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Bhanwar Lal Mundra & Ors. v. State Of Rajasthan & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sunil Ambwani, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners are residents of Mundron Ka Bas, Gram Panchayat Napasar, District Bikaner. They challenged the State Government's Notification dated 18.9.2009 that withdrew an earlier Notification dated 6.10.2008 which had declared Gram Panchayat Napasar to be a Municipality (Nagar Palika) Class IV under Section 3(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance, 2008 (later enacted as the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009). The petitioners sought a direction declaring the 18.9.2009 Notification illegal and to quash it, and sought directions to hold elections for the Municipal Board rather than for the Gram Panchayat.
The interim application to stay elections was rejected on 17.1.2005 (noting the elections were notified on 24.12.2014 as per the opinion). Napasar is described in the opinion as an urbanised area (27 kms from Bikaner) with population 19,550 per 2001 Census and alleged current population over 30,000; it has industrial development, schools, a hospital, bank branches, a railway station and other urban facilities. Historically Napasar had been declared a municipality in 1944 under the erstwhile Bikaner State, and thereafter became a Gram Panchayat after the Constitution; it remained so until the 2008 Notification.
Administrative steps preceding the 6.10.2008 Notification included a request by the Director, Local Self Department to the District Collector (22.10.2005) and the Collector's collection and forwarding of data, including a Tehsildar's report showing land use and population. The State issued the 6.10.2008 Notification declaring Napasar a Municipality and a Government order on 16.10.2008 stating that until elections are held the Sarpanch, Upsarpanch and Panch or Panchas representing the area shall be deemed additional members of the Municipality. Administrative sanction for 39 sanitation posts and a budget were also issued on 13.2.2009.
Nathi Devi and Murli Manohar Ojha (Sarpanch and Upsarpanch) filed Writ Petition No. 1490/2009 challenging the 6.10.2008 declaration; it was dismissed on 25.2.2009 with liberty to the petitioners to approach the State Government. A Special Appeal was initially stayed (29.4.2009) but was later dismissed as rendered infructuous (18.2.2011). Subsequently, on 18.9.2009 the State issued the impugned Notification withdrawing the 6.10.2008 declaration, which gave rise to this writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State Government had the legal power to withdraw the Notification dated 6.10.2008 declaring Gram Panchayat Napasar as Municipality (Nagar Palika) Class IV by issuing the Notification dated 18.9.2009.
- Whether a municipality, once constitutionally or statutorily declared under Article 243Q and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (Section 3(1)), can be de-notified or reverted to a Gram Panchayat by executive action.
- Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, permits the State to withdraw or reverse a prior Notification constituting a Municipality.
- Whether the impugned withdrawal Notification was arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice or of constitutional provisions including Article 21 and Article 243Q.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The 18.9.2009 Notification withdrawing the 6.10.2008 Notification is illegal, arbitrary and violative of natural justice.
- Once Napasar was declared a Municipality under Section 3(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance, 2008 (now Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009), the State had no power to withdraw that Notification or to de-notify the Municipality and reconstitute a Gram Panchayat.
- There is no provision in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, or the Constitution permitting such de-notification; the Panchayat can only be constituted under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, subject to its procedure.
- Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 deals with delimitation and does not empower withdrawal of a Notification to convert a municipal area back into a rural Panchayat area.
- The transition from rural to urban (Part IX-A / Article 243Q) is a forward path and cannot be reversed; withdrawal is constitutionally impermissible.
- Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to withdraw an exercise of legislative power such as issuance of that Notification; authority for this proposition was placed on Supreme Court decisions (Tulsipur Sugar Co. and Baldev Singh).
- Reliance was placed on K.P. Raveendran v. State of Kerala and Vishwa Nath v. State of Rajasthan to support the legal position that a municipality, once constituted under the constitutional scheme, cannot be re-transited to a rural Panchayat.
State's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The State (through Additional Advocate General) contended that it had power to withdraw the Notification under Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and under Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, including reliance on Clause 3(1)(d) dealing with delimitation and dissolution.
- The State argued that de-limitation under Section 3(1)(d)(iv) could lead to dissolution of a municipality and that certain rural schemes (e.g., MNREGA) could not be implemented in a municipal area; for continuation of rural schemes the State considered it appropriate to withdraw the Notification.
