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A. Rajagopala Iyer And Others v. S. Ramachandra Iyer
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit on the Original Side for redemption of a mortgage. The respondent (the eldest son of the deceased mortgagor S. Subramania Ayyar) sued for the benefit of a mortgage-security that had been held by Mrs. Booth.
Chronology and material facts as found in the opinion:
- Two promissory notes were owed by S. Subramania Ayyar to Ayyaswami Ayyar. Ayyaswami Ayyar died on 14 September 1919; Subramania Ayyar died on 15 October 1919.
- In 1920 the appellants instituted a suit against Subramania Ayyar's widow and the executors/executrix. On 4 March 1921 a decree for Rs. 2,939-11-0 was entered in favour of the appellants.
- In execution of that decree the appellants attached the property now in suit and bought it at sale. Sale certificate issued 22 January 1925; possession obtained 14 May 1925.
- The present suit was instituted by the respondent on 14 April 1937 seeking relief connected with the discharge of a mortgage in favour of Mrs. Booth.
- Subramania Ayyar had life insurance policies with (a) Gresham Life Assurance Society Ltd and (b) Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. These policies had been assigned during his lifetime to his widow and children (including the respondent).
- The debt to Mrs. Booth (mortgagee of the property now in suit) was discharged in 1920 partially or wholly out of the monies received from these two insurance companies: Rs. 4,000 from the Gresham Society and Rs. 3,204-2-8 from the Oriental Company (figures as found by the Court).
- The respondent contends that portions of those insurance moneys which he was entitled to (by assignment) were used to discharge the Booth mortgage and that he is therefore entitled to the benefit of the security held by Mrs. Booth.
- At first instance (Somayya, J.) the Judge found that the respondent had paid in effect Rs. 2,801-0-8 towards discharge and decreed that sum with interest at 7% p.a., directing sale in default; sale was avoided when appellants paid money into Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent is entitled to the benefit of the security held by Mrs. Booth (i.e., whether a person in the respondent's position can claim the security when he contributed to repayment).
- Whether evidence established that the respondent contributed towards the discharge of Mrs. Booth's mortgage.
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation — specifically, whether the mortgage is an "English mortgage" within s.58 of the Transfer of Property Act so that Art.147 (sixty years) applies rather than Art.132.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The evidence does not establish that the respondent contributed towards the discharge of the mortgage in favour of Mrs. Booth.
- Even if the respondent contributed, he is not in law entitled to the benefit of the security held by Mrs. Booth.
- The suit is barred by limitation — the mortgage is not in the English form and therefore Art.132 of the Limitation Act governs, rendering the suit out of time.
Respondent's Position
- The mortgage held by Mrs. Booth was discharged out of monies received under two insurance policies which had been assigned in the lifetime of the assured; those moneys were not part of the deceased's estate but belonged to the assignees (including the respondent).
- Because the respondent contributed (by virtue of his share in the insurance proceeds) to the repayment of the Booth mortgage, he claims entitlement to the benefit of the security held by Mrs. Booth and consequential relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Duncan Fox and Co. v. The North and South Wales Bank | The three classes of cases in which a surety or an analogous person is entitled to the benefit of security held by the creditor (including the third category: primary and secondary liability where one person is primarily liable and the other secondarily liable). | The Court applied the third category identified by Lord Selborne to hold that the respondent, though not described as a surety in the deed, was in substance in a surety-like position and so could be entitled to the benefit of Mrs. Booth's security. |
| R.M.M.S.T. Vyravan Chettiar v. Official Assignee of Madras | Recognition that principles in Duncan Fox may be applied in equity, though the particular facts of that case did not fall within Duncan Fox. | The decision was cited to show this Court's prior recognition of applying Duncan Fox principles in appropriate cases; the present case was distinguished because here the debt was wholly that of the mortgagor. |
| Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai (Privy Council) | Holds that suits for foreclosure or sale of a mortgage in English form fall within Art.147 of the Limitation Act. | Used to support the conclusion that if the mortgage is in English form Art.147 (sixty years) governs, and hence the suit was in time. |
| Raja Janki Nath Roya v. Syed Asaid Reza (Patna High Court) | Stipulations giving the mortgagor options/extension and requiring payment of costs/expenses do not affect a clause by which the mortgagor binds himself to pay on a certain date; such provisions do not make the mortgage other than an English mortgage under s.58. | Relied on to support the conclusion that the additional provisions in the deed (extension of time in certain events and payment of insurance/taxes) did not change the character of the mortgage from an English mortgage. |
| Satya Charan Srimani v. Ramkinkar Banerjee (Calcutta High Court) | A view (in that case) that a provision requiring the mortgagor to pay various outgoings might change the character of the mortgage. | The Court noted this decision but rejected it as a correct indication for the present case; it also observed that the Privy Council did not find it necessary to decide the English mortgage point in the appeal from that case. |
| Cohen v. Baidya Nath Mukherji (Calcutta High Court) | Indicates dissent from the view taken in Satya Charan Srimani. | Used to show there was judicial authority indicating the Satya Charan view was not universally accepted; supported refusal to accept Satya Charan as decisive here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based strictly on the material recited in the opinion:
- Fact-finding on discharge of mortgage: The Court agreed with the trial Judge that the Booth mortgage was discharged out of insurance moneys: Rs. 4,000 from the Gresham Society and Rs. 3,204-2-8 from the Oriental Company.
