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Hrishikesh Saha And Ors., Decree-Holders v. Sreematy Radharani Kar, Judgment-Debtor .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mukherjea, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
A final mortgage decree for approximately Rs. 1,19,000 was obtained against Akhoy Kumar Kar on 13 June 1930 in the Court of the 2nd Subordinate Judge of 24-Parganas. The decree was put into execution on 8 August 1930 (Title Execution Case No. 187 of 1930), and no portion of the decretal dues had been realised up to the time of the events recounted.
The judgment-debtor Akhoy died on 23 December 1941; his death was reported to the executing Court on 10 January 1942. On 5 March 1942 the decree-holders applied for continuation of execution proceedings against the widow and sons of the judgment-debtor by substituting their names as legal heirs. The widow, Radharani (Respondent No. 1), objected, asserting that Akhoy had left a Will naming her sole executrix and that she alone was the legal representative; she stated she had applied for probate (which had not then been granted).
On 25 April 1942 the executing Court dismissed Radharani's objection and allowed substitution of the intestate heirs including Radharani. On the same day, in two miscellaneous cases arising from objections in the same execution proceeding, Radharani was substituted in her capacity as sole executrix and legal representative.
Probate was granted to Radharani on 8 June 1942; she informed the executing Court on 16 September 1942. On 29 September 1942 the decree-holders applied to amend the execution petition to describe Radharani as sole executrix and to strike other heirs' names. That application was allowed and the petition amended on 1 October 1942.
On 3 October 1942 Radharani filed an objection contending that the amendment/application of 29 September 1942 was, in substance, a fresh application for execution presented more than 12 years after the decree and therefore barred under section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Subordinate Judge overruled that contention by order dated 5 April 1943. On review, however, the Judge vacated his earlier order and on 13 May 1943 dismissed the execution case on the ground that the application of 29 September 1942 was a fresh application for execution barred by section 48 CPC.
The decree-holders (Appellants) appealed against the order of 13 May 1943. The High Court (Mukherjea, J.; Ellis, J. concurring) heard the appeal and set aside the Subordinate Judge's 13 May 1943 order, restoring the earlier order of 5 April 1943. The Appellants were awarded costs (hearing fee, three gold mohurs).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the application made by the decree-holders on 29 September 1942 was, in substance, a "fresh application" for execution within the meaning of section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore barred because it was presented more than twelve years after the decree.
- Whether the Subordinate Judge properly exercised review jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code to vacate his earlier order dated 5 April 1943 (i.e., whether grounds for review existed such as an error apparent on the face of the record or discovery of new evidence).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The application of 29 September 1942 was merely ancillary to the original execution petition and not a fresh substantive application within the meaning of section 48 CPC.
- There were no grounds within Order 47, Rule 1 CPC (no error apparent on the face of the record and no newly discovered evidence) to permit the Subordinate Judge to set aside his earlier order of 5 April 1943 by review.
- Continuation of execution proceedings against heirs or legal representatives after the death of a judgment-debtor does not require presentation of a fresh execution petition under Order 21, Rule 11 CPC; substitution on the record suffices (relying on prior authorities cited in the opinion).
Respondent's (Radharani's) Arguments
- As the decree-holder's application for substitution/amendment was made more than twelve years after the date of the decree, it was, in substance, a fresh application for execution and therefore barred by section 48 CPC.
