on the contrary, they have acted upon a particular interpretation of certain clauses of the contract on which two views are possible. This case certainly cannot be brought under the principle that the Arbitrators have ex facie exceeded the authority or jurisdiction conferred on them by the contract. At worst, what can be said is that they may have committed an error in deciding the issue referred to them but the error is not apparent on the face of the award even if the contract is read as part of it both because the Arbitrators have not given their reasoning and because the view taken by them of the relevant terms of the contract cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. In a matter on which the contract is open to two equally plausible interpretations, it is legitimate for the Arbitrators to accept one or the other of the available interpretations and, even if the Court may think that the other view is preferable, the Court will not and should not interfere.”

13. In the case before me under the same Claim No. 7, the Arbitrator has a warded damages as the overhead expenses incurred on account of establishment for the execution of work during the prolonged period of execution amounted to Rs. 9,27,750/-. The award of a sum of 9,27,750/- on this account was also assailed by the respondent. The finding of the Arbitrator on this count is as follows:—

“The record of Establishment employed by the contractor during this period which has been duly verified by the site staff of the respondents is considered as adequate evidence in support of the expenses incurred by the claimants. The total amount spent on establishment as per records works out to Rs. 9.27.750/- which was not objected to by the respondent at any stage during the execution of the work.”(Emphasis supplied)

14. Ms. Salwan has argued that the respondent has given notice under Clause-2 of the Agreement to the petitioner on 7.1.85 and once Clause-2 of the Agreement had been invoked, the Arbitrator was not competent to grant damages. I must at the threshold repel the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent. Letter dated 7.1.85 is of no significance. As has been observed by me earlier that the stipulated date of completion of work was 24.5.80 The petitioner was allowed to work upto 1.9.84 when the respondent rescinded the contract, therefore, any letter issued after the stipulated period of work is of no consequence. Even otherwise it has been urged before me by Mr. Vohra that apart from the cost index filed by the petitioner before the Arbitrator, there were other materials before the Arbitrator, two other contractors were awarded the work by the respondent during the relevant period at the rate of 68% and 66% higher rate on the estimated cost of tender whereas in the case of the petitioner, he was only awarded 30% higher rate at the estimated cost of tender. Therefore, the Arbitrator had sufficient materials and evidence before him to arrive at a finding to award damages under Clause-7 of the Agreement in favour of the petitioner.

15. In view of discussions above, the objection of the respondent regarding Claim No. 7 is devoid of any force and the same is dismissed.

16. Next objection raised by the respondent is in relation to Claim No. 8. It has been urged before me that grant of pre-suit interest by the Arbitrator is not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Interest Act, 1978. However, in ‘Ground-G’ of the objections application filed by the respondent, this objection has not been taken. The objection taken is that the Arbitrator has not given any basis or reasons as to why interest is being awarded much less at the rate at which the Arbitrator has allowed the sum and the award in respect thereto is without jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that no notice in terms of Section 3 of the Interest Act was given by the petitioner and in alternative she has argued that ‘Ex.C-1’ dated 2.1.83 is no notice in terms of The Interest Act. She had also relied upon the case of International Engineering Consultancy v. Himachal Pradesh Mineral and Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd., 1992 (2) Delhi Lawyer 336. I am afraid that the authority cited before me is not of much help to the respondent as while interpreting the letter dated 13.11.79 the learned Single Judge of this Court, which according to the claimant was one of demand of interest, held that it was not a letter demanding interest as no demand of interest was made in the said letter. In the case before me there is clear finding of the fact recorded by the Arbitrator regarding ‘Ex.C-1’ dated 21.1.83, Ex. C-9 and C-44’ both dated 30.3.82 treating these letters as notices to the respondent demanding interest. On the basis of materials, documents, records and evidence before the Arbitrator, he held that simple interest @ 12% p.a payable to the claimant with effect from 22.10.83 upto the date of first hearing of arbitration proceedings i.e 26.10.88 The Arbitrator did not allow the pendente lite interest as he has stated in the award that it was outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator under the then prevalent law. However, Mr. Vohra prayed that at the time of arguments in view of the latter decision of the Supreme Court, Arbitrator had the power to award pendente lite interest, this Court may award pendente lite interest in favour of the petitioner. As the Arbitrator has not awarded the pendente lite interest may be on account of the law prevalent at the time, I am not inclined to award pendente lite interest in favour of the petitioner.

17. No other argument has been raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent regarding other claims and counter-claims. Even otherwise, as I have stated earlier the award is a reasoned award and the reasons given by the Arbitrator are cogent and based on the materials on record. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the work “reasonable”.

“Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncarasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks.”

In Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (supra) the supreme Court held:—

“But mankind must be satisfied with with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the verdict of a jury or the decision of a Judge sitting as a jury usually determines what is “reasonable” in each particular case. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know.”

18. In view of the above discussions, I dismiss the objections application of the respondent.

S. 3470 of 1991

19. The objections application of the respondent has been dismissed vide my above order. Therefore, the award is made rule of the Court. A decree in terms of the award is passed. Petitioner will be entitled to interest @ 12% p.a from the date of decree till its realisation.

20. Suit stands disposed of accordingly.

Award made rule of Court.