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Nand Kishore v. U.P Secondary Education Services Commission And Others

Allahabad High Court
Jul 13, 1992
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Special Appeal challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 6 May 1992, which dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The writ petition attacked an order dated 29 January 1992 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission, Allahabad, by which the Commission informed the District Inspector of Schools and others that Ram Nawal Singh (respondent No. 6) had been selected for appointment as Lecturer in Public Inter College, Motihar, Allahabad.

Facts as recited in the opinion: Raghunath Singh was Lecturer in History at the College and died on 11 May 1989, creating the vacancy. The Committee of Management appointed the petitioner as an ad hoc Lecturer in History and notified the vacancy to the Commission. The Commission advertised the post, a selection took place and the Selection Committee recommended respondent No. 6; by letter dated 29 January 1992 the Commission recommended Ram Nawal Singh for appointment to the vacancy.

The appellant filed a writ petition claiming entitlement to promotion under a 40% promotion quota, asserting he was the senior-most teacher and qualified for appointment as Lecturer. The Single Judge rejected these contentions and dismissed the writ petition; the appellant filed the present Special Appeal against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant, being the senior-most teacher, was entitled to promotion to the post of Lecturer (under the promotion quota) instead of a direct recruitment by the Commission.
  2. What is the relevant date for determining eligibility (minimum qualification and five years' continuous service) for promotion under Rule 9(1) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Rules — the date of occurrence of vacancy or the date when the Committee of Management decides to make the appointment?
  3. Whether, for the purpose of eligibility, a candidate's examination result can be treated as relating back to the date of the examination (i.e., whether the appellant should be regarded as having the required M.A. qualification as of the date of vacancy because his examination was held earlier and result declared later).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted he was the senior-most teacher and qualified and therefore entitled to promotion to the Lecturer post under the promotion quota (40%).
  • He argued that it was not necessary to possess the minimum qualification on the date the vacancy occurred; instead, the relevant date for assessing minimum qualification should be the date when the Management decided to make the appointment.
  • He contended that his M.A. examination was completed on 30 April 1989 and although the result was declared on 1 September 1989, the declaration should relate back to the date of the examination (relied on Sangam Lal Pandey v. State of U.P.).

Respondent / Commission's Arguments

  • The Commission and respondents contended that the appellant did not possess the minimum qualification on the date the vacancy occurred (11 May 1989) and therefore could not be considered for promotion under Rule 9(1).
  • The respondents produced a photostat copy of the attendance sheet for the 1989 examination showing the last paper of the M.A. in Ancient Indian History and Culture was held on 13 May 1989 and bearing the appellant's signature; this contradicted the appellant's claim that the last paper was on 30 April 1989.
  • Respondents also submitted that respondent No. 6 was senior to the appellant and, in case selection was not accepted, respondent No. 6 was entitled to promotion in preference to the appellant (the court did not decide that factual question in the appeal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hans Raj Singh v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allahabad (1990 16 ALR 813) In an ad hoc appointment under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act, the relevant date for eligibility for promotion may be the date when the Management decides to make an ad hoc appointment (after the post has remained vacant for more than two months). The court noted this decision but held it was not applicable to the present case because Hans Raj Singh concerned ad hoc appointments under Section 18(1)(b), whereas the present matter was not an ad hoc appointment and Rule 9(1) was not considered in that decision.
Yogendra Nath Singh v. District Inspector of Schools Same view as Hans Raj Singh regarding ad hoc appointments under Section 18(1)(b). The court observed that the same view had been taken in Yogendra Nath Singh but again emphasised that those decisions dealt with ad hoc appointments and therefore were not applicable to the present, non-ad hoc, case under Rule 9(1).
Dinesh Pratap Sinsh v. State of U.P. When provisions pari materia with Rule 9(1) were considered, eligibility must be taken on the date the vacancy arose (for example, date when the permanent incumbent retired). The court relied on this case to support the proposition that eligibility must be judged as of the date the vacancy occurs; it treated Dinesh Pratap Sinsh as consistent with applying Rule 9(1)'s requirement that qualifications and service be present on the date of occurrence of vacancy.
Krishna Dutt Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur The validity of sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 was upheld; the court criticised fixing the date of occurrence of vacancy at the discretion of the Management (i.e., selecting date of selection), as it would lead to uncertainty and malpractices. The present court cited Krishna Dutt Singh to reject the appellant's contention that the Management's decision date should be the relevant date; the opinion relies on the reasoning that allowing such discretion would cause uncertainty and potential malpractice.
Sangam Lal Pandey v. State of U.P. (1990 1 UPLBEC 706) Cited for the proposition that the declaration of an examination result may relate back to the date of the examination. The appellant relied on this precedent to argue his declared result should relate back to the date of his examination. The court nevertheless rejected that factual argument here because the respondents produced evidence showing the last exam paper was held after the date of vacancy.
Kania Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan; Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal; Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gamma of Vedum Vasco De Gama Principle of statutory interpretation: words in a statute should be given their plain grammatical meaning unless they are capable of two constructions; only then may policy or object be considered. The court invoked these authorities to support the textual/plain meaning interpretation of Rule 9(1), concluding there is no ambiguity in "date of occurrence of vacancy" and therefore the ordinary meaning must be applied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded on the basis of Rule 9(1) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Rules (quoted in the opinion). The provision requires that, where a vacancy is to be filled by promotion, all teachers working in L.T. or C.T. grade who possess the minimum qualifications and have put in at least five years' continuous service in the concerned subject on the date of occurrence of the vacancy shall be considered for promotion.

