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Ahamad Thambi Maracayar (), v. Basava Maracayar (Petitioner) .

Madras High Court
Oct 10, 1922
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Factual and Procedural Background

This petition arises from an election for the Chairmanship of a municipal body. The Subordinate (lower) Court set aside the election on the ground that a statutory election rule (Rule 4) had been broken: the successful petitioner, whose name had been proposed and seconded, presided at the meeting and conducted the ballot, opened the ballot box, counted the votes and acted as Returning Officer. The petitioner challenged the lower Court's decision by petition to this Court, advancing three main points for review: (1) whether the statutory rules for election of the Chairman were broken; (2) whether, having found they were broken, the lower Court was required to find further that the breach had materially affected the result before setting aside the election; and (3) whether this Court could, in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, interfere with the lower Court's order and, if so, in what manner.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statutory election rules (in particular Rule 4) were broken by a candidate presiding at the meeting and conducting the ballot for an election in which he was a candidate.
  2. If the rules were broken, whether the lower Court was required to find that the breach had "materially affected" the result of the election before it could set the election aside under the applicable Madras Rules.
  3. Whether this Court can, in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, interfere with the lower Court's order where the lower Court allegedly failed to decide the question of material effect, and if so, what relief is appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The lower Court's finding that Rule 4 was broken is vitiated by a fundamental misreading of the statutory rules and therefore is an error of law (i.e., petitioner contended the lower Court misinterpreted the rules).
  • Petitioner argued that the phrase "taking part in a ballot" should be restricted to the mere act of voting and not to presiding or acting as Returning Officer.
  • Petitioner implicitly contended that the lower Court ought to have considered whether any breach materially affected the result; he relied on the absence of any allegation or proof that the result would have been different but for the breach.

Counter-petitioner's Arguments

  • Counter-petitioner argued that the lower Court correctly held Rule 4 to have been broken and relied on authority (Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman, Dacca Municipality) to suggest that where a rule is mandatory its breach can be treated as materially affecting the election.
  • Counter-petitioner suggested that section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act (Act V of 1920) — implying that the Chairman shall preside at every meeting at which he is present — conflicts with Rule 4, and proposed an interpretation of "absence" to include "incapacity" in order to reconcile the provisions.
  • Counter-petitioner argued that the onus of showing that the breach did not affect the election lay on petitioner who violated the rule.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Queen v. Owens; The Queen v. White English law principle that a candidate is precluded from acting as Chairman at an election and is incapable of acting as Returning Officer; if he so acts and is elected, the election is voidable on a petition ad hoc. Wallace, J. cited these English authorities to support the view that Rule 4 (no candidate whose name has been proposed and seconded shall take part in a ballot) prevents a candidate from presiding or acting as Returning Officer; used to uphold the lower Court's factual conclusion that Rule 4 was broken.
Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman, Dacca Municipality Used by counter-petitioner to argue that a breach of a mandatory rule may be treated as materially affecting the result (the Election Rules in Calcutta — possibly following rule 13 of the English Ballot Act — were referred to in that ruling). The Court discussed this authority but distinguished it on the ground that the Madras Rules differ: under the Madras Rules an election is invalid only if "the result of the election has been materially affected thereby," and therefore a breach (even of a mandatory rule) is not automatically treated as material in Madras.
C.K. Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder Held that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to revision of decisions in election inquiries of this kind because the Judge is sitting as a subordinate Court to the High Court. Wallace, J. relied on this bench decision to conclude that section 115 is available to this Court for revision of the Subordinate Judge's order.
Amritrav Krishna Deshpande v. Balkrishna Ganesh Amrapurkar; Kuppuswami Aiyangar v. Narayana Aiyangar; Jhotu Lal Ghose v. Ganouri Sahu; Merwanji Muncherji Cama v. Secretary of State for India Authorities cited for the negative proposition that a mere mistake of fact or law is not, by itself, a "material irregularity" that warrants interference under section 115. Wallace, J. referred to these cases to support the general principle that not every erroneous decision by a Court constitutes a material irregularity for purposes of revision.
Atchayya v. Seetharamachandra Rao; Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari Authorities illustrating that when a mistake has occasioned a wrong assumption or refusal of jurisdiction, section 115 may apply. Used to show the distinction between mere error and errors that affect jurisdiction; supports the Court's framing of "material irregularity."
Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh; Shew Prasad Bungshidhur v. Ram Chunder Haribux Authorities indicating that where a Court has jurisdiction and exercises it wrongly (i.e., gives a wrong decision on fact or law), section 115 cannot be called in aid merely because the decision is wrong. Wallace, J. cited these to reinforce that an erroneous decision alone does not make out material irregularity under section 115.
Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar Authority for the proposition that where jurisdiction has not been exercised or has been illegally or irregularly exercised, section 115 will apply. Wallace, J. invoked this decision to support the conclusion that omission to decide the determinative question in an election petition constituted a material irregularity justifying revision under section 115.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis around the three main points argued on petition.