- The State relied on Punjab & Haryana High Court decisions (Inderjit Singh; Begowal Full Bench) and a Division Bench decision of this Court (Girdhari Singh) that, in similar fact patterns, upheld or permitted de-notification or non-interference with executive decisions to de-notify.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K.P. Raveendran v. State of Kerala (AIR 2005 Kerala 319) | Held that withdrawal of notification converting a rural area into a municipality (thereby retransiting it into a rural area) is impermissible under Article 243Q; Section 21 General Clauses Act not attracted in such context. | The Court found the reasons in K.P. Raveendran closely in support of petitioners and extensively quoted and relied on the Kerala High Court's reasoning that Part IX-A contemplates only transition from rural to urban and not vice versa, and that executive de-linking is unconstitutional. |
| Vishwa Nath v. State of Rajasthan (1993 WLN 127) | Explained that to establish a new Gram Panchayat of an area formerly part of a Municipality, the State must follow procedure in the Rajasthan Panchayat Act considering population, habitation and rural/urban character. | The petitioners relied on this decision to support the proposition that re-creation of a Gram Panchayat out of a municipal area requires statutory procedure; the Court considered this authority supportive of the petitioners' position. |
| Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur ((1980) 2 SCC 295 : AIR 1980 SC 882) | Establishment that issuance of a notification declaring an area is a legislative act which cannot be reversed by applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. | The petitioners relied on this Supreme Court precedent to argue that Section 21 General Clauses Act cannot be used to withdraw a legislative notification; the Court referenced this as part of petitioners' legal foundation. |
| Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((1987) 2 SCC 510 : AIR 1987 SC 1239) | Supports principle that an issuance of Notification is a legislative act and Section 21 of General Clauses Act cannot be used to reverse such legislative action. | Relied upon by petitioners to argue non-applicability of General Clauses Act to withdrawal of a municipal notification; Court accepted this principle in its analysis quoting K.P. Raveendran which relies on Baldev Singh. |
| Inderjit Singh v. State of Haryana (CWP No. 3705/2007, decided 18.2.2014) | Interpreted Section 8 of Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (express power to abolish municipality) and upheld exercise of power to abolish municipality under that State law. | The State relied on this decision; the Court distinguished it, noting it was based on a statute that expressly permitted abolition and did not address post-Seventy-third/Seventy-fourth Amendment constitutional scheme; the Court found its reasoning not persuasive here. |
| Begowal v. The State of Punjab (Full Bench, decided 3 Oct 1980) (AIR 1981 PH 101) | Full Bench upheld a Notification (context: de-notification or boundary alteration issues in Punjab/Haryana jurisdiction). | The State relied on this Full Bench decision; the Court considered it but found its reasoning distinguishable and not persuasive in light of the constitutional framework after the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendments. |
| Girdhari Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 11436/2013, decided 17.1.2014) | Division Bench declined to interfere with an order de-notifying a Sub-Tehsil (interpretation and non-intervention in certain administrative de-notifications). | The State relied on this Court's decision; the opinion notes the reliance but treats the present facts and constitutional context as distinct (municipality versus sub-tehsil de-notification), and did not accept this as decisive authority for the State's position. |
| State of U.P v. Pradhan Singh Kshettra Samiti (1995 Supp (2) SCC 305 : AIR 1995 SC 1512) | Held the Governor is not bound by particular yardsticks when specifying villages under Part IX; contrasted with Article 243Q(2) which supplies yardsticks for municipal classifications. | Quoted in the K.P. Raveendran reasoning relied upon by this Court to show Article 243Q(2) contains yardsticks for transitional/smaller/larger urban areas and to distinguish Part IX yardstick situation. |
| T.M. Kanniyan v. ITO (AIR 1968 SC 637) | Authority on limits of application of General Clauses Act in contexts where application would be repugnant to constitutional provisions; cited for principle that Section 21 may not apply where inconsistent with constitutional scheme. | Quoted in the Kerala High Court exposition and adopted in part by this Court to support the conclusion that Section 21 General Clauses Act cannot be used to re-transit an area contrary to Article 243Q. |
| N.D. Jayal v. Union of India ((2004) 9 SCC 362) | Recognised that the right to development is part of right to life under Article 21 and includes civil, political, cultural and social processes and rights to health, education and decent environment. | The Court relied on this line of authorities to underscore that the right to development is a component of Article 21 and to view retrograde administrative action that impedes urban development as a violation of Article 21. |
| Samatha v. State of A.P. ((1997) 8 SCC 191) | Part of the jurisprudence on rights and development relied upon in N.D. Jayal about the content of Article 21. | Referenced indirectly through N.D. Jayal to support the Court's view on the right to development under Article 21. |
| Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar ((1996) 5 SCC 125) | Authority contributing to the understanding of constitutional rights connected to development and social entitlements referenced in N.D. Jayal. | Referenced as part of the jurisprudential basis for treating development as encompassed by Article 21, used in the Court's reasoning. |
| Election Commission of India v. St. Mary's School ((2008) 2 SCC 390) | Held that the right to development is a valuable human right. | The Court cited this decision as supporting the proposition that the right to development is constitutionally significant when considering the impact of the withdrawal Notification on residents' continuing development opportunities. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in several steps, closely following the text of the opinion and the authorities relied upon:
- Constitutional framework and Article 243Q: The Court emphasised that the Seventy-fourth Amendment added Part IX-A and Article 243Q which contemplates a one‑way transition of a rural area into urban categories (Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council, Municipal Corporation) based on specified yardsticks (population, density, revenue, non‑agricultural employment etc.). The Court accepted the reasoning in K.P. Raveendran that the constitutional scheme does not contemplate or permit retransit of an urban area back into a rural area.
