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Sanjay Kumar Mahajan v. State Of Bihar

Patna High Court
Apr 20, 2010
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two appeals heard together because of the commonality of controversy. L.P.A. 525 of 2010 was preferred by Sanjay Kumar Mahajan, who was the 12th respondent in Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 7540 of 2009 filed by Jai Muni Devi (then Chief Councillor of Sitamarhi Nagar Parishad). L.P.A. No. 670 of 2010 was preferred by Md. Jalaluddin Khan, who obtained leave to appeal after the post of Chief Councillor fell vacant as a result of a successful vote of no-confidence against Jai Muni Devi.

Jai Muni Devi had been elected Chief Councillor by the elected Councillors under the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. A no-confidence motion under Section 25 of the Act was put to vote on 18.7.2009, and on that date the Chief Councillor was removed. The removal created a vacancy and the State Election Commissioner held an election on 4.8.2009 to fill the post. While Jai Muni Devi challenged the manner of mooting and finalising the no-confidence motion in C.W.J.C No. 7540 of 2009, she nonetheless participated in the consequential election and lost; Md. Jalaluddin Khan was elected Chief Councillor.

The learned Single Judge annulled the no-confidence motion (relying on a precedent that circulars have no authority of law) and allowed Jai Muni Devi's writ petition, observing that replacement of the no-confidence motion could not prevent a fresh motion being brought under the relevant provisions and rules. Jalaluddin Khan challenged the Single Judge's order by way of appeal (leave having been granted), and Sanjay Kumar Mahajan also preferred an appeal. The present Court heard counsel for appellants, contesting respondents and the State and ultimately allowed the appeals, setting aside the Single Judge's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the learned Single Judge annulling the no-confidence motion (in part on the basis that circulars have no authority of law) was legally sustainable.
  2. Whether the doctrine of waiver (or acquiescence) applies where the removed Chief Councillor participated unconditionally in the subsequent election and, having lost, sought to challenge the earlier removal — i.e., can the erstwhile Chief Councillor be allowed to continue after losing the election if she had willingly contested the election?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the writ petitioner (erstwhile Chief Councillor) by participating in the election after the no-confidence removal invoked the doctrine of waiver — her unconditional participation meant she waived her right to challenge the removal and could not now be reinstated.
  • It was argued that re-opening the legality of the removal after a full public election where the petitioner had contested and lost would destroy the basic interest of democracy and send an improper message: the loser of the election should not be restored by judicial intervention.
  • Counsel commended decisions such as Sanjay Singh Som, Nirmala Singh and Smt. Shamshad Khatun as authorities supporting the waiver/acquiescence principle in similar factual matrices.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the respondents supported the Single Judge's order annulling the no-confidence motion on the ground that the motion was not held in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act, and thus quashing it was justified.
  • It was contended that, as a consequence, the erstwhile Chief Councillor retains her post and her participation in the election would not bar her continuance.
  • Counsel urged that, given conditions at the grass-roots level (including alleged illiteracy and nascent democracy), the Court should adopt a lenient view; Brij Nandan Sharma was cited in support of such an approach.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pawan Kumar Purvey v. The State or Bihar, 2010 (1) P.L.J.R 272 Held that circulars have no authority of law; actions taken under such circulars are invalid. The learned Single Judge relied upon this decision to annul the no-confidence motion. The present Court noted that annulment but did not rest its decision solely upon that reasoning because it proceeded on the doctrine of waiver invoked by the appellants.
Nirmala Singh v. State of Bihar, 2006 (1) P.L.J.R 129 Addressed consequences of participation after a challenged removal; discussed waiver/acquiescence where petitioners participated in subsequent proceedings. Referenced both as the basis for leave being granted to one appellant and as authority illustrating that participation in subsequent proceedings can preclude later challenge. The Court relied upon its reasoning in applying waiver principles.
Sanjay Singh Som v. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2002 (3) P.L.J.R 589 Holds that unconditional participation in an election after a disputed removal may amount to waiver; a defeated participant may not later challenge the earlier removal. The Court quoted and treated this decision as squarely covering the present case and central to its conclusion that waiver applies where the removed Chief Councillor contested and lost the election.
