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Ramratan Lal And Ors. v. Bhuri Begum And Anr.

Allahabad High Court
Jul 7, 1915
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking to set aside a decree obtained by the defendants under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, alleging that the decree had been procured by fraud. The underlying litigation began with a mortgage dated 25 October 1893: the defendants (or their representatives) sued on the mortgage and obtained a decree. In that earlier suit the defendants had claimed both a decree for sale of the mortgaged property and a personal decree; the claim for a personal decree was disallowed.

Some years later the decree-holders applied to the Court for a decree under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. Notice of that application was duly served on all judgment-debtors (including pardanashin ladies). The judgment-debtors did not appear in response to that notice, and the Court granted the decree limited to the assets of the deceased mortgagor. In execution of that decree a house of the judgment-debtors was attached; the male judgment-debtors objected to sale on the ground that they were agriculturists, but that objection was overruled and the related appeal was dismissed.

Both Courts below (first instance and the appellate court) granted the plaintiffs a decree setting aside the decree obtained under Section 90. On the present appeal the higher Court examined whether fraud had been established that would justify setting aside the Section 90 decree. Two separate opinions appear in the record: one (lead opinion) reasons that the alleged failures did not amount to the kind of fraud required; a concurring or separate opinion by Rafique, J. finds on the record that no personal decree was in fact passed against the plaintiffs individually (only a representative decree against the estate of a deceased mortgagor), and thus the plaintiffs' contention—premised on an assumed personal decree—failed. The ultimate order allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees of both Courts below, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with costs in all Courts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether it is open to a party to challenge in a fresh suit an order or decree obtained in execution proceedings between a decree-holder and a judgment-debtor, where no fraud is alleged or proved.
  2. What is the nature and standard of fraud that must be alleged and proved to justify setting aside a decree obtained in a prior proceeding (including a decree under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  3. Whether the omission by the decree-holders to inform the Court of a prior unsuccessful attempt to obtain a personal decree constitutes fraud sufficient to set aside a subsequent decree under Section 90.
  4. Related procedural question (as characterised by the Court): whether the present suit is, in substance, an appeal against the earlier decree long after limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (respondents') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs contended that the decree obtained under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act was procured by fraud.
  • The specific fraud alleged was that the defendants (as decree-holders) did not inform the Court that, at an earlier stage of the litigation when a preliminary decree on the mortgage was being considered, they had sought a personal decree which had been refused. The plaintiffs argued this omission amounted to fraudulent concealment justifying setting aside the later Section 90 decree.

