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Mohini Mohan Mitra And Another v. Radha Sundari Dasi And Others

Calcutta High Court
Apr 9, 1935
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two of several cosharer landlords (the petitioners) obtained this rule after their application for pre-emption under Section 26-F of the Bengal Tenancy Act was dismissed by the learned Munsiff of Dubrajpur. Opposite parties 2 to 5 held a tenancy and on 7 April 1933 sold 13 acres out of that tenancy to opposite party 1. The conveyance described the property as a "ryoti holding." A notice of transfer under Section 26-C was given to the landlords and the transfer fee under Section 26-D was deposited. The petitioners received the notice on 8 August 1933 and, on the reopening of the civil courts on 23 October 1933, made the application for pre-emption.

It was not established whether the notice had been served on Sasadhar Mitra (a cosharer landlord and proforma defendant). Other cosharer landlords who had applied for pre-emption were dismissed by the Munsiff on the ground of limitation. The claim of opposite party 16, who is the legal representative of Sasadhar Mitra (deceased 10 November 1933), required consideration in the proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lands transferred formed part of an agricultural tenancy governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act (and thus whether Section 26-F applied), or whether the tenancy was residential and governed by the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. Whether proceedings under Section 26-F are limited to the matters specified in sub-sections (2) and (3) of that section, or whether other issues (for example, defect of parties or benami transactions) may be raised in such proceedings.
  3. Whether the doctrine of estoppel precludes the transferee from contradicting statements made in the notice of transfer (specifically the description of the tenancy) to defeat an application for pre-emption.
  4. Whether opposite party 16's claim for pre-emption was wrongly dismissed on the ground of limitation, given uncertainty as to service of the notice on his deceased father Sasadhar Mitra.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite Party 1 (Transferee) - Principal Defence

  • Argued that Section 26-F was inapplicable because the lands transferred did not form part of an agricultural tenancy; the tenancy was taken for residential purposes and thus governed by the Transfer of Property Act rather than the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • This position was accepted as a factual finding by the learned Munsiff, who dismissed the petitioners' application on that basis.

Mr. Dass / Petitioners (supporting the rule)

  • Contended that in proceedings under Section 26-F the inquiry is limited to matters specified in sub-sections (2) and (3) of that section; the court should not go beyond those enumerated matters (such as shortfall in deposited money, rent paid after transfer, amounts paid for annulling encumbrances, and interest rates on those items).
  • Argued, alternatively, on the basis of estoppel that the transferee (opposite party 1) could not repudiate the statement in the notice of transfer that the holding was an occupancy holding and thereby defeat the petitioners' pre-emption application.

Opposite Party 16 (Minor, legal representative of Sasadhar Mitra)

  • Contended that his claim for pre-emption was wrongly dismissed on limitation grounds because there was no finding that the notice of transfer had been served on his father, and thus he could have applied within a reasonable time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nabendra Kishore Roy v. Abdul Majid (civil rule no. 1324 of 1934; decided 19 Feb 1934) Permitted raising of the question whether a sale was benami in pre-emption proceedings; benami proved, resulting in dismissal of pre-emption application. Used to show that questions beyond the narrow list in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 26-F (e.g., benami) have been held admissible in pre-emption proceedings.
Nibaran Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hem Nalini Debi (civil rule no. 1700 of 1934; decided 14 Mar 1935) — Henderson, J. Held that pre-emption proceedings under Section 26-F are summary and the court can only go into matters specified in sub-sections (2) and (3); a plea that the transfer was fictitious had no locus standi in those proceedings. Cited by the court; the court disagreed with a broad application of Henderson, J.'s limitation but acknowledged the decision and noted it would require careful consideration if the narrowness of inquiry again arose.
Brajendra Kumar Banerjee v. Symannessa Bibi (1934 Cal 830) Illustrates circumstances where estoppel was not applied to bind a transferee by statements in the notice of transfer; supports the principle that estoppel cannot be applied to defeat statutory provisions. Relied on to explain limits of estoppel where applying estoppel would conflict with statutory protections (specifically Section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act).
Adhar Chandra Shaha v. Gour Chandra Shaha (1935 Cal 153) Similar support for the proposition that transferees are not necessarily estopped by statements in a notice of transfer where doing so would undermine statutory provisions. Used to support the proposition that estoppel cannot be permitted to defeat statutory rights created by the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Surendra Nath Laik v. Notan Behary Mandal (1931 Cal 483) — Suhrawardy and Costello, JJ. Provides a principle relevant to whether representations in a notice can bind parties in pre-emption contexts (the opinion states the present case falls within the principle enunciated in that decision). The court stated the present facts fall within that principle and relied on it in holding that the transferee could not now plead the tenancy was governed by the Transfer of Property Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytical strands corresponding to the two main contentions advanced by Mr. Dass and the factual posture presented by opposite party 1.