Smt. Shamshad Khatun v. The State of Bihar, 2010 (1) P.L.J.R 929 (Division Bench) Explored concepts of acquiescence and waiver; referred to a body of authorities on waiver/acquiescence in the context of votes of no confidence and participation. The Court invoked the principles of waiver as laid down in Shamshad Khatun, holding that those principles "come into full play" in the present facts and support denial of relief to the writ petitioner.
Brij Nandan Sharma v. The State of Bihar, 2004 (2) PLJR 244 Discussed interpretation of statutory provisions concerning voting/majority and cautioned about interference where quashing would revive an illegal order; also addressed whether superior courts should exercise writ jurisdiction in similar circumstances. Counsel for respondents relied on this decision for a lenient approach; the Court observed that the factual matrix here was materially different and distinguished Brij Nandan Sharma from the present case.
The United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230 Constitution Bench decision under the Industrial Disputes Act (cited by earlier counsel in another case). The Court noted that this authority arose under different legislation and facts and that an attempt to apply it to the present circumstances was inapplicable, consistent with the observation in an earlier reported passage.
Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70 One of the authorities dealing with acquiescence/waiver referenced in Shamshad Khatun. Identified as part of the body of authorities on waiver/acquiescence that were considered in Shamshad Khatun and relied upon for the general principle of waiver invoked by this Court.
Pulin Behari Lal v. Mahadeo Dutta, (1993) 1 SCC 629 Cited in Shamshad Khatun among authorities on waiver/acquiescence. Noted as part of the jurisprudence on waiver; used collectively as antecedent authority supporting the waiver principle applied by this Court.
Bibi Amna Khatun v. Zahir Hussain, AIR 1981 Patna 1 : [1980 PLJR 208 (FB)] Included among decisions on acquiescence and waiver in Shamshad Khatun. Referred to as part of the array of authorities relied upon for the doctrine of waiver/acquiescence invoked by this Court.
Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre, (2004) 8 SCC 229 One of the Supreme Court authorities cited in Shamshad Khatun relating to waiver/acquiescence principles. Noted as contributing to the body of precedent establishing waiver/acquiescence, which this Court found applicable.
Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corpn., (2008) 12 SCC 401 Cited among authorities on waiver/acquiescence in municipal/administrative contexts. Considered as part of the jurisprudential background supporting the Court's application of waiver principles.
Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 5 Referenced in Shamshad Khatun as authority on acquiescence/waiver. Identified as part of the precedent-base endorsing waiver/acquiescence principles relied upon by the Court.
Krishna Lal v. State of J & K, (1994) 4 SCC 422 Listed in Shamshad Khatun among decisions addressing waiver/acquiescence. Referred to as one of the authorities in support of the waiver doctrine applied by this Court.
Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197 Classical authority cited in the chain of cases addressing waiver/acquiescence. Included among the precedents relied on in Shamshad Khatun and by this Court for the legal doctrine of acquiescence/waiver.
Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 54 IA 338 Cited in the historic line of authorities on waiver/acquiescence. Noted by the Court as part of the jurisprudential matrix underpinning the Court's view on waiver.
Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Shudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300 Included in the list of authorities on acquiescence/waiver. Recognised as supporting material in the chain of cases on waiver relied upon by the Court.
Lachoo Mai v. Radhey Shyam, (1971) 1 SCC 619 : AIR 1971 SC 2213 One of the Supreme Court authorities cited in Shamshad Khatun on waiver/acquiescence. Part of the collective authority invoked to support the application of the waiver doctrine in this case.
Smt. Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P., 2000 (4) M.P.H.T 69 (FB) Cited among the precedents in Shamshad Khatun concerning waiver/acquiescence. Referred to as further supporting authority in the jurisprudence on acquiescence/waiver adopted by the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court commenced by noting the twin questions it was initially required to consider: (a) the justifiability and legal substantiality of the learned Single Judge's order annulling the no-confidence motion (the Single Judge had relied upon the proposition that circulars have no authority of law), and (b) whether the doctrine of waiver is attracted in the circumstances where the removed Chief Councillor contested the subsequent election and lost.

The Court recorded the appellants' primary submission that the erstwhile Chief Councillor's participation in the election amounted to waiver of the challenge to the prior removal. The appellants argued that revisiting the legality of the removal after the petitioner had taken part in and lost the election would subvert democratic expectations and would in effect restore a candidate who had been defeated in a public electoral process.