Defendants' / Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants relied on numerous authorities (listed later) to contend that a prior decree (including execution-stage decisions) should not be lightly reopened in fresh proceedings unless the standard of fraud is met.
  • It was argued (as reflected in the record) that neglect to inform the Court of the earlier request for a personal decree—even if wilful—did not amount to the sort of "actual, positive" fraud required to set aside a decree.
  • As recorded by Rafique, J., the appellants also effectively argued (and the record showed) that no personal decree had in fact been passed against the plaintiffs individually; the decree was in representative capacity against the estate of a deceased mortgagor, which undermined the plaintiffs' core contention based on an assumption of a personal decree.
  • Dr. Sulaiman (counsel referred to in the opinion) admitted that one could not claim to have a decree under Section 90 set aside on any ground of fraud that would not suffice to set aside a decree in a suit—i.e., the standard of fraud must be that which would invalidate a suit decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahomed Golab v. Mahomed Sulliman, 21 C. 612 Cited by the appellants; the opinion references it in connection with warnings about re-opening decided litigation. The Court notes this authority and that it quotes Flower v. Lloyd; it is used in the discussion cautioning against permitting routine re-litigation of contested decisions.
Nilmadhub Rai v. Naba Das, 12 C.W.N. 28 (note) The opinion records the case as relied upon by the appellant. The provided opinion lists the case among those relied upon but does not elaborate a specific rule or application in the text supplied.
Moruful Huq v. Surendra Nath Roy, 15 Ind. Cas. 893 : 16 C.W.N. 1002 Cited in the context of contrasting authorities on re-opening decrees obtained ex parte or after notice. The opinion refers to this case as casting doubt on the broader approach taken in some Calcutta High Court decisions; no detailed rule beyond this contextual use is elaborated in the provided text.
Marochin v. Parsuram, 10 Ind. Cas. 905 Cited by the appellant as authority. The opinion lists the case among those relied upon; no specific principle or application is detailed in the provided text.
Janki Kuar v. Lachmi Narain, 30 Ind. Cas. 789 : 13 A.L.J. 753 Cited by the appellant. The opinion cites this case but does not set out a discrete rule or its application in the supplied passages.
Nanda Kumar Howladar v. Ram Jiban Howladar, 23 Ind. Cas. 337 : 41 C. 990 : 18 C.W.N. 681 : 19 C.L.J. 457 Establishes the principle that the fraud must be "actual, positive fraud" — a meditated and intentional contrivance to keep parties and the Court ignorant of real facts. The Court quotes and applies this principle, using it to require a high standard of proof of fraud before reopening prior decrees.
Flower v. Lloyd, (1879) 10 Ch. D. 327 : 29 L.T. 613 : 27 W.R. 496 Quoted to illustrate the danger of allowing judgments to be re-opened on allegations of perjury, false evidence or misleading productions; a cautionary precedent. The Court refers to Thesiger, L.J.'s warning in Flower v. Lloyd and relies on that caution in arguing against permitting relitigation that would encourage successive actions to overturn judgments.
Patch v. Ward, 3 Ch. App. 203 : 18 L.T. 134 : 16 W.R. 441 Quoted in Nanda Kumar Howladar and referenced for the standard of fraud required. The Court, in quoting Nanda Kumar Howladar, indirectly invokes Patch v. Ward to support the requirement that fraud must be deliberate and positive.
Rajmohun Gossain v. Gourmohun Gossain, 8 M.I.A. 91 : 4 W.R. 47 (P.C.) Cited for a factual proposition: a party who had expressly agreed not to appeal nonetheless appealed — the Privy Council set aside results based on those facts. The Court observes that this decision turned on its particular facts and did not discuss the general law on what constitutes sufficient allegation and proof of fraud to set aside a prior decree.
Lakshmi Charan Shaha v. Nur Ali, 1 Ind. Cas. 626 : 38 C. 936 : 15 C.W.N. 1010 A Calcutta High Court ruling that appears to allow re-opening of ex parte decrees on allegation of false evidence. The Court notes this authority and criticises its breadth, observing that it omits to consider the danger of unlimited re-litigation and that it has not met with universal approval; the present Court declines to adopt such an unqualified approach.
Kedar Nath Das v. Hemanta Kumari, 22 Ind. Cas. 709 : 18 C.W.N. 447 This decision cited approvingly another Calcutta decision (Lakshmi Charan Shaha). The opinion notes the citation but points out the differing judicial responses and the potential consequences of the approach taken in those Calcutta decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal and factual findings, each tied to a normative principle:

