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State Of West Bengal & Ors. v. Krishna Kumar Majumdar & Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Sep 26, 2000
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 4.2.1999 by a Single Judge in W.P. No. 12810(W) of 1999, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondents. The respondents claimed to have been appointed as Tax Collectors by their respective Gram Panchayats, allegedly in terms of section 37 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, and alleged their appointments were long-standing. A prior writ application was allowed on 3.12.1997 directing the District Panchayat Officer (DPO) to consider their cases. The DPO, by order dated 12.6.1998 (annexure ‘C’), held that several government memoranda relied upon by the petitioners did not apply because the petitioners were employees of Gram Panchayats appointed for periods not exceeding two years, and reference was made to Rule 33 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Miscellaneous Accounts & Audit) Rules, 1990.

The Single Judge concluded, having regard to some Apex Court decisions, that the petitioners had been appointed as Tax Collectors in terms of section 37 and were therefore entitled to the relief claimed. The appellant challenged that conclusion before the Division Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents (Tax Collectors) appointed by Gram Panchayats were regular employees entitled to relief (including regularisation or promotion) on the basis of section 37 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, or whether their engagements were contractual in nature under Rule 33 of the Gram Panchayat Rules.
  2. Whether the petitioners had a legal right and the corresponding legal duty on the part of the respondents to warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus for regularisation.
  3. Whether precedents relied upon by the parties (including sympathetic regularisation decisions such as Arun Kumar Rout) applied to or governed the present facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Learned counsel for the appellant (Mr. Dasgupta) submitted that the Single Judge erred in allowing the writ petition, relying on a recent decision of this court in Biplab Kumar Das Mahapatra (MAT No. 4027/99, disposed 27.4.2000), where petitioners who were not regularly appointed were not entitled to promotion in view of the Apex Court decision in State of M.P. v. Dharambir (1998 (6) SCC 145).
  • Implicit in the appellant's position is the submission that irregular/contractual appointments do not automatically entitle incumbents to regularisation, promotion or other reliefs that would circumvent Recruitment Rules and constitutional principles under Articles 14 and 16.

Respondents' Arguments (as recorded)