The court found that the vacancy occurred on 11 May 1989 upon the death of the permanent incumbent (Raghunath Singh). It held that the petitioner did not possess the minimum qualification on that date, and therefore could not be considered for promotion under Rule 9(1).

The appellant's alternative argument — that the relevant date for assessing eligibility was the date when the Committee of Management decided to make the appointment — was considered but rejected. The court examined earlier decisions (Hans Raj Singh and Yogendra Nath Singh) which had taken the date of the Management's decision as relevant in the context of ad hoc appointments under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. However, the court distinguished those authorities on the ground that they dealt with ad hoc appointments and had not been called to consider Rule 9(1). Consequently, the court concluded those decisions were not applicable to the present case.

The court relied on precedents (including Dinesh Pratap Sinsh and Krishna Dutt Singh) that supported treating the date of occurrence of vacancy as the relevant date for eligibility and upheld Rule 9(1)'s plain wording. The court emphasised that allowing the Management or other authorities to fix a different relevant date (such as the date of selection or the date on which the Management decided to appoint) would produce uncertainty and opportunities for malpractice, contrary to the object of the rule.

On the question of whether the appellant's M.A. qualification should be treated as effective on 11 May 1989 by virtue of the result declaration relating back to the date of examination, the appellant's factual assertion (that the last paper was on 30 April 1989) was contradicted by the respondents' evidence (an attendance sheet showing the last paper was held on 13 May 1989). Because the examination itself had not been completed by 11 May 1989, the court held the appellant could not claim to have been declared passed on that date.

Having found the appellant lacked the required qualification on the date the vacancy arose and having rejected the contention that the Management's decision date was the relevant date for eligibility, the court found no error in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Special Appeal is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences: The judgment of the learned Single Judge (dismissing the appellant's writ petition) stands, and the Commission's recommendation dated 29 January 1992 in respect of respondent No. 6 (Ram Nawal Singh) remains unperturbed by this appeal. The court also ordered that there shall be no order as to costs.

Broader implications noted by the court: The opinion affirms that, under Rule 9(1), eligibility for promotion must be assessed by reference to the date of occurrence of the vacancy (e.g., death, resignation, retirement of the permanent incumbent) and not by reference to a later date chosen by the Management. The court expressly declined to apply ad hoc appointment principles (as in some earlier decisions) to the non-ad hoc context governed by Rule 9(1), and it did not lay down a rule about whether Rule 9(1) would apply in ad hoc appointment cases. No new legal principle contrary to Rule 9(1)'s plain meaning was established.

Show all summary ...

Sudhir Narain, J.:— This Special Appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated May 6, 1992, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.

