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New Suraj Transport Co. And Others v. Ruby General Ins. Co. And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 30, 1972
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This application was filed by the appellants seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of respondent No. 6, Bela Singh, who died on April 9, 1971. The application to implead the legal representatives (identified in paragraph 4 of the petition) was filed on March 17, 1972. The appellants explained the delay by stating that appellant No. 2 had its office at Chandigarh and therefore could not know of Bela Singh’s death sooner. The appellants also contended that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act or to appeals under section 110-D of that Act.

Respondents 4 and 5 opposed the application, contending that the appeal had abated in its entirety on account of Bela Singh’s death. The matter concerns an appeal to this High Court from an award of a Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court considered whether the procedural provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure (dealing with abatement and substitution on death) or general principles of abatement apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and to appeals under section 110-D.

The Court ultimately granted the appellants’ application: it held that the appeal does not abate, permitted the appellants to implead the legal representatives of the deceased Bela Singh as named in paragraph 4 of the petition, directed that notices be issued to them, and made no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure (concerning abatement and substitution on death) are applicable to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and to appeals under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  2. Whether, if Order 22 is not applicable, the general principles regarding abatement nevertheless operate to cause the appeal to abate on the death of a party (here, Bela Singh), or whether representative proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act survive such death and permit substitution/impleadment of legal representatives.
  3. Whether the presence on record of some legal representatives of a deceased party prevents abatement and permits late impleadment of other legal representatives.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Bela Singh (respondent No. 6) has died and his legal representatives (specified in the petition) should be brought on the record; the application to do so was filed on March 17, 1972.
  • The delay in filing the application is explained (appellant No. 2's office being at Chandigarh) and should not prevent impleadment.
  • The Code of Civil Procedure (and specifically Order 22) does not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act or to appeals filed under section 110-D of the Act; therefore, the abatement rules of Order 22 are not applicable.
  • If proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are representative in nature (as provided by section 110-A), death of a claimant does not cause abatement; the legal representatives can be brought on record and the proceedings continue.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The appeal has abated in toto on account of the death of Bela Singh.
  • Even if there is no specific procedure prescribed by statute for appeals to the High Court, the High Court should apply its ordinary civil appellate procedure; therefore, the Code (and its rules about abatement) should be treated as applicable to such appeals.
  • Counsel relied on earlier Full Bench observations (e.g., decisions discussing that an appeal against an award to the High Court is in its ordinary civil jurisdiction, and that in appeal the proceeding does not retain the character of arbitration) to support the contention that the Code applies to appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, 1969 A.C.J. 276 (Full Bench, Delhi High Court) Observed that an appeal against an award to the High Court is made in its ordinary civil jurisdiction (used to argue that civil procedure including provisions of the Code applies). The Court noted these observations but distinguished them: the Full Bench observations concerned Letters Patent appeals and whether a decision could be termed a 'judgment' for those purposes; the present Court declined to accept them as authority for applying the Code (Order 22) to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Shanti Devi v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala, 1971 A.C.J. 247 (Full Bench) Observed that the High Court, while hearing appeals under section 110-D of the Act, acts as a 'Court' and that a proceeding does not retain its character as arbitration on appeal (used to argue civil character of such appeals). The Court considered the observation but held it was made in a different context (Letters Patent appeals) and therefore it could not be relied upon to make the Code or Order 22 applicable to Motor Vehicles Act proceedings in appeal.
Chuharmal Issardas v. Haji Wali Mohammed Held that the provisions relating to abatement contained in Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure have no application to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court relied on and found support in this decision for the proposition that Order 22 is not applicable to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and that such proceedings, being representative in nature, do not abate on the death of a claimant.
Ram Sahai v. Rabia Begum (Single Judge, Delhi High Court) Observed that Order 22 of the Code has not been made applicable to proceedings under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and hence provisions relating to abatement do not apply; emphasized the representative character of such proceedings. The Court expressly adopted and stated respectful agreement with these observations, using them to support the conclusion that proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act do not abate and that legal representatives may be brought on record.
Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram (Supreme Court) Held that where a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on the record in another capacity, there can be no abatement merely because no formal application has been made; it is sufficient to describe that person appropriately by application; lack of impleadment of other heirs within the period of limitation will not necessarily cause abatement. The Court considered itself bound by this Supreme Court observation and applied it to hold that if some legal representatives are already on the record, proceedings do not abate and other representatives can be impleaded at any time.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step legal analysis addressing (a) whether Order 22 of the Code applies to Motor Vehicles Act proceedings and appeals under section 110-D, and (b) whether general principles of abatement would nevertheless apply if Order 22 were not applicable.

  1. Applicability of the Code / Order 22:

    The Court noted that rules have been framed under the Motor Vehicles Act for proceedings before the Tribunal but there is no specific provision making Order 22 of the Code applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal or to appeals before the High Court. The Court examined Full Bench observations cited by counsel (Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Shanti Devi) that appeals against awards are in the High Court's ordinary civil jurisdiction. However, the Court distinguished those decisions: their observations related to Letters Patent appeals and the character of a Single Judge's decision, not to the application of the Code or Order 22 to Motor Vehicles Act proceedings. Therefore, those Full Bench observations could not be used as authority to make Order 22 applicable.

