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Amir Hushen v. Abdul Bari Khan

Calcutta High Court
May 31, 1943
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Opinion Summary — Mukherjea, J. (with Pal, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff sued for recovery of possession of disputed lands by establishing a jote (raiayat/tenant) right. He alleged that the lands formed part of Sikimi Taluk Rastum Khan, owned at the material time by Rangu Mia; the Plaintiff claimed settlement from Rangu Mia on 17th Kartick, 1326 B.S., and possession until dispossession in Falgun, 1343 B.S. by Defendant No. 6 in collusion with other defendants. The Defendants denied the Plaintiff's title and possession, and alleged intervening transactions: Rangu Mia's interest was sold on 25th July, 1922, and the Das family (represented by Defendants Nos. 4–7) possessed the property; Defendant No. 1 claimed to have taken settlement from Defendant No. 4 and co-sharers on 25th Bhadra, 1333 B.S., and to have been in possession since then.

Prior to the present suit the Plaintiff had instituted Title Suit No. 105 of 1938, which was withdrawn on 13th December, 1938 "with liberty to sue afresh" but with an order that the contesting defendants "get costs which are made condition precedent to the institution of a fresh suit." The present suit was filed on 13th January, 1939; hearings began on 9th May, 1939 and were adjourned so that arguments would be heard the following day. The Plaintiff deposited the costs in Court on 10th May, 1939.

The trial Court decided the suit in favour of the Defendants (holding the Plaintiff failed to prove title and that the suit was barred under Order 23, rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure). The Appellate Court reversed and decreed the Plaintiff's suit. The present second appeal is by Defendant No. 1 against that appellate decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit is barred because the Plaintiff failed to comply with the condition precedent (payment of costs) imposed when the earlier suit was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to sue afresh — i.e., the legal effect of non-compliance with such an order (including the application of Order 23, rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure).
  2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Art. 3, Schedule 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act given the dates of alleged dispossession and the effective date of institution of the fresh suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Contentions

  • That he took settlement of the disputed land from Rangu Mia on 17th Kartick, 1326 B.S., and was in possession until dispossession in Falgun, 1343 B.S.
  • The previous suit was withdrawn with liberty to sue afresh; he instituted the fresh suit on 13th January, 1939 and ultimately paid the costs into Court on 10th May, 1939 (during the hearing).

Defendants' Contentions

  • The Plaintiff had no title to or possession of the land and never took settlement from Rangu Mia.
  • Rangu Mia's interest was sold on 25th July, 1922; the Das family, represented by Defendants Nos. 4–7, were in possession; Defendant No. 1 took settlement from Defendant No. 4 and co-sharers on 25th Bhadra, 1333 B.S., and has been in possession since.
  • As to procedure, the contesting Defendants contended that the withdrawal order of the earlier suit made costs a condition precedent to instituting a fresh suit and that non-payment rendered the fresh suit incompetent.

