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Rajdeo Singh v. The Chief Engineer, U.P Jal Nigam, Lucknow And Others
Structured Summary of Opinion: Dr. B. S. Chanhan, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a work-charge employee of the Ganga Pardushan Unit, U. P. Jal Nigam, Deenapur, Varanasi, designated as Work Agent and paid a consolidated monthly salary. The petitioner was transferred from Varanasi to Azamgarh in the public interest because the staff at Varanasi had become surplus. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 10-8-1995 requesting recall of the transfer on the ground that a mid-academic-session transfer would adversely affect the education of his children. The respondents did not dispose of that representation and the petitioner challenged the transfer order dated 30-8-1995 by filing the present writ petition.
This Court initially allowed the writ petition by order dated 22-11-1995, directing disposal of the representation by a speaking order within one month and restraining implementation of the transfer order until 30-6-1996, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Director of School Education Madras v. O. Karuppa Thevan (1994 (Supp) 2 SCC 666) regarding mid-academic transfers. The respondents preferred a Special Appeal against that order; the Special Appeal set aside the judgment and directed the matter to be decided afresh. The present hearing occurred after exchange of affidavits and with counsel consent the petition was finally heard and disposed of.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a mid-academic-session transfer of the petitioner should be set aside on the ground that it would adversely affect the education of his children.
- Whether a Class IV / work-charge employee has a right to remain posted within a particular district or can be transferred outside the district.
- Whether the transfer was invalid because (a) the workforce at Varanasi was not surplus or (b) juniors should have been transferred instead of the petitioner.
- Whether the transfer order was vitiated by mala fides on the part of the respondents.
- Whether relative hardship to the petitioner arising from the transfer justifies judicial interference.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The transfer was ordered in the middle of an academic session and would adversely affect the education of his children.
- Being a Class IV employee, he could not have been transferred outside the district.
- The workforce in Varanasi was not surplus; 12 other contract employees who were junior to the petitioner continued to work there, so juniors should have been moved instead.
- The transfer was motivated by malice on the part of the respondents.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents denied the allegations; they contended the staff at Varanasi had become surplus and, after considering relevant factors, the petitioner was transferred (to his home district).
- The petitioner's representation about mid-academic hardship was vague and did not disclose particulars such as the ages and classes of his children; such vagueness did not oblige the employer to avoid the transfer.
- The principle of 'first come-last go' applies to retrenchment, not to transfers; juniors need not be transferred in preference to the petitioner.
- A work-charge (Class IV) employee has no vested right to remain posted at one place; transfer is an administrative decision of the employer.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Director of School Education Madras v. O. Karuppa Thevan, 1994 (Supp) 2 SCC 666 | Mid-academic-session transfers should be given "due weight" and avoided if they would affect children's education; does not confer a right but requires employer to consider the factor. | The Court noted this authority was relied on in an earlier order; observed that the precedent directs employers to give due weight but does not confer a substantive right on the employee. |
| Union of India v. S. L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 | Supports the proposition that transfer is an administrative incident of service and employees have no vested right to remain posted at a particular place. | Cited to support that a work-charge employee has no vested right to remain at one place and employer may decide transfers. |
| Shilpi Base v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 532 | General principle that transfer is an incident of service and courts should not interfere with administrative transfers except in limited circumstances. | Used alongside other authorities to uphold the principle that transfers are administrative and not ordinarily subject to judicial interference. |
| V. O. I. v. N. P. Thomas, AIR 1991 SC 1605 | Transfers are part of service conditions; limited judicial review. | Relied upon to show petitioner had no vested right and transfer decisions rest with administration. |
| Chief General Manager (Tel.) N. E. Telecom Circle v. Rajender Ch. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1995 SC 813 | Transfer decisions fall within administrative domain and are not to be lightly interfered with by courts. | Adduced to support refusal to interfere with the transfer of a work-charge employee. |
| Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram Sugomal Poshani, 1989 (2) SCC 602 | Transfer is an incident of service; no legal right to be posted at any particular place; transfers may be necessary in public interest and for administrative efficiency. | Quoted and applied to reinforce the principle that transfer does not affect legal rights and is normally immune from judicial interference. |
| Union of India v. H. N. Kirtania, 1989 (3) SCC 445 | Transfers made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer illegal or mala fide. | Quoted to justify non-interference absent strong grounds of illegality or mala fides. |
| Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1977 (2) SCR 198 | High Court may refuse to investigate allegations of mala fides if necessary particulars making out a prima facie case are not given; burden of proof on the person alleging mala fides. | Applied to hold that vague allegations of mala fides without particulars do not warrant judicial investigation. |
| E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 (2) SCR 348 | Allegations of mala fides carry a heavy burden of proof and courts should be slow to draw adverse inferences from incomplete facts. | Relied upon to caution against drawing inferences of mala fides from incomplete or unsubstantiated allegations. |
| M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1982 (1) SCC 31 | Court may refuse to investigate mala fides where necessary particulars are not supplied; burden on applicants to establish bad faith. | Quoted to support the proposition that petitioners must establish bad faith with adequate particulars. |
| Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi v. Shivajirao Nilangerkar Patil, 1987 (1) SCC 228 | Courts must scrutinize allegations of mala fides carefully to avoid being influenced by unfounded charges made merely to cause prejudice. | Used to justify careful scrutiny and to decline to act on allegations lacking basis in fact. |
| M. Sankarnarayana, I.A.S. v. State of Karnataka, 1993 (1) SCC 54 | Inference of mala fide may be drawn only on a factual matrix; such inference cannot rest on insinuation, surmise or conjecture. | Cited to require that any inference of mala fides be grounded in established facts rather than conjecture. |
| N. K. Singh v. Union of India, 1994 (6) SCC 98 | Inference of mala fides must be drawn from attendant circumstances; judicial review of transfers is limited and intervention is warranted only where decision is vitiated by mala fides or violation of norms. | Applied to emphasize limited scope of judicial review in transfer matters and to reject petitioner’s claims absent such vitiation. |
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. S. S. Kaurav, AIR 1995 SC 1056 | Courts should not adjudicate relative hardship; administrative machinery should mitigate hardship in service of efficient administration. | Cited to support the position that relative hardship is not ordinarily a ground for judicial interference and that administration should consider mitigation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a sequence of factual and legal considerations explicitly stated in the opinion:
- Initial sufficiency and timing of the petitioner's representation: The representation of 10-8-1995 cited mid-academic transfer affecting children's education but did not disclose ages or classes of the children. The Court regarded that omission as rendering the representation vague and "unsatisfactory," such that it could not compel the employer to avoid the transfer.
- Subsequent disclosure of particulars: A rejoinder-affidavit filed on 7-1-1996 revealed that the petitioner's son was studying in 1st Standard and his daughter was admitted in Lower Kinder-Garden in 1995. The Court nonetheless considered that the petitioner failed to furnish necessary particulars to his employer at the time of representation and that this failure weighed against exercising extraordinary jurisdiction.
- Surplus workforce and seniority argument: The Court accepted respondents' counter-affidavit statement that the staff at Varanasi had become surplus and that the transfer resulted from consideration of relevant factors. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that junior staff should have been transferred instead, noting that the 'first come-last go' principle applies to retrenchment and not to transfers.
- Vested right to remain posted and administrative prerogative: Relying on multiple Supreme Court authorities, the Court reiterated that a person holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain at a particular place and that transfer is an administrative incident of service; thus, courts should not ordinarily interfere with transfers made in public interest or administrative exigency.
- Allegations of mala fides: The Court applied the settled rule that the burden of establishing mala fides is heavy and that courts will refuse to investigate such allegations absent necessary particulars making out a prima facie case. Having found the petitioner's allegations vague and unsubstantiated, the Court declined to infer mala fides.
- Hardship argument: The Court relied on authority that courts should not ordinarily adjudicate relative hardship and that administrative authorities are responsible for mitigating hardship. Given the petitioner's vague representation, the Court held that the mere claim of hardship did not warrant intervention.