  1. The material facts were largely undisputed: the defendants had obtained a mortgage decree earlier (in which a personal decree had been refused) and later secured a decree under Section 90 after notice was served on all judgment-debtors, including the pardanashin plaintiffs.
  2. On the specific complaint that the pardanashin ladies knew nothing of the Section 90 decree, the Court observed that the process of service had been conducted in a manner respecting the pardah and that both the ladies and the male family members had been duly served; therefore the defendants were not responsible for any lack of knowledge on that ground.
  3. The Court identified the only alleged fraud: failure by the defendants to inform the Court when obtaining the decree under Section 90 that they had earlier sought (and been refused) a personal decree at an earlier stage. The Court formulated two central legal questions from this allegation: (a) whether an order made between a decree-holder and judgment-debtor can be challenged in fresh proceedings in the absence of fraud; and (b) what degree or kind of fraud must be alleged and proved to set aside a prior decree.
  4. On the first question, the Court held that it is not open to parties to re-open matters decided in execution proceedings by instituting an independent suit, in the absence of sufficient fraud. The Court relied on established authorities (including Privy Council decisions) and warned against enabling endless relitigation — for example, setting aside a judgment obtained after contest on allegations that witnesses perjured themselves or produced false evidence would allow parties to alternate bringing new suits to upset each other's victories.
  5. The Court rejected any meaningful distinction between an "ex parte" decree obtained after due notice (i.e., when a party was served but did not appear) and a decree obtained after contest. The Court reasoned that a party who has been duly notified but neglects to oppose an order is in the same legal position as a party who contests and loses: neither should be entitled to better rights to re-open the matter later.
  6. On the second question (nature of fraud), the Court endorsed the high standard articulated in cited authority: fraud must be "actual, positive fraud, a meditated and intentional contrivance to keep the parties and the Court in ignorance of the real facts" — a standard that requires careful and reserved exercise of jurisdiction to set aside prior decrees.
  7. Applying those principles to the present facts, the Court concluded that the alleged omission to disclose a prior unsuccessful effort to obtain a personal decree—even if wilful—did not amount to the kind of deliberate, positive fraud necessary to invalidate the subsequent Section 90 decree.
  8. Rafique, J. added a distinct factual point based on recourse to the record: no personal decree had in fact been passed against the plaintiffs personally; the decree was in representative capacity against the estate of Imtiaz Ali, deceased. Because the plaintiffs' challenge depended on the assumption of a personal decree against them, that foundational assumption was mistaken and their contention therefore failed.
  9. Given the lack of the requisite type of fraud and the procedural posture (the suit amounted to an out-of-time "appeal" against the decree), the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decrees of the Courts below.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The decrees of both Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs' suit to set aside the decree obtained under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act is dismissed with costs in all Courts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiffs' attempt to set aside the Section 90 decree on the grounds alleged (principally the omission to disclose a prior attempt to obtain a personal decree) failed; the decree obtained by the defendants under Section 90 stands as validated by the appellate Court's decision to allow the present appeal and dismiss the suit.
  • Standard reaffirmed: The opinion reiterates and applies the established principle that only "actual, positive" and deliberate fraud — a meditated contrivance to keep parties and the Court ignorant of material facts — will justify setting aside a prior decree. Mere omission to mention a prior procedural attempt (even if wilful) is not necessarily sufficient to meet that standard, absent proof that this omission amounted to the high form of fraud described in authority.
  • No broad new precedent: The Court's reasoning is presented as an application and reinforcement of existing authorities and cautionary principles; the opinion does not purport to create a novel rule beyond applying the high standard of fraud and guarding against unlimited relitigation.

Note: This summary is restricted to and faithful to the matters and language expressly contained in the provided opinion. No facts or legal propositions beyond those stated in the opinion have been inferred or introduced.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs sought to set aside a decree, which the defenantshad obtained under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, on the allegation that the same was obtained by fraud. The material facts are practically undisputed. The defendants or their representatives brought a suit upon foot of a mortgage dated the 25th of October 1893 and obtained a decree. They had asked in that suit not only for a decree for sale of the mortgaged property but also for a personal decree. This latter part of their claim was disallowed. Some years afterwards the decree-holders applied to the Court for a decree under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. Notice of the application was duly served on all the judgment-debtors.

2. They did not appear and the Court granted the decree, but limited it to the assets of the deceased mortgagor. This is the decree which it is sought in the present suit to set aside. Later on in execution of this decree a house of the judgment-debtors was attached. The male judgment-debtors objected that the house could not be sold on the ground that they were agriculturists. This objection was overruled. There was an appeal by the judgment-debtors which was dismissed. Both the Courts below have granted the plaintiffs a decree, setting aside the decree obtained by the defendants under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. The judgment of the Court of first instance is a little misleading unless one reads it as a whole, when carefully considered it is clear that the defendants practised no fraud on the plaintiffs to the present suit in respect of the service of notice of the application for the decree under Section 90.