    The Court concluded that if the Legislature or rule-making authority intended Order 22 (or the Code) to be applicable to Tribunal proceedings or to appeals, it could have made that clear; absent such provision, the Court would not import Order 22 into proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act.

  2. Nature of claims under the Motor Vehicles Act and abatement:

    The Court examined section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (and its proviso) and determined that claims for compensation arising out of death by accident are filed by legal representatives in a representative capacity. Because the claims are representative, proceedings do not abate upon the death of a claimant: other claimants on the record can continue proceedings, or if the deceased was a sole claimant, his legal representatives (or persons for whose benefit the claim was filed) can be brought on record.

    The Court analogized these proceedings to suits under Order 1, rule 2 of the Code and noted the principle under Order 1, rule 8 that death of one or more parties does not necessarily make suit or appeal abate where representatives represent a class. The Court reasoned that the underlying rationale is that a representative party represents the whole class and their death does not extinguish the rights of the represented class.

  3. Reliance on precedents and binding authority:

    The Court found support in Chuharmal Issardas and the Single Judge decision in Ram Sahai v. Rabia Begum, which expressly held that Order 22 is not applicable to such Motor Vehicles Act proceedings and that abatement principles in Order 22 therefore do not apply. The Court stated respectful agreement with those decisions.

  4. Effect of presence of some legal representatives on record:

    The Court relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram to hold that where some legal representatives of the deceased are already on the record (even in another capacity), the proceedings do not abate and it is sufficient to make an appropriate application to show that such persons are also on the record as heirs/legal representatives; other legal representatives may be impleaded later and the proceeding will not abate.

  5. Application to the present facts:

    It was not disputed that Mrs. Charan Kaur (respondent No. 4) and Hardip Singh (respondent No. 5) are legal representatives of the deceased, and the Court noted that under the schedule to the Hindu Succession Act (1956) they are class I heirs. Even though the appellants’ application did not explicitly show them as heirs, that omission did not prevent the application for impleading other legal representatives from being maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court held that the appeal does not abate on account of the death of Bela Singh and granted the application to bring his legal representatives on the record. The Court ordered that notices be issued to the legal representatives named in paragraph 4 of the petition and made no order as to costs.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure were held not to apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act (as applied in this case), and the general principles of abatement under Order 22 do not operate to cause abatement of such representative proceedings.
  • Proceedings under section 110-A (claims in representative capacity) and appeals under section 110-D survive the death of a party where the claim is representative; legal representatives who are not already on record may be impleaded and notices issued to them.
  • Where some legal representatives are already on the record, the proceeding does not abate and other representatives may be added later (consistent with the Supreme Court authority cited).
  • The direct practical outcome in this case is that the appellants may implead the legal representatives of deceased Bela Singh (as named) and the appeal will proceed; there is no order as to costs.

The Court did not announce a broader change in law beyond the application of the legal principles to the facts before it; it relied on existing precedents and statutory reading to reach its decision.

Show all summary ...

1. This application has been filed by the appellants that Bela Singh, respondent No. 6, has died on April 9, 1971, and his legal representatives as detailed in para 4 should be brought on the record. This application was filed by them on March 17, 1972. The reason for delay which has been given is that appellant No. 2 has its office situated at Chandigarh and, as such, could not know in time about the death of Bela Singh. They further claim that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, ???, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) or to the appeals filed under section 110-D of the Act. The learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 has vehemently contested this application and has submitted that the appeal has abated in toto on account of death of Bela Singh.

2. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has got no application to the proceedings under the Act or in appeals which are filed under section 110-D of the Act.

3. The learned counsel for the respondents controverts this position and submits that in case of appeals in the High Court, there is no specific procedure which has been prescribed by any law. The High Court has to apply the procedure which it applies in the case of other appeals pending before it as a Court of civil jurisdiction.

4. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for both the parties that the rules have been framed under the Act for the proceedings to be taken under the Act before the Tribunal. There is no specific provision by which Order 22 of the Code has been made applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal under the Act. There is also no provision in the rules which makes the said order applicable in appeals before this Court. Mr. M.M Punchhi, in support of his arguments, relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as. The Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari . 1969 A.C.J 276.. In the said judgment, the Full Bench observed that an appeal against the award to the High Court is made in its ordinary civil jurisdiction. Similary, in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Shanti Devi v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala . 1971 A.C.J 247. it was observed that the High Court while hearing appeals under section 110-D of the Act, acts as a ‘Court’ and a proceeding even if at its inception has a semblance of an arbitration proceedings, does not retain its character as such in appeal. From the aforesaid discussion, the learned counsel for the respondents wants me to infer that the provisions of the Code are applicable in the proceedings in appeal against the awards of the Tribunal under the Act. He submits that the proceedings are civil proceedings and this High Court decides such appeals in its civil jurisdiction and, therefore, the Code is applicable to such proceedings. The aforesaid observations had been made in a different context. The proposition which was before the Full Benches was as to whether an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was maintainable against the decision of the Single Judge and whether that decision could be termed as judgment as contemplated in clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The observations of the Full Benches are with respect to the Letters Patent Appeals. Mr. Punchhi cannot take any benefit of those observations for the purposes of application of the Code. In my view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents does not hold good. The Rules which have been framed under the Act provide the procedure which is to be followed by the Tribunals. In case the Legislature or the rule-making authority thought that the provisions of the Code or its Order 22 was to be made applicable in the proceedings before the Tribunals or before the High Court in appeals, they could very well do so. I am, therefore, of the view that the provisions of Order 22 of the: Code are not applicable in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. In this view. I am also supported by Chuharmal Issardas v. Haji Wali Mohammed and Ram Sahai v. Rabia Begum.

