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Sheik Ibrahim Tharagan And Anr. v. K.R. Rama Iyer And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, acting as the manager of an undivided Hindu family, instituted a suit to enforce payment on a mortgage bond executed by defendants Nos. 1 to 15. The bond stood in the name of the 16th defendant, the plaintiff's eldest son. Defendants Nos. 1 to 15 pleaded that the debt was due to the 16th defendant alone, and they alleged that they had paid Rs. 650 to the 16th defendant prior to the suit and, after the suit, deposited the total amount due in the South Indian Bank, from which the 16th defendant could draw on executing an indemnity bond. The 16th defendant claimed the debt as his own and asserted that the family had been partitioned on 17 December 1904. The Subordinate Judge found that no partition had occurred, that the bond though in the 16th defendant's name was for the benefit of the family, that the Rs. 650 payment and the bank deposit were not bona fide but collusive, and accordingly decreed the plaintiff's claim in full. Defendants (the debtors) appealed, limiting their appeal formally to the disallowance of credit for the Rs. 650, to the award of interest after the deposit, and to the plaintiff's costs; however, the appeal implicated all issues decided below. The appellate court heard the points and delivered the opinion summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the alleged partition of the family, relied on by the 16th defendant to claim the debt as his own, was proved.
- Whether the payment of Rs. 650 to the 16th defendant prior to the suit and the subsequent deposit in the South Indian Bank were bona fide and binding on the plaintiff and the undivided family.
- Whether payment to one of several joint creditors operates in law as a valid payment to all joint creditors (i.e., whether payment to the 16th defendant could bind the whole family).
- Whether a suit by the managing member of an undivided Hindu family can be maintained without joining all members of the family as plaintiffs (i.e., the manager's right to sue on behalf of the family).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants / Appellants (summary of their positions)
- Defendants Nos. 1 to 15 contended that the debt was due to the 16th defendant alone and not to the family.
- They asserted that they had paid Rs. 650 to the 16th defendant prior to institution of the suit, producing a receipt dated the day before the suit, and that they later deposited the full amount due in the South Indian Bank for the 16th defendant to draw on providing an indemnity.
- Mr. Seshagiri Aiyar (for the appellants) argued that, regardless of the exact date of payment, payment to one of several joint creditors must in law be deemed a valid payment to all, relying on Barbar Maran v. Ramanna Gounden.
- One defence raised was that the family had been divided (partition) on 17 December 1904, a contention advanced by the 16th defendant.
Plaintiff / Respondent (summary of their positions)
- The plaintiff, as manager, maintained that the bond though in the 16th defendant's name was taken for the benefit of the undivided family.
- The plaintiff's case was that the Rs. 650 payment and the bank deposit were not bona fide but resulted from collusion between the 16th defendant and defendants Nos. 1 to 15 to defraud other family members and to support the 16th defendant's claim.