2. The appellant had filed a writ petition challenging the order dated 29th January, 1992 passed by the U.P Secondary Education Services Commission, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as “Commission), by which the Commission informed the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and other persons that Ram Nawal Singh, respondent No. 6 has been selected for appointment to the post of Lecturer in Public Inter College Motihar, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the College).” Briefly the facts are that one Raghunath Singh was Lecturer in History in the College. He died on 11th May, 1989. The petitioner was appointed as ad hoc Lecturer in History in the College by the Committee of Management. The Committee of Management further notified the vacancy to the Commission. The Commission advertised the post and a selection took place. The Selection Committee recommended the name of the respondent No. 6 and by letter dated 29th January, 1992 the Commission recommended the name of Ram Nawal Singh for appointment as Lecturer in the vacancy caused on the death of Sri Raghunath Singh.

3. The appellant filed the writ petition. He claimed that he was entitled to be promoted as the promotion quota was 40% for such appointment and he being the senior-most teacher and qualified to be appointed as Lecturer, was entitled to be appointed. The learned Single Judge did not agree with his contention and the writ petition was dismissed by order dated May 6, 1992, against which this Special Appeal has been filed.

4. Learned Counsel for the appellant urged that he was the seniormost Teacher qualified, and was entitled to be promoted and no direct recruitment by selection could be made by the Commission.

5. There is no dispute that in case the appellant is duly qualified and a seniormost Teacher he could be promoted to the post of Lecturer in the vacancy caused on the death of Raghunath Singh. But it has been found that he was not qualified on the date of occurrence of vacancy.

6. Rule 9 of the U.P Secondary Education Services Commission Rules provides as follows:—

“9. procedure for appointment by promotion (1) where any vacancy is to be filled by promotion, all teachers working in L.T or C.T Grade, who possess the minimum qualifications and have put in at least 5 years continuous service as teacher in the concerned subject, on the date of occurrence of vacancy shall be considered for promotion without their having applied for the same.

Note:— For the purpose of this sub-rule, service rendered in any other recognised institution shall count for eligibility unless interrupted by removal, dismissal or reduction to a lower post.”

7. A perusal of Rule 9(1) makes it clear that for being considered for promotion it is necessary that a teacher is working in L.T or C.T grade for at least five years continuously in the concerned subject and possesses the minimum qualification on the date of occurrence of vacancy. The vacancy occurred on 11th May, 1989 when Raghunath Singh had died. The petitioner did not possess minimum qualification on the date of occurrence of vacancy.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that it was not necessary for him to possess the minimum qualification on the date on which the vacancy occurred and the relevant date for consideration of the minimum qualification will be the date when the Management had decided to make appointment.

9. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the decision in Hans Raj Singh v. U.P Secondary Education Service Commission, Allahabad . 1990 16 ALR 813.. It was a case of ad hoc appointment under Section 18(1)(b) of the U.P Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was observed that the date on which the management, after expiry of more than two months from the date of vacancy, decides to make ad hoc appointment under Section 18(1)(b), is the relevant date with reference to which eligibility for purpose of promotion is to be seen. Relying on this decision, the same view was taken in Yogendra Nath Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur,2 Section 18(1)(b) provides that where the Management has notified a vacancy to the Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the post of such teacher has actually remained vacant for more than two months then the Management may appoint by direct recruitment or promotion, a teacher purely on ad hoc basis from amongst the persons possessing qualifications prescribed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the Regulations framed thereunder. The limitation is that the Management does not acquire a right to make ad hoc appointment either by direct recruitment or promotion before the expiry of two months from the date, the Management has notified the vacancy. There is no period prescribed for making ad hoc appointment by the Managing Committee. The Committee of Management had to make appointment for a limited period and in this context, the Court observed that the relevant date for the purpose of considering the eligibility of a teacher for promotion is the date when the Management decides to make appointment. The Court was not invited to consider Rule 9(1) of U.P Secondary Education Services Commission Rules, 1983. It is not a case of ad hoc appointment and, therefore, the law laid down in these cases are not applicable. We are not called upon to decide the question as to whether Rule 9(1) will also be applicable in a case of ad hoc appointments also.