- Quantification of the respondent's entitlement in the insurance monies: The Court agreed with the trial Judge that the respondent was entitled to one-half of the Gresham proceeds (thereby Rs. 2,000 of the Rs. 4,000) and clarified that the respondent was entitled to one-fifth (not one-fourth) of the Oriental Company proceeds; accordingly the respondent's contribution from those funds is Rs. 640-12-11 (one-fifth of Rs. 3,204-2-8), making a total contribution of Rs. 2,640-12-11.
- Whether respondent could claim the benefit of Mrs. Booth's security: The Court framed the main question as whether the respondent, having in effect paid part of the mortgage debt (by his share of assigned insurance monies), could claim the security. It examined the mortgage deed and the nature of the respondent's liability under it.
- Characterisation of respondent's liability: Although the respondent was not named "surety" and the deed did not expressly limit his liability to default by the mortgagor, the deed recited that he joined at the request of the mortgagee and had assumed liability in case of need. Reading the deed as a whole, the Court concluded his position was in substance that of a surety—i.e., a secondary liability vis-à-vis the father's primary liability.
- Application of Duncan Fox principles and equity: The Court held that relief to a person in the position of a surety is not confined to strict contractual guarantees under s.126 of the Indian Contract Act; equitable principles and the categories in Duncan Fox could be applied unless displaced by positive statutory law. On the facts (debt wholly that of the mortgagor), the case falls within the third category described by Lord Selborne and supports entitlement to benefit of the security.
- Distinguishing precedent: The Court considered R.M.M.S.T. Vyravan Chettiar and explained why that decision did not apply to defeat the respondent's claim (there the debt was equally of both makers and so did not fall into the third category).
- Limitation analysis and character of mortgage: The appellants contended the mortgage was not an English mortgage because of certain additional provisions (an extension of the date for payment in specified events; obligation to pay insurance premiums, taxes and other outgoings; and a purported absence of an express reconveyance stipulation on extension). The Court analysed s.58 of the Transfer of Property Act and relevant authorities and held that these additional provisions did not alter the essential features of an English mortgage (an obligation to repay on a specified date and an absolute transfer subject to reconveyance on payment).
- Reliance on authority for limitation: The Court invoked Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai (Privy Council) to confirm that suits for foreclosure or sale of an English mortgage fall under Art.147 (sixty-year limitation), and on Raja Janki Nath Roya to support that ordinary protective or administrative provisions in the deed do not change its character as an English mortgage.
- Conclusion on limitation: Because the deed was an English mortgage, Art.147 governed and the suit was held to be within time.
- Decretal adjustment: The Court found the trial Judge's quantification to be slightly in excess. The respondent's correct entitlement was fixed at Rs. 2,640-12-11 (total contribution properly attributable to him). The Court directed variation of the trial decree to this figure and preserved the interest at the rate fixed by Somayya, J. Other consequential directions were given regarding costs and payment out of monies deposited in Court.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed except insofar as the decretal amount is varied. The mortgage in suit is an English mortgage within s.58 of the Transfer of Property Act and the suit is therefore within time under Art.147 of the Limitation Act. The respondent is entitled to recover Rs. 2,640-12-11 with interest at the rate fixed by Somayya, J.; the trial decree is varied accordingly. The parties will bear and receive proportionate costs, and funds on deposit in Court will be paid out to the respondent to the extent due on his complying with the decree.