- Scope of Section 3(1) Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009: The Court examined Section 3(1) (delimitation) and concluded it provides for declaring an area to be a Municipality, including including/excluding local areas or altering limits, and contains provisions for consequences (e.g., elections, removal of members, dissolution in certain cases). However, the Court held Section 3(1) does not support the State's submission that the State may withdraw the Notification that originally constituted the Municipality so as to revive the Gram Panchayat; the provision contemplates delimitation, amalgamation, splitting and dissolution under the Act but not a retrograde re-transit to Part IX.
- Inapplicability of Section 101 Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994: The Court found Section 101 had no application because the impugned Notification was not issued under Section 101. It also noted procedural requirements under Section 101(1) (one month's notice as prescribed) which were not followed. The Court observed Section 101(1)(a) contemplates notification of a local area within a Municipality as a Panchayat Circle, not the de‑notification of an entire Municipality to revive a Gram Panchayat.
- On the General Clauses Act and Section 21: The petitioners argued (relying on Tulsipur Sugar and Baldev Singh) that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could not be used to reverse a legislative notification that constituted a Municipality. The Court, adopting the reasoning in K.P. Raveendran, held that recourse to Section 21 would be repugnant to the constitutional scheme under Article 243Q and Article 367; in absence of express constitutional provision allowing retransit, it would be impermissible to allow a statutory or executive provision to effect such retransit.
- Assessment of State's reasons and factual context: The Court reviewed the factual record about Napasar's urban characteristics (industrial units, banks, schools, hospital, railway station, PHED and electricity offices, population figures, land use) and concluded that Napasar had matured into an urban area and had progressed on the path of urbanisation. The Court found the only reason given in the State's reply for withdrawing the Notification was to enable continuation of certain rural schemes (e.g., NREGA) and held that this rationale was "wholly absurd" and insufficient to justify re-transiting an urban area to rural status.
- Distinguishing contrary authorities: The Court considered cases relied upon by the State (Inderjit Singh; Begowal; Girdhari Singh) but distinguished them on statutory language (where those statutes expressly permitted abolition) or on facts (e.g., small village Sadhaura in Inderjit Singh) or on the nature of the administrative action (sub‑tehsil de‑notification in Girdhari Singh). The Court held those authorities did not persuade it to accept the State's position in the present constitutional context.
- Article 21 and right to development: The Court invoked jurisprudence recognising right to development within Article 21 (N.D. Jayal, Election Commission v. St. Mary's School and other authorities) to underline that reverting a community's recognised urban development to a rural status for narrow administrative or political considerations infringes constitutional protections.
- Conclusion of illegality and arbitrariness: Combining the constitutional prohibition on retransit, the statutory interpretation of Section 3(1), the inapplicability of Section 101, the absence of required notice or procedure, and the inadequacy of State's reasons, the Court concluded the 18.9.2009 Notification was illegal, arbitrary, issued with an oblique retrograde purpose and beyond the power of the State to advise the Governor to issue.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned Notification dated 18.9.2009 (which withdrew the Notification dated 6.10.2008 declaring Gram Panchayat Napasar as Municipality Class-IV) is QUASHED. The Notification of 18.9.2009 was declared unconstitutional as violative of Article 21 and Article 243Q of the Constitution (as inserted by the Seventy-fourth Amendment Act, 1992). The State Government is directed to take consequential steps. There shall be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The direct legal effect is that the withdrawal Notification (18.9.2009) is annulled and the earlier declaration of Napasar as Municipality Class IV (6.10.2008) stands; the State must take consequential administrative action consistent with this judgment.