10. The Commission is bound to make recommendation of a candidate considering the eligibility strictly in accordance with U.P Education Services Commission Rules, 1983. It cannot ignore Rule 9(1) while considering claim of any teacher for promotion when a vacancy has occurred A vacancy occurs when a permanent incumbent to it resigns, retires or dies. The creation of vacancy is not dependent on the appointment to the said post and when it is made. In Dinesh Pratap Sinsh v. State of U.P,3 the Court while considering the question regarding the eligibility of a teacher for appointment as provided under Regulation 6(1) of Chapter II of the Regulations framed under the U.P Intermediate Education Act, the provision of which were in pari materia with Rule 9(1) of the Rules, took the view that the eligibility has to be taken into consideration on the date when the vacancy arose and the vacancy was held to have occurred on the date when permanent incumbent retired from service.

11. In Krishna Dutt Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur,4 while considering the validity of sub-rule (1) of Rule 9, the Court took the view that in case the date of occurrence of vacancy is to be fixed at tho discretion of the Committee of Management or any other authority. It would give rise to uncertainty and various kinds of malpractices will arise. The validity of the rule was upheld and it was observed as follows:—

“The completion of procedure for selection of teachers by promotion, as indicated above, will naturally take some time. Neither the Commission will be in a position to know nor the candidate will be able to ascertain the date of selection which would be uncertain. The inherent uncertainty of the date of selection with reference to which the five years period of continuous service might be determined according to the provisions of Rule 9(1) may give rise to various kinds of mal practices such as favouritism, nepotism etc., in the actual working of those provisions. In order to favour a particular candidate or to exclude a particular candidate from consideration, the time gap may be prolonged or shortened by the Management or other authorities in respect of the performance of various acts assigned to them by or under Rule 9. Therefore, the choice of date of selection as the relevant date for determining the requisite period of continuous service would not be reasonable and would have no nexus with the object of the rule, as it would not serve the purpose. The contention of the “Learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf must fail accordingly.”

12. Lastly, it may be pointed out that if the submission of the counsel for the appellant is accepted then while interpreting the word “date of occurrence of vacancy” the “date when the Committee of Management has decided to make appointment is the date of vacancy” should be read. This will be against the principle of interpretation of Statutes. It is settled principle that the words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise (vide Kania Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan,5 Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal,6 Ibid. Referred to in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gamma of Vedum Vasco De Gama,7. There is no ambiguity in the language of Rule 9 and it does not involve any interpretation.

13. The contention of the learned counsel that the date when the Committee of Management decides to make appointment should be taken as the date for consideration of the eligiblity of the candidate, must, therefore, fail.

14. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the qualification was that the candidate should have passed M.A Examination in the subject concerned. The petitioner had appeared in the examination on 30th April, 1989 and the result was declared on 1st September, 1989 and he was declared passed. The date of the declaration of result will relate back to the date of the examination. He relied upon the decision in Sangam Lal Pandey v. State of U.P . 1990 1 UPLBEC 706..

15. The appellant in para 5 of the petition stated that examination of M.A in Ancient Indian History and Culture was held in the month of April, 1989 and the last paper was held on 30-4-1989 but the result was declared on 1-9-1989. This fact has been denied in para 6 of the counter-affidavit and it was stated that the last paper of Master of Arts in the Ancient Indian History and Culture, conducted by the Kanpur University was held on 13-5-1989. The appellant was a candidate in the said examination conducted by the Kanpur University from K.P College, Allahabad. The respondent has filed photostat copy of the attendance sheet of the 1989 examination demonstrating that the last paper was held on 13-5-1989 and the attendance sheet bears signature of the appellant. This fact has not been denied in para 6 of the rejoinder affidavit. Raghunath Singh died on 11th May, 1989 and the last paper was held on 13th May, 1989. In view of these facts, the appellant cannot claim that he should be treated as declared ‘passed’ on 11th May, 1989 when the examination itself had not been completed by that date. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the respondent No. 6 is senior to the appellant and was entitled to be promoted in preference to him, in case selection is not accepted. It is, however, not necessary to go into that question of fact in the present appeal. We find no infirmity in the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

16. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

17. However, there shall be no order as to costs.