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Munnavaru Begam Sahibu v. Mir Mahapalli Sahib
Structured Summary of the Judgment delivered by Abdur Rahim, J. (with concurring opinion of Seshagiri Ayyar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was instituted to recover certain lands attached to what is described in the plaint as the "Astana Bara Imam" at Inuguduru, a suburb of Masulipatam, from defendants who were in possession. The appeal is by the third plaintiff, who is the daughter of the first plaintiff (the first plaintiff died after institution of the suit). The third plaintiff claimed the office of Head Mujavar of the Astana in succession to her mother.
The parties' title traces to a 1725 grant by Nizam-ul-Mulk (the Nizam of Hyderabad), contained in a Persian sanad (referred to in the opinion as Exhibit VI). There was prior litigation in or about 1896 resulting in a compromise (rajinama, marked Exhibit B) under which the second defendant (the mother of the appellant in the present appeal) was to be Head Mujavar "henceforward" and the office was to continue "from generation to generation" according to the terms of that agreement. The Subordinate Judge held that Exhibit B was inconsistent with the terms of the sanad (Exhibit VI) and therefore not binding; the Subordinate Judge also held that the appellant (a woman) was disqualified from holding the office of Head Mujavar. The present Court heard the appeal from that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- How should the 1725 Persian grant (Exhibit VI) be interpreted — as an absolute estate to the named grantees or as creating a public religious trust/waqf for performance of certain religious ceremonies?
- Whether the compromise (rajinama, Exhibit B) of the 1896 litigation, which conferred Head Mujavarship "from generation to generation" on the mother of the appellant and her descendants, is binding on the parties in light of the sanad?
- Whether a woman (the third plaintiff) is competent to hold the office of Head Mujavar of the Astana in issue, given the nature of the duties attached to that office and relevant Muhammadan law and local custom?
- If the third plaintiff is competent and the rajinama is binding, whether she is entitled to possession of the lands and related reliefs (including mesne profits and costs)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Third Plaintiff)
- Claims entitlement to the office of Head Mujavar in succession to her mother (the first plaintiff).
- Relies on the rajinama (Exhibit B) — the compromise of earlier litigation — which provides that the mother (second defendant in that suit) shall be Head Mujavar and that the business should be carried on "from generation to generation". If that compromise is binding, the appellant claims she is entitled to the office.
- Accepts, for purposes of the appeal, the parties' interpretation of the sanad as creating a religious trust (waqf) under which descendants performing the duties are entitled to maintenance allowances.
Respondents / Defendants
- Asserted before the Subordinate Judge that the rajinama (Exhibit B) was in violation of the sanad (Exhibit VI) and therefore could not bind the parties.
- Raised the contention that a woman is disqualified from holding the office of Head Mujavar because of the religious nature of the office and duties, and adduced evidence (on remand) suggesting initiation of fakirs and ceremonies that they claimed a woman could not properly perform or supervise.
- Generally resisted the appellant's claim to possession of the lands tied to the Head Mujavarship.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shahoo Banoo v. Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem (Privy Council) | If religious duties attached to an office are such that a woman cannot properly discharge them in person or by deputy, she cannot be appointed to that office. | The Court accepted this principle as correctly stating the law's limitation: women are competent unless duties cannot be performed by them personally or by deputy. It used the principle to assess whether the duties of the Head Mujavar were of that disqualifying character. |
| Shah Imam Buksh v. Beebee Shahee | Early decision relying on Macnaughten's statement that females are not competent to assume certain superiors of endowments due to local usages of seclusion and duty to instruct disciples. | Cited as an historical authority; the Court noted reliance on Macnaughten in that decision but did not treat it as laying down an absolute rule precluding women in all cases. |
| Hussain Beebee v. Hussain Sherif | That a woman may manage temporal affairs of a mosque but not necessarily spiritual affairs requiring particular personal qualifications; courts had treated some offices as involving spiritual duties not suitable for women. | The Court treated the ruling as limited to cases where the office involved peculiar personal/spiritual qualifications that a woman could not perform; it declined to read the decision as a broad prohibition. |
| Mujavar Ibram Bibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff | Held that a woman was not competent to perform the duties of Mujavar of a durga when those duties were of a spiritual character (reading Fatiha, offering prayers/incense) and there was no evidence the office had been held by a woman. | The Court accepted that where special evidence showed spiritual duties unsuitable for a woman, exclusion was appropriate, but refused to treat that ruling as establishing a universal rule that women cannot perform Fatiha or other prayers. |