- The Court emphasised that under the constitutional scheme of Part IX-A (Article 243Q), a rural area that is constitutionally recognised and notified as an urban area cannot be retransited back into a rural Gram Panchayat by executive notification; the judgment constrains executive action that would effect such retrograde change without constitutional or statutory authority and procedure.
- The opinion stresses the necessity of following statutory procedures (where applicable) and of respecting constitutional provisions (Article 243Q and Article 21) when altering local government status; the Court found the State's motive (to permit continuation of rural schemes) insufficient to justify reversal.
- The opinion did not expressly state that it was laying down a binding new precedent beyond deciding the disputes before it, but it does declare the impugned action unconstitutional and relies on established constitutional principles and prior authorities to reach that conclusion.
Sunil Ambwani, C.J:— The petitioners are residents of Mundron Ka Bas, Gram Panchayat Napasar District Bikaner. By this petition, they have prayed for a direction to declare the Notification dated 18.9.2009 issued by the State Government as illegal and to quash the same with consequential directions, by which the Notification dated 6.10.2008 issued by the State Government under the authority of the Governor of Rajasthan declaring the Gram Panchayat Napasar as Municipality (Nagar Palika) Class IV, was withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 3(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance, 2008, which was later-on enacted as the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. The petitioners have also prayed for direction to hold elections for Municipal Board, Napasar and not to hold elections for Gram Panchayat, Napasar.
2. The interim relief application for staying the elections was rejected on 17.1.2005 on the ground that the elections were notified on 24.12.2014
3. The Napasar is situated at a distance of 27 kms. from Bikaner. It has a population of 19500 as per 2001 Census. At present, the population is alleged to have increased to more than 30,000. It is an urban area having industrial set up by the RIICO with several industrial units engaged in the manufacture of wool and woolen products, mosaic tiles, PVC pipes and cement pipes. It has two Senior Secondary Schools, one for boys and one for girls; 20 bedded Government hospital, two branches of nationalized Banks, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur and M.G.D Gramin Bank; a telephone exchange; a Police Station; and offices of the Assistant Engineers of PHED and Jodhpur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited. It is on a railway line with a Railway Station and Bus Stand of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation.
4. Prior to independence of India, the erstwhile Bikaner State had declared the village Napasar as Municipality vide Notification dated 2.3.1944 On the promulgation of the Constitution of India, a Gram Panchayat was established in Napasar, which continued in its existence till 2007. The Director, Local Self Department called upon the District Collector, Bikaner on 22.10.2005 to submit information for the purposes of enabling the State Government to take a decision for constituting Municipal Board at Napasar. A representation was also made by Shri Pareek Jan Kalyan Samiti, Napasar to that effect giving the details of urban development in Napasar to the Minister of the Panchayat Raj Department.
5. The District Collector, Bikaner collected the necessary information and forwarded the same to the State Government, in which he, after getting a report from Tehsildar, reported that the village Napasar has geographical area of 7795 hectares with a population of 19,550 according to 2001 Census. It has one member of Zila Parishad and one member of Panchayat Samiti. In the village, there is a land measuring 24 hectares belonging to Railway Department; 17 hectares for RIICO; 6 hectares for 132 KV G.S.S Napasar; 54 hectares for PWD; 5812 hectares for agriculture purposes. Apart from this, 299 hectares of land was used as abadi land by Gram Panchayat; 1015 hectares of land belonged to the Forest Department; and 444 hectare is a gochar land. A map of the village was enclosed showing the railway line crossing Napasar from the middle.
6. The State Government satisfied with the requirements of the constitution of the Municipality, issued a Notification dated 6.10.2008 declaring the Gram Panchayat, Napasar as Municipality (Nagar Palika) Class IV under Section 3(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance, 2008 (later on enacted as Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009). By the Government order dated 16.10.2008, in pursuance to Section 3(7)(C) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Ordinance, 2008, it was directed that until elections are held under sub-section (1) or the term of the Municipality is expired, whichever is earlier, the Sarpanch, Upsarpanch and the Panch or Panchas representing the area of the village so included in or declared as a Municipality, shall be deemed to be the additional members of the Municipality in which such area of the village is included.
7. The Local Self Govt. Department also issued a Government order on 13.2.2009 giving administrative sanction for creation of 39 posts of “Safai-Karamchari” and also sanctioned a budget of Rs. 4,83,000 for the said purpose.