Appellant's (Defendant No. 1) Legal Argument

  • Argued that non-payment of the costs prior to the institution of the present suit made the suit incompetent under Order 23, rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shital Prasad v. Gaya Prasad (Shital Prosad's case) Held that where withdrawal with leave to sue afresh is conditional on payment of costs, the second suit cannot be dismissed for non-payment; in such circumstances the old suit remains pending until costs are paid (no time limit or order of dismissal provided). The Court described this as a leading decision and discussed its principle, but concluded that it did not provide decisive assistance to the Plaintiff in the present case.
Syed Qazi Muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh Patna High Court case following the Shital Prasad principle; where time was specified for payment the Court has power under Section 148 of the Code to extend the prescribed time. Noted by the Court as following Shital Prasad and as an example where extension under Sec. 148 was considered; used in the comparative survey of authorities.
Deb Kumar Roy Choudhury v. Debnath Barua Decision that follows the reasoning in Shital Prasad's case. Noted as a decision aligning with Shital Prasad; part of the body of authorities the Court examined.
Abdul Khaleque v. Susil Chandra Chaudhuri Letters Patent Appeal bench held that when costs are made a condition precedent but no consequences are prescribed, the condition applies to withdrawal (so earlier suit remains pending until costs are paid). The Court recited this formulation and observed it as an alternative statement of law; it considered this among divergent authorities and noted it was not strictly identical to Shital Prasad but related.
Harinath Dass v. Syed Hossein Ali Held that failure to pay the costs (the condition for withdrawal) means the plaintiff is taken to have withdrawn without permission and is precluded from instituting a fresh suit. Noted as a contrasting Calcutta view; the judgment gave the rule without detailed reasoning and the Court observed it departs from Shital Prasad.
Abdul Aziz v. Ebrahim Where costs were not paid before institution but were paid before trial commenced, the defect was cured and the suit was not bad ab initio (payment after institution but before trial may cure defect). The Court found this decision supportable on Shital Prasad principle but held it was not directly applicable to the present case because the costs were paid only after trial had commenced and there was no court order extending time.
Shubal Chandra v. Musaraf (also cited as Musharaf/Bhuban Chandra in the opinion) Held that whether the earlier suit was pending depends on the order; when payment of costs is a condition precedent to instituting the second suit, failure to pay costs before the second suit would be fatal to the plaintiff's case. Referred to as taking a view at variance with Shital Prasad; the Court noted the emphasis on construing the form of the withdrawal order in each case.
Seshayya v. Subbayya Phillips, J.'s view: mere withdrawal needs no court permission; permission is required only to bring a fresh suit and conditions attach to that permission (so condition relates to institution of second suit, not to withdrawal). Described as an "illuminating judgment" and as supporting the view that withdrawal is complete on the order and that the second suit is bad unless the condition is complied with; cited along with similar Bombay/Allahabad authorities.
Shidramappa v. Mallappa Bombay High Court followed the Seshayya view that withdrawal completes on the order and the second suit is bad unless condition (payment) complied with. Noted as a supporting authority for the Seshayya line of cases.
Rachhpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan Allahabad High Court took substantially the same view as Seshayya (withdrawal completed; condition attaches to leave to institute second suit). Referred to among the series of decisions treating the condition as applicable to institution of the second suit.
Peria Muthirian v. Karappanna Muthiran Held that the Court has jurisdiction to extend time for payment of costs where sufficient cause is shown. Noted by the Court as an authority recognizing jurisdiction to enlarge time in appropriate cases.
Gopilal v. Lola Mogga Lal Held that a new suit must be taken to be instituted only on the day when the condition of payment of costs was complied with. The Court applied this principle to treat the present fresh suit as instituted on the date the costs were paid (10th May, 1939) for the purposes of limitation analysis.
Bhuban Chandra v. Musharaf The opinion references this decision but does not state in the provided text a specific principle drawn from it. The Court mentioned that the Plaintiff could not derive comfort from this decision; the opinion does not elaborate a principle from it in the provided text.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the first question as the legal effect of non-compliance with the order in which the earlier suit was withdrawn "with liberty to sue afresh" subject to payment of costs as a condition precedent. It surveyed the authorities and emphasised that there is a divergence of judicial opinion — with some authorities (e.g., Shital Prasad and cases following it) treating the old suit as still pending until costs are paid, and other authorities (e.g., Seshayya and decisions of Bombay and Allahabad High Courts) treating the withdrawal as complete on the order and the condition as attached to the permission to institute the fresh suit, making the fresh suit bad if costs were not paid prior to institution.

The Court noted intermediate formulations (for example the Letters Patent bench in Abdul Khaleque) which treated the condition as applying to withdrawal so that the earlier suit remains pending until costs are paid. The opinion emphasised that the authorities are not uniform and that different forms of orders in individual cases affect the construction.

Turning to the present case, the Court examined the language of the order that had permitted withdrawal of the earlier suit. It concluded that the order clearly allowed withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit "if not otherwise barred by limitation," and separately directed that the defendants "do get costs which are made condition precedent to the institution of a fresh suit." The Court found as a fact (admitted in the record) that costs were not paid prior to institution or before the suit came on for trial, and no order of the Court granted extension of time nor was there any waiver by the defendants.

Applying the surveyed authorities and construing the particular order in this case, the Court held that on the day when the costs were paid (10th May, 1939) the previous suit was disposed of and the fresh suit must be treated as instituted on that day (relying on the position clarified in Gopilal v. Lola Mogga Lal).