1. On point (1) — whether Rule 4 was broken — the Court treated the lower Court's finding as a finding of fact. The petitioner argued the lower Court misread the statutory rules (an error of law). Wallace, J. reviewed Rule 4 ("no candidate whose name has been proposed and seconded shall take part in a ballot") and the admitted facts that petitioner presided at the meeting, conducted the ballot, opened the ballot box, counted the votes and acted as Returning Officer. The Judge agreed with the lower Court that this constituted "taking part in a ballot," rejecting petitioner's narrower reading that the phrase referred only to voting. The Court explained that Rule 4 embodied the principle that no person should be a judge in his own cause and cited English authorities (The Queen v. Owens, The Queen v. White) to show that a candidate who so acts is precluded from presiding or acting as Returning Officer and that such an election is voidable on petition.

The Court addressed a suggested conflict between Rule 4 and section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920 (which implies the Chairman shall preside at meetings where he is present). The Court rejected counter-petitioner's interpretive fix (reading "absence" to include "incapacity"), noting that section 18 uses the terms separately. The Court resolved the difficulty by construing "Chairman" in section 28 to include "Chairman-Delegate" where there is no Vice-Chairman, and described the proper procedure: if the Chairman is incapacitated to preside at an election meeting, he should appoint a Chairman-Delegate under section 18, who would preside under section 28. The Court observed a policy concern — that a Chairman appointing his own delegate may not preserve the principle against being judge in one's own cause — but recognized this as the effect of the statutory scheme and rules.

2. On point (2) — whether the lower Court needed to find that the breach had "materially affected" the result — the Court noted that under the Madras Rules (as published in the Fort St. George Gazette, 30 Nov. 1920) non-compliance with the Act or rules can invalidate an election only if "the result of the election has been materially affected thereby." The Court found that the lower Court had nowhere considered this question. The Court contrasted the Madras position with the law applied in Calcutta (as in Shyam Chand Basak), where rules may be wider and more readily render an election invalid if not conducted in accordance with principles. In Madras, whether a breach invalidates an election is a question of fact for the Judge hearing the petition.

The Court emphasized that in the present case counter-petitioner never alleged or proved that the election result would have been different but for the breach; there was no suggestion that petitioner gave any decisive rulings during the ballot that could have affected the result; and the majority in petitioner's favour was overwhelming. Although counter-petitioner argued that the onus lay on petitioner to show the breach did not affect the result, the Court observed that the lower Court never put that issue to petitioner or called on him to prove it; nothing in the record shows the lower Court required evidence on material effect before setting aside the election.

3. On point (3) — whether this Court can interfere in revision — the Court accepted that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to revision of such subordinate Court proceedings (relying on C.K. Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder). The Court then examined the meaning of "material irregularity" in section 115, noting that it is not definable in abstract but must be decided on the facts. The Court summarized relevant authorities to show the distinction between (a) mere mistakes of fact or law (which generally do not constitute material irregularity for revision), and (b) failures to take up or decide a point which affect the Court's jurisdiction or which amount to illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction.

Applying that principle, Wallace, J. found that the Subordinate Judge had failed to decide the determinative question — whether the breach of Rule 4 materially affected the election result — and therefore had no legal basis for setting aside the election. That failure, being central to the Subordinate Judge's jurisdiction to annul the election, amounted to the exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. Because the omission might have altered the outcome (the Subordinate Judge might have decided the question in petitioner's favour and thus would not have set aside the election), intervention by this Court in revision was appropriate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court SET ASIDE the order of the Subordinate Judge under section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and directed the Subordinate Court to re-hear and decide the petition afresh according to law.

Direct consequences and directions given:

  • The Subordinate Judge is directed to re-hear the election petition and to address expressly the question whether the breach of Rule 4 materially affected the result of the election (the question which gives jurisdiction, under the Madras Rules, to set aside an election).
  • If the Subordinate Judge ultimately decides that the election should be annulled, he is to consider, having regard to the amendments introduced by Madras Act I of 1922 into Madras Act V of 1920, whether a fresh election is necessary.
  • Costs of the petition in this Court and up-to-date in the lower Court were ordered to abide the result of the re-hearing.