8. A Writ Petition No. 1490/2009 was filed by Nathi Devi, Sarpanch and Murli Manohar Ojha, Upsarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Napasar against the declaration of Gram Panchayat Napasar as Municipality Class-IV. The said writ petition was dismissed on 25.2.2009, with liberty to the petitioners to approach the State Government after passing resolution in the newly constituted Municipality, for appropriate decision. In Special Appeal No. 383/09, an order was passed on 29.4.2009 that until further orders, the petitioners shall not be unseated from their status as elected representatives. On 18.2.2011, the Special Appeal was dismissed with the following observations:—“Learned counsel for the appellant submits that this appeal has rendered infructuous on account of certain subsequent events which have cropped up during pendency of the litigation. We accepted the statement and accordingly, dismiss the appeal as having been rendered infructuous.”
9. On 18.9.2009, the State Government issued the impugned Notification in exercise of the powers under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 withdrawing the Notification dated 6.10.2008 by which the Gram Panchayat Napasar was declared as Municipality (Nagar Palika) Class-IV, giving rise to this writ petition.
10. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the order withdrawing the Notification is grossly illegal, arbitrary and is violative of the principles of natural justice. It has been passed against the constitutional scheme as envisaged by the Seventy-fourth Amendment to the Constitution of India providing for constitution of the Municipalities under Article 243Q inserted in Part-IX-A by the Constitution (Seventyfourth Amendment) Act, 1992 with effect from 1.6.1993 There is no provision under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and the Constitution of India to de-notify a Gram Panchayat. There was no power vested in the State Government to withdraw the Notification, by which the Gram Panchayat Napasar was declared to be a Municipality Class-IV. The Panchayat can only be constituted under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. There are no provisions under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 to withdraw the Notification or to de-notify a Municipality and to constitute or re-constitute the Gram Panchayat and no such power exists in the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, either. After the Notification declaring Gram Panchayat, Napasar as a Municipality Class-IV, some posts were sanctioned and the budget was also sanctioned. The establishment of Napasar as a Municipality Class-IV was complete in all respects, which could not be undone by an executive order.
11. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 provides for de-limitation of the Municipalities. The State Government may declare any local area not included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Municipality, or include any such area in a Municipality, or exclude any local area from a Municipality, or otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality. It has no power to withdraw the Notification declaring a Municipality. The provisions of Sec. 3(1)(d) providing the cases in which the Municipality can be dissolved, does not include any such event, which may authorize the State Govt. to withdraw the Notification declaring a Municipality.
12. It is submitted that the transition from rural to urban area, as envisaged in Part IX-A of the Constitution of India amended by the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act 1992 with effect from 1.6.1993 provides for a Nagar Panchayat to be constituted a transitional area, in transition from a rural area to an urban area, a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area and a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, under Article 243-Q(1). The path of progress of the residents of a rural area to be constituted as a transitional area, a smaller urban area or a larger urban area, is not provided to be reversed. The withdrawal of the Notification and thereby converting the municipal area into rural area is a retrograde step of the State Government, which is not permissible by the Constitution of India. The urban area of Napasar had all the signs of urbanization. It was progressing on the path of development and was so recognized and notified and declared as Municipality (Nagar Palika) Class-IV by the State Government. There was absolutely no material whatsoever with the State Government nor any representations were made by the elected representatives or any other persons to withdraw the Notification.
13. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied on the judgment of Kerala High Court, which according to him, addresses all the legal issues, in K.P Raveendran v. State of Kerala (AIR 2005 Kerala 319), in which a similar Notification of withdrawal was quashed. He has also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Vishwa Nath v. State of Rajasthan (1993 WLN 127), in which it was held that in order to establish a new Gram Panchayat of an area, which was part of the Municipality or to add any area to a Gram Panchayat, which was earlier an area covered by a Municipality, the State Government is required to follow the procedure laid down in the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, considering various factors like the population, the inhabitation, the nature of the area being rural or urban and others.
14. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondents cannot take help of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as the provisions of Section 21 are not applicable for withdrawing the Notification, which has been issued in exercise of the legislative powers. He submits that in view of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Notified area Committee, Tulsipur ((1980) 2 SCC 295 : AIR 1980 SC 882) and Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((1987) 2 SCC 510 : AIR 1987 SC 1239), the issuance of Notification is a legislative act, which cannot be reversed under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
15. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State submits that the State Government has the power to withdraw the Notification, under Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. He submits that Section 3(1)(d) provides for de-limitation of an area of Municipality into an area of Panchayat and in that case, under Section 3(1)(d)(iv), the Municipality shall be dissolved. He submits that various Schemes implemented in the village Panchayat had to be discontinued on its de-limitation as Municipality and on which, the State Government considered it appropriate to withdraw the Notification. Learned Additional Advocate General has relied on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High court in Inderjit Singh v. The State of Haryana (CWP No. 3705/2007) decided on 18.2.2014 and the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gram Sabha, Begowal v. The State of Punjab (decided on 3rd October, 1980) (AIR 1981 PH 101), in which in a similar case, the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the Notification. He has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Girdhari Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (D.B Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 11436/2013) decided on 17.1.2014, in which the Division Bench of this Court declined to interfere with the order by which the Sub-Tehsil of village Khatu Kallan, Tehsil Jayal District Nagaur was de-notified.
16. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, we are of the opinion that the reasons given by Kerala High Court in K.P Raveendran v. State of Kerala (supra) are much closer in support of the arguments of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The transition from rural area to urban area is a gradual process on the path of development. The urban area receives recognition of various facilities such as schools, colleges, hospitals, police stations, industries, opportunities for growth and employment. The Seventy-fourth Amendment of the Constitution of India recognized this path of progress of the rural areas in India and has added Part-IX-A by the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, in which, Article 243Q provides as follows:—
“243Q. Constitution of Municipalities.- (1) There shall be constituted in every State,-
(a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area;
(b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area; and
(c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, in accordance with the provisions of this Part:
Provided that a Municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township.
(2) In this article, “a transitional area”, “a smaller urban area” or “a larger urban area” means such area as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this Part.”
17. We do not find anything in Part-IX, which provides for the Panchayats and Part IX-A, which provides for the Municipalities, in which a step in forward direction and the progress made by the members of a community living in village marching on the road to progress qualify under Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution of India to be declared a transitional area, and which gradually develops into a smaller urban area and thereafter, a larger urban area, can be stopped and be allowed to move backwards. There is no provision in the Constitution of India, by which a Municipality can be reconstituted by way of a reverse and retrograde process into a Gram Panchayat. The relevant paragraphs of the discussions made in the judgment of Kerala High Court in K.P Raveendran v. State of Kerala (supra) are quoted as below:
“13. Article 243Q(1)(a) provides for the constitution of a Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area, that is, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area. Article 243Q envisages two types of urban areas, namely, smaller urban area and larger urban area. There is no transitional area contemplated where the transition is from a smaller urban area to a larger urban area. The constitutional context emanating out of Article 243Q conceives and envisages only the transition of a rural area to an urban area, be it as a smaller urban area or as a larger urban area. It does not contemplate or provides to the contrary, for the transition of an urban area into a rural area. This is what emanates out of a plain reading of Article 243Q(1) of the Constitution. There is no provision in either among Parts IX or IXA, for the transition of an urban area to a rural area.
14. While Article 243(g) gives no constitutional yardstick for the Governor to ascertain and specify a village, Article 243Q(2) provides yardsticks to identify transitional area, smaller urban area and larger urban area. It has been held by the Apex Court in State of U.P v. Pradhan Singh Kshettra Samiti, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305 : (AIR 1995 SC 1512) that in specifying villages for the purpose of Part IX, the Governor is not bound by any particular Yardsticks. Article 243Q(2) provides the yardsticks for the three types of areas mentioned in Article 243Q(2) and the municipal area as defined in Article 243P(d) is the territorial area of a Municipality as is notified by the Governor. These provisions would show that there cannot be a transition of the constitutionally created smaller urban area, larger urban area and a transitional area, to be a village, to fall into Part IX of the Constitution and such an exercise cannot be done under Part IXA of the Constitution. This is because the Municipality, in relation to a transitional area or a smaller urban area, or a larger urban area, on its coming into existence, becomes a constitutional institution and cannot be abolished by an act of the Legislature without specific authorisation in that regard in the Constitution. All that could be clone, if a situation demands, is to exclude any particular urban area from a Municipality to be made part of another Municipality or merger of municipalities or creation of a new municipality, either by the area being excluded or by merging such excluded areas.
However, there cannot be a transition of an urban area as a rural area. I may at once notice that unlike the Municipalities Act, 1960, which had provided for the abolition of Municipalities, there is no such provision in the Municipality Act, 1994. Such provisions would be contrary to the constitutional provisions in Part IXA and hence, obviously, not made in the 1994 Act. However, Section 4(6) provides for handling the situation, owing to such abolition. The said provision is superfluous.