- The plaintiff produced the bond in court and relied on documentary correspondence and Exhibit C to show earlier demands and dealings demonstrating that the payments/deposit were not in good faith.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Barbar Maran v. Ramanna Gounden (1897) I.L.R. 20 M. 461 | Authority that payment to one of several joint creditors may operate as payment to all (relied on by appellants). | The court observed that this decision might support the appellants but noted its authority had been weakened by subsequent rulings; further, in that case the payment was said to be unaffected by fraud, whereas in the present case the court found fraud/collusion. |
| Veerasawmi Naicker v. Ibramsa Rowthen (1909) 19 M.L.J. 221 | Subsequent authority that weakens the rule in Barbar Maran; supports the view that fraudulent payment to one creditor will not bind all. | The court cited it as part of later rulings that limit Barbar Maran and to support the proposition that fraudulent payments do not bind the whole family. |
| Ramasami v. Muniyandi (1910) 20 M.L.J. 709 | Cited as one of the later rulings that lessen the authority of Barbar Maran. | Used to show subsequent judicial development undermining a broad application of Barbar Maran. |
| Husaimunissa Begum v. Rahimunissa Begum (1910) 13 C.L.J. 3 | Listed among authorities on the payment-to-one-creditor point. | Referred to as part of the body of authorities that qualify the rule cited from Barbar Maran. |
| Ramaswami Chetti v. Manicka Mudali (1899) 9 M.L.J. 155 | Decision proceeding on ground that the bond stood in the name of one member only; payment to him operates as discharge. | Court noted it does not support the appellant's contention in this case because it rests on the special fact that the bond was in one member's name. |
| Adaikkalam Chetti v. Marimuthu (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 326 | Similar to Ramaswami Chetti: payment to the named member where bond stood in his name operates as discharge. | Court observed this case does not assist the appellants' general contention; it proceeds on the special fact of the bond being in one name. |
| Baikunth Nath Chakrabarti v. Har Lal Pal Chowdhry (1911) 13 C.L.J. 234 | Discussion (by Mukerjee J.) of authorities on whether payment to one joint creditor binds all; addresses fraud exception. | Cited to support the proposition that a fraudulent payment to one creditor does not bind the others; court relied on this analysis. |
| Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 7, p. 456, para 930 | Textual authority supporting the proposition that fraudulent payment will not bind other joint creditors. | Referenced as supportive doctrinal authority for the fraud exception to the rule that payment to one creditor binds all. |
| Piercy v. Fynny (1871) L.R. 12 Eq. 69 | English authority referenced on the same point (fraud exception). | Used as an illustrative authority supporting the court's view that fraudulent payments do not bind joint creditors. |
| Kishen Prasad v. Har Narain Singh (1911) 21 M.L.J. 378 (P.C.) | Privy Council decision holding that the managing member of a family carrying on business has the right to sue without joining all members; approves Arunachala. | The court regarded this decision as practically settling the question and relied on it to uphold the plaintiff-manager's right to sue on behalf of the family. |
| K.P. Kanna Pishardoy v. V.M. Narayana Somayajipad (1881) I.L.R. 3 M. 234 | Held that agents of a sabhayogam (an artificial religious assembly) could not maintain a suit in their own names for ejectment; discussed as a contrasting authority. | The court distinguished that case from the managing-member-of-family situation and noted its limited application to artificial associations, not to family management. |
| Arunachala Pillai v. Vythilinga Mudaliar (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27 | Held that a suit for possession of family property could be maintained by the managing member alone in his representative capacity. | The court treated this as a foundational authority supporting the manager's right to sue and noted that the Privy Council approved this decision. |
| Viraragavamma v. Samudrala (1885) I.L.R. 8 M. 208 | Applied the principle that the managing member could sue for family property. | Cited as one of several cases applying the Arunachala principle. |
| Ramakrishna v. Namasivaya (1884) I.L.R. 7 M. 295 | Applied the managing-member principle. | Included in the list of cases supporting the manager's right to litigate on behalf of the family. |
| Muthia v. Virammal (1886) I.L.R. 10 M. 283 | Applied the same managing-member principle. | Listed as part of the body of Madras cases adopting the Arunachala principle. |
| Guruvappa v. Thimmanna (1887) I.L.R. 10 M. 16 | Applied the managing-member principle. | Cited among decisions where the managing member's representative capacity was recognized. |
| Ramayya v. Venkataratnam (1893) I.L.R. 17 M. 122 | Held that omission to include other family members as plaintiffs when the suit is by the managing member is to be treated as an error or misdescription. | Referred to as supportive of the view that suits by a managing member without all family members named may nevertheless be valid. |
| Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (1894) I.L.R. 18 M. 33 | Held a suit bad for failing to make all family members plaintiffs before limitation expired; relied on partnership reasoning in that context. | The court treated this decision as distinguishable (on partnership grounds) and noted it had been relied upon in some decisions that opposed the Arunachala line. |
| Imamudin v. Liladhar (1892) I.L.R. 14 A. 524 | Authority referenced alongside Romsebuk/Ramsebuk on partnership cases where all partners must join. | Used to illustrate that partnership cases require all partners to join, which is distinguishable from the manager-of-family situation. |
| Angamuthu Pillai v. Kolandavelu Pillai (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 190 | Held that a managing member alone could not maintain a suit for recovery of land even if suing for the whole family. | Noted as a decision contrary to the Arunachala line in certain contexts (land), forming part of the conflicting authorities survey. |
| Seshan Pattar v. Veera Raghavan Pattar (1909) I.L.R. 32 M. 284 | Addressed manager's right to sue for money on behalf of the whole family; preferred the Alagappa Chetti rule over Arunachala in that decision. | Cited as an example of conflicting Madras decisions; court noted some cases were not brought before that court. |
| Vadilal v. Shah Kushal (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 157 | Upheld the Arunachala rule that the managing member can sue. | Referred to as supporting the managing-member's right to sue. |
| Kalidas Kevid Das v. Nathu Bhagavan (1883) I.L.R. 7 B. 217 | Held a contrary view to the Arunachala principle in some jurisdictions. | Listed as part of the contrary authorities in the survey. |
| Balakrishna Moreshwar Kunte v. Municipality of Mahad (1885) I.L.R. 10 B. 32 | Another decision adopting a contrary position to Arunachala. | Noted as part of conflicting decisions. |
| Radho Proshad Wasti v. Esuf I.L.R. 7 C. 414 | Decision described as not in accordance with Arunachala. | Included in the survey of divergent authorities. |
| Pateshri Partap Naran Singh v. Rudra Narain Singh (1904) I.L.R. 26 A. 528 | Allahabad decision supporting the manager's right to sue on behalf of the family. | Referred to as an authority supportive of the managing-member's locus to sue. |
| Shamrathi Singh v. Kishen Prasad (1907) I.L.R. 29 A. 311 | Allahabad court held managing member could not maintain a suit for trade-related recoveries without joining all members; later reversed by the Privy Council in Kishen Prasad. | Cited to show the conflict of authority later resolved by the Privy Council decision in Kishen Prasad. |
| Ghirdhari Lal v. Kantoo Lal (1894) 14 B.L.R. 187 (P.C.) | Established that a creditor could proceed against the father or managing member alone and bind the family property. | Referred to as part of the line of authorities upholding the manager's representative power to bind the family. |
| Ittachan v. Valappan (1885) I.L.R. 8 M. 484 | Case concerning a Malabar tarwad manager, supporting the manager's right to sue or be sued on behalf of the family. | Cited to show consistent recognition of manager's representative powers in Malabar law; court saw no reason to distinguish Malabar families from others on this point. |
| Romsebuk v. Randall (1881) I.L.R. 6 C. 815 (also cited as Ramsebuk / Ram Lal Koondoo) | Partnership-business authority: all partners must join in suits relating to partnership business; distinguished from family-manager suits. | Used to illustrate that partnership cases are different and that the rule requiring all partners to join does not govern a managing member of a Hindu family suing in a representative capacity. |
| Alagappa Chatty v. Vellian Chetty (variant citation of Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti) (1894) I.L.R. 18 M. 33 | Decision treated as distinguishing cases where the plaintiff was not shown to be the managing member or sole proprietor. | The court noted the Privy Council distinguished that decision on facts and did not regard it as barring the manager's right in general. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (A) factual findings about partition and the payments/deposit, and (B) legal questions about the effect of payment to one creditor and the plaintiff-manager's locus to sue.
(A) Factual findings — partition and bona fides of payment/deposit
- Partition: The court held unanimously that the asserted partition by the 16th defendant was not proved. The only oral evidence was the 16th defendant's own testimony; there was no formal instrument of partition. Exhibit III (a yadast) authorised the 16th defendant to conduct the family trade and contained other provisions, but both its language and the deposition demonstrated that negotiations for division were incomplete and the family remained undivided. The court observed that the 16th defendant did not contend the debt belonged to him if the family remained undivided.