  1. Inquiry-limits under Section 26-F:
    • The court considered the contention that proceedings under Section 26-F are strictly limited to matters specified in sub-sections (2) and (3). While acknowledging authority (Henderson, J.) that adopted that narrow view, the court observed that reported cases had permitted raising various other matters in pre-emption proceedings, including defects of parties and benami pleas (citing Nabendra Kishore Roy).
    • The court rejected the broad assertion that inquiry must be confined only to the matters listed in sub-sections (2) and (3). It also explained why Henderson, J.'s separate suggestion — that the question could be litigated in a subsequent suit for possession — was impractical: under Sub-section 6, Clause (3), Section 26-F an executing court would give effect to a pre-emption order and possession would follow, making a later suit to recover possession ineffective unless the pre-emption order itself were vacated.
    • Nevertheless, the court noted that it was unnecessary to decide the narrowness question finally in light of the second ground (estoppel), on which it rested the decision in the present rule.
  2. Estoppel and representations in the notice of transfer:
    • The court analyzed the estoppel argument: estoppel requires a representation of fact and an act done in reliance on that representation. Both elements were present here: the transferee represented the tenancy to be an occupancy holding in the notice of transfer, and the petitioners acted on that representation by applying for pre-emption.
    • However, the court stated two important limits to applying estoppel: (a) estoppel will not operate where the party pleading estoppel actually knew the real facts at variance with the representation; and (b) estoppel cannot be used to defeat a statutory enactment (the principle that there is no estoppel against statute).
    • The court considered reported decisions (Brajendra Kumar Banerjee; Adhar Chandra Shaha; Nabendra Kishore Roy) in this light and concluded that in the present case there was no pleading, proof, or finding that the petitioners knew the tenancy was not an occupancy holding. Further, there was no statutory provision that would be defeated by allowing estoppel to operate in their favour.
    • Accordingly, the court held that opposite party 1 could not in these proceedings plead or prove that the tenancy was governed by the Transfer of Property Act in order to defeat the petitioners' pre-emption application.
  3. Claim of opposite party 16 (minor representative of Sasadhar Mitra) and limitation:
    • Opposite party 16 argued his pre-emption claim had been dismissed on limitation grounds without a finding whether the notice had been served on his father. The court noted factual matters: Sasadhar died on the date the notice of application for pre-emption was served; opposite party 16 was placed on record on 6 January 1934; a court guardian was appointed who only communicated with the mother on 22 March 1934; an application on his behalf to become co-applicant was filed on 18 April 1934.
    • The court concluded that, although opposite party 16's argument might be forceful if no notice had been served on Sasadhar, it could not accede to his prayer because he had not appealed the learned Munsiff's order. The Munsiff had not recorded any finding on service of the notice on Sasadhar Mitra; to decide in favour of opposite party 16 the court would need to remit the matter to the Munsiff for that factual finding. Because opposite party 16 had not moved against the Munsiff's order, the court was unwilling to remand and therefore did not allow his claim to be entertained further in this rule proceeding.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The court set aside the learned Munsiff's order and granted the petitioners' application for pre-emption; the rule was made absolute.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petitioners' application for pre-emption is allowed — the Munsiff's dismissal is set aside.
  • Costs were awarded against opposite party 1.
  • Hearing fee assessed at one gold mohur.
  • Opposite party 16's claim was not allowed by this Court because he had not challenged the Munsiff's order and because the Munsiff had made no finding on service; the Court declined to remand the matter.