The Court then performed a limitation analysis based on the dates pleaded in the plaint: the Plaintiff alleged dispossession in Falgun, 1343 B.S. (February 1937). More than two years had elapsed by 10th May, 1939 (the effective date of institution) and thus, on the face of the plaint, the suit was barred under Article 3, Schedule 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Consequently, even if the suit were otherwise competent, it was barred by limitation as pleaded.

Because of this conclusion, the Court decided that it was unnecessary to refer the conflicting authorities to a larger Bench; the divergence of authorities was noted but the result for the present case was inevitable on the facts and the construction of the particular order.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: This appeal is ALLOWED. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the Court of first instance (trial Court) are restored. The appearing Defendant is entitled to his costs throughout.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Plaintiff's suit, as pleaded, is barred by limitation under Art. 3, Schedule 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act because the fresh suit must be treated as instituted only on the date the condition (payment of costs) was complied with (10th May, 1939), by which date more than two years had elapsed since the alleged dispossession.
  • The appellate decree in favour of the Plaintiff is set aside; the trial Court's decision for the Defendants is restored.
  • The appearing Defendant is awarded costs.

Broader implications on precedent:

The Court surveyed conflicting authorities on the legal effect of conditional withdrawal-with-liberty orders and expressly recorded that the authorities are not uniform. It declined to refer the matter to a Full Bench, reasoning that for the purposes of the present case such a reference was unnecessary because the result was clear on the construction of the particular order and the dates pleaded. Thus, while the Court applied existing authorities (notably Gopilal v. Lola Mogga Lal for the proposition as to the effective date of institution), it did not attempt to resolve the broader conflict of authorities or lay down a binding new precedent resolving that divergence.

End of summary of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal is on behalf of the Defendant No. 1 and it arises out of a suit commenced by the Plaintiff for recovery of possession of the lands in suit on establishment of his jote right to the same. The Plaintiff's case was that the disputed land appertained to Sikimi Taluk Rastum Khan which was at the material time owned by one Rangu Mia. The Plaintiff took settlement of the land from Rangu Mia on the 17th Kartick, 1326 B.S and was in possession of the same till Falgun, 1343 B.S, when he was dispossessed from it by Defendant No. 6 in collusion with the other Defendants. The defence was that the Plaintiff had no title to or possession of the land in suit and he never took settlement of the same. Rangu Mia's interest in the taluk was sold on the 25th July, 1922, and was possessed by the Das's who were represented by Defendants Nos. 4 to 7 in the suit. Defendant No. 1, it is alleged, took settlement of the land from Defendant No. 4 and his co-sharers on the 25th Bhadra, 1333 B.S, and was in possession of it since then. A further point raised was, that the Plaintiff instituted a previous suit claiming identical reliefs against the Defendants; he was allowed to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, and payment of costs to the Defendants was made a condition precedent to the institution of the fresh suit; these costs not being paid prior to the institution of the suit or even before the suit came on for trial, the condition upon which the leave was granted was not complied with and consequently it became inoperative and barred the present suit.

2. The trial Court decided the suit in favour of the Defendant. It held that the Plaintiff failed to establish his title to the disputed property and it was further of opinion that the suit was barred under Or. 23, r. 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal the judgment was reversed and the Plaintiff's suit was decreed. It is against this decision that the present second appeal has been preferred.

3. The first question for our consideration in this appeal is as to whether the present suit is barred by reason of the Plaintiff's failure to comply with the condition upon which the previous suit was allowed to be withdrawn and leave was given to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. It appears from the records that the Plaintiff has instituted an earlier suit namely, Title Suit No. 105 of 1938, against these Defendants and the suit was based on identically the same cause of action. The suit was withdrawn with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the 13th December, 1938. The order made by the Court stands as follows:

“That the Plaintiff be permitted to withdraw from the suit with liberty to sue afresh in respect of the same cause of action, if not otherwise barred by limitation. The contesting Defendants do get costs which are made condtion precedent to the institution of a fresh suit”.