- Payment and deposit: The court affirmed the Subordinate Judge's view that the payment of Rs. 650 and the later bank deposit were not bona fide and were part of collusion between defendants Nos. 1–15 and the 16th defendant to defraud other family members. The court relied on documentary and testimonial evidence: (i) a false statement by the 4th defendant claiming ignorance of the plaintiff until just before the suit; (ii) Exhibit C showing prior demand by the plaintiff months before the bond; (iii) the bond (Exhibit A) had been taken by the plaintiff (in the 16th defendant's absence) and produced by him in court; and (iv) the correspondence culminating in the deposit revealed that defendants attempted to exploit family differences, issued a notice of readiness to pay on 4 June 1906 (Exhibit XI), and failed to act in good faith to extinguish the debt prior to suit. The chronology: correspondence ended 30 June 1906; suit instituted 2 July 1906; summonses taken to defendants' residence 15 July 1906 (not served); deposit made 18 July 1906. The Rs. 650 receipt bears the date 1 July 1906 (the day before suit), but the court agreed with the lower court that the circumstances point to antedating of the receipt and that defendants failed to produce day-books which would likely demonstrate the true date of any payment.
(B) Legal analysis — payment to one creditor and manager's right to sue
- Payment to one of several joint creditors: Mr. Seshagiri Aiyar argued that payment to one creditor binds all, relying on Barbar Maran. The court acknowledged that Barbar Maran could be read to support that proposition but held that subsequent rulings (citing Veerasawmi Naicker, Ramasami, Husaimunissa Begum, and others) have considerably qualified that authority. Crucially, the court emphasized the fraud exception: even if payment to one of several joint creditors could operate as payment to all in some circumstances, the rule would not apply where the payment was fraudulently made to one creditor and not for the benefit of all. The court cited Baikunth Nath Chakrabarti (Mukerjee J.'s discussion), Veerasami Naicker, Halsbury, and Piercy v. Fynny in support of this limitation, and concluded that the payments here, found to be collusive and fraudulent, could not bind the plaintiff or his family.
- Manager's right to sue without joining all family members: The court acknowledged conflicting authorities in various High Courts and traced the case-law. It identified Arunachala Pillai v. Vythilinga Mudaliar and a line of Madras cases supporting the managing member's right to sue as representative of an undivided family. It contrasted these with other decisions (e.g., K.P. Kanna Pisharody, Alagappa Chetti) and partnership authorities where all partners must join. The court regarded the Privy Council decision in Kishen Prasad v. Har Narain Singh as having practically settled the issue in favour of the managing member's right to sue: the Privy Council approved Arunachala and distinguished cases concerning mere co-owners or partnership, holding that a manager of a family business can make contracts and sue in his own name without joining all family members. The court concluded that the manager of a Hindu family does have the substantive power (under Hindu law) to represent the family in suits and that statutory procedural rules and partnership cases do not override that substantive principle.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appellate court affirmed the Subordinate Judge's decree and dismissed the appeal with costs. It also dismissed the 16th defendant's memorandum of objections to being made liable with defendants Nos. 1–15 for the plaintiff's costs, awarding costs against him as well.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The decree below (in favour of the plaintiff-manager for the full amount claimed on the mortgage bond) is affirmed. The defendants' asserted set-offs/credits (the Rs. 650 payment and the bank deposit) were held not to be bona fide and therefore do not reduce the plaintiff's recovery. The 16th defendant is held jointly liable with defendants Nos. 1–15 for the plaintiff's costs because the court found collusion between them to assert an exclusive claim by the 16th defendant.
- No broader new precedent was announced: The court applied and reconciled existing authority (including the Privy Council's decision in Kishen Prasad) to resolve the disputed legal points; the opinion does not claim to create a new rule but confirms the fraud exception to the payment-to-one-creditor rule and the established principle that a managing member can, in appropriate circumstances, sue in his representative capacity.