The Court reviewed the authorities dealing with waiver and acquiescence in closely analogous contexts. It quoted at length the decision in Sanjay Singh Som which holds that a candidate who participates unconditionally in an election, with eyes open, and loses, may not thereafter be permitted to challenge the earlier resolution of removal. The Court also considered the exposition in Nirmala Singh and the Division Bench decision in Smt. Shamshad Khatun that collected and applied principles of waiver/acquiescence from numerous precedents.

The Court distinguished Brij Nandan Sharma on the ground that the facts in that case involved an incompetent authority setting aside a no-confidence motion in circumstances where the elected candidate had no role; in contrast, in the present case the removed Chief Councillor contested the election following removal and was defeated. The Court emphasised that had the petitioner refrained from contesting the subsequent election and awaited the outcome of her writ petition, the posture might have been different; by contesting she chose to take a chance.

Applying the cited precedents (particularly Sanjay Singh Som and the waiver principles in Shamshad Khatun), the Court concluded that the doctrine of waiver applies here. It reasoned that permitting reinstatement after the petitioner voluntarily contested and lost would produce a travesty of justice and send an improper message to the public. For these reasons the Court declined to uphold the Single Judge's order annulling the no-confidence motion as a basis for reinstatement.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Single Judge's annulment of the no-confidence motion (as a ground to reinstate the erstwhile Chief Councillor) is set aside; the Court accepted that the removed Chief Councillor's unconditional participation in the subsequent election and her defeat invoked the doctrine of waiver, precluding reinstatement.
  • The Court explicitly emphasised that it is not expressing any opinion regarding any no-confidence motion carried out against the Deputy Chief Councillor (i.e., the decision is confined to the Chief Councillor issues in the appeals).
  • No broader or novel precedent was announced beyond application of existing authorities on waiver/acquiescence; the decision applies established principles (as reflected in Sanjay Singh Som and Smt. Shamshad Khatun) to the facts before the Court.
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Dipak Misra, C.J:— Regard being had to the commonality of the controversy in both the appeals, they have been heard analogously and are being disposed of by a singular order.

2. Be it noted, L.P.A 525 of 2010 has been preferred by Sanjay Kumar Mahajan, the 12th respondent in C.W.J.C No. 7540 of 2009 which was preferred by Jai Muni Devi who was the Chief Counciltor of Sitamarhi Nagar Parishad. L.P.A No. 670 of 2010 has been preferred by Md. Jalaluddin Khan who has preferred the appeal after obtaining grant of leave, on the foundation that he is the elected Chief Councillor of Sitamarhi Municipality after the election was held when the post of Chief Councillor, which was occupied by Jai Muni Devi, fell vacant because of vote of no confidence motion mooted against her became successful. The factual matrix lies in a narrow compass. Jai Muni Devi was elected as a Councillor of Sitamarhi Municipality after contesting the election under Bihar Mu nicipal Act, 2007 (for brevity ‘the Act’). The elected Councillors elected Jai Muni Devi as Chief Councillor. The vote of no confidence motion was mooted under Section 25 of the Act and the same was put to vote on 18.7.2009 On that date on the basis of vote cast the Chief Councillor was removed from post. Because of removal, the post was treated to be vacant and accordingly the State Election Commissioner took steps to hold the election on 4.8.2009 to fill up the post.

3. It is apposite to note that Jai Muni Devi has challenged the manner in which the vote of no confidence motion was mooted and finalized, in C.W.J.C No. 7540 of 2009. While the matter was sub judice, she participated in the election but lost the same and Md. Jalaluddin Khan was elected as the Chief Councilllor.

4. Learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the meeting was called and in the said meeting the writ petitioner, Jai Muni Devi was removed on the basis of Circular No. 62 dated 22.6.2009 Reliance has been placed upon the case of Pawan Kumar Purvey v. The State or Bihar, 2010 (1) P.L.J.R 272 wherein it has been held that circulars have no authority of law and, therefore, the action taken therein is invalid. Because of the said view he annulled the no confidence motion and allowed the writ petition and observed that replacement of no confidence motion could not be an impediment for bringing up a fresh no confidence motion under the provisions of the Act and Rules framed in 2010 which has been promulgated by the State Government.

