1. This is an appeal on behalf of the plaintiff in an action in ejectment. Defendant 1 claims as purchaser of the right, title and interest of the other defendants, who were in possession of the disputed property by right of inheritance from their father. The original grant was in favour of the grandfather of these defendants and the question in controversy between the parties is whether the tenancy was permanent and transferable. The District Judge, in concurrence with the Court of first instance, has found upon this question against the plaintiff. This decision has been challenged in this Court on the ground that it is based on evidence not admissible in law.

2. The first document to which exception has been taken is a dar-mukarari lease granted on 20th February 1880 by Kanchan Singh, the first tenant. The criginal of this document is not in existence and a copy has been produced which was taken in 1861 and since then has been produced in Court on several occasions.

3. It has been contended that as there is no proof of execution of the original the copy cannot be received in evidence under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. In support of this proposition reliance has been placed principally upon the terms of S. 90 and it has been argued with considerable force that by no stretch of language can it be said that in the case before us the presumption mentioned in S. 90 is applicable to the copy produced. S. 90 provides that where any document purporting or proved to be thirty years old is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is in that person's handwriting, and in the case of a document executed or attested that it was duly executed or attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. It has been argued that this section contemplates the production of the original document, and that only upon such production can the Court presume that the signature and every other part of the document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person was in that person's handwriting. This view it has not been disputed, may lead to hardship where the original of an ancient document has been lost (though a certified copy is in existence) and no witness is available who can speak to its actual execution by way of analogy it has been mentioned that a similar hardship arises in cases where an unstamped original has been lost and a certified copy cannot be received in evidence even upon payment of penalty Marine Investment Co. v. Haviside (1) and Kopasan v. Shamu (2) which is in conflict with Haran Chunder v. Russick Chunder (3). We do not think any question of hardship really arises for consideration; what we have to determine is whether the interpretation of S. 90, suggested by the appellant is justified by its language; that we think must be conceded in his favour.

4. But it is admitted that a different construction was placed upon S. 90 by Wilson J., in the case of Khetter Chunder Mookerjee v. Khetler Paul Sreeterutno (4) which was accepted as good law though with some hesitation by Sir Arthur Strachey in the case of Ishri Prasad Singh v. Lalli Jas Kunwar (5) The observations in Vasudeo v. Bhau (6) possibly tend in the same direction while the observations in Appathura Pattar…(Plaintiff) v. Gopala Panikkar…(Defendant) .* (7) support the contrary view. In view of this divergence of judicial opinion it would have been our duty to construe the terms of Section 90 of the Evidence Act but whatever our opinion might have been if the matter were res integra, we are bound by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Shahzadi Begam v. Secy. of State (8) which we think concludes the point against the appellant. As it has been contended however that the point which now requires consideration was not decided by their Lordships we must examine the circumstances of that case. In that case reliance was placed upon a deed of exchange, the original of which had been lost. A certified copy, obtained in 1851, was produced at the trial. The genuineness of this certified copy was questioned. The District Judge found that the certified copy was genuine and admitted it in evidence. Upon appeal to this Court the certified copy was pronounced a forgery and the document was consequently rejected. When the matter went before the Judicial Committee reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant upon the certified copy and it was argued that the certified copy was not a forgery because it bore the same stamp and water marks as other contemporary documents admittedly genuine and produced in a previous litigation between the parties. The respondents contended that the certified copy was a forgery and also argued that the certified copy even if genuine was not admissible. On behalf of the appellant in reply reference was made to the decision in Khetter Chunder Mookerjee v. Khetter Paul Sreeterutno and it was contended that the certified copy was admissible without proof of execution of the original. Lord Collins in the course of his judgment first observed with regard to the deed of exchange that the certified copy was produced from the custody of Shahzadi Begum and was found to be written on paper bearing the same stamp and water marks as other documents on the record of that litigation he then proceeded to state that their Lordships agreed with the District Judge that it was admissible in evidence and for the reasons given by him adopted his conclusions as to its genuineness.

5. The learned vakil for the appellant has contended that the only question before the Judicial Committee was whether or not the certified copy was genuine and that their Lordships did not decide whether the certified copy if genuine could be received in evidence because the parties at the original trial had contended that there was a genuine original which had been lost and the only question thus was whether what was produced as a certified copy was genuine or not. In our opinion it is clear from the report of the arguments before the Judicial Committee that the question of the admissibility of the certified copy was expressly raised before their Lordships and was treated by them as really not open to serious argument. But even if it be held that their Lordships assumed the document to be admissible because it was conceded that there was a genuine original the case before us is not distinguishable from the one before the Judicial Committee because the judgment of the District Judge shews that even according to the plaintiff there was a genuine original lease. Reference was made on behalf of the appellant to the decision of the House of Lords in Padwick v. Wittcomb (9) to show that the certified copy would not be admissible according to the rules of evidence recognized in English law; that decision however is clearly distinguishable and is of no assistance to the appellant. On the other hand the observations in Bullen v. Michel (10) undoubtedly support the view taken by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee (see also Wigmore on Evidence Vol. 3, S. 2143). It is not necessary however to place reliance upon the rule of English law on the subject; the question before us must be determined with reference to the statutory provisions contained in Section 90 of the Evidence Act; and in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Shahzadi Begum v. Secy. of State , we must hold that the certified copy was properly received in evidence.