Disposition
DISMISSED WITH COSTS. The appeal and the 16th defendant's memorandum of objections are dismissed; the Subordinate Judge's decree and directions (including costs against the debtors and the 16th defendant) are affirmed.
1. The suit from which this appeal was preferred was instituted by the plaintiff as the manager of an undivided Hindu family to enforce payment of the amount due on a mortgage bond executed by defendants Nos. 1 to 15. The 16th defendant in whose name the bond stood is the eldest of the three sons of the plaintiff, and was brought in as a party on account of the plea of defendants Nos. 1 to 15 that the debt was due to him alone and not to his family. They also pleaded that they had paid to the 16th defendant, prior to the suit, a sum of Rs. 650 towards the interest due on the bond, and that, subsequent to the suit, they deposited the total amount due on the bond with the South Indian Bank, which amount the 16th defendant was at liberty to draw on executing a bond to indemnify them against any claims that might be made by the other members of his family. The 16th defendant also claimed the debt as his own and set up that the family became divided on the 17th December 1904. The Subordinate Judge held that no division took place as alleged by the 16th defendant; that, although the bond was executed in the 16th defendant's name, it was really taken by the plaintiff for the benefit of the family; that the payment of Rs. 650 was not made prior to the suit, and that both the payment and the deposit were not bona fide acts but the result of collusion between the defendants Nos. 1 to 15 and the 16th defendant with a view to defraud the other members of thei6th defendant's family, and he accordingly decreed the whole of the claim made in the plaint.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the debtors. It is confined to the Subordinate Judge's disallowance of credit for the Rs. 650 alleged to have been paid to the 16th defendant prior to the suit and to the award of interest on the principal amount subsequent to the deposit made by the debtors in the South Indian Bank and of the plaintiff's costs against the debtors; but the points involved in appeal relate to all the questions decided by the Subordinate Judge.
3. We have no hesitation in concurring with the Subordinate Judge that the partition set up by the 16th defendant is not proved. There is no formal instrument of partition and the only oral evidence adduced to prove it is the testimony of the 16th defendant himself. He relies on Exhibit III, a yadast executed in his favor by his father, the plaintiff, authorising him to conduct the trade of the family at Cochin and Kottayam, and containing certain other provisions with respect to that trade as well as with respect to his right in the rest of the property belonging to the family. But the language of the instrument and the 16th defendant's deposition both show that though some negotiations went on for effecting a division they were never completed and that the family continued undivided. It is not contended by the 16th defendant that the debt belonged to himself if the family did not become divided.
4. The next question for decision is whether the payment and the deposit pleaded were made bona fide by the debtors and are binding on the family. On this question also we confirm the findings of the Subordinate Judge. The 4th defendant, when examined, as a witness, swore that he was not aware of the existence of the plaintiff at all till shortly before the suit, but this is an absolute falsehood. Defendants Nos. 1 to 15 had dealings with the plaintiff's family for a considerable time before the execution of the bond Exhibit A. Exhibit C shows that some months before the date of Exhibit A the plaintiff demanded payment of the amount due by the defendants but they were unable to pay. The bond itself was taken from the defendants by the plaintiff himself in the absence of the 16th defendant and it was produced in court by the plaintiff. The correspondence between the debtors and the 16th defendant which culminated in the payment and deposit in question began with an attempt on the part of the debtors to take advantage of the differences in the creditor's family. They gave the 16th defendant notice on the 4th of June 1906 (Exhibit XI) that they were ready to pay the amount of the debt, and the 16th defendant had failed to go to them as promised with the mortgage bond for the purpose of receiving the money and making an endorsement of discharge thereon. The subsequent correspondence, fully set out in the judgment of the lower Court, shows that they were apprised of the fact that the 16th defendant was not in possession of the bond; that in consequence they demanded of him, and he agreed to give them, a bond of indemnity instead, and that the 16th defendant, discovering their device, charged them with making a mere make-believe assertion of readiness to pay without being in possession of the money required for payment. This correspondence ended on the 30th June 1906. The plaintiff launched his suit on the 2nd of July 1906. Summonses in the suit were taken to the residence of the defendants on the 15th July 1906, but were not served on them on that date. They then deposited most of the amount due on the 18th of July 1906 in the South Indian Bank. They state that on the 1st July 1906, that is, on the day previous to the institution of the suit, they had paid Rs. 650 to the 16th defendant and produce a receipt bearing that date for the amount. We agree with the Subordinate Judge that the circumstances of the case are in favour of the conclusion that the payment was not really made on that date and that the receipt was antedated so as to secure evidence of payment before the institution of the suit. We concur with him also in the reasons given for his finding. We may add that the defendants have not produced their day-books which must presumably have been written up from day to day and would, therefore, be strong evidence of the actual date of payment.
