Vijayvargiya, J.:— This appeal, under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, is directed by the claimant-appellant against the award dated 16-3-74, passed by the Second Additional Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Indore, in Claims Case No. 14 of 1971.

2. The claimant is the real brother of the deceased Rambharosey. Rambharosey was coming on a bicycle from Rao on the Bombay Agra Road. He was knocked down near Akashwani by motor truck No. RJZ 2733, which was being driven rashly and negligently on the wrong side of the road, Rambharosey succumbed to his injuries on the same day, while he was being taken to the M.Y Hospital. The truck was being driven by the respondent No. 2 Gheesalal. The truck was insured with the respondent No. 3, New India Assurance Company Limited, Bhagwansingh or respondents No. 4 and 5. The name of the respondent No. 1 was deleted by the appellant during the pendency of this appeal. The deceased was aged about 30 years at the time of the accident and he was earning Rs. 150/- per month. The appellant claimed a sum of Rs. 60,000/- as compensation on account of the death of his brother, Rambharosey. He alleged that there was no other legal representative and heir of the deceased. The respondent No. 2 denied that the accident was caused on account of his rash and negligent driving of the truck. The respondent No. 3 also denied the case of the petitioner. There were other pleas raised by the respondents, which do not survive now. The Tribunal held that the accident was caused on account of the rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 2. The Tribunal also held that the deceased was contributing a sum of Rs. 320/- per year to the claimant. The deceased was a bachelor and was aged about 30 years. The Tribunal, considering the circumstances of the case and the fact that after the deceased was married, his contribution to his brother would be reduced: held that the compensation awardable to the claimant would be Rs. 3,400/- with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the application till realization. However, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the petitioner, as the brother of deceased, was not entitled to get any compensation on the ground that a brother was not a representative of the deceased. The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the petition of the claimant. The claimant has challenged the award of the Tribunal in this appeal.

3. The only point for consideration in this appeal, therefore, is whether the claimant, as the brother of the deceased, is entitled to claim compensation for death of the deceased caused by the rash and negligent act of the respondent No. 2. The appellant contended that there being no nearer heir left behind by the deceased Rambharosey, he was his legal representative being his only heir and was entitled to claim compensation. The respondents contended that the claimant the brother of the deceased cannot be said to be dependent or the representative of the deceased and therefore he is not entitled to claim any compensation for the death of the deceased, under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act.

4. The learned counsel for the respondent supported the view taken by Tribunal and contended that the Claims Tribunal enquiring into a claim for compensation in respect of fatal accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle has to apply the law contained in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. He contended that the claimant, who is the brother of the deceased, was not a dependent under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act and that the section recognises only the wife, husband, parents and children as beneficiaries and, therefore, the claimant was not entitled to claim compensation for the death of Rambharosey. He placed reliance upon the decisions in Dewan Hari Chand v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1973 A.C.J 87 P.B Kedar v. Thatchamma A.I.R 1970 Ker. 241; Mrs. Pushpa v. State of Jammu & Kashmir 1977 A.C.J 375; Suman v. The General Manager, Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport 1970 A.C.J 280 and Balmukund v. Smt. Mustaqbai 1970 M.P.L.J (S. Note) 13.

5. This learned counsel for the appellant contended that all claims for compensation arising out the use of a motor vehicle are now governed by the provisions of sections 110 to 110-F of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and that under 110-A of the said Act, a claim for compensation by the brother of the deceased is maintainable as his legal representative and the provisions of section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, will not come in the way. He placed reliance upon the decisions in Mohammed Rabibulluh v. K. Seethammal 1966 A.C.J 349; The Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chellu Hanumantha Rao 1975 A.C.J 344; Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai 1977 A.C.J 253; and Kasturi Lal v. Prabhakar 1970 A.C.J 1.

6. Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 may be made where death has resulted from the accident by or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to this section lays down that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined, any such application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives of the deceased who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.

7. The word ‘legal representative’ has not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act. The word ‘legal representative’ has been defined in section 2(ii) of C.P.C 1908 as follows: “‘Legal Representative’ means a person, who in law, represents the estate of the deceased ………” The definition of the word ‘legal representative’ as contained in C.P.C was known to the Parliament when it used the word ‘legal representative’ in section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It would, therefore, be proper to construe the expression ‘legal representative’ as defined in Civil Procedure Code. In Kasturi Lal & An v. Prabhakar 1970 A.C.J 1 a Division Bench of this court held that term ‘legal representative’ must be construed in the context of section 2(ii) of Civil Procedure Code and further also in the context of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. In Vanguard Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Chellu Hanumantha Rao 1975 A.C.J 344, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that as the expression ‘legal representative’ was not defined in the act, the court will be justified in relying upon the expression ‘legal representative’ as defined in Civil Procedure Code. It is not in dispute that if the word ‘legal representative’ is so construed, the appellant as the brother of the deceased, is his legal representative, because, there being no nearer heir of the deceased, he is a person, who, in law, represents the estate of the deceased and, therefore, he has a right to make an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