  • Learned counsel for the respondents (Mr. Sarkar) contended that their service had been regularised on the basis of an unreported decision of this court in Janaki Ram Mishra v. State of West Bengal (C.O. No. 15911(W) of 1993), and therefore their appointments should be treated as regular.
  • The respondents also relied strongly on the Apex Court decision in Arun Kumar Rout v. State of Bihar (AIR 1998 SC 1477), which had, in the particular facts of that case, directed sympathetic relief (including filling 50% of sanctioned posts from incumbents) despite irregularity in appointment.
  • The respondents asserted that their appointments were under section 37 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act (i.e., that they were Tax Collectors under the statute).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Biplab Kumar Das Mahapatra (MAT No. 4027/99) (disposed 27.4.2000) Applied in argument to show that petitioners not regularly appointed are not entitled to promotion. The Division Bench records the appellant's reliance on this decision to contend the Single Judge erred; the decision was used by appellant to support the proposition that irregularly appointed incumbents could be denied promotion.
State of M.P. v. Dharambir (1998 (6) SCC 145) [also cited elsewhere as 1998 (6) SCC 165 in the opinion] Authority for denying promotion/regularisation where initial appointment was not in accordance with rules. Referred to as authority supporting the proposition that incumbents not regularly appointed cannot claim promotion/regularisation; relied upon by the appellant and noted by the court.
Janaki Ram Mishra v. State of West Bengal (C.O. No. 15911(W) of 1993) — unreported Relied upon by respondents to contend Tax Collectors' service had been regularised in an earlier decision. The court held this decision was distinguishable and inapplicable: that case concerned whether Tax Collectors became employees of a Municipality and did not address illegality of appointments or the precise issue in the instant appeal.
Arun Kumar Rout v. State of Bihar (AIR 1998 SC 1477) Shows that in special circumstances the Supreme Court exercised Article 142 relief to provide sympathetic regularisation (50% of posts to incumbents) where incumbents had requisite qualifications and had served long without fraud. The respondents relied on it; the court analysed the scope of that decision, noted it was exercised under Article 142 and for special facts, and observed that subsequent decisions distinguished or limited its applicability.
Sairindhri Dolui v. State of West Bengal (2000 (1) SLR 803) Decision of Division Bench distinguishing Arun Kumar Rout and discussing limits of sympathetic regularisation. Cited by the court as a Division Bench decision that distinguished Arun Kumar Rout and emphasised limits on regularising illegal appointments.
Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar (1997 (2) SCC 1) Referenced as part of a line of authority where the Supreme Court considered regularisation/relief in the context of irregular appointments. Listed among authorities showing the circumstances and jurisprudence around regularisation — referenced as part of the court's review of authorities.
Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1995 SC 962; 1994 (5) SLR 234) Authority on the limits of regularisation when appointments are not made according to rules. Referred to in the court's survey of decisions which restrict regularisation where recruitment rules are not followed.
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Saha (1999 (2) CHN 519) Listed among decisions on treatment of irregular appointments. Included in the court's catalogue of cases dealing with regularisation principles.
J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan (1994 (2) SCC 630) Principle that recruitment rules and consultation with PSC (where required) cannot be bypassed for direct recruitment. Used in the court's discussion that direct recruitment rules cannot be relaxed and backdoor direct recruitments are impermissible.
Dr. Surindar Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1996 SC 2775) Authority in the line of cases addressing illegal appointments and their remedies. Mentioned among cases that indicate the Court's approach to irregular appointments and limits on regularisation.
Ashok Kumar Maheswari v. State of U.P. (AIR 1998 SC 966) Establishes that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against a statute or a promise contrary to law. Quoted to support the proposition that promises contrary to statutory recruitment schemes cannot be enforced; applied to reject equitable arguments that would conflict with statutory recruitment rules.
Kasinka Trading v. Union of India ((1995) 1 SCC 274) Part of authority that promissory estoppel cannot enforce promises contrary to law. Referenced in support of the principle that estoppel cannot operate against statute or beyond legal powers.
Shabi Construction Co. v. City & Industrial Development Corporation (1995 4 SCC 301) Similarly cited on the limits of promissory estoppel where promise is beyond lawful authority. Used to reinforce the principle that estoppel cannot validate actions contrary to statutory requirements.
Rama Dutta v. State of West Bengal (2000 CWN 671) Recent Division Bench consideration of related issues on regularisation/appointments. Noted as another recent authority where the court considered related questions; part of the court's survey of precedent.
Suraj Prakash Gupta v. State of J. & K. (2000 (4) SLR 486) Noted for its discussion of the recent trend requiring strict conformity with Recruitment Rules. Quoted to show the Supreme Court's recent insistence on strict compliance with recruitment rules for both direct recruits and promotees.
Keshab Chandra Joshi v. Union of India (1992 (Supp.) 1 SCC 272) Holds that discretion in rules cannot be read as permitting relaxation of core recruitment requirements; consultation with PSC may be mandatory where rule prescribes. Referred to as authority for the proposition that recruitment rules are to be strictly followed and cannot be relaxed to permit irregular appointments.
Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India (1993 (Supp.) 3 SCC 575) Three-Judge Bench refusing to imply relaxation of Recruitment Rules even where rule language suggested some flexibility. Used by the court to stress that recruitment requirements cannot be relaxed and the condition precedent is appointment in accordance with rules.
State of Orissa v. Sukanti Mahapatra (1993 (2) SCC 486) Held that even power to relax rules did not permit relaxation of direct recruitment without consulting the Commission; ad hoc service cannot be treated as regular service. Referred to as authority limiting the scope of any rule-based relaxation for recruitment.
Dr. M.A. Haque v. Union of India (1993 (2) SCC 213) Held that rules relating to recruitment through PSC could not be relaxed for direct recruitment. Referred to in support of the proposition that recruitment procedures prescribed (e.g., PSC consultation) must be followed.
Surinder Singh Jamal v. State of J. & K. (1996 (9) SCC 619) Authority concerning recruitment and requirement to follow proper procedures. Mentioned among the authorities the court relied upon in emphasising strict compliance with recruitment rules.
Swapan Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India (1999 (5) SLR 807) Division Bench decision distinguishing Arun Kumar Rout. Listed as a subsequent decision distinguishing the Arun Kumar Rout approach and reinforcing caution in applying sympathetic regularisation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds along the following lines (as expressly stated in the opinion):