- Conclusion from combined reasoning: On the cumulation of these considerations — inadequate particulars about the children's education, acceptance of respondents' account of surplus staff, absence of proof of mala fides, and insufficiency of hardship grounds — the Court concluded there was no legal basis to interfere with the transfer order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is dismissed. (Petition dismissed.)
Direct consequences and implications:
- The Court refused to quash or restrain the transfer order based on the grounds advanced by the petitioner.
- The petitioner's allegations of mala fides and hardship were held to be inadequately pleaded and unsupported by material sufficient to attract judicial interference.
- There shall be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.
The opinion does not announce any new legal principle; it applies established Supreme Court authorities to the facts and declines to set aside the administrative transfer.
Dr. B. S. Chanhan, J.-
The petitioner in the instant petition has challenged the transfer order dated 30-8-1995 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). The petitioner is a work-charge employee of the Ganga Pardushan Unit, U. P. Jal Nigam Deenapur, Varanasi and designated as Work Agent and gets a consolidated monthly salary, Petitioner was transferred from Varanasi to Azamgarh in the public interest as the staff at Varanasi had become surplus. Being aggrieved petitioner moved a representation (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) before respondent No. 1 on 10-8-1995 that his transfer order be recalled as the transfer in the mid academic session would adversely affect the education of his children. The respondents did not consider the said representation and thus said transfer order was challenged by the instant writ petition. This Court vide its order dated 22-11-1995 allowed the writ petition directing the respondent to dispose of the said representation by means of speaking order within a period of one month by issuing a further direction that the transfer order dated 20-8-1995 shall not be given effect to till 30-6-1996 as the reliance had been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Director of School Education Madras v. O. Karuppa Thevan, 1994 (Supp) 2 SCC 666, in whfch the mid academic sessions transfer has been depricated.
2. Being aggrieved, respondents preferred Special Appeal against the Judgment and order dated 22-11-1995, wherein the said judgment and order were set aside and direction was issued to decide the case afresh.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As the case relates to transfer of an employee and affidavits have been exchanged, with the consent of the counsels the petition is heard and disposed of finally. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the said transfer order mainly of the following grounds :-
(a) Transfer order would affect the education of his children as the order has been passed in mid-academic session ;
(b) the petitioner being a Class IV employee could not have been transferred outside the District ;
(c) the work force in Varanasi was not surplus, as 12 other persons were working there on contract basis, who were Junior to petitioner ; and
(d) the transfer order was passed as the respondents were having malice against the petitioner.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents denied all the allegations. In the representation dated 10-8-1995 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition), petitioner has mentioned that mid academic session transfer would adversely affect the education of his children, though there is no whisper regarding the ages and classes of the children, in which they were studying. Such a vague and unsatisfactory demand would and must not force the employer to consider the representation made by an employee. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of O. Karuppa Thevan (supra), does not confer any right upon an employee but merely directs the employer to give "due weight" to the fact and consider as to whether the transfer in the mid-academic session can be avoided, if it was going to affect the education of the children. The Apex Court observed as under :-
"Although, there is no rule, we are of the view that in affecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent".
5. In the instant case petitioner's representation, as stated above, does not disclose any particulars about the education of his children. In rejoinder-affidavit, filed before this Court first time on 7-1-1996, it has been disclosed that son of the petitioner was studying in 1st Standard and the daughter was admitted in Lower Kinder-Garden in 1995 (Annexure R-A-1 to the writ petition).
6. No doubt, there is an awakening in the society to give best possible education to the children but again the question does arise as to whether this Court must exercise its extra-ordinary discretionary jurisdiction in favour of a person, who did not even think it desirable to place his grievances before his employer with full particulars. I am of the considered opinion that such circumstances do not warrant any interference by this Court.
7. In has further been argued on behalf of the petitioner that there was no surplus work force in Varanasi, and even if it was so, there were transferred as they were juniors to the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit, it has been specifically mentioned that the staff had become surplus at Varanasi and after considering all the relevant factors, he was transferred to his home District. Petitioner cannot claim that his juniors should have been transferred as the principle of 'first come-last go' applies in the case of retrenchment and not in the case of transfer.