Implications:
- Direct effect on parties: The respondent's monetary recovery is fixed at Rs. 2,640-12-11 plus interest as fixed below; the appellants' challenge on limitation and entitlement to the security is largely rejected.
- Limitation consequence: The mortgage is treated as an English mortgage for limitation purposes (Art.147 applies, sixty-year period), so the suit was not time-barred.
- Equitable principle applied: The Court affirmed the ability to apply equitable principles (as expounded in Duncan Fox) to allow a person in a surety-like position to claim the benefit of security when he has borne part of the debt, even if the strict statutory provisions (e.g., s.126 Indian Contract Act) do not literally describe the relationship as a guarantee.
- No novel legal precedent announced: The opinion applies existing authorities and statutory definitions to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a new rule beyond the application and reconciliation of cited authorities to these facts.
Decree varied. (N.R.R.)
(Delivered by The Chief Justice).
This appeal arises out of a suit filed on the Original Side of this Court by the respondent for the redemption of a mortgage. The case presents some unusual features and it is necessary in order to appreciate the questions involved in the appeal to state in detail the history of the case. The respondent's father, S. Subramania Ayyar, was indebted to the appellant's father, Ayyaswami Ayyar, on two promissory notes. Ayyaswami Ayyar died on the 14th September 1919 and Subramania Ayyar on the 15th October 1919. In 1920 the appellants instituted a suit against the widow of Subramania Ayyar and D. Venkatarama Ayyar and M. Gopala Ayyar, who had been nominated by him as the executrix and the executors of his will. On the 4th March 1921 a decree was passed in favour of the appellants for Rs. 2939-11-0. In execution of that decree the appellants attached the property now in suit and bought it at the sale held in pursuance of an order of the Court passed in the execution proceedings. The sale certificate was issued to them on the 22nd January 1925 and the appellants obtained possession on the 14th May 1925. The present suit was instituted by the respondent on the 14th April 1937.
The respondent's father had insured his life with the Gresham Life Assurance Society Limited and with the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company Limited. The assured assigned to his wife and the respondent, who is his eldest son, the policy issued by the former company and the policy issued by the latter company to them and to his three other sons. In the Court below it was taken that the assignment of the second policy was only to the sons of the assured, but we have allowed the appellants to put in an extract of the Assignment Register and this establishes that the widow was also one of the assignees. Subramania Ayyar was indebted to a person named Johnstone and to a Mrs. Booth. To Johnstone he owed Rs. 5145-13-4 and to Mrs. Booth Rs. 7000. To secure the debt to Mrs. Booth he mortgaged to her the property now in suit. On the 25th October 1920, when the debt due to Mrs. Booth was discharged, there was owing Rs. 7204-2-8. It is the respondent's case that the debt was repaid to the extent of Rs. 4000 out of the moneys received from the Gresham Life Assurance Society Limited and the balance of Rs. 3204-2-8 out of the moneys received from the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company Limited. The moneys obtained from the two Insurance Companies did not form part of the deceased's estate. The policies having been assigned by the testator during his life-time, on his death the assignees became entitled to receive payment by reason of the assignments, not by reason of his will. On the ground that the mortgage in favour of Mrs. Booth was discharged out of the moneys received from these insurance companies in which he had an interest, the respondent claims that he is entitled to the benefit of the security held by her and to consequential relief.
Somayya, J. who tried the suit held that of the Rs. 4000 which was paid out of the money received from the Gresham Life Assurance Society Limited, Rs. 2,000 came from the respondent. Of the Rs. 3,204-2-8 which was paid out of the money received from the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company Limited, the learned Judge held that one-fourth namely Rs. 801-0-8 was the respondent's money. As the respondent had only a one-fifth share, the figure should have been Rs. 640-12-11. Having found that the respondent had paid Rs. 2,801-0-8 towards the discharge of Mrs. Booth's mortgage, Somayya, J. gave him a decree for this sum with interest at 7 per cent per annum, and directed that the property be sold in default of payment. The sale was however avoided as the appellants paid the money into Court.