  1. Statutory and regulatory framework: The court examined section 37 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 and Rule 33 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Miscellaneous Account and Audit) Rules, 1990. Rule 33 expressly contemplates engagement of Collecting Sarkars (Collecting Sarkar/Tax Collectors) on a commission basis for a specified period not exceeding two years at a time, describing the contractual mechanics (receipt books, security deposit, periodic accounting) and provisions for earlier termination and disciplinary processes.
  2. Factual findings and documentary shortcomings: The petitioners had not produced appointment letters and had asserted appointments by the Prodhan of the Gram Panchayat. The competent authority (DPO) had found that the petitioners were appointed by Gram Panchayats on contractual terms and for periods of two years at a time.
  3. Constitutional context and recruitment principles: The court emphasised that a Gram Panchayat is a "local authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution and that appointments to Gram Panchayat service must have regard to Articles 14 and 16 (equality and equal opportunity in public employment). Any regular appointment to a sanctioned post must conform to Recruitment Rules and the constitutional principles encapsulated in Articles 14 and 16.
  4. Precedential constraints on regularisation: The court surveyed relevant case law (including Arun Kumar Rout and a number of subsequent and related decisions) and concluded there is an emerging and consistent requirement for strict conformity with recruitment rules. While some decisions (e.g., Arun Kumar Rout) granted relief on special facts and under Article 142, later decisions have distinguished or confined such relief. The court also invoked the principle that promissory estoppel cannot be used to enforce promises contrary to statutory recruitment schemes (Ashok Kumar Maheswari and related authorities).
  5. Application to the present case: Given the statutory and regulatory scheme (Rule 33) permitting engagement on a contractual/commission basis for limited periods, the absence of any evidence of regular appointment in accordance with Recruitment Rules or compliance with Articles 14 and 16, and the DPO's factual finding of contract appointments, the court concluded that the petitioners had not established any legal right enforceable by mandamus. The Single Judge therefore erred in granting the writ relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The impugned judgment and order dated 4.2.1999 is set aside.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The writ petitioners' entitlement to the relief granted by the Single Judge is withdrawn; the petitioners were found to have been engaged on contractual terms (as Collecting Sarkars/Tax Collectors under Rule 33) and had not proved a legal right to regularisation or a writ of mandamus requiring the respondents to regularise them.
  • On precedent and law: The court reinforced the principle (as reflected in a series of decisions it surveyed) that regular appointments to sanctioned posts must conform to Recruitment Rules and the demands of Articles 14 and 16; sympathetic regularisation is confined to special facts and cannot be routinely invoked to override statutory recruitment processes. The opinion did not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond applying and aligning with the existing authorities it reviewed.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: Appeal allowed. (Pratap Kumar Ray, J. agreed.)

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 4.2.99 passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in W.P No. 12810(W) of 1999 whereby and whereunder the writ application filed the respondents herein has been allowed. The respondents herein are said to have been appointed as Tax Collectors. Such appointment had allegedly been made on commission basis. The respondents before the learned Trial Judge have, inter alia, contended that they had been appointed for a long time by their respective Gram Panchayats purported to be in terms of section 37 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Act).

A writ application had been filed before this court by the respondents and by an order dated 3.12.97 the said writ application was allowed directing the District Panchayat Officer to consider their cases. The District Panchayat Officer by reason of his order dated 12.6.98 as contained in annexure ‘C’ to the writ application, inter alia, held that the reliance placed by the said employees on the circular letters dated 3.8.79, 28.3.90 and 13.3.96 have no application. It was held:

“The above three memorandums describe the principles to be followed in the matter of absorption of casual and such other categories of workers under the State Govt. Here the petitioners are the employees of the Gram Panchayats and they are appointed by the Gram Panchayat for a period of not exceeding two years at a time. In this connection I make reference of rule 33 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Miscellaneous Accounts & Audit) Rules, 1990. In my consideration the provisions of the three memorandums herein mentioned above are not applicable in case of the petitioners as they are not appointed by any establishment/Deptt. of the Government of West Bengal.”