Broader implications: The decision applies existing principles concerning revision under section 115 — distinguishing mere error from material irregularity where a subordinate Court has omitted to decide the determinative factual question conferring jurisdiction. The Court did not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Wallace, J.:— Three main points have been argued on this petition, (1) whether the statutory rules for the election of the Chairman were broken, (2) whether having found that they were broken the lower Court was not bound to find further that breach had materially affected the result of the election, before it could set aside the election, (3) whether if the Court has neglected so to find, this Court can, and, if it can, will, interfere in revision, and in what manner it should so interfere.

As to point (1) whether the election rules have been broken, the lower Court's finding appears to me to be a finding of fact, which in revision, this Court will not ordinarily disturb. It is pleaded for petitioner that the lower Court's finding is vitiated by a fundamental misreading of the rules which are statutory rules, i.e, that it is based on an error of law. Rule 4 lays down that:

“no candidate whose name has been proposed and seconded shall take part in a ballot.”

It is admitted that petitioner, whose name had been duly proposed and seconded, himself presided at the meeting and conducted the ballot, opened the ballot box, counted the votes and acted as Returning Officer. I am in full agreement with the lower Court that this is “taking part in a ballot,” and that phrase is not restricted, as petitioner argues, to the mere act of voting. The rule has clearly been framed to carry out the salutary principle that no man shall be a Judge in his own cause, and that it should not be in the power of one vitally interested in the result to decide on such questions intimately affecting the result, e.g, the validity of a particular vote, as the officer presiding at the ballot has to decide. The English Law on this subject, is quite plain, see The Queen v. Owens, The Queen v. White and other cases cited on page 115 of Volume III of Rogers on Elections 18th Edition, viz., that a candidate is precluded from acting as Chairman at an election and is incapable of acting as a Returning Officer, and that if he so acts and is elected, his election is voidable on petition ad hoc. Rule 4, I have no doubt, was designed to carry out the principle of English Law.

I have no doubt then that in this case rule 4 was broken, and that the lower Court did not misinterpret the rules or the law relating to elections when it held so. It has been urged before me that this rule 4 seems to be in direct contravention of section 28 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, Act V of 1920, which implies that at every meeting of the Council at which the Chairman is present, he shall preside. The difficulty is not met in my opinion by counter-petitioner's suggestion of interpreting “absence” as including “incapacity.” These two words are in fact uses in section 18 separately and as not implying each other, and if the incapacity of the Chairman to preside had been contemplated in section 28, similar language to that used in section 18 could have been employed. Section 30(4) has been obviously misread by the lower Court and has no application to the present point. The difficulty however is resolved by holding that the word “Chairman” in section 28 includes “Chairman-Delegate” in cases where there is no Vice-Chairman, and in fact it is clear that one must hold so, otherwise the “Chairman-Delegate” could not preside at meetings at all, a, reductio ad absurdum. The proper procedure then in cases like the present is that the Chairman, being incapacitated from fulfilling his duty of presiding at the election meeting, should under section 18 appoint a Chairman-Delegate, who, under section 28, would preside at the meeting. Whether the salutary principle that a man should not be a Judge in his own cause is preserved by a procedure which allows him to appoint his own Judge in his cause may well be doubted, but that is, so far as I can see, the result of the present procedure as laid down in the Act and the statutory rules.

Be that as it may, the difficulty does not alter the fact that petitioner committed a breach of the election rules in presiding at the meeting and taking part in the ballot-for the election at which he was a candidate. It does not, however, at all follow that the lower Court's order setting aside the election was correct. Here I come to the second point argued before me. Under the statutory rules for the decision of election disputes published in the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 30th November 1920, page 607, non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or rules made thereunder can invalidate an election only if

“the result of the election has been materially affected thereby.”

To that question the lower Court has, in my opinion, nowhere given its attention. Counter-petitioner argues that since the lower Court holds that the rule broken was a mandatory provision, it must be deemed to have held that the result of the election was materially affected, and relies on the ruling in Shyam Chand Basak v. Chairman, Dacca Municipality. What the Election Rules in Calcutta are, has not been stated before me. If they follow rule 13 of the English Ballot Act of 1872 as quoted at page 532 of that ruling, they are wider in principle than the rules in Madras, for under rule 13 an election conducted “not in accordance with the principles laid down in the body of the Act may be declared invalid.” Under the Madras Rules no breach of the rules, whether mandatory or directory, shall invalidate an election: unless the result of the election has been materially affected by such breach. It is not an axiom then in this Presidency that the breach of a mandatory rule will so affect an election. It is a question of fact to be decided and found by the Judge who hears the election petition.