| Imam Bee v. Molla Khasim Sahib (this Court) | Religious office can be held by a woman unless duties of a religious nature cannot be performed in person or by deputy; burden of proof is on those pleading exclusion; usage governs absent founder's rules. | The Court relied on this recent decision to support the proposition that, absent proof of duties a woman cannot perform, the presumption favors competence; it applied the burden allocation accordingly. |
| Mohan Lalji v. Madhsudan Lala | Recognizes that peculiar doctrines of a sect may preclude certain women (e.g., women married into a different sect) from performing duties of a particular religious institution. | Cited by Seshagiri Ayyar, J. as an illustration of a limited class of exceptions where women might be disqualified because of doctrinal/sectarian reasons. |
| Dhunacoverboi v. Advocate-General | Example where a Mohuntship (Hindu religious office) was held to be capable of being held by a female. | Used to illustrate that women can hold offices involving secular duties connected with religious institutions; supports the Court's view that secular duties do not disqualify women. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual findings, applying recognized principles and the parties' own usage:
- Interpretation of the 1725 grant (Exhibit VI): The Persian grant, when translated, confirmed prior grants of Madad-Maash (subsistence allowances) to Mir Ali Akbar and others and contemplated that the lands be left in their possession so that the incomes be used for maintenance and that they and their descendants (aulad and ahfad) perform prayers and Fatiha for the perpetuity of the State. Although the document could on a narrow textual reading be treated as an absolute estate to named persons, the evidence showed the parties themselves treated the grant as creating a public religious trust (waqf) for performance of specified ceremonies; the Court adopted that interpretation for purposes of the appeal because it was the foundation on which the parties based their claims.
- Nature of the institution (Astana Bara Imam): The Court analyzed the evidence regarding what "Astana" and "Mujavar" meant in this instance and found no tomb, shrine, Khankah, or institution for initiation and teaching of Sufi doctrines. Instead, the place is a raised platform where a 'panja' and 'peer' are planted and Muharram ceremonies/processions are performed. The purported "fakirs" were evidenced to be procession participants (Hindus and Muhammadans) engaged to carry the panja and peer during Muharram, not persons initiated into a religious brotherhood.
- Assessment of the rajinama (Exhibit B): The 1896 compromise explicitly designated the second defendant (the mother of the appellant) as Head Mujavar "henceforward" and provided for succession "from generation to generation". The Court found that, if binding, the rajinama entitled the appellant to the office; the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that Exhibit B violated the sanad was erroneous. The appellate Court held the parties were bound by the compromise reached before a competent Court.
- Whether a woman is competent to hold the office: The Court reviewed authorities and distilled the governing legal principle (as stated in Shahoo Banoo and applied in Imam Bee): a woman can hold a religious office unless the duties are such that she cannot properly perform them in person or through a deputy. The burden of proving that a woman is precluded rests on those who plead exclusion. Applying the principle to the factual findings — that the duties were largely secular (organizing and conducting Muharram processions in which Hindus and Muhammadans participate) and that there was no evidence of initiation into a religious brotherhood or performance of spiritual functions requiring gender-specific contact — the Court concluded the appellant was not disqualified by sex.
- Application of precedent and customs: The Court distinguished prior authorities that had excluded women in circumstances involving spiritual duties that a woman could not perform, and it emphasized that the prohibition arises from local usage and custom (seclusion practices) rather than any absolute tenet of Muhammadan theology. The Court therefore applied the precedent in a limited way, refusing to extend it beyond suitable factual contexts.
- Relief ordered: The Court reversed the Subordinate Judge, directed that a decree be entered in favour of the third plaintiff giving her possession of the disputed property, ordered the Subordinate Judge to enquire into mesne profits from the date of suit to the date when possession under the decree is obtained, and directed respondents to pay the third plaintiff's costs in the appellate and lower Court and the government court-fee.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appellate Court reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree and gave judgment for the third plaintiff (the appellant), declaring her entitled to possession of the disputed property and to the Head Mujavarship in accordance with the compromise (rajinama, Exhibit B). The Court ordered an inquiry into mesne profits and awarded costs and court-fee against the respondents.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The third plaintiff is entitled to possession of the lands attached to the Astana Bara Imam and to the office of Head Mujavar as per the rajinama; respondents must pay mesne profits (to be quantified by enquiry), the appellant's costs, and the government court-fee.