The appellants challenge the validity of the decree passed by the learned Judge on several grounds. They say that (i) the evidence does not establish that the respondent contributed towards the discharge of the mortgage in favour of Mrs. Booth; (ii) the respondent is not in law entitled to the benefit of the security, even if he did contribute to the repayment of Mrs. Booth's mortgage and (iii) the suit is barred by the law of limitation.
We agree with the finding of the learned Judge that the mortgage in favour of Mrs. Booth was discharged out of the moneys received from the Insurance Companies, to the extent of Rs. 4,000 out of the moneys received from the Gresham Life Assurance Society Limited and to the extent of Rs. 3,204-2-8 out of the moneys received from the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company Limited. We also agree with the learned Judge that the respondent was entitled to a half of the moneys received from the Gresham Life Assurance Society Limited, but as already pointed out, he was not entitled to a fourth, but only to a fifth, of the money received from the other company.
The main question in this appeal is whether the respondent is entitled to the benefit of the security held by Mrs. Booth. The learned Judge considered that the respondent could not be regarded as a surety within the meaning of S. 126 of the Indian Contract Act, but that his case fell within the third category of the cases referred to in the judgment of Lord Selborne in Duncan Fox and Co. v. The North and South Wales Bank(1). Lord Selborne said that there were three classes of cases in which a surety or a person in an analogous position is entitled to the benefit of security held by the creditor, namely:—(i) those in which there is an agreement to constitute, for a particular purpose, the relation of principal and surety, to which agreement the creditor thereby secured is a party; (2) those in which there is a similar agreement between the principal and surety only, to which the creditor is a stranger; and (3) those in which, without any such contract of suretyship, there is a primary and a secondary liability of two persons for one and the same debt, the debt being, as between the two, that of one of those persons only, and not equally of both, so that the other, if he should be compelled to pay it, would be entitled to re-imbursement from the person by whom (as between the two) it ought to have been paid.
The respondent was made a party to the mortgage deed executed by his father in favour of Mrs. Booth and he made himself liable for the repayment of the debt, although not as a mortgagor. There was only one mortgagor, the father. The respondent was referred to “as the party of the second part,” and the deed recites that he had agreed to join in at the request of the mortgagee. The document does not describe him as a surety and his liability is not expressly stated to be limited to default on the part of the mortgagor; but reading the document as a whole, it is quite clear that he was brought in case of need and that his position was in reality that of a surety. We agree with the learned Judge that this case falls within the third category of cases referred to in Duncan Fox and Co. v. North and South Wales Bank.
The Court in granting relief to a person in the position of a surety is not confined to contracts of guarantee within the meaning of S. 126 of the Indian Contract Act and the Court is free to apply the principles of equity unless the position is governed by some positive provision of Indian Law and therefore the Court is entitled in a suitable case to apply any of the principles stated in Duncan Fox and Co. v. North and South Wales Bank. This was recognised by this Court in R.M.M.S.T. Vyravan Chettiar v. Official Assignee Of Madras(2) although it was held in that case that Duncan Fox and Co. v. North and South Wales Bank was not in point. There two Nattukottai Chettiars borrowed Rs. 1,00,000 from a bank on a promissory note which they both signed as makers. The bank having paid over the money each took Rs. 50,000 for his own purposes. One of them became insolvent and the other being jointly and severally liable was called upon to repay the Rs. 1,00,000 due to the bank. The question was whether the solvent borrower who had repaid the bank was entitled to the benefit of securities which the insolvent borrower had deposited with it. The Official Assignee contended that he was not and the Court upheld the Official Assignee. The judgment in Duncan Fox & Co. v. North and South Wales Bank was discussed and it was held that the case did not fall within the third category as stated by Lord Selborne because the debt was not wholly of one but equally of both the Chettiars. In the present case the debt was wholly that of the mortgagor. It is common ground that the property mortgaged was the separate property of the father and that the father had the benefit of the whole of the mortgage loan.