5. The next submission which has been made by the learned counsel for the respondents is that even if Order 22 of the Code is not applicable, the general principles regarding abatement will apply and the appeal would stand abated. The learned counsel for the appellants controverts this position also. He submits that in case of the death of a claimant in the proceedings before the Tribunal or in appeal, the claim or the appeal does not abate in spite of the death of the sole claimant or any of the claimants. I may clearly state that in this appeal. I am concerned with the death of the claimant who is now a respondent in appeal. Any observations in this order will hold good in case of death of a claimant either at the stage of the claim or in appeal. The observations will not apply in the case of death of other persons. Under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 can be made in the case of death resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. A proviso has been added to sub-clause (1) which lays down that where all the representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The reading of the aforesaid sub-section and the proviso clearly shows that the claims are filed by the claimants in a representative capacity. Though the amendment has been made in the said section by Act 56 of 1969, but even earlier, section 110-A provided that the claims could be filed in case of death from accident by the legal representatives of the deceased. The reading of the aforesaid sections clearly shows that the claims were filed in a representative capacity. In case, any person who has filed the claim dies, the proceedings started in a representative capacity do not abate. If the other claimants are already on the record, they can continue the proceedings. If the deceased was the sole claimant, his legal representatives or the persons for whose benefit the claim has been filed, could be brought on the record. Such proceedings can be equated with suits brought under Order 1, rule 2 of the Code after complying with the requirements of that provision. In the case of suits under Order 1, rule 8, of the Code, the death of any one or more of the parties to such a suit or in appeal do not make the suit or appeal abate. The reason for this principle is that the persons who have brought the suit in a representative capacity represent the whole class of persons and if the representative or the representatives die, the other person or persons whom the deceased represent still are deemed to be parties to those proceedings and, therefore, the question of abatement does not arise. This view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chuharmal Issardas case (supra). The learned Judges in that case observed that the provisions relating to abatement contained in Order 22 of the Code have no application to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. The same view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Ram Sahai v. Rabia Begum. The observations of the learned Judge are as follows:—

“The provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to proceedings for compensation filed under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This implies that the provisions relating to abatement contained therein have also no application to such proceedings. The underlying principle is that proceedings of this kind are not brought by or against a person in his personal capacity, but are brought by or against him as a representative of a class of persons who should be constructively held to be parties to the proceedings.”

6. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations and hold that the principles of abatement do not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and the legal representatives of the deceased, if they are not already on the record, can be brought on the record at any time. The present appeal in the aforesaid circumstances does not abate and the appellants can implead the legal representatives of deceased Bela Singh even at this stage.

7. Mr. L.M Suri has also argued that some of the legal representatives of the deceased are already on the record. In case, it is held that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code are applicable to these proceedings, even then the appeal does not abate. His contention is that if some of the legal representatives of the deceased are already on the record, then the suit or the appeal even under Order 22 of the Code does not abate. In support of his contention, he has relied on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram.

“Even on the alternative ground that Mahavir Prasad being one of the heirs of Saroj Devi there can be no abatement merely because no formal application for showing Mahabir Prasad as an heir and legal representative of Saroj Devi was made. Where in a proceeding a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on the record in another capacity, it is only necessary that he should be described by an appropriate application made in that behalf that he is also on the record, as an heir and legal representative. Even if there are other heirs and legal representatives and no application for impleading them is made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the proceeding will not abate. On that ground also the order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained.”

8. I am bound by the aforesaid observations. Even if some of the legal representatives are on the record, the proceedings do not abate and the application for bringing other persons on record can be made at any time. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that Mrs. Charan Kaur, respondent No. 4, and Hardip Singh, respodent No. 5, are the legal representatives of the deceased. Even otherwise, according to the Schedule appended to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, they are class I heirs. Though in the application filed by the learned counsel for the appellants they have not been shown to be heirs, yet it does not make any difference. In view of this matter also, the application for impleading other legal representatives is maintainable.

9. In view of my above findings. I grant the application and order that the notices may be issued to the legal representatives of the deceased as given in para 4 of the petition. There is, however, no order as to costs.