- On legal principle: The decision applies the established principle that women may hold religious offices unless it is shown the duties cannot be performed by them in person or by deputy; the burden lies on those who assert exclusion. The Court emphasized reliance on parties' usage and the factual nature of duties in determining competence.
- On precedent and novelty: The Court did not purport to establish a novel rule of law; rather, it applied and limited existing authorities (including Shahoo Banoo and earlier local cases) to the particular facts that showed predominantly secular duties. No new broad precedent disqualifying women was created; instead the ruling reinforces the approach that factual usage and the nature of duties govern competency questions.
Concurring opinion: Seshagiri Ayyar, J. concurred and emphasized that, except in two narrow classes of cases (grants expressly requiring personal/sex-dependent religious duties, or sectarian doctrines precluding certain women), there is no warrant for disqualifying women from inheriting religious offices; he agreed that in this case the duties were mostly secular and that the compromise was binding.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Abdur Rahim, J.:— The appeal is by the third plaintiff, daughter of the first plaintiff who died since the institution of the suit. The suit was to recover certain lands which are attached to what is described in the plaint as the Astana Bara Imam at Inuguduru, a suburb of Masulipatam, from the defendants who are in possession. The third plaintiff's case is that she is entitled to the office of Head Mujavar of the Astana in succession to her mother, the first plaintiff, What the nature of the institution is one of the important questions we have to consider in the appeal.
There was a grant made by Nizam-ul-Mulk, Nizam of Hyderabad, in 1725 which is the root of the title of the parties, and one of the questions for consideration is as to the true interpretation of that document. The grant is in Persian, and when properly translated the material portions of it are to this effect.—It purports to confirm previous grants by ancient rulers made by way of Madad-Masb, or (literally translated) subsistence allowance of Mir Ali Akbar and others, sons of Mir Syed Mahomed Madam who are to recite Darood or blessings on the Prophet and Fatiha in the name of the Imams and the Martyrs, the descendants of the prophet. Then it goes on to say, “It is necessary that the said lands should be left in the possession of the aforesaid persons so that they should utilize the incomes thereof towards their maintenance and along with their descendants, literally, children and grand-children (aulad and ahfad), should engage themselves in offering prayers for the perpetuity of the State.” If the matter stood merely upon the interpretation of this document, it might be contended that the grant was in absolute terms to the parsons mentioned therein, Mir Ali Akbar and others, sons of Mir Syed Mahomed Madani, who were expected to perform certain religious ceremonies. Upon such an interpretation the grant would be of an absolute estate to the persons named in the sanad. But the evidence clearly shows that the parties concerned have put their own interpretation upon the document and the practice and usage has been in accordance with that interpretation. That is to say, they have treated the grant as creating a public religious trust for the performance of Fatiha and certain other ceremonies during the Muharram, and though it might be possible to hold that the grant was of an absolute estate to Mir Ali Akbar and others, sons of Mir Syed Mahomed Madani, I am not prepared to say that the parties' interpretation of the sanad as creating a Waqf is unreasonable. In any case, so far as this appeal is concerned, we must proceed upon that interpretation, for, it is upon it that the parties base their claim.
Both the parties are descendants of Mir Syed Mahomed Madani's sons and they are, according to the interpretation placed by themselves on the grant, entitled to allowances for maintenance provided they keep up and perform the religious duties mentioned in the sanad. There has been previous litigation with respect to the rights of the parties, some time in 1896, when a suit was instituted by the father of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the present suit against the first plaintiff and another lady. That suit was compromised and a decree passed in the terms of the rajinama marked Exhibit B. By that compromise it was provided that “the second defendant, (that is the mother of the appellant) should be Head Mujavar henceforward, the plaintiff should give up the remaining lands for which he had brought the suit in excess heretofore and the part produce, etc.… business should be carried on from generation to generation (not lineally as wrongly translated in the paper-book) according to the terms of this agreement.” There cannot be any doubt that if this rajinama is binding on the parties the appellant is entitled to the office of Head Mujavar. This is what has been held by the lower Courts and is undoubtedly in accordance with the correct interpretation of Exhibit B. The lower Court, however, is of opinion that Exhibit B is in violation of, or contrary to, the provisions of the sanad already referred to (Exhibit VI) and cannot bind the parties; and that we have therefore to fall back on the terms of the sanad and in the light of the general Muhammadan Law to ascertain whether the plaintiff or the defendant is entitled to the office of Head Mujavar.