Broader legal implications: The opinion rejected a categorical restriction that pre-emption proceedings under Section 26-F are limited only to sub-sections (2) and (3), and it recognized that other matters (such as benami and defects of parties) have been entertained in such proceedings. However, the court decided the present case on the estoppel point rather than issuing a definitive, sweeping rule on all potential collateral issues; the opinion does not purport to establish a new overarching precedent beyond the resolution of the present rule.

Show all summary ...

1. This rule has been obtained by two out of many cosharer landlords whose application for pre-emption made under Section 26-F, Ben. Ten. Act, has been dismissed by the learned Munsiff of Dubrajpur. Opposite parties 2 to 5 had a tenancy under the petitioners and opposite parties. 6 to 41. On 7th April 1933 they sold to opposite party 1.13 acres of land out of the said tenancy. In the conveyance the description of the property sold was given as a ryoti holding. A notice of transfer under the provisions of Section 26-C was given to the landlords and the landlord's transfer fee prescribed by Section 26-D, Ben. Ten. Act was also deposited. On 8th August 1933 the petitioners received the said notice of transfer and on the reopening of the civil Courts on 23rd October 1933 they made the application for pre-emption. It does not appear whether the notice of transfer was served upon Sasadhar Mitra, one of the cosharer landlords who had been made a proforma defendant to the application for pre-emption. At least there is no specific finding of the learned Munsiff on the point. The cosharer landlords who had been made defendants also applied for pre-emption but their claims have been dismissed by the learned Munsiff on the ground of limitation. It will be necessary to consider the claim of opposite party 16, who is the legal representative of Sasadhar Mitter who died on 10th November 1933.

2. The main defence of opposite party 1 was that Section 26-F was not applicable at all as the lands transferred according to him do not form part of an agricultural tenancy. She contends that the tenancy of opposite parties 2 to 5 was taken for residential purposes, and is not governed by the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act at all. The learned Munsiff has found as a fact that the said tenancy is governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and has on that ground dismissed the application for preemption. It was contended before him, as it is before me, that the opposite party 1 was not entitled to raise in these proceedings the question of the nature and character of the tenancy. Mr. Dass who has appeared in support of the rule has placed his contentions on two grounds, namely that (1) in proceedings under Section 26-F, Ben. Ten. Act, the inquiry is limited to the matters mentioned in sub-Ss. 2 and 3, Section 26-F and the Court cannot travel beyond the matters specified therein. His contention comes to this, that when an application for pre-emption has been made, the Court has to determine the following questions only: (a) as to whether the money deposited by the applicant falls short of the price stated in the notice and the compensation, (b) what amount of rent has been paid by the transferee after the date of the transfer, (c) what amount has been paid for annulling encumbrances and (d) the rate of interest that the applicant for pre-emption will have to pay on items (b) and (c). Although the view I am taking on the second contention of Mr. Dass renders it unnecessary for me to decide the said question, I am of opinion that this contention of Mr. Dass cannot be given effect to. The reported cases show that various other questions have been allowed to be raised in proceedings arising under Section 26-F. For instance, questions of defect of parties, and as to whether the sale was one taken in benami for the benefit of a cosharer tenant, have been allowed to be raised in such proceedings. In Nabendra Kishore Roy v. Abdul Majid, civil rule no. 1324 of 1934 Decided on 19th February 1934 I have myself held that the last mentioned question could be raised and the benami being proved, the application for pre-emption was dismissed. No doubt Henderson, J., has by his judgment delivered on 14th March 1935 held in Nibaran Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hem Nalini Debi, civil rule no. 1700 of 1934 Decided on 14th March 1935 that in proceedings for pre-emption under Section 26-F, the Court can only go into the matters specified in Section 26-F sub-Ss. (2) and (3). There, an application for pre-emption was made. Both the transferor and transferee pleaded that the sale was a fictitious one and no title was intended to pass or had passed. Henderson, J., held that the transfer had no locus standi in those proceedings which he said was of a summary nature and remarked that the aforesaid question falls beyond the scope of the inquiry. He however remarked that the order for pre-emption would not give the successful applicant possession and that the said question can be raised in a subsequent suit for possession. I do not see why a landlord who has obtained an order for pr-emption will have to bring a suit for possession. He would obtain possession in execution of the order for pre-emption under the provisions of Sub-section 6, Clause (3), Section 26-F. The executing Count in executing the order for pre-emption would not be able to go behind the order. I do not see how after the landlord has been put in possession in execution of the order for pre-emption a suit to recover possession from him would lie or be successful. The pre-emption order will have to be vacated or got round in order that such a suit may be successful. The right of pre-emption has been created by statute which has also defined the procedure for enforcing the right. According to well established principles the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by Section 26-F would be exclusive and its decision would be final. The decision given by Henderson, J., in the said rule may be supported on different principles and will have to be carefully considered if the question, as to whether such a plea as was taken by the transferee in the case that came up before him would be admissible in preemption proceedings, again comes up for consideration before this Court. But it is not necessary to consider the matter further as I have stated before that this rule can be decided on the second point raised by Mr. Dass. However I hold that it cannot be asserted broadly that the inquiry in the proceedings under Section 26-F is to be limited only to the matters mentioned in sub-Ss. (2) and (3) of the said section.