8. There is also no force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that a Class IV employee cannot be transferred outside the district. The petitioner is a work-charge employee and has no vested right to remain posted at one particular place. It is entirely upto the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. [Union of India v. S. L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 ; Shilpi Base v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 532 ; V. O. I. v. N. P. Thomas, AIR 1991 SC 1605 and Chief General Manager (Tel.) N. E. Telecome Circle v. Rajender Ch. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1995 SC 813]
9. The law on transfer has been settled by the Apex Court in a catina of judgments. A person holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work on a particular place as the transfer order does not affect any of his legal rights and Court cannot interfere with a transfer order passed in public interest or administrative exigency. In the case of Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram Sugomal Poshani, 1989 (2) SCC 602, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under :
"Transfer of a Government Servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the other is an incident of service. No Government servant of employee of Public Undertaking has legal right for being posted at 0ny particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter, Transfer from(one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration".
10. Similarly in the case of Union of India v. H. N. Kirtania, 1989 (3) SCC 445 the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under :
"Transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on ground of mala fide".
11. In the case of Tar a Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1977 (2) SCR 198, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :
"It has been held time and again by this Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. Keeping in view the well established rule that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations made by the appellant in regard thereto, we do not think that they could be considered as sufficient to establish malus animus".
12. Similarly in the case of E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 (2) SCR 348, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made that proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extra-ordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to act which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may land themselves to mis-constructions and suspicion as to the bona fide of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and other, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set-u-.^.... these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach.. .but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become? difficult in a democracy".
13. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1982 (1) SCC 31 (Para 12) was pleased to observe as under:
"The court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition. The burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned order of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias of misuse by the Government of its powers".
14. In the case of Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi v. Shivajirao Nilangerkar Patil, 1987 (1) SCC 228, the Supreme Court has observed as under :
"That it was somewhat unfortunate that allegations of mala fide which could have no foundation in fact were made and several cases which, had come up before this Court and other courts and it had been found that these were made merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether they have basis in fact or not some of which might at least stick. It is therefore the duty of the Courts, warned this Court in the said decision, to scrutinize these allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them in cases where they have no foundation in fact......Therefore, while the court should be conscious to deal with the allegations of mala fide or cast aspersions on holders of high office and power, the court cannot ignore the probabilities arising from proven circumstances".
15. In the case of M. Sankarnarayana, I. A. S. v. State of Karnataka, 1993 (1) SCC 54, the Supreme Court observed as under :
"It may be permissible in an appropriate case to draw reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of insinuation, surmise or conjecture".
In the case of N. K. Singh v. Union of India, 1994 (6) SCC 98, the Supreme Court has held as under :
"The inference of mala fides should be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into account the attendant circumstances......No other suspicious circumstance is made out to permit the contrary inference. No rowing inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of Judicial review of a transfer scrutinised with reference to the private rights of an individual........unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised judicially, transfers and the manageable standards for scrutinising all there are no judicially Courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all Government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to be limited judicial scruitiny indicated"
16. In view of the above, the petitioner in the instant petition has not made any firm foundation for alleging that his transfer is contrary to any statutory provision or has been actuated by any malice. Vague and mellow allegations of mala fides without material to substantiate the same do not warrant this Court to interfere.
17. In the last, it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that if the petitioner is transferred he would suffer great hardship. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. S. S. Kaurav AIR 1995 SC 1056 : 1995 (1) LBESR 669 (SC), the Apex Court has held that it is not permissible for the Court to go into the relative hardship. It is for the administration to consider the facts of a given case and mitigate the real hardship in the interest of good and efficient administration. In the instant case the petitioner has already made a representation though as stated above is totally vague and the petitioner has not furnished sufficient material to the respondents in respect of the said representation which may compel the respondents to take a contrary view and cancel the transfer order.
18. In view of the above, the petition lacks merit, whatsoever, and is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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