5. At this juncture it is seemly to state that Jalaluddin Khan was elected in the resultant election because of the vacancy caused. He had thought to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge as he was apprehensive that his right would be affected and on the basis of a decision rendered in Nirmala Singh v. State of Bihar, 2006 (1) P.L.J.R 129 leave was granted to prefer an appeal. Thus, the appeal at his instance.

6. We have heard Mr. Y.V Giri alongwith Mr. Raju Giri, learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals, Mr. S.B.K Mangalam, learned counsel for contesting respondents and Mr. Vijay Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the State in both the appeals.

7. At the very outset we may state that initially we were required to consider the justifiability and the legal substantiality of the order passed by the learned Single Judge whether the vote of no confidence motion, that has been nullified by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the decision rendered in Pawan Kumar Purvey (supra), is correct or not but, pregnant one, we are not disposed to and it is not required to dwell upon the same as the learned Senior counsel, Mr. Giri, appearing for the appellants, submitted that when the erstwhile Chief Councilor contested the election that took place on the basis of vacancy of the post which had come into existence ???ue to the order of removal, invited and attracted in fullest vigour the doctrine of waiver to the realm of the case and, therefore, the whole scenario is to be tested on the said touchstone. It is urged by him that putting the clock back by dwelling upon the legality of the order only would tantamount to the annihilation of the basic interest of democracy inasmuch as a person who had lost the second election would come into power which would be an anathema to the fundamental facet of democratic institutions. Learned Senior counsel commended us to the decision in Sanjay Singh Som… v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.…, 2002 (3) P.L.J.R 589, Nirmala Singh (supra) and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Shamshad Khatun v. The State of Bihar, 2010 (1) P.L.J.R 929.

8. Mr. Mangalam, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supporting the order passed by the learned Single Judge, contended that when the vote of no confidence motion was not held in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Act, the same has been justifiably axed by the learned Single Judge and, therefore, as a sequiter, she holds the post and her participation in the election would not be an impediment for her continuance. It is urged by him that at grass root level of democracy when the people are illiterate and the democracy is in a nascent stage, a lenient view has to be taken. Learned counsel has drawn inspiration from the decision in Brij Nandan Sharma v. The State of Bihar, 2004 (2) PLJR 244.

9. We note with profit that there is no dispute with regard to the factual matrix. The gravamen of the matter is whether the doctrine of waiver gets attracted and if the same principle is invoked whether the erstwhile Chief Councillor can be allowed to continue after losing in the election. In Sanjay Singh Som (supra), Aftab Alam, J., (as his Lordship then was), while dealing with a similar situation has held as follows:

“8. Even if the election was held disregarding the petitioner's request there was no compulsion for him to take part in the election. Had the petitioner not participated in the election of 6.5.2002 or even if he had participated in the election putting it clearly on the record that his participation was under protest and without prejudice to his claim and subject to the result of his writ petition in the High Court, the matter might have been different. B??? the petitioner did not do any such thing. He participated in the election unconditionally, with his eyes open and took a chance of winning the election. Now having been defeated in that election he may not be allowed to question the earlier resolution removing him from the office of Pramukh.

9. Mr. Sharma further submitted that the subsequent development will not disentitle the petitioner to the relief claimed in this writ petition and in support of his submission he relied upon a constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in The United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230. That case was under the Industrial Disputes Act and on an entirely different set of facts and I see no application of that decision to this case.

10. In the facts and circumstances stated above, any interference by this Court in the petitioner's favour will give a very wrong message to the public. To a layman it would appear that taking advantage of some loop-hole in the law the petitioner was able to persuade the court to reinstate him in the office of Pramukh even though he lost the election in full public gaze in the meeting of 6.5.2002”

10. In Nirmala Singh (supra) the learned Single Judge while dealing with the similar fact situation, has expressed the view as follows:—

“Be that as it may, the meeting was convened pursuant to the notice as aforesaid. At the meeting the petitioners were removed from the posts of Pramukh as well as Up-pramukh. Neither in the requisition, nor in the notice, any reason in support of the motion had been mentioned, which appears to be a requirement of law. However, for that reason the petitioners did not suffer any prejudice inasmuch, none of the petitioners attended the meeting. After the meeting was held and they were removed, again a meeting was held for the purpose of supplying the vacancy caused by such removal and both the petitioners participated in the said meeting proceeding on the basis that the same was a valid and legal meeting. While the petitioner no. 1 participated in the meeting, the petitioner no. 2 even offered himself for one of the posts for which election was to be held. In such a situation, if I interfere either with the requisition or with the notice or with the meeting being the subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petition, that would be travesty of justice and would permit the petitioner to have the status restored despite having had participated in the meeting by which with the mandate of the majority the status has been altered.”