It was the more necessary for the lower Court to have decided this question in this case, as it was never even alleged much less attempted to be proved by counter-petitioner, that the result of the election would have been different had the rules not been broken, and there is no suggestion that when the ballot was going on, the petitioner had to give and did give a decision on any point which could have affected the result of the ballot, and the majority of votes in his favour was overwhelming. Counter-petitioner argues that the onus of showing that the breach did not affect the election lay on petitioner who had violated the rule. Granting so, it is still clear that the lower Court never put that issue before petitioner or called on him to prove it, while obviously it was unnecessary for petitioner to go out of his way to set out any rebuttal to a case never stated by counter-petitioner in his objection petition to the lower Court.

The lower Court has thus neglected to put to itself and to the parties the question it had to decide before under the rules it had any legal power to set aside the election. I therefore come to the third point argued, viz., whether this Court can, and if it can, with interfere in revision. That in a matter of this kind this Court has power to interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been lately decided by a Bench of this Court, in C.K. Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder. I need not recapitulate the ratio decidendi of the decisions of their Lordships Krishnan and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., on this point, with which I respectfully agree. They hold that, when dealing with an election inquiry of this kind, the Judge is sitting as a Court subordinate to this Court and therefore section 115 applies.

Is the present case one then in which this Court should interfere on revision? The phrase in section 115 which can be called in aid by petitioner is—

“if such subordinate Court appears to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity.”

A good deal of discussion has centred round this point and many cases have been cited to me for the purpose of showing in what sort or class of cases High Courts in India and in England have acted in revision. I need not deal with these cases in detail since they all lead to the same conclusion that what is a “material irregularity” is a matter in itself undefinable and must be decided on the facts in each case. So far as it may be negatively defined, it is not a mere mistake of fact or law; see [Amritrav Krishna Deshpande v. Balkrishna Ganesh Amrapurkar, Kuppuswami Aiyangar v. Narayana Aiyangar, Jhotu Lal Ghose v. Ganouri Sahu, Merwanji Muncherji Cama v. Secretary of State for India], unless that mistake has occasioned a wrong assumption or refusal of jurisdiction [Atchayya v. Seetharamachandra Rao, Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari] since a Court which has jurisdiction to decide a case on a point of fact or law has jurisdiction to give a wrong as well as a right decision on either point. Thus where there is jurisdiction and that jurisdiction has been exercised merely wrongly so as to eventuate in a wrong decision on fact or law, section 115 cannot be called in aid; see Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh and Shew Prasad Bungshidhur v. Ram Chunder Haribux. But when there is jurisdiction and that jurisdiction has not been exercised or has been illegally or irregularly exercised, section 115 will apply; see Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar.

I take the general principle to be this, that when a Court has taken up a point of fact or law for decision and has decided that point wrongly, it has acted with full jurisdiction and regularly and legally, and no revision lies unless that decision itself affects the Court's own jurisdiction; but that when, having jurisdiction, the Court has failed or refused or take up the point for decision, it has exercised its jurisdiction irregularly, and the more the failure or refusal affects the exercise of its jurisdiction, the greater the irregularity will be.

Applying that principle to the present case, and recalling my conclusions that the lower Court has omitted to decide whether the result of the election was materially affected by the breach of the rules, i.e, to decide the one point in this case which gave it jurisdiction to set aside the election, I cannot come to any other conclusion than that the Subordinate Judge exercised his jurisdiction with material irregularity. Clearly he exercised it irregularly, since he had no legal basis on which to set aside the election and overlooked the one factor which alone gave him jurisdiction to set it aside and clearly the irregularity was material, because it may well be that if he had decided that question, his decision might have been in petitioner's favour, and then he would not have set aside the election.

I, therefore, under section 115(c) set aside the lower Court's order and direct it to re-hear and decide afresh the petition before it according to law. In doing so, the Subordinate Judge will consider, if he decides that the election should be annulled, whether having regard to the amendments introduced by Madras Act I of 1922 into Madras Act V of 1920, a fresh election is necessary. It is a point I have not heard at length in this Court.

Costs in this petition and up-to-date in the lower Court will abide the result.

N.R