3. The plaintiffs are pardanashin ladies, and it is quite impossible for any litigant to serve process of the Court in any way which would violate the pardah of such ladies. When the Court of first instance says that these ladies knew nothing about the decree under Section 90, it does not mean that the defendants in the present suit were in any way responsible for their want of knowledge. The ladies were duly served with the notice, so also were the male members of the family. No objection was taken to the granting of the decree under Section 90 and no application was ever made to set it aside. The male members who were equally interested with the ladies in opposing the decree, evidently thought that there would be no chance of success. We find, however, when the house was attached in execution of that decree, they opposed the sale on the ground that they were agriculturists.

4. We now come to the only fraud which is suggested in the present case. The fraud is that the defendants (who then occupied the position of decree-holders) did not inform the Court that when the preliminary decree was being granted on foot of the mortgage, they had asked for a personal decree and that this had been refused upon the ground that having regard to the date of the mortgage and the position of the judgment-debtors, a personal decree ought not to be granted. Two questions arise. First, whether it is open to a party to challenge an order which has been made between the decree-holder on the one side and the judgment-debtor on the other, even where no fraud is alleged or proved. It seems to me impossible to contend that, where (in the absence of fraud) a matter has been decided in execution proceedings relating to the satisfaction of the decree, it is open to the parties to re-open matters which have been so decided by an independent suit. This has been settled by numerous decisions of the various Courts in India and also by their Lordships of the Privy Council.

5. Some attempt has been made to distinguish between what is called an "ex parte" decree or order and a decree or order after contest. I do not think there is any just ground for such a distinction. Assuming a party to have been duly served with notice, if he neglects to come forward and avail himself of the opportunity of preventing a wrong order being made against him, I cannot conceive upon what possible ground he should be placed in a better position than the party who comes forward and informs the Court (in the manner provided by law) of his rights and prevents (so far as he can) a wrong order being made. In my judgment the party who after due notice allows the decree or order to be made without opposition is in the same position as a person who had a decree or order made against him after contest.

6. The next question is as to the nature of the fraud which must be alleged and proved in order to entitle the plaintiffs to have the decree set aside. On this part of the case Dr. Sulaiman admitted, as I think he was bound to admit, that he could not claim to have a decree under Section 90 set aside on any ground of fraud which would not have been sufficient to have a decree in a suit set aside.

7. A large number of casess have been cited on each side. On the part of the appellant the following cases were relied upon: Mahomed Golab v. Mahomed Sulliman 21 C. 612; Nilmadhub Rai v. Naba Das 12 C.W.N. 28 note; Moruful Huq V. Surendra Nath Roy 15 Ind. Cas. 893 : 16 C.W.N. 1002, Marochin v. Parsuram 10 Ind. Cas. 905; Janki Kuar v. Lachmi Narain 30 Ind. Cas. 789 : 13 A.L.J. 753 and Nanda Kumar Howladar v. Ram Jiban Howladar 23 Ind. Cas. 337 : 41 C. 990 : 18 C.W.N. 681 : 19 C.L.J. 457.

8. In the case of Mahomed Golab v. Mahomed Sulliman 21 C. 612 Petheram, C.J., quotes at page 618 from the case of Flower v. Lloyd (1879) 10 Ch. D. 327 : 29 L.T. 613 : 27 W.R. 496.

Assuming all the alleged falsehood and fraud to have been substantiated, is such suit as the present sustainable? That question would require very grave consideration indeed before it is answered in the affirmative. Where is litigation to end if a judgment obtained in an action fought out adversely between two litigants sui juris, and at arm's length, could be set aside by a fresh action on the ground that perjury had been committed in the first action, or that false answers had been given to interrogatories, or a misleading production of documents, or of a machine, or of a process had been given? There are hundreds of actions tried every year in which the evidence is irreconcilably conflicting, and must be on one side or other wilfully and corruptly perjured. In this case if the plaintiffs had sustained on this appeal the judgment in their favour, the present defendants, in their turn, might bring a fresh action to set that judgment aside on the ground of perjury of the principal witness and subornation of perjury; and so the parties might go on alternately ad infinitum.