8. However, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the provisions of section 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act are merely adjectival or procedural in nature and they do not confer any substantive right on a person to claim compensation on account of the death of a person, and that the substantive right is conferred only by the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. According to the learned counsel, under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, only the wife, husband, parents and children are entitled to claim compensation for the death of a person and the appellant, not being one of them has no such right. This submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is not well-founded. Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, used the word ‘representative’ and the word ‘representative’ as used in the said section, has been construed as being limited to the relations mentioned in that section. The word ‘legal representative’ was defined in C.P.C, 1908. When the provisions of section 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act were inserted in the statute in the year 1956, the Parliament knew that by the Fatal Accidents Act, the right to claim compensation for the death of the deceased was conferred on his representative, which was construed to mean the relations mentioned in section 1-A of the said Act. The Parliament also knew that the term ‘legal representative’ as defined in C.P.C, 1908, had a wider connotation. If inspite of this, the Parliament used the word ‘legal representative’ in section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, it would be reasonable to construe that the Parliament intended to confer the right to receive compensation for the death of the deceased also upon persons, who were not mentioned in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, and who came within the definition of the term ‘legal representative’, as defined in C.P.C In Megjibhai's case 1977 A.C.J 253, a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court, after considering in detail the several conflicting decisions of the High Courts, held that clause (b) of sub-section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act conferred a substantive right on all the legal representatives of the deceased victim to claim compensation from the wrong-doer and being a special provision providing for relief for accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles, it has the effect of over-riding the provisions of section 1-A of the 1855 Act. In that case, the Gujarat High Court has held that the brother and the nephew of the deceased were entitled to claim compensation for the death of the victim, as his ‘legal representatives’. In Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Chellu Hanumantha 1975 A.C.J 344, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has similarly held that the brother of the deceased was entitled claim relief as a legal representative of the deceased. In Mohd. Habibullah's case 1966 A.C.J 349, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has held that a married sister of the victim, who was a bachelor and who died without leaving children, parents or any other nearer heir, was entitled to claim compensation as the legal representative of the deceased.

9. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the decision in Dewan Harichand's case 1973 A.C.J 87, and contended that only the heirs mentioned in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act are entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased. In that case, this question did not really arise for consideration because the claim was made by the father and three brothers of the deceased. Under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, the father was the heir of the deceased in entry No. 1 of class-2 of the schedule to the said Act. The brothers would be the heirs of the deceased in entry No. 2 of class 2 of the schedule and the father being the nearer heir shall be preferred to the brothers, who were in second entry and, therefore, in the presence of the father, the brothers would not be the legal representatives of the deceased. In the circumstances, the father alone was rightly held entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased. The decision in P.B Kedar's case A.I.R 1970 Ker. 241, is also not helpful to the respondents, because in that case, the provisions of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act have not been considered by the said High Court and further in that case, in the presence of nearer heirs, the brothers could not be said to the legal representatives of the deceased. The decision in Megjibhai's case 1977 A.C.J 253, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is also not helpful because in that case also, there were nearer heirs and the brother, therefore, could not be said to be legal representative of the deceased. The learned counsel has also placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this court in Suntan's case 1970 A.C.J 280. The point involved in that case was quite different. In that case, the widow of the deceased only submitted an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and the children of the deceased were not made parties to the proceeding. It was, therefore, contended by the respondents that the loss sustained by the children should not be taken into consideration because they were not parties to the petition. Negativing this contention of the respondents, it was held that the claim under section 110-A of the Act, being representative in character, it is essentially on behalf of all the representatives of the deceased. In this connection, reference was made to section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. This case, therefore does not help the respondents. Reference was also made by the learned counsel for the respondents to the decision of the Division Bench of this court in Kamla Devi v. Kishan Chand 1970 A.C.J 310, 120 In that case construing the provisions of section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, it was held that the said section does not create any new basis for assessing compensation and the amount of compensation has to be determined according to the substantive law of liability as provided in Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The provisions of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act were not involved in that case and this court had no occasion to consider the same.

10. The learned counsel for respondents also placed reliance upon my decision in Balmukund v. Smt. Mustaqbai 1979 M.P.L.J (S.N) No. 13. In that case, the claim was made by the father, brother and sister of the deceased. It was held that in presence of the father, the brother and sister have no right to claim compensation and the father was entitled to the whole of the compensation. The case, therefore, does not help the respondents, because in the presence of the father, the brother and sister were not the legal representative of the deceased.

11. There is another, aspect, which requires consideration. The provisions of sections 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, were inserted to provide cheap and speedy remedy to the persons, who had suffered loss on account of the accident. The provisions, being benevolent, call for liberal and broad interpretation so that the real purpose of enacting sections 110-A to 110-F is achieved. It is well settled that if the provisions of a welfare legislation are capable of two interpretations, the interpretation, which furthers the policy of the act and is more beneficial to the persons for whose interest the law has been made, should be preferred. Therefore, if the Parliament has thought it fit not to use the word ‘representative’, as was used in Fatal Accidents Act, but has used, the word ‘legal representative’ in section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, full effect has to be given to the legislative intent. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the category of persons, who are entitled to claim compensation on account of the death of the deceased person, cannot be restricted to the relations specified in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and I agree with the view taken by the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts in the decisions referred to above that all the legal representatives of a deceased as defined by section 2(ii) of C.P.C are entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, if they have suffered any loss on account of the death of the deceased. In the present case, it is common ground that the appellant being the brother of the deceased was not survived by any other nearer heir. The appellant, therefore, is entitled to claim compensation on account of the death of the deceased from the respondents. On consideration of the evidence, adduced by the parties, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal has rightly held that the accident was caused on account of the rash and negligent, act of the respondent No. 2 in driving the truck and, therefore, the respondents are liable to pay compensation to the appellant. I am also of the opinion that the amount of compensation assessed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be too low or too excessive requiring interference by this Court in appeal.

12. As a result of the discussion aforesaid this appeal is allowed, the award of the Tribunal is set aside and it is directed that the respondents shall pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 3,400/- as compensation with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the application till realization. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.