4. The present suit was filed on the 13th January, 1939, and was fixed for hearing on the 9th May, 1939. On that day the hearing commenced and both parties adduced whatever evidence they had to adduce. The further hearing of the suit was adjourned till the day following when the arguments were to be heard. On that day, that is to say, on the 10th May, 1939, the Plaintiff deposited the costs in Court. It is argued by the learned Advocate for the Appellant that the non-payment of costs prior to the institution of this suit made the suit incompetent under the provisions of Or. 23, r. 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. On the question as to what is the legal effect of non-compliance with the order relating to payment of costs in cases of this description, there is unfortunately a divergence of judicial opinion, and the decisions of our Court itself cannot be said by any means to be uniform. In the case of Shital Prasad v. Gaya Prasad(1) which is one of the leading decisions of our Court on the subject, it was laid down by Sir Lawrence Jenkins that if a suit was allowed to be withdrawn by a party with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action on condition of paying costs to the Defendant, the second suit could not be dismissed for non-payment of costs, and that inasmuch as the permission to withdraw the suit and bring a fresh suit was made conditional on payment of costs, the old suit must be held, to be still pending and undisposed of so long as the costs were not paid. In that case there was no time limit specified by the Court within which the costs were to be paid, nor was it ordered that the suit would stand dismissed in case of default. As there was no final order determining the suit, his Lordship was of opinion that the first suit must be held to be still pending. This view was followed by the Patna High Court in the case of Syed Qazi Muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh*(2). In the Patna case a period was specified within which the payment of costs was to be made and it was held by the learned Judges that the Court had power under Sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend the prescribed time.

6. The decision of Mookerjee, A.C.J and Fletcher, J., in the case of Deb Kumar Roy Choudhury v. Debnath Barua, (3), follows the reasoning in Shital Prosad's case. In the case of Abdul Khaleque v. Susil Chandra Chaudhuri(4), our learned brother Mitter,. J., felt constrained to follow the principle enunciated in these cases though his own opinion was different. On an appeal being taken against the judgment of Mitter, J., under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, his decision was affirmed but the learned Judges who heard the Letters Patent Appeal preferred, to lay down the law in a somewhat different manner. What they held was that, when the Plaintiff is given liberty to withdraw a suit with permission to institute a fresh suit and costs are directed to be paid to the Defendant as a condition precedent to the institution of such suit, but no directions are given as to the consequences of non-compliance with the condition, the condition applies to the withdrawal of the suit and not to the bringing of the fresh one; consequently, as there was no withdrawal of the previous suit till the costs were paid, the first suit must be held to be still pending. I must say that this view taken by the learned Judges is not strictly in accordance with the principle enunciated by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Shital Prosad's case, though in a sense they purported to follow that decision. In that case the learned Chief Justice pointed out that what the Court allows in such circumstances is not the withdrawal of the old suit, and institution of the fresh suit separately, but both withdrawal and institution together on certain conditions. The whole is one order and no part of it can be separated from the other: it is, therefore, not possible to say that the condition attaches to one part of the order and not to the other.

7. I may notice here three other cases decided by this Court where the view taken is somewhat at variance with that taken in Shital Prosad's case. The first is the case of Harinath Dass v. Syed Hossein Ali(5), where it was held by Sir Francis Maclean, C.J and Pratt, J., that when the Plaintiff did not pay the costs which was the condition upon which the withdrawal was obtained, he must be taken to have withdrawn without the permission of the Court and would be precluded from instituting a fresh suit for the same matter. There was no discussion of any principle in the judgment and no reason was assigned.

8. The second case is that of Abdul Aziz v. Ebrahim(6). Here the Plaintiff was allowed to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit on payment of costs. There was no time specified, nor was there an order of dismissal consequent on default. The costs were not paid prior to the institution of the suit, but they were paid before the suit came on for trial. It was held that the suit was not bad ab initio and although it was irregularly instituted, the payment of costs with the permission of the Court after the suit was instituted would cure the defect. This decision could certainly be supported on the principle enumerated in Shital Prosad's case, though that was not the ground upon which the learned Judges purported to base their judgment.

9. The last case I desire to notice in this connection is that of Shubal Chandra v. Musaraf(7). The learned Judges decided this case, did not follow the principle in Shital Prosad's case, although that authority was referred to in the judgment. It was held that whether the earlier suit was pending or not would depend upon the order made in that particular case, and when the order was that the payment of costs was a condition precedent to the institution of the second suit, failure to pay the costs before the second suit was brought would be fatal to the Plaintiff's case.