The learned Judge having regard to some decisions of the Apex Court, inter alia, held that as the petitioners had been appointed as Tax Collectors in terms of section 37 of the said Act, they were entitled to the relief, prayed for.

2. Mr. Dasgupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that having regard to the decision of this court in the case of Biplab Kumar Das Mahapatra v. State of West Bengal, (MAT No. 4027/99) disposed of on 27.4.2000, the learned Judge must be held to have committed an error in allowing the writ application. In Biplab Kumar Das Mahapatra's case the petitioner prayed for promotion. Having regard to the fact that they had not been regularly appointed, in terms of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P v. Dharambir, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 145, it was directed that they were not entitled to the promotion.

Section 37 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 reads thus:

“Dafadars, Chowkidars and Gram Panchayat Karmees.—

(1) For general watch and ward, prevention of crime, protection of life and property (running of office of the Gram Panchayat) and discharging all functions relevant thereto as hereinafter provided within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat every Gram Panchayat shall, unless otherwise directed or other provisions are made by the State Government maintain under its a control such number of (Dafadars, Chowkidars and Gram Panchayat Karmees) as the State Government may by general or special order determine.

(2) The manner of maintenance of Dafadars, Chowkidars and Gram Panchayat Karmees by a Gram Panchayat the salary, allowances and gratuity to be paid to them and the nature and the cost of their equipment and all matters relating to their recruitment, conditions of service, superannuation, discipline, punishment and dismissal shall be determined in accordance with such rules as may be made:

Provided that the Gram Panchayat shall have disciplinary control over Dafadars, Chowkidars and Gram Panchayat Karmees.”

3. From the aforementioned provision it would appear that the concerned Gram Panchayat is not entitled to appoint the Tax Collector and other employees mentioned therein. The petitioners had not been able to produce any appointment letters, according to them, they had been appointed by the Prodhan of the Gram Panchayat.

4. The Gram Panchayat is a local authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the appointment of the employees of the Gram Panchayat must be made keeping in view the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It appears from the West Bengal Anchal and Gram Panchayat (Account and Audit) Rules, 1959 which has since been replaced by the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Miscellaneous Account and Audit) Rules, 1990 that the Collecting Sarkar for collection of taxes is appointed in terms of Rule 33 of the Rules which reads thus:

“33. Collecting Sarkars.—

(1) If considered necessary and expedient, Gram Panchayats may, at its meeting resolve to engage for a specified period, not exceeding two years at a time, not more than two persons to work on commission basis, as Collecting Sarkar for collection of rates, taxes and fees assessed by the Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat shall also determine at the meeting the rate of commission payable to Collecting Sarkar, subject to the maximum limit fixed by the Government from time to time and also the amount of security deposit to be pledged by the Collecting Sarkar, subject to the minimum as may be fixed by the Government from time to time.

(2) On deposit of the security as fixed by the Gram Panchayat, the Collecting Sarkar shall be given a receipt book as prescribed in Form 4. Each individual collection shall be made against each individual receipt and as soon as the Collecting Sarkar has Rs. 50 or mere, in hand he shall make over the amount to the Secretary/the Prodhan for crediting to the Gram Panchayat Fund.

(3) Gram Panchayat may take disciplinary action against a Collecting Sarkar by earlier termination of contract and (forfeitting his security deposit in the case of misappropriation of money) on charges of incompetence, negligence of duty or any other irregularity committed by him;

Before taking such disciplinary action, the Gram Panchayat shall frame a charge against him, give him a copy thereof requesting him to submit his explanation within a specified time and also give him an opportunity of personal hearing and shall record in writing the evidence given by him, or by his witness, if any.”

5. A bare perusal of the aforementioned rules clearly show that the petitioners were appointed by way of contract of service.

If they were to be appointed on regular basis, therefor, the procedure laid down under the Recruitment Rules and in any event the principle adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India was required to be followed.

6. Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents herein has placed strong reliance upon an unreported decision of one of us in the case of Janaki Ram Mishra v. State of West Bengal, C.O No. 15911(W) of 1993 and submitted on the basis thereof that in terms of the said judgment the service of the Tax Collectors have been regularised. In the aforementioned judgment the only question which arose for consideration was as to whether the Tax Collectors in Kasba Egra-I and II Gram Panchayat which included in the Egra Municipality became employees of the Municipality. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal did not arise therein nor there was any controversy as regard the illegality or otherwise of the appointment of such Tax Collectors. This court having regard to the provision of section 6 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, inter alia, held that those employees, having been appointed legally would be deemed to be the employees of the Municipality.

The said decision, therefore, in our opinion, has no application in the instant case.

7. Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel, has also placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Arun Kumar Rout v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1998 SC 1477, wherein it has been held:

“It may also be stated that such salaries had been paid to these appellants after a departmental inquiry indicating that even though there were irregularities in the appointment but the appellants has requisite qualifications for the respective post to which they were appointed. Although the appellants had not been appointed by following the due procedure and, therefore, they cannot claim regularisation as a matter of course. But considering the fact that they had satisfactorily served the department even without getting any salary for a long time and they were not guilty of any fraud or sharp practice and also did not lack in requisite qualification and they had been appointed against sanctioned posts, we feel that the appellants deserve sympathetic consideration in getting appointment against such sanctioned posts on human consideration. Considering the special facts of this appeal it appears to us that it will be just, proper and consistent with ends of justice to direct that 50 per cent of the sanctioned posts which were held by these appellants should be filled from amongst the appellants on the basis of their inter se merit position by taking into account their academic qualifications by waiving question of age bar if any and usual procedures for such appointment.”

8. Arum Kumar Rout's case was distinguished by a Division Bench of this Court in the case Sairindhri Dolui v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2000 (1) SLR 803, wherein it has been noticed:

“15. In Arun Kumar Rout v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1998 SC 1477, the Apex Court held:

‘Although in the matter of getting appointment in the Government Service, the procedure required to be followed for such appointment cannot be by-passed and if the initial appointment was illegal on account of not following the procedure for appointment, the incumbent obtaining appointment without following the procedure cannot claim as a matter of right to be regularised. This Court, however, has looked with sympathy when question of regularisation came for consideration in cases of temporary or ad hoc appointments, even made improperly, if the incumbents had been allowed to continue for a long time because of the human problem involved in such continued service.’

16. In the said decision the Apex Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India has been directed that the 50 per cent of the sanctioned posts which were held by these appellants should be filled from amongst the appellants on the basis of their inter se merit position by taking into account their academic qualifications by waiving question of age bar if any and usual procedures for such appointment. Thus, illegal appointments even in that case had not been and could not be set aside evidently in view of the decision of the Apex Court in various decisions as for example in Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar, reported in 1997 (2) SCC 1 : 1996 (7) SLR 15 (SC); Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1995 SC 962 : 1994 (5) SLR 234 (SC); State Of West Bengal & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Saha, reported in 1999 (2) CHN 519; J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan, reported in 1994 (2) SCC 630 : 1994 (1) SLR 246 (SC); State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dharambir, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 165 and Dr. Surindar Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in 1996 SC 2775.

17. Arun Kumar Rout (supra) has also been distinguished by a Division Bench of this court in Swapan Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India, reported in 1999 (5) SLR 807.

18. Furthermore it is a well settled principles of law that there can be no estoppel against statute. See Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheswari v. State of U.P, reported in AIR 1998 SC 966 : 1998 (2) SLR 291 (SC), wherein the law has been laid down in the following terms:

‘Whether a Promissory Estoppel, which is based on a ‘promise’ contrary to law can be invoked has already been considered by this court in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 274, as also in Shabi Construction Co. v. City & Industrial Development Corporation, (1995) 4 SCC 301, wherein it is laid down that the Rule of Promissory Estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a ‘promise’ or a ‘declaration’ which is contrary to law or outside the authority or power of the Government or the person making that promise.