The use of the words Astana and Mujavar prima facie indicates as if there was a shrine or tomb of some holy person which had to be kept; up by the endowment. But the evidence shows that these words are used merely to indicate a sort of place in the form of a raised platform where a ‘panja’ and a ‘peer’ (staffs which are carried about in a Muharram procession) is planted and where certain ceremonies in connexion with the Muharram are performed. There is no evidence to show that there is any tomb of any well-known Sufi of fakir whera any initiation of fakirs takes place as may be the case in some Kjhankah or Astanad. If we look to the pleadings of the parties there can be no doubt that all the religious ceremonies which are performed at the place called Astana Bara Imam are in connexion with Maharrana, and the defendants in their written statement never alleged that any Sufi or other doctrines are propagated at this place or any fakirs are initiated into any particular order or brotherhood. It was by the words Astana or Mujavar that the Subordinate Judge who originally tried the case as well as the learned Judge against whose judgment this appeal has been preferred, were misled into thinking that there were some particular religious teachings associated with this so-called Astana. Then unfortunately when the matter came up on a previous occasion before this Court, arguments were addressed on the assumption that there might possibly be certain ceremonies connected with this institution which a woman was not capable of performing. In order to ascertain if this was so, the appeal was remanded to the lower Court for enquiry into this matter. As was to be expected, some of the defendants have now put forward some sort of evidence suggesting that initiation of fakirs actually takes place in this institution in order to make out that the appellant is not fit to be at its head. The evidence, however, is that by ‘fakirs’ all that is meant is some persons, Hindus or Muhammadans, who are engaged to carry in the procession the ‘panja’ and the ‘peer’ during the ten days of the Muharram. That is to say, these so-called fakirs are no more than parsons taking part in a Muharram procession. It is not suggested, nor could it well be, that these men have to be initiated into any particular doctrines or they have to perform any ceremonies requiring particular religious status. To describe such a state of things as equivalent to initiation into a religious brotherhood is absolute misuse of words. So is the use of the words Astana and Head Mujavar in this case, for these terms properly used are connected with institution for the up-keep of a shrine of a reputed saint or for the teaching of certain doctrines connected with Sufi-ism. The evidence amply makes out that the parties are absolutely illiterate and know nothing about any religious order or any religious teaching connected with any brotherhood of fakirs properly so called. The duties connected with this Astana are nothing more than the organizing and carrying out of certain processions in which the Hindus according to the evidence participate equally with the Muhammadans of the locality.
Many authorities have been quoted to us in connexion with the question whether a woman can properly be a Head Mujavar of an Astana or not. None of those cases or authorities call for any serious consideration, having regard to the fact that there is no Astana in the proper sense of the word and the Mujavars duties are only purely of a secular character so far as the evidence shows. We can take it to be the law as laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Shahoo Banoo v. Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem(1) that if the religious duties connected with a religious office are such that a woman cannot properly discharge in person or by deputy, then she cannot be appointed to that office. The well-known cases referred to, relate to the office of Sajjadanashins of certain Khankah and also of Mujavar of certain shrines. The word ‘Mujavar’ literally means a sweeper or the person who cleans the place, but it is conventionally used to denote a person who is looking after a shrine or tomb of a holy person generally called Astana. ‘Astana’ is a word which is often used to denote a place inspiring respect and reverence. It need not necessarily indicate a tomb or shrine though in popular use it indicates a shrine or tomb of a holy person. The term Sajjadanashin or Gadhnashin is conventionally used to denote the person in charge of a Khankah or an institution where religious enthusiasts and fakirs congregate and where the superior or the bead of the institution has certain doctrines of Sufi-ism to teach. But there is absolutely nothing in connexion with Astan Bara Imam which has anything in common either with a Khankah or an Astana properly so-called. That a woman cannot be a Sajjadanashin may, for the present case, be taken to be sound law, if the duties involve the teaching of certain doctrines to fakirs, necessitating her coming into daily contact with them. It is not, however, the fact that a woman cannot be a sufi-ism or that she is not competent to teach the tenets of Sufi-ism. Sufi-ism, as a school of Muhammadan religion, is equally open to men and women. But having regard to the custom and usage of the country by which women observe seclusion, it is not ordinarily to be expected that women could satisfactorily perform the duties connected with the head of an institution like Khankah which would bring her into contact with fakir and other men not being her own close relations. Excepting for this local usage and custom, I am not aware of any general provision of Muhammadan Law against a woman specializing in any form of religious teaching and propagating any doctrines of the Muhammadan religion either of orthodox Muhammadan religion or of Sufi-ism. The rule prohibiting women from being appointed to such offices is not confined to the office of Sajjadanashin but there way be other offices which she may not be able to perform, for instance, that of an Imam, in a mosque where she would have to lead the congregation. At any rate in practice women are not known to have officiated as Imams in mosque any more than Christian women are known to have officiated as priests or clergy in Christian churches.