“We now come to another class of cases decided by the other High Courts in India where the question has been approached from a different standpoint. One of the most illuminating judgments in this series is that of Phillips, J., in Seshayya v. Subbayya(8). The view taken by Phillips, J., is, that for mere withdrawal of a suit no permission of the Court is necessary. It is only when the Plaintiff applies for leave to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action that an order of the Court is required. The Court can attach any condition to that order and this condition must be taken to be attached to the permission for instituting a second suit and not to the withdrawal of the earlier one. If the first suit was considered as pending, it would be open to the Plaintiff instead of complying with the condition to come to the Court and demand trial of the suit, however long the interval might be. This decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in Shidramappa v. Mallappa(9) and practically the same view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rachhpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan(10). According to these decisions, the withdrawal of the first suit is completed as soon as the order of withdrawal is made, and the second suit is bad unless the condition regarding the payment of costs is complied with. It has been held however in some of these cases that the Court has jurisdiction to extend time for payment if sufficient cause is made out. Vide Peria Muthirian v. Karappanna Muthiran(11).

10. Speaking for myself, the principle enunciated in these cases seems to be sound though it is opposed to the view taken by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J, in the case of Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad. As I have already shown, the cases of this Court are far from being uniform on this point. The decision in Hari Nath Das v. Syed Hossein Ali takes a view quite different from the one enunciated in Shital Prosad's case, and the learned Judges in Shubal Chandra v. Musaraf were inclined to lay stress upon the form of the order made in each individual case; it is according to them a question of construction as to whether the condition is to be attached to the institution of the second suit or the withdrawal of the earlier one. This also seems to be the view underlying the decision of the Letters Patent Appeal Bench in Abdul Khaleque v. Susil Chandra Chaudhuri(12). As there is fundamental difference as regards the standpoint from which this question has been approached by different Judges, it is not possible to attempt at any re-conciliation of the conflicting views, and the conflict is further aggravated by reason of the fact that the form of the order varies in each individual case. It may be necessary at some time or other to try to solve this tangle by reference to a larger Bench.

11. We think, however, that for the purpose of this case a reference to the Full Bench is not necessary, and whatever view we may choose to adopt, the Plain-tiff's suit is bound to fail. The language in which the order in the present case has been expressed makes it perfectly clear that the withdrawal was (?) allowed unconditionally. The order says that the Plaintiff would be permitted to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit if not otherwise barred by limitation. Then follows a provision relating to payment of costs and it is directed that the Defendants would get costs of the suit, and the payment of these costs would be a condition precedent to the institution of the fresh suit. Admittedly, the costs were not paid not only before the institution of the suit but not even before it came up for trial, and there was no order of the Court granting further extension of time or any waiver by the Defendants of their rights. Leaving aside the view taken by the Madras and the Bombay High Courts, I think that none of the Calcutta decisions referred to above is of any assistance to the Plaintiff. The decision in Abdul Aziz v. Ebrahim is not directly applicable as the money was paid here after the trial of the suit commenced and there was no order of the Court granting extension of time. The Plaintiff cannot derive any comfort from the decisions in Bhuban Chandra v. Musharaf or Hari Nath Das v. Syed Hossein Ali. Even if he takes his stand entirely upon the pronouncement of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Shital Prosad's case, we do not think that it is of any real assistance to him. We may take it that so long as the costs were not paid, the earlier suit was pending. The costs were paid here on the 10th of May, 1989, and the decision in law would be that on that day the previous suit was disposed of and the new suit was instituted. The case of Gopilal v. Lola Mogga Lal(13) makes the position clear and it was held in that case the new suit must be taken to be instituted only on the day when the condition of the payment of costs was complied with. Now, on the face of the allegation contained in the plaint the Plaintiff's suit was time-barred on 10th of May, 1939. The Plaintiff instituted this suit for recovery of possession of the land in suit on establishment of his title as a raiyat. There is a distinct allegation in the plaint that he was dispossessed from the land in Falgoon, 1343 B.S (February, 1937) by Defendant No. 6 who is the landlord, in collusion with the other Defendants. More than two years had already elapsed from the date of dispossession when the suit could be deemed to have been filed in the present case and consequently it was clearly barred under Art. 3, Schedule 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In our opinion, therefore, even if the suit is otherwise competent, it is on the face of the plaint barred by limitation.

12. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed.

13. We set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court and restore those of the Court of first instance. The appearing Defendant will be entitled to his costs throughout.

Pal, J.:— I agree.

C.C