5. Mr. Seshagiri Aiyar has argued two questions of law arising on these findings. He contends that whenever the payment may have been made it was binding on the plaintiff, as payment to one of several joint creditors must in law be deemed a valid payment to all, and he relies on the decision in Barbar Maran v. Ramanna Gounden (1897) I.L.R. 20 M. 461. That decision may be taken to support his contention, but the' authority of that decision has been considerably shaken by subsequent rulings of this court. See Veerasawmi Naicker v. Ibramsa Rowthen (1909) 19 M.L.J. 221 and Ramasami v. Muniyandi (1910) 20 M.L.J. 709. See also Husaimunissa Begum v. Rahimunissa Begum (1910) 13 C.L.J. 3. The cases of Ramaswami Chetti v. Manicka Mudali (1899) 9 M.L.J. 155 and Adaikkalam Chetti v. Marimuthu (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 326 do not really support the appellant's contention as they proceed on the ground that as the bond stood in the name of one member only of the family, payment to him would operate as a valid discharge. We do not, however, consider it necessary to decide the point in this case as the evidence shows clearly that the payment to the 16th defendant and the deposit were not made for the benefit of the plaintiff's family but was tendered to defraud its members other than the 16th defendant and in collusion with him to support his undivided claim to the amount due under the bond. Assuming that the payment to one of several joint creditors will in law operate as payment to them all, there can be no doubt that the rule will not apply where the payment is fraudulently made to one of the creditors and not for the benefit of them all. That question has recently been fully discussed by Mukerjee J. in Baikunth Nath Chakrabarti v. Har Lal Pal Chowdhry (1911) 13 C.L.J. 234 where the authorities on the point have been fully considered. This Court has held the same view in Veerasami Naicker v. Ibramsa Rowthen (1909) 19 M.L.J. 221 See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 7, p. 456, para 930 and Piercy v. Fynny (1871) L.R. 12 Eq. 69. In Barbar Maran v. Ramanna Gounden (1897) I.L.R. 20 M. 461, it was observed that the payment in the case was unaffected by fraud. We are, therefore, of opinion that the payment and deposit in this case could not bind the plaintiff or his family.