15. The aforesaid view that I take is also fortified by the nature of Section 4 of the Municipality Act, 1994 which provides for conversion of village Panchayat into a Town Panchayat or a Municipal Council, for conversion of a Town Panchayat into a Municipal Council and for conversion of a Municipal Council into a Municipal Corporation. This shows that it had never been in the contemplation of even the State Legislature while making the Municipality Act, 1994 that a Municipality could be converted to a village Panchayat. This was because it was wholly impermissible in the constitutional context in which Part IX and Part IXA have been separately provided, to govern two types of local self-government institutions.
17. In my considered view, as rightly urged by senior Advocate Sri T.P.K Nambiar, this is a context to the contrary, which excludes the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and therefore, even in terms of Article 367, the said rule of interpretation does not apply to the situation in hand. This is so because unless the power to re-transit an area which has become smaller urban area or larger urban area, to be a rural area is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it will result in conceding a power to re-transit an area from the operation of part IXA to part IX of the Constitution. Had it ever been the intention of the Parliament to provide for such a re-transit, a crucial process, there is no reason why such specific provision does not find a place in the Constitution itself. The very absence of such a provision leads only to the conclusion that such re-transit is impermissible. Therefore, the application of the provisions of the Section 21 will be repugnant to the context and situation governed by Article 243Q(2). In such situations, recourse to the General Clauses Act is not available (See T.M Kanniyan v. ITO, AIR 1968 SC 637).
19. Therefore, a rural area after its transition to be an urban area, thereby becoming a “smaller urban area” or a “larger urban area” in terms of Art. 243Q of the Constitution of India, cannot be converted to be a rural area. Further, no such exercise can be done under the provisions of Part, IXA of the Constitution of India or otherwise. Hence, the impugned “de-linking” of certain urban areas from the municipalities, for being treated as rural areas is unconstitutional and void.”
18. In K.P Raveendran v. State of Kerala (supra), learned Single Judge discussed in detail the provisions of the Municipalities Act of the State of Kerala and observed that there was nothing in the provisions of the Act which may give power to exclude any area from the municipal area and to retransit the municipal area so excluded, to be a rural area. He held that the rural areas coming into being under Part IX of the Constitution by virtue of the exercise of notifying the villages, do not survive after its transit to an urban area, and further that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not attracted in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra).
19. Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 has no application to the present case. The impugned Notification was not issued in exercise of the powers under Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. It was issued with reference to Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. Further, the power under Section 101(1) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 can be exercised only after giving one month's notice as prescribed in the Rules. In the present case, no notice was given to the Municipality or the residents of Napasar. We also find that Section 101(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 speaks of a local area whether whole or a part within the limits of a Municipality to be declared by a Notification as Panchayat Circle, and not the whole of the area of the Municipality. Once the village Panchayat is notified as Municipality, the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 and not the provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 will be applicable to such Municipality.
20. Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 is quoted as below:—
“3. Delimitation of Municipalities.-(1) The State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, declare any local area not included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Municipality, or include any such area in a Municipality, or exclude any local area from a Municipality, or otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality and when-
(a) any local area is declared as, or included in, a Municipality, or
(b) any local area is excluded from a Municipality, or
(c) the limits of a Municipality are otherwise altered, by amalgamation of one Municipality into another or by splitting up a Municipality into two or more Municipalities, or
(d) any local area ceases to be a Municipality, the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, by an order published in the Official Gazette provide,-
(i) in a case falling under clause (a), that the election of the members for the area or the additional area shall be held within a period of six months from the appointed day;
(ii) in a case falling under clause (b), that the members who in the opinion of the State Government represent the area excluded from the Municipality shall be removed;
(iii) in a case falling under clause (c), that until the term of the Municipality in which another Municipality is amalgamated expires under this Act, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and members of such another Municipality shall be deemed to be the members of the Municipality in which such another Municipality is amalgamated and where a Municipality is split into two or more Municipalities, that the members representing the area included in the newly constituted Municipality shall be deemed to be the members of such new Municipality and such new Municipality shall continue, unless dissolved sooner, until original Municipality would have continued;
(iv) in a case falling under clause (d), that the Municipality shall be dissolved.
Explanation.- In this sub-section, “appointed day” means the day from which a change referred to in any of the clauses (a) to (d) takes effect.”