11. In Smt. Shamshad Khatun (supra) a Division Bench while dealing with the concept of acquiescence and waiver after referring the decisions in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70 and Pulin Behari Lal v. Mahadeo Dutta, (1993) 1 SCC 629, Bibi Amna Khatun v. Zahir Hussain, AIR 1981 Patna 1 : [1980 PLJR 208(FB)], Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre, (2004) 8 SCC 229; Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corpn., (2008) 12 SCC 401; Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 5 and Krishna Lal v. State of J & K, (1994) 4 SCC 422; Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197; Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 54 IA 338; Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Shudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300; Lachoo Mai v. Radhey Shyam, (1971) 1 SCC 619 : AIR 1971 SC 2213 and Smt. Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P, 2000 (4) M.P.H.T 69 (FB) has expressed that:

“21. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case there can be no room for doubt that the right could be waived by the elected candidate and she has done so by her express conduct. Quite apart from the above this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant had participated ip the meeting by taking a chance and 12 members voted against her. It is also apt to note all the members had been served and they had participated. The requisite majority had voted against her. Ergo, there is no justification or warrant to interfere in the proceeding of No Confidence Motion in exercise of the extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.”

12. In Brij Nandan Sharma (supra) the learned Single Judge in paragraphs 9 and 10 has expressed the view as follows:

“9. From a plain reading of section 44(7) of the Act, it is evident that all questions shall be decided by a majority of votes of the members present and voting unless otherwise especially provided. Section. 42(3) of the Act, in specific term provides that the resolution expressing want of confidence in a Pramukh or Up-pramukh shall be passed by the majority of total number of elected members of the Panchayat. Thus, when section 42(3) of the Act has specifically provided that motion of no-confidence can be carried out by majority of the total number of elected members of the Panchayat, the general provision will give way to the special provision. In my opinion special provision, i.e, section 42(3) having provided for passing of resolution by a majority of the total number of elected members same shall govern the field. Hence, the submission of Mr. Pradhan that it shall be decided by majority of votes of the members present and voting, is not fit to be accepted.

10. Although I have held that the Secretary of the Department has no power to nullify a no-confidence motion but the question is as to whether same requires to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In my opinion, power to issue prerogative writs and orders have been conferred on superior Courts to do justice. It is well settled that this Court does not interfere with an order, the quashing whereof will revive an illegal order. In the present case, quashing of impugned order will revive no-confidence motion passed against the petitioner, which is absolutely illegal. In that view of the matter, in exercise of my power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I quash the resolution dated 28.9.2002 (Annexure-5) and decline to interfere with the impugned order.”

13. If the obtaining factual matrix is typically scrutinized, it would become luculent that there is a sea of difference between the two. In the cited authority an incompetent authority had set aside the vote of no confidence and the elected candidate had no role but in the case at hand after the no confidence motion she had contested the election and lost. Thus, the decision rendered in Brij Nandan Sharma (supra) is distinguishable.

14. Be it noted, the respondent Chief Councillor had challenged vote of no confidence motion. It would have been totally a different matter had she restrained herself from contesting in the second election and waited for the fate of her case but, she did not choose to do so, on the contrary she thought it appropriate to contest the election and to take a chance.

15. Thus, in our considered view, the decision in the case of Sanjay Singh Som (supra) squarely coveres the case and principles of waiver as laid down in the case of Mrs. Shamshad Khatun (supra) comes into full play.

16. Ergo, despite immense endeavour by Mr. Mangalam to build the edifice on the foundation of concept of grass root level of democracy has to founder and we remain unpersuaded to accept the same, it is inconceivable that a Chief Councillor would take a chance in an election and her failure take a somersault and attack the illegality in carrying out the vote of no confidence motion with vengeance. It would be sending improper message to the public at large and tantamount to travesty of justice. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

17. Needless to emphasize,-as both the appeals deal with the Chief Councillors, we are not expressing any opinion whatsoever with regard to vote of no confidence motion carried out against the Deputy Chief Councillor.