6. The other contention of law argued is that as the debt belongs to all the members of the family and as two of the plaintiff's sons are not parties to this suit either as plaintiffs or as defendants, the suit is not maintainable. It is not denied that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff in his capacity as manager of the family; but this, it is argued, is insufficient. There has been considerable conflict of authority in the Indian courts on the point raised, but we are of opinion that the decision of the Privy Council in Kishen Prasad v. Har Narain Singh (1911) 21 M.L.J. 378 (P.C.) has practically settled the point. Before referring to their Lordships' judgment and considering its effect, it may be desirable to refer very briefly to the state of the case-law in this High Court. In K.P. Kanna Pishardoy v. V.M. Narayana Somayajipad (1881) I.L.R. 3 M. 234 it was held, with reference' to a sabhayogam or assembly of religious Brahmins in Malabar, that some amongst their members appointed as agents for the management of the property of the assembly could not maintain a suit in their own names for ejectment of a person in unlawful possession of its property. It will be observed that the sabhayogam was merely an artificial combination of persons and that its agents possessed no powers under the law of the country, but derived them solely from their appointment as agents by the 'sabhayogam. It is, no doubt, well-established law that a mere agent cannot maintain a suit in his own name with respect to property belonging to his principal, whatever powers of management he may have in regard to it. In Arunachala v. Vythilinga (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27 this Court decided that a suit for possession of family property could be maintained by the managing member alone in his capacity as managing member. The same principle was applied in several subsequent cases where the question was whether a decree against a managing member in his representative capacity would be binding on the family. See Viraragavamma v. Samudrala (1885) I.L.R. 8 M. 208; Ramakrishna v. Namasivaya (1884) I.L.R. 7 M. 295; Muthia v. Virammal (1886) I.L.R. 10 M. 283; Guruvappa v. Thimmanna (1887) I.L.R. 10 M. 16. In Ramayya v. Venkataratnam (1893) I.L.R. 17 M. 122 it was held that when a suit is instituted by the managing member as such, the omission to include the other members of the family as plaintiffs would be regarded only as an error error or misdescription, and the suit would be considered as properly laid. In Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (1894) I.L.R. 18 M. 33, on the other hand, a suit was held to be bad on the ground that all the members of the family, to whom the money sued to be recovered belonged had not been made plaintiffs before the period of limitation to the institution had expired. But the decision seems to be based on the ground that all the members of the family were carrying on a partnership trade and that in such a case all the partners should join as plaintiffs. And reliance was placed on Romsebuk v. Randall (1881) I.L.R. 6 C. 815 which was also a case of partnership business carried on by the members of a family. See also Imamudin v. Liladhar (1892) I.L.R. 14 A. 524. In Adaikkalam Chetti v. Marimuthu (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 326 a suit by the managing members alone was sustained. But this decision may perhaps be regarded as proceeding on the special ground that the bond sued on was in the name of the managing member only. In Angamuthu Pillai v. Kolandavelu Pillai (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 190 a suit for the recovery of land was held to be not maintainable by the managing member alone even if it appeared that he was suing to enforce the right of the whole family. The question arose again in Seshan Pattar v. Veer a Raghavan Pattar (1909) I.L.R. 32 M. 284 with respect to the manager's right to sue for money on behalf of the whole family. In that case the rule laid down in Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (1894) I.L.R. 18 M. 33 was preferred to the proposition laid down in Arunachala Pillai v. Vythelinga Mudaliar (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27, but several of the other Madras cases referred to above were apparently not brought to the notice of the court. The rule laid down in Arunachala Pillai v. Vythilinga Mudaliar (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27 was upheld in Vadilal v. Shah Kushal (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 157 although in two previous cases - Kali das Kevid Das v. Nathu Bhagavan (1883) I.L.R. 7 B. 217 and Balakrishna Moreshwar Kunte v. The Municipality of Mahad (1885) I.L.R. 10 B. 32 - a contrary view had been held, and the latter case had expressly followed K.P. Kanna Pisharody v. V.M. Narayanan Somayajipad (1881) I.L.R. 3 M. 234. The ruling in Radho Proshad Wasti v. Esuf I.L.R. 7 C. 414 was not accordance with Arunachala Pillai v. Vythelinga Mudaliar (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27. The Alahabad Court in Pateshri Partap Naran Singh v Rudra Narain Singh (1904) I.L.R. 26 A. 528 supported the manager's right to sue on behalf of the family; but in. Shamrathi Singh v. Kishen Prasad (1907) I.L.R. 29 A. 311 that court held that the managing member of a family carrying on a trade on its behalf could not maintain a suit to recover moneys due from third persons in connection with the trade