21. The provisions of Section 3(1) do not support the submissions of learned Additional Advocate General that any local area which is declared as or included in the Municipalities can be de-notified as village Panchayat. Section 3 provides for delimitation of Municipalities. The State Government may in exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section (3) declare any local area not included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Municipality, or include any such area in a Municipality, or exclude any local area from a Municipality, or otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality. It cannot withdraw the Notification by which a Municipality was constituted nor it can withdraw the entire areas of Municipality and as a consequence allow the village Panchayat to revive. The manner in which learned Additional Advocate General has read the provisions of Section 3(1), cannot be sustained.
22. The judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Inderjit Singh v. The State of Haryana (supra) was based upon the interpretation of Section 8 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 applicable to the State of Haryana, which gave express powers to the State Government to abolish the Municipality declared under Section 3 of the Act. The reasoning in the judgment thereafter on the exercise of the power to abolish the Municipality is not persuasive to be accepted. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court did not consider the scheme of the Constitution after Seventy-third and Seventyfourth Amendment, which does not provide for a Municipality to revert back to village Panchayat. We may further observe that the Division Bench in Inderjit Singh's case (supra) also took into consideration that village Sadhaura was a small village with few houses and shops. It had a population of 13176, out of which, 2589 were Scheduled Castes living in the radius of one kilometer. The village did not have significant development and that the burden of taxes on constitution of Municipality would have been excessive on the residents of the village.
23. In the present case, we find that the Gram Panchayat Napasar has matured itself into an urban area and with almost all the urban facilities available in Napasar, it has moved on the path of urbanization and was declared as Municipality Class IV by the State Government. The right to development has been recognized to be included in the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is a component of right to life. It cannot be treated as a mere right to economic betterment and includes within it an umbrella of fundamental human right such as civil, political, cultural and social process, right to health, education and for decent and clean environment, vide N.D Jayal v. Union of India ((2004) 9 SCC 362), in which reliance was placed on Samatha v. State of AP ((1997) 8 SCC 191) and Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar ((1996) 5 SCC 125). In Election Commission of India v. St. Mary's School ((2008) 2 SCC 390), it was held that the right to development is a valuable human right.
24. In the reply filed by the State Govt., the only reason to withdraw the Notification given is that the implementation of the various schemes in the village, such as, MANREGA would be discontinued. The relevant paragraph of the reply filed on behalf of the respondents No. 1-4 is quoted below;
“(C) That representations were made to the Hon'ble Chief Minster and Hon'ble Minster for Urban Development and Housing for declaring Napasar, Khajuwala and Lunkaransar as Gram Panchayats again, so that the benefit of the Schemes like National Rural Employment Guarantee can be extended to these villages, so that the rural unemployed people of these villages may be benefited under the said schemes. In these circumstances, it is in the larger interest of the public in general and the villagers of Napasar in particular the notification Annex. 11 is passed. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief from this Hon'ble Court and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.”
25. In our view, the reasons for withdrawing the Notification are wholly absurd. A village, which has progressed and has organized facilities of schools, hospitals, industries, industrial areas, commercial areas, electricity and water, cannot be allowed to revert back to rural life only for the sake of continuance of some of the schemes such as National Rural Employment Guarantee. A Municipality cannot be dissolved to back track to become a Village only for the purpose of benefit of some of the schemes, which are village specific. There is no material nor any pleadings in the reply that the resolution to the effect of dissolving the Municipality was passed or any public notice or hearing to the residents of Napasar was given before the Notification dated 18.9.2009 was issued. The difference between Eleventh and Twelfth Schedule for the development of rural and urban area amply demonstrates that the require-ment of an urban area is entirely different to meet the aspirations of the people, who have collectively worked together and marched to development towards more promising future for themselves than living in a model village with schemes of rural employment and upliftment. The constitutional scheme does not permit such a retrograde step of governance. The narrow autocratic political considerations cannot be allowed to subvert the constitutional scheme and violate the fundamental rights of the citizens of the country.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that the Notification dated 18.9.2009 issued by the State Government withdrawing the Notification dated 6.10.2008 declaring village Panchayat Napasar as Municipality Class-IV, is illegal, arbitrary and has been issued by the State Government with oblique and retrograde purpose, for which it did not have any power to advice the Governor to issue such Notification. The impugned Notification is declared unconstitutional being violative of Article 21 and Article 243Q in Part-IX-A of the Constitution of India as inserted by Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 with effect from 1.6.1993 It is also declared to be a retrograde step of governance by the State Government, which cannot be sustained in law.
27. The writ petition is consequently allowed and the impugned Notification dated 18.9.2009 is quashed. The State Government will take consequential steps. There shall be no order as to costs.
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