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Amar Kumar v. State Of Bihar And Ors.

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 15, 2013
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were appointed as Sub-Inspectors of Police in June 2009 and placed on a two-year probation. On 6 October 2009, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Bihar, issued a one-line order terminating their services. The appellants filed writ petitions before the Patna High Court. A learned Single Judge directed them to submit representations, which were rejected by a detailed order dated 27 October 2009 alleging that, during training, they had instigated protests after the death of a trainee. A second round of writ petitions was dismissed; the Division Bench likewise dismissed the resulting Letters Patent Appeals on 26 September 2011. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the present appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ostensibly “simple” order terminating the appellants’ probation amounted to a punitive discharge founded on allegations of misconduct.
  2. If so, whether the termination was void for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India (1984) 2 SCC 369 A non-stigmatic discharge that is in reality founded on misconduct is punitive and attracts Article 311(2). Relied upon to hold that courts may look behind the form of an order; if misconduct is the foundation, the order is punitive.
State Bank of India v. Palak Modi (2013) 1 PLJR (SC) 476 Distinction between termination for general unsuitability and punitive termination; need for enquiry if misconduct forms the foundation. Cited for the principle that foundation-based terminations without enquiry violate natural justice.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India 1958 SCR 828 Classical test distinguishing punitive dismissal from discharge simpliciter. Referenced while tracing jurisprudential development.
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 (1) SCR 814 Governor’s pleasure and protections of Article 311; scope of probationer’s rights. Part of historical line of authorities examined.
State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur 1968 (3) SCR 234 Camouflage doctrine – looking beyond the form of the order. Included in survey of governing precedents.
Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba 1971 (79) ITR 143 (SC) Termination of temporary service vs. punitive dismissal. Referenced in background discussion.
State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra 1971 (2) SCR 191 Requirement of reasonable opportunity when misconduct is involved. Cited in chain of authorities.
R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. (1974) 3 SCR 754 Nature of “discharge” orders during probation. Part of precedent list relied upon.
State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi (1976) 4 SCC 52 Probationary termination—tests for punitive character. Noted in the Court’s survey.
I.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. (1967) 2 SCR 496 Scope of Article 311 protections for probationers. Mentioned as supporting authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the record, including the order dated 16 June 2011, and found that the decision to terminate the appellants was preceded by an inquiry into “serious misconduct” allegedly committed during training. Although the impugned order was couched in neutral language, its foundation was the appellants’ alleged role in instigating protests, making it punitive in substance.

Applying Anoop Jaiswal, the Court reiterated that where misconduct is the real cause, a non-stigmatic form cannot shield the order from constitutional scrutiny. The Court further adopted the ratio in Palak Modi: a probationer may be discharged for unsuitability without enquiry, but if misconduct underlies the action, the safeguards of natural justice and Article 311(2) are mandatory.

Because the appellants were neither given a proper departmental enquiry nor an opportunity of hearing, the termination breached the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954, Article 14, and Article 311(2). Consequently, both the Single Judge and Division Bench had erred in treating the discharge as non-punitive.

Holding and Implications

Appeals ALLOWED; termination orders QUASHED.

The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court’s judgment and declared the appellants’ termination illegal. The appellants are to be reinstated with consequential benefits. Nonetheless, the competent authority is permitted to conduct a proper enquiry into the alleged misconduct and may, if it chooses, withhold posting during such enquiry. The decision does not create new doctrine but reinforces the established principle that punitive terminations of probationers require adherence to natural justice.

Show all summary ...

Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954 - Rule 12; Constitution of India - Articles 14; Constitution of India - 311(2)

Cases Referred: Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 369; State Bank of India v. Palak Modi 2013 (2) PLJR (SC) 77 : 2013 (1) PLJR (SC) 476 : 2012 (11) SCALE 542; Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union Of India 1958 SCR 828; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 (1) SCR 814; State of Punjab v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur 1968 (3) SCR 234; Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba 1971 (79) ITR 143 (SC); State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra 1971 (2) SCR 191; R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. (1974) 3 SCR 754; State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi (1976) 4 SCC 52; I.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. (1967) 2 SCR 496

Disposition: Appeal AllowedCiting Reference: Mentioned  8Relied On  2

Case Note:Service - Termination - Appellants were terminated from service - Hence, present appeal - Whether termination of services of Appellants was declared illegal - Held, as observed in various precedents of apex court that if allegation of misconduct constitutes foundation of action taken, ultimate decision taken by competent authority can be nullified on ground of violation of rules of natural justice - Established that action to terminate services of Appellants was taken after holding inquiry into allegations of serious misconduct allegedly committed by them - Services of Appellants could not had been terminated, without holding proper enquiry and giving them opportunity of hearing - Termination of services of Appellants was declared illegal and liable to be quashed - Appeal allowed.