without making all the members as plaintiffs. The decision of the Privy Council referred to above was passed on appeal from the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the last case. The Judicial Committee upheld the manager's right to sue. Their Lordships appproved of the decision in Arunachala Pillai v. Vythilinga Mudaliar (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27 and observed that the rule laid down in K.P. Kanna Pisharodi v. Narayanan Somayajipad (1881) I.L.R. 3 M. 234 was not applicable "to the members of a business carried on for an undivided Hindu joint family" and distinguished the case from that of mere co-owners as K.P. Kanna Piskarodi v. Narayanan Somayajipad (1881) I.L.R. 3 M. 234. They also explained Ramsebuk v. Ram Lal Koondoo (1881) I.L.R. 6 C. 815 and Imamudin v. Liladhar (1892) I.L.R. 14 A. 524 as resting on the ground that all who are trading as partners must join in a suit relating to the partnership business and observed that the other members of the family interested in the partnership business need not be joined as plaintiffs. The case of Alagappa Chatty v. Vellian Chetty (1894) I.L.R. 18 M. 33 was distinguished on the ground that the single plaintiff in that case was not shown to be the managing member of the family or to be the only partner or proprietor of the business with which the litigation was concerned." Their Lordships concluded as follows : - "In the opinion of their Lordships, the original plaintiffs in this case were entitled, as the sole managers of the family business, to make in their own names the contracts which gave rise to the claim and that they properly sued on such contracts without joining the other members of the family." It is clear to us that their Lordships' decision is not based on the ground that the contract was sued on in the name of the actual plaintiffs only as they expressly approved of the judgment in Arunachala Pillai v. Vythilinga Mudaliar (1882) I.L.R. 6 M. 27 and distinguished it from the case of mere co-owners. In fact, the Privy Council had even previously to their decision in the above case, practically upheld the right of the managing member to represent the family in litigation. A long line of cases beginning with Ghirdhari Lal v. Kantoo Lal (1894) 14 B.L.R. 187 (P.C.) establish the right of a creditor of a Hindu family to proceed against the father or other managing member of the family alone and to effectively bind the whole family property, including the sharers of those not actually parties to the litigation. It need hardly be said that a decree against a mere agent, or guardian of an infant, or a sale in execution of such decree could not bind the principal or the minor, for a suit cannot be instituted against the agent or the guardian as the representative of the principal or the minor. The reason why a decree against the manager of a family in his representative capacity is binding on the whole family is, that amongst the powers which he has according to Hindu Law as manager must be included the power of representing the family in suits, This view has for a long time been consistently held in the case of the manager of a tarwad in Malabar whether governed by the Marumakkathayam law or Makkathayam law - Ittachan v. Valappan (1885) I.L.R. 8 M. 484, Barbar Maran v. Ramana Gounden (1897) I.L.R. 20 M. 461. There is no reason why a difference should be made between a joint family in Malabar and one elsewhere with respect to the right of the manager to sue or be sued on behalf of the family, the only distinction between the two being that a member of a Malabar family has no right to compel a partition of the family property. The ordinary rule no doubt is that all persons in whom the right to any relief exists should be joined as plaintiffs. But this rule is not of universal application. The language of Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, corresponding to Order I, Rule 1, of the present code, is "that all persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative." Section 30 of the Code of 1882, corresponding to Order I, Rule 8, lays down the general rule of procedure where one or more persons wish to sue on behalf of, or for the benefit of, themselves and other persons having the same interest in a suit. But it cannot, in our opinion, be laid down that in no case has a person a right to sue on behalf of himself and others, where the procedure laid down in Section 30 is either not applicable or has not been taken advantage of. There are several statutory exceptions to the rule, and there is no reason why there should not be other exceptions based not on any legislative provision but on the substantive law applicable to the parties. The case of the Judicial Committee already referred to shows that the case of the manager of a Hindu family is such an exception. We must, therefore, refuge to uphold this contention also.
7. In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs. The 16th defendant has preferred a memorandum of objections against the direction of the Subordinate Judge making him liable with defendants Nos. 1 to 15 for the plaintiff's costs of the suit. On the finding that he and defendants Nos. 1 to 15 colluded with each other to put forward an exclusive right in himself to the amount of the mortgage-bond, the lower court's order is right, and we must dismiss the memorandum of objections also with the costs of the plaintiff.
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