6. A second objection has been taken to the admissibility of this document. Our attention has been invited to Section 18-A of the Ben. Ten. Act, which was introduced by S. 8, Act 1 of 1907 (B.C). That section provides that nothing contained in any instrument of transfer to which the landlord is not a party shall be evidence against the landlord of the permanence amount or fixity of rent area, transferability or any incident of any tenure or holding referred to in such instrument. In our opinion this section is of no assistance to the appellant. If it be assumed that the section is applicable it merely lays down that nothing contained in the instrument to which exception is taken can be used as evidence as against the landlord of the permanence of the tenure mentioned in such instrument. This does not prevent the use of the document for an entirely different purpose, namely, to show that there was an assertion by the tenure holder at the time that his tenancy was of a particular description. Ex. O (the dar mukarrari patta) must therefore be treated as admissible in evidence. The second document to which exception has been taken is a usufructuary mortgage-bond executed by Durbari Singh, the son of the original tenant, on 8th March 1861. What has been produced is a certified copy of the document, and it contains an assertion by the executant that the property granted by way of usufructuary mortgage was his maurasi mukarrari property and that it had been possessed by his father who made a dar-mukarrari settlement thereof with the father of the mortgagee referring obviously to the document of 20th February 1830. We are of opinion for the reasons already given, that the certified copy was admissible in evidence. The third document to which exception has been taken is the record of a statement by the mother and step-mother of the predecessor of the plaintiff in 1861. It has been argued that the guardian of the person of the infant was not competent to bind the minor by an admission as to his property rights, and in support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Brojendra Coomar Roy v. Chairman of the Dacca Municipality (11), Suruj Muhki Konwar v. Bhagwati Konwar (12) and Ram Autar v. Mahamad Mumtaj Ali (13). In our opinion it cannot be disputed that the guardians of the person of the infant were not competent to bind the ward by an admission of this character. The document however appears to have been used in the Court of first instance, not with a view to bind the plaintiff by the admission of the guardian, but for an entirely different purpose.

7. The plaintiff himself produced a statement by the mother of the infant to the effect that Durbari Singh, the son of the original tenant, held merely as an ijaradar; it was with a view to contradict this statement that the defendants produced the statement to which exception has been taken. For this limited purpose the document was undoubtedly receivable in evidence; but apparently, it has been used by the District Judge for a wider purpose. To this extent the judgment of the District Judge is open to criticism. The fourth document to which exception is taken is a road cess return. The objection here is really not to the admissibility of the document but rather to its proof. The document bears the seal of the Raja; it is contended that the District Judge should also have compared what purports to be the signature of the Raja on the document with his signature in certain documents which were produced at the trial and were more than 30 years old. In our opinion, the judgment of the District Judge is not open to criticism on this point. The aspect of the matter which has been presented here, was not placed before the District Judge, and the only question argued there was about the admissibility of the document in that objection, there was no substance. The fifth document to which exception is taken is the record of an admission by the Court of Wards, made apparently on behalf of the predecessor of the plaintiff when the estate was in charge of the Court.

8. It cannot be seriously disputed that the admission by the Court of Wards cannot bind or prejudice the infant proprietor. But the judgment of the District Judge is not open to criticism on this ground, because he does not really base his conclusion upon the admission. We may observe incidentally that some of the objections urged here were not taken, at least in the same form in the Court below, but we have allowed them to be argued fully, partly from the importance of the questions raised, and partly in view of the principle that omission to take objection to the admission of a document which is absolutely inadmissible does not make it admissible in law:] Miller v. Babu Madho Das (14), Girindra Chandra v. Rajendra Nath (15), Basava v. Kalapa (16) and Oomatool Fatima v. Ghnnnoo Singh (17). The position then, is that we have a document of 1830 in which the existence of the tenancy is recited. We have further a document of 1851 in which the factum of tenancy is acknowledged by the grantor of the mortgage. It is true the landlord was not a party to these transactions; but it is not disputed on his behalf that there was a tenancy in favovr of Kanchan Singh and subsequently in favour of his son Durbari Singh. We have thus a tenancy of unknown origin, which has descended from father to son for three generations, has been effectively transferred from time to time and has been held at a uniform rent for at least 80 years from 1829 up to the date of the present suit. From these circumstances we are of opinion that the Court may legitimately infer that the tenancy in its inception was of a permanent character; Mohoram Sheik Chaprasi v. Telamuddin Khan (18). In this view it is not material to rely upon the documents to which objection has been successfully taken namely, the admission made by the mother and step-mother of the infant in 1861, the statement in the road cess return, and the settlement in the sale certificate, which after all is merely the allegation of the decree-holder and cannot in any way be direct evidence against the landlord. Even if all these statements be left out of consideration, the circumstances already mentioned, which have been indisputably established, support the conclusion that the tenancy was of a permanent character. It is consequently needless to remand the case for further consideration. The inference to be drawn is one of law from facts found or admitted: Mohoram Sheik Chaprasi v. Telamuddin Khan ; the facts established by the evidence legally admissible are sufficient to support the decree of the District Judge. But we desire to add that we do not in any way depart from the principle recognized by Sir Richard Garth, C.J, in Womes Chunder Chatterjee v. Chundee Churn Roy (19), which we hold does not apply to this case. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.

V.B/R.K

9. Appeal dismissed.