9. In the case of Nanda Kumar Howladar v. Ram Jiban Howladar 23 Ind. Cas. 337 : 41 C. 990 : 18 C.W.N. 681 : 19 C.L.J. 457; Jenkins, C.J., quotes with approval Sir John Rolt, L.J., in the case of Patch v. Ward 3 Ch. App. 203 : 18 L.T. 134 : 16 W.R. 441:

The fraud must be actual, positive fraud, a meditated and intentional contrivance to keep the parties and the Court in ignorance of the real facts of the Case and obtaining that decree by that contrivance.

10. In an earlier part of the judgment the learned Chief Justice says:

But it is a jurisdiction to be exercised with care and reserve, for it would be highly detrimental to encourage the idea in litigants that the final judgment in a suit is to be merely a prelude to further litigation. The fraud used in obtaining the decree being the principal point in issue, it is necessary to establish it by proof before the propriety of the prior decree can be investigated.

11. On the other side also a number of cases have been cited including a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Rajmohun Gossain v. Gourmohun Gossain 8. M.I.A. 91 : 4 W.R. 47 (P.C.) : 1 Suth. P.C.J. 378 : 1 Sar. P.C.J. 723 : 19 E.R. 464. That was a case in which a party having expressly agreed not to appeal, in contravention of his agreement presented an appeal and obtained a decree, which he afterwards sought to set up against the other side. It is quite clear that this case was decided entirely upon its own facts and circumstances. The general law as to what constitutes sufficient allegation and proof of fraud to justify the setting aside of a decree in a previous suit was not discussed.

12. Special reliance was placed on a ruling of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Lakshmi Charan Shaha v. Nur Ali 1 Ind. Cas. 626 : 38 C. 936 : 15 C.W.N. 1010. This decision was cited with approval by another Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Kedar Nath Das v. Hemanta Kumari 22 Ind. Cas. 709 : 18 C.W.N. 447. In this case a decree had been obtained against the plaintiff ex parte. The plaintiff succeeded in having the ex parte decree set aside but another ex parte decree was passed against him. The plaintiff then brought a suit to set aside that decree on the ground that the same had been obtained by means of false evidence. It would appear that the Court held that on the mere allegation that the decree was obtained by false evidence the plaintiff was entitled to re-open the litigation. If we assume that, no just distinction can be drawn between a person against whom a decree has been obtained without contest after due notice and a person who has appeared after notice and has been defeated after making the best fight he can. It seems to me that the decision of the learned Judges in the case cited omits to consider the great danger pointed out by Thesiger, L.J., in the case of Flower v. Lloyd (1879) 10 Ch. D. 327 : 29 L.T. 613 : 27 W.R. 496. As the result of the decree of the learned Judges if the plaintiff had succeeded in setting aside the decree on the ground that the evidence advanced by the plaintiff in that suit was false, what was there to prevent the defeated defendant instituting another suit to set aside that decree on exactly similar grounds? This decision does not appear to have met with the universal approval of the Calcutta High Court see Moruful Huq v. Surendra Nath Roy 15 Ind. Cas. 893 : 16 C.W.N. 1002.

13. I would here like to point out that it is open to question whether a decree or order which has been obtained after due notice is very accurately described as "ex parte." It is hardly necessary to remark that an order obtained after notice is very different from an order obtained without notice.

14. In the present case it seems to me that the neglect to inform the Court of the fact that there had been a previous attempt at another stage of the litigation to get a personal decree, even assuming that the neglect was wilful, could not amount to fraud" which would entitle the plaintiffs to set aside the decree which was obtained by the defendants under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act.

15. The present suit is in reality an "appeal" against the decree of the Court long after limitation. I would allow the appeal.

Rafique, J.

16. I find that the questions argued at the Bar do not arise in this case. The arguments have proceeded on the assumption that a personal decree under Section 90 of Act IV of 1882 was obtained by the defendant-appellant not against the plaintiffs-respondents. On reference to the record I find that no personal decree was passed against them, but a decree against them was passed in their representative capacity against the estate of Imtiaz Ali, deceased, one of the mortgagors. The contention for them challenging the decree as having been fraudulently obtained is based on the assumption of a personal decree and as no such decree was passed, their contention fails. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.

17. The order of the Court is that the appeal is allowed, the decrees of both the Courts below axe set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs in all Courts.