It is not necessary for us to consider in this case the extent of the application of the rule precluding the appointment of women to an office like that of Sajjadanashin and the limitations of such a rule. So far as I have been able to trace the history of the question, it had its origin in certain passages in Macnaughten's Principles and Precedents of Muhammadan Law page 332. It is stated there:
“Females are not competent to assume the office of superior of an endowment; and such an act is at variance with the usages of the country, because it is the duty of the superior to instruct and guide his disciples, to teach his scholars, and to keep their company continually, in private and in public, and this cannot be done with propriety by a woman, whose duty it is to live retired and secluded.”
I think that seems to be a perfectly reasonable proposition so long as it is understood that the prohibition or the disability arises from certain local usages and customs and not by any, absolute injunction of Muhammadan religion or law. Mr. Ameer Ali, in stating the law on the subject at page 443, IV Edition, Volume 1, of his Muhammadan Law, states it in similar terms. He also bases it on custom and not on any rule of Muhammadan Theology or canonical law which has in fact very little to do with Sufi-ism, Khankah and Asthanas. One of the earliest decisions on the subject is to be found in Shah Imam Buksh v. Beebee Shahee. There the learned Judge of the Suddar Diwany Adawlut rely upon the passage in Macnaughten already recited as authority for the proposition in question. There a to also some rulings of the Madras High Court on the point. Hussain Beebee v. Hussain Sherif, Mujavar Ibram Bibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff(2). In Mujavar Ibram Bibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff, what is laid down is that a woman is not competent to perform the duties of Mujavar of a durga which are not of a secular nature. What the learned Judges say is that it was established by evidence that the office of Mujavar entailed the discharge of duties of a spiritual character, such as reading the Fatiha, offering prayers and incense, etc., which could not conveniently be performed by a woman, and that there was no satisfactory evidence that the office has ever been held by a woman. Apart from what the special evidence in that case was, I do not think the learned Judges meant to lay down a general proposition that any religious office which entails the performance of Fatiha and other prayers or the offering of incense could not be performed by woman, for I do not think they could have meant that Fatiha which consists in reciting Certain suras of the Koran could not be said by woman and that a woman could not say prayers according to the Muhammadan religion. Such a proposition would be incorrect, and apart from the special facts of that particular case, I cannot accept the decision as laying down any such general rule of law as contended for. In Hussain Beebee v. Hussain Sherif, it was held that according to Muhammadan Law a woman may manage the temporal affairs of a mosque, but not the spiritual affairs connected with it, the management of the latter requiring peculiar personal qualifications. There the institution to which the office in dispute related was called Shakh Fareed Shukkurgunj Mosque. If it was a mosque in its proper and ordinary sense of the word, that is, a place where prayers are said by Muhammadans, then there are no duties connected with it which a woman could not perform at least through a deputy. But from the evidence in this case and from what we have noticed in other cases, we know that the word ‘mosque’ or ‘Musjid’ is applied to all sorts of places, may be a mere tomb or an Imam Bara. The learned Judges in dealing with the law in Hussain Beebee v. Hussain Sherif, cited cases connected with the office of Guddeenishin. If that was the real nature of the institution as probably it was from the name, it might have been a replica of the tomb or a shrine containing some relics of that well-known saint. In that case it would perhaps properly be called a durga. The report does not give what the actual duties were in connexion with the office then in question, and if the office required any peculiar personal qualifications which might be wanting in a woman, that is to say, duties which could not be performed by her either personally or through a proxy, then undoubtedly the decision was right. The facts do not appear sufficiently fully to enable me to say what the exact scope of that decision is. On the other hand, I entirely agree with a recent decision of this Court in Imam Bee v. Molla Khasim Sahib, that a religious office can be held by a woman unless there are duties of a religious nature which she cannot perform in person or by deputy and the burden of establishing that a woman is precluded from holding a particular office is on those who plead the exclusion and in the absence of anything in the rules by the founder, the usage of the institution governs the case. In that case the office was that of a Mujavar in a mosque. I believe the duties attached to the office were simply those of a Muttavalli though the word used there is Mujavar. In this Presidency the word ‘Mujavar’ is not seldom used in the sense of Muttavalli of an ordinary religious trust.