ORDER

1. Leave granted. These appeals are directed against judgment dated 26.9.2011 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court whereby the letters patent appeals filed by the Appellants were dismissed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge refusing to quash the termination of their services was upheld.

2. The Appellants were appointed as Sub-Inspectors in June 2009 and were placed on probation for two years. Their services were terminated by one line order dated 6.10.2009 issued by Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Bihar (respondent No. 4 herein). The writ petitions filed by the Appellants questioning the termination of their services were disposed of by the learned Single Judge by giving them liberty to make representation to the concerned authority with a direction to the latter to decide the same by speaking order.

3. In compliance of the direction given by the High Court, Respondent No. 4 passed detailed order dated 27.10.2009 whereby he rejected the representations of the Appellants by observing that during the course of training, they had instigated to do commotion/agitation/protest and to raise slogans by spreading false rumours in connection with the death of one of the trainees.

4. The second batch of writ petitions filed by the Appellants was dismissed by the learned Single Judge who opined that the termination of their services cannot be treated as punitive. The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeals.

5. We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record including order dated 16.6.2011 (Annexure-R-), which clearly show that action to terminate the services of the Appellants was taken after holding an inquiry into the allegations of serious misconduct allegedly committed by them. We have also gone through the judgment of this Court in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 369 and State Bank of India v. Palak Modi 2013 (2) PLJR (SC) 77 : 2013 (1) PLJR (SC) 476 : 2012 (11) SCALE 542. In Annop Jaiswal's case (supra), this Court considered the question whether termination of the Appellant's service, who was appointed to Indian Police Service and was on probation, by invoking Rule 12(b) of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954 was punitive in nature. The facts found by the Court were that while undergoing training at National Police Academy, Hyderabad, the Probationary Officers had delayed attending the ceremonial drill practice. The Director of the Academy called explanation from all the probationers. The Appellant was accused of having instigated others not to join ceremonial drill practice on time. He denied the allegation. Thereafter, his service was terminated by a non-stigmatic order. The Appellant challenged the termination of his service on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 311(2) of the Constitution. The writ petition filed by him was summarily dismissed by the Delhi High Court. This Court referred to the averments contained in the pleadings of the parties, the judgments in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union Of India, 1958 SCR 828, Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 (1) SCR 814, State of Punjab v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur 1968 (3) SCR 234, Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba 1971 (79) ITR 143 (SC), State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra 1971 (2) SCR 191, R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. (1974) 3 SCR 754, State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi (1976) 4 SCC 52 and I.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. (1967) 2 SCR 496 and held:

It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee.

In the instant case, the period of probation had not yet been over. The impugned order of discharge was passed in the middle of the probationary period. An explanation was called for from the Appellant regarding the alleged act of indiscipline, namely, arriving late at the gymnasium and acting as one of the ringleaders on the occasion and his explanation was obtained. Similar explanations were called for from other probationers and enquiries were made behind the back of the Appellant. Only the case of the Appellant was dealt with severely in the end. The cases of other probationers who were also considered to be ringleaders were not seriously taken note of. Even though the order of discharge may be noncommittal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read alongwith the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

6. In Palak Modi's case (supra), this Court reviewed various precedents and recorded the following conclusion:--

The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service-can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice.

7. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned judgments, it must be held that the services of the Appellants could not have been terminated, without holding a proper enquiry and giving them an opportunity of hearing. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the termination of the services of the Appellants is declared illegal and quashed. The Respondents shall reinstate the Appellants with consequential benefits. However, it is made clear that the competent authority shall be free to hold enquiry into the allegations of misconduct against the Appellants and pass appropriate order with requisite expedition. It will also be open to the competent authority not to give posting to the Appellants till the conclusion of the enquiry.