Applying the above principles to the instant case, even if it is accepted that the State Government of the Director, Medical Education & Trading assured the appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted to the posts of Lecturer, such a ‘promise’ cannot be enforced against the respondents as the avenue of promotion for demonstrators to the post of Lecturers was not provided either under the Statute or any executive instruction. Moreover, if the post of Lecturer was filled up by promotion of Demonstrator, it would defeat the existing mode for recruitment, namely, that it can be filled up by direct recruitment only and not by promotion. It may also be stated that the appellant did not make any clear, sound and positive averment as to which officer of the Government, when and in what manner gave the assurance to the appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted to Lecturers. It was also not stated that the appellant had, at any time, acting upon the promise, altered his position, in any manner, specially to his detriment. Said pleadings cannot be made the foundation for invoking the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.’”

9. This aspect of the matter has again recently been considered by a Division Bench of this court in the case Rama Dutta v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2000 CWN 671.

Decisions on this question are galore. It is not necessary to refer to the said decisions having regard to the fact that the aforementioned question came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently in Suraj Prakash Gupta v. State of J & K, reported in 2000 (4) SLR 486, wherein the Apex Court has noticed the recent trend in the decision of the Supreme Court helding:

“25. The decision of this court have recently been requiring strict conformity with the Recruitment Rules for both direct recruits and promotees. The view is that there can be no relaxation of the basic or fundamental Rules of Recruitment. In Keshab Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, 1992 (Supp.) 1 SCC 272 : 1998 (7) SLR 469 (SC), the Rule permitted relaxation of conditions of service and it was held by the three Judge Bench that the Rule did not permit relaxation of Recruitment Rules. The words ‘may consult the PSC’ were, it was observed, to be read as ‘shall consult PSC’ and the Rule was treated mandatory. In Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India, 1993 (Supp.) 3 SCC 575 at 603 : 1993 (1) SLR 89 (SC), decided by a three Judge Bench, a similar strict principle was laid down. The relevant Rule-Rule 3 of the Residuary Rules (see p. 603) (para 33) in that case did permit relaxation of ‘Rule’. Even so, this court refused to imply relaxation of Recruitment Rule and observed:

‘the condition precedent, therefore, is that there should be appointment to the service in accordance with Rules and by operation of the Rule, undue hardship has been caused…. It is already held that condition of recruitment and conditions of service are distinct and the latter is preceded by an appointment according to Rules. The former cannot be relaxed.’

26. Similarly, in State of Orissa v. Sukanti Mahapatra, 1993 (2) SCC 486 : 1992 (2) SLR 321 (SC), it was held that though the power of relaxation stated in the Rule was in regard to ‘any of the provisions of the Rules,’ this did not permit relaxation of the Rule of direct recruitment without consulting the Commission and the entire ad hoc service of direct recruit could not be treated as regular service. Similarly, in Dr. M.A Haque v. Union of India, 1993 (2) SCC 213 : 1993 (2) SLR 1 (SC), it was held that for direct recruitment, the Rules relating to recruitment through the Public Service Commission could not be relaxed. In Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission v. Narinder Mohan, 1994 (2) SCC 630 : 1994 (1) SLR 264 (SC), it was held that the provision of the J & K Medical Recruitment Rules could not be relaxed for direct recruitment. Backdoor direct recruitments, could not be permitted. See also Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 (Supp.) 3 SCC 380 : 1994 (5) SLR 234 (SC). In Dr. Surinder Singh Jamal v. State of J. & K., 1996 (9) SCC 619, this court direct the direct recruits to go before the Public Service Commission.”

10. A bare perusal of the aforementioned decision of this court as also the Apex Court leave no manner of doubt whatsoever that an appointment on regular post must be made in terms of the Recruitment Rules having regard to the principles adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, as indicated hereinbefore, neither any appointment has been made nor any averment has been made by the writ petitioner that such appointment has been made in accordance with the Recruitment Rules or in consonance with the principle laid down under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Such appointment, therefore, cannot been encouraged. Furthermore, a finding of fact has been arrived at by the competent authority that the writ petitioners were appointed on contractual basis and that to for a period of 2 years at one point of time.

11. For the reason aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the learned Judge went wrong in passing the impugned order as evidently the writ petitioners had not been able to prove the existence of any legal right in them and the corresponding legal duty in the respondents to obtain a writ of Mandamus.

For the reason aforementioned, the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. This appeal is allowed and the applications are thus disposed of.

Pratap Kumar Ray, J.: I agree.

Appeal allowed.