Here the appellant, as a member of the family of the descendants of Mir Ali Akbar and his brother, is admittedly entitled to certain allowance by way of maintenance, and she does not dispute that the defendants are also entitled to similar allowance. The dispute is solely about the office of Head Mujavar in virtue of which she claims to be entitled to possession of the property in dispute, that is, the lands of the institution concerned. As Head Mujavar she would also be entitled to an additional share of the income. The Subordinate Judge, in my opinion, was entirely wrong in holding that the compromise was in violation of the terms of the sanad and therefore could not be given effect to. He had also gone wrong in thinking that the appellant is disqualified to hold the office she claims. The evidence clearly shows that this was never the consciousness of the parties, in fact the consciousness of the parties themselves was just the other way. Before the appellant her mother held the office and the written statement never raised any doubt as to the competency of the appellant to hold the office on the ground of sex, if she was not precluded from holding it, as alleged, by the terms of the sanad. I reverse the decree of the Subordinate Judge and there will be a decree in favour of the third plaintiff giving her possession of the property in dispute. The Subordinate Judge will enquire into the mesne profits she is entitled to from the date of suit to the date when she obtains possession under the decree. The respondents will pay the third plaintiff's costs in this and the lower Court and they will also pay the Court fee payable to Government.
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— I entirely agree. In a very recent reference to the Full Bench which I made in conjunction with Napier, J., I went fully into the question of the capacity of a Hindu female to succeed to religious offices and to discharge the duties of those offices. I am glad to find that my learned brother's exposition of the Muhammadan Law is in complete accordance with my views with regard to the position of Hindu women. Except in cases of grants given for the express purpose of performing religious duties which are dependent on personal or sex capacity, I fail to see why a female, whether Hindu or Muhammadan, should be disentitled to perform those duties. In the language of the Judicial Committee in Shahoo Banoo v. Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem, a woman holding an office of a religious trust which by its nature involves no spiritual duties such as a woman could never properly discharge in person or by deputy, is competent to hold such an office. Or it may be as in the case in Mohan Lalji v. Madhsudan Lala that the peculiar doctrines of a sect may preclude women married into a different sect from performing the duties of the temple or religious institution, belonging to the former sect. Except in these two classes of cases, in my opinion, there is no warrant for holding that women are incompetent to inherit a religious office connected with a religious institution. It has always been held that, in the case of secular duties pertaining to a religious trust, women are competent to perform them. For example, as my learned brother has pointed out, the Muttawalliship in a Muhammadan mosque can be held by women. So also it has been held in the Dhunacoverboi v. Advocate-General that a Mohuntship can be held by a female. Wherever there are profits which are payable to an heir in the discharge of duties appertaining to a religious office, it must be taken as a general rule, subject to some exceptions, that women are competent to inherit those offices and to perform the duties pertaining to them.
In the present case, the course of devolution and the way in which the parties have been enjoying show that women have been held competent to discharge the duties pertaining to this particular Astana. As my learned brother has pointed out, the original grant confers an absolute right in the property. I am inclined to think that its dedication as a waqf must have been by the successors of the original grantee. Any way there can be no doubt that the duties connected with the Astana were mostly secular. As has just been pointed out, the way in which Hindus and Muhammadans have been initiated into Fakirship during the Muharram shows that there are really no religious duties to be performed by the Head Mujavar. And further in my opinion the parties are bound by the compromise as the matter had been litigated in a competent Court and the parties agreed that the first plaintiff and her descendants are entitled from generation to generation to the Head Mujavarship. The Subordinate Judge seems to think that this compromise is not consistent with the original sanad. I fail to see how there is any inconsistency between the sanad and the compromise. Even if there were any inconsistencies, I am not prepared to say that the compromise is not binding upon the parties and upon those who claim under the parties to the compromise.
And lastly, I would say that the fact that in the written statement no objection is taken to the third plaintiff succeeding to the Head Mujavarship on the ground of her being a female is clear evidence that in the opinion of the litigants and of their coreligionists women are not incompetent to perform the duties of Head Mujavarship. For these reasons, I entirely agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother.
K.R
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