3. The second ground urged by Mr. Dass is based on estoppel. He says that the transferee cannot go back upon the statements made in the notice of transfer as to the nature of the tenancy and having purchased a property with the specific description that it is an occupancy holding cannot turn round and defeat the application for pre-emption by stating and proving that the tenancy purchased was of a different nature. In order to attract the doctrine of estoppel there must be representation of a fact and on the faith of that representation an act must be done. These two factors prima facie attract that doctrine. It would not be applied if the real state of facts, which is at variance with the facts represented, be known by the party pleading estoppel. It would not be applied also to defeat a statutory enactment on the principle that there is no estoppel against statute. It is on these principles the decision given in Brajendra Kumar Banerjee v. Symannessa Bibi, 1934 Cal 830 and Adhar Chandra Shaha v. Gour Chandra Shaha 1935 Cal 153 can be supported, for if the transferee had been held bound by the statements in the notice of transfer as to the number and names of the landlords on the principle of estoppel, Section 188, Bengal Tenancy Act, would have been made nugatory in such cases. In one of these cases also, the facts indicate that the applicant for pre-emption knew who his cosharer landlords were, and that the persons mentioned as landlords in the notice of transfer were not all the landlords of the holding. It is also on the principle that there cannot be estoppel against statute that I based my decision in Nabendra Kishore Roy v. Abdul Majid, civil rule no. 1324 of 1934 Decided on 19th February 1934. In the case before me representation of a fact was made by the transferee that the tenancy was an occupancy holding; the petitioners acted on the faith of that representation by making the application for pre-emption. It is not pleaded, nor is there any proof or a finding that the said applicants knew that the tenancy was not an occupancy holding, and there is no statutory provision which would be defeated by allowing estoppel to operate. I hold accordingly that it was not open to the opposite party 1 to plead or prove in these proceedings that the tenancy was governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The case before me comes within the principle enunciated by Suhrawardy and Costello, J J., in Surendra Nath Laik v. Notan Behary Mandal, 1931 Cal 483. I accordingly hold that the learned Munsif was wrong in dismissing the application for pre-emption made by the petitioners.

4. The opposite party 16, who is a minor, contends before me that his claim for pre-emption has been wrongly dismissed on the ground of limitation. He says that there is no finding that the notice of transfer had been served on his father, Sasadhar Mitra, and as such he could have applied for preemption within a reasonable time. Sasadhar died on the very date on which the notice of the application for pre-emption was served on him. Opposite party 16 was brought on the record in the place of his father on 6th January 1934. A Court guardian was appointed, who communicated with the mother of this opposite party only on 22nd March 1934 and on 18th April 1934 an application on his behalf to become co-applicant for pre-emption was filed. If no notice of transfer had been served on Sasadhar, the argument placed before me would no doubt be forceful, but I cannot accede to the prayer of the opposite party 16 to allow him pre-emption along with the petitioners before me. He did not move this Court against the order passed by the learned Munsif and if his prayer be acceded to, the matter cannot be finally disposed of here, for the Munsif has not recorded any finding as to whether Sasadhar Mitter had been served with the notice of transfer. If I am to accede to his prayer I would have to remand the case to the Munsif, which I am not willing to do, seeing that he has not moved this Court against the Munsif's order. The result is that I set aside the Munsif's order and grant the application of the petitioners before me for pre-emption. The Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs against opposite party 1. Hearing fee one gold mohur.