Turning now to the question of limitation, unless the mortgage is in the English form the suit will be governed by Art. 132 of the Limitation Act and therefore will be out of time. The learned Judge held, however, that the mortgage was in the English form and that the appropriate article was Art. 147 which provides for a period of limitation of sixty years. Suits for foreclosure or sale of a mortgage in English form fall within this article. This was decided by the Privy Council in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai. S. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act sets out the requirements of an English mortgage. The mortgagor must bind himself to repay the mortgage money on a certain date and transfer the mortgaged property absolutely to the mortgagee, subject to a proviso that the mortgagee will re-transfer it to the mortgagor upon payment of the mortgage money as agreed. The learned Advocate for the appellants admits that these conditions are fulfilled, but he says that there are other conditions which are not usually found in a mortgage of the English form and therefore this mortgage must be regarded as an anomalous mortgage in which case it will not fall within Art. 147 of the Limitation Act. The additional provisions in the deed which the learned Counsel for the appellants relies on here, are these: (i) If the mortgage debt should not be repaid on the due date, interest shall be charged at 7 per cent per annum, and if the interest is paid regularly every month the date for payment shall be extended from the 8th October 1916 to the 8th April 1919; and (ii) the mortgagor shall pay the fire insurance premiums, quit rent, assessment rates, taxes and other outgoings for the time being payable in respect of or charged upon the property. He also says that although there is a provision for the extension of the time for the payment of the mortgage debt it is not accompanied by a stipulation that the mortgagee should reconvey and that this changes the character of the mortgage.
Unless these provisions can be read as altering the obligation of the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt on a specified date or detract from the absolute nature of the transfer, the mortgage must be regarded as being in the English form. The fact that in a certain event the date of payment is changed from the 8th October, 1916 to the 8th April, 1919 does not mean that the mortgagor has not contracted to pay the debt on a certain date within the meaning of S. 58(3) of the Transfer of Property Act, and the fact that the mortgagor has agreed to pay the cost of insurance and other charges does not detract from the absolute transfer to the mortgagee. In Raja Janki Nath Roya v. Syed Asaid Reza(3) the Patna High Court held that a stipulation which gave the mortgagor options with regard to part payment and extension of time for repayment of the principal sum did not affect a clause in the mortgage bond under which the mortgagor bound himself to pay the mortgage money on a certain date. Nor did a provision in the bond requiring the mortgagor to pay in addition to the mortgage debt and interest, further advances and sums paid by the mortgagee for the protection and preservation of the mortgaged property and Government revenue, rents and all other costs, charges and expenses incurred in connection with the property make the mortgage any the less an English mortgage within the definition given in S. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act.
For the appellants reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Satya Charan Srimani v. Ramkinkar Banerjee, where it does appear that the view was taken that a provision in a mortgage deed requiring the mortgagor to pay “rent, royalty, cess, taxes, rates, and assessments and impositions which now are or hereafter may be payable in respect of the said premises” did change the character of the mortgage. But dissent from this view is indicated by the decision of the same Court in Cohen v. Baidya Nath Mukherji*. It may be mentioned that Satya Charan Srimani v. Ramkinkar Banerjee was carried to the Privy Council but there it was held that it was not necessary to decide whether the mortgage in that case was in the English form. I.L.R (1939) 1 Cal. 283 = 49 L.W 229 (P.C). We are not prepared to accept Satya Charan Srimani v. Ramkinkar Banerjee as embodying a correct indication of the answer to be given here.
There is no substance in the third contention of the appellants. The mortgage deed contains a stipulation that the mortgagee shall re-convey on payment being made on the 8th October, 1916 and this stipulation must be read as applying also in the event of the time being extended to the 8th April; 1919.
For the reasons given we hold that the additional provisions in the mortgage deed in suit do not alter the character of the mortgage. Consequently we concur in the finding of Somayya, J. that the mortgage is in the English form, which means that the suit was filed in time.
The appeal fails except as regards the decretal amount. As already indicated, the respondent is only entitled to Rs. 2640-12-11, but this sum will carry interest at the rate fixed by Somayya, J. The decree of the trial Court will be varied to this extent. The parties will pay and receive proportionate costs. Out of the money in deposit in Court, so much of it as is due to the respondent under the decree passed by this Court will be paid out to him on his complying with the other requirements of the decree.
Decree varied.
N.R.R
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