- Radharani asserted she was the sole legal representative (executrix) by virtue of a Will and that substitution of intestate heirs was not appropriate; she had applied for probate (later granted).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rahim All v. Phul Chand, I.L.R. 18 All. 482 (1896) | Defines "fresh application" in section 48 CPC as meaning a fresh substantive application and not merely an ancillary application made to move the Court in respect of an existing substantive application. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the 29 September 1942 application was ancillary to the original execution petition and therefore not a "fresh application" barred by section 48 CPC. |
| Ram Sarup v. Dasrath, I.L.R. 33 All. 517 (1911) | Supports the distinction between a substantive fresh application and an ancillary application for the purposes of section 48 CPC. | The Court cited this case alongside Rahim All to reinforce the legal meaning of "fresh application" and to hold that the decree-holders' application was ancillary. |
| Purushottam v. Rajabai, I.L.R. 34 Bom. 142 (1909) | Holds that when a judgment-debtor dies pending execution, the decree-holder need not file a fresh execution petition under Order 21, Rule 11 CPC and can continue the same execution proceeding by substituting heirs on the record. | The Court relied on this authority to conclude that continuation against heirs by substitution is permissible without presenting a fresh execution application and so section 48 CPC would not apply. |
| Shankar v. Hiralal, 33 Bom. L.R. 858 (1931) | Holds that even if a separate application is made to continue proceedings against heirs after death, it may not be regarded as a fresh application within the meaning of section 48 CPC. | The Court invoked this decision to support the view that separate or ancillary steps to continue execution against heirs do not automatically amount to a barred fresh application under section 48 CPC. |
| Maharaja Ram Ram Bijaya v. Kesho Prasad, A.I.R. [1940] Pat. 571 | Was relied on by the Subordinate Judge but the opinion noted that its facts are different from the present case. | The Court distinguished this Patna High Court decision on its facts and held it was not controlling for the present situation; it emphasised that the Patna case did not apply where the decree-holder only sought continuation against an heir already effectively on the record. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a two-part analysis: first whether the Subordinate Judge properly exercised review jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC to vacate his own earlier order; and second whether the 29 September 1942 application was a "fresh application" within the meaning of section 48 CPC.
On review, the Court held there were no grounds contemplated by Order 47, Rule 1 CPC to set aside the earlier order of 5 April 1943. Specifically, there was no error apparent on the face of the record and there was no discovery of any new and important piece of evidence subsequent to the passing of the earlier order. The Court noted that if the earlier decision was erroneous, the remedy was appeal rather than review under Order 47, Rule 1.
On the central point of section 48 CPC, the Court first explained the proper understanding of "fresh application": it must be a fresh substantive application, not merely an ancillary application intended to enable the Court to proceed in an existing execution proceeding. The Court relied on authorities (Rahim All v. Phul Chand; Ram Sarup v. Dasrath) to support that distinction.
The Court observed that section 48 CPC does not automatically render the executing Court functus officio upon the expiry of twelve years. If an execution proceeding was commenced before the expiry of twelve years and remains incomplete, the executing Court can continue the proceeding, provided no fresh substantive application is presented after twelve years. The Court accepted that continuation by bringing heirs or legal representatives on record (in place of an original judgment-debtor who died) is permissible without filing a fresh execution petition (citing Purushottam v. Rajabai and Shankar v. Hiralal).
The Court also considered the converse: if the decree-holder, after instituting execution, sought to proceed against a new party not mentioned in the original petition or to attach new property not included in the petition, such an application might properly be regarded as a fresh application for execution. However, that principle did not apply where the decree-holder sought only to continue proceedings against an heir or legal representative of the original judgment-debtor.
Factually, the Court further noted that Radharani had already made herself a party to the execution proceeding in her capacity as executrix by orders made on 25 April 1942 (in two miscellaneous cases) — that substitution had occurred before the expiry of twelve years from the decree. In those circumstances the 29 September 1942 application was properly treated as a formal correction/amendment of the cause title to reflect Radharani's capacity and not as a fresh substantive application.
Applying the legal principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the Subordinate Judge's view that the 29 September 1942 application was a fresh application barred by section 48 CPC was unsound. Consequently, the Court set aside the 13 May 1943 order (which dismissed execution) and restored the 5 April 1943 order (which had allowed continuation/amendment).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The order of the Subordinate Judge dated 13 May 1943 is set aside and the earlier order dated 5 April 1943 is restored.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The executing Court may proceed in the execution proceedings against Radharani as the legal representative/executrix; the decree is not barred by section 48 CPC on the facts before the Court.
- Costs: The Appellants were awarded the costs of the appeal (hearing-fee, three gold mohurs).
- Broader precedent: The opinion applies and reiterates existing authorities distinguishing ancillary continuation steps from a "fresh application" under section 48 CPC; it does not state that a new legal principle or broader precedent is being established beyond the application of those existing authorities to the facts of this case.
Disposition recorded by Mukherjea, J.; Ellis, J. concurred.
Mukherjea, J.:— The facts giving rise to this appeal may be shortly stated as follows: Certain persons who may be called the Sahas and who are represented in this appeal by the Appellants and pro forma Respondent obtained a final mortgage decree against one Akhoy Kumar Kar in the Court of the 2nd Subordinate Judge of 24-Parganas for a sum of Rs. 1,19,000 and odd on the 13th of June, 1930. The decree was put into execution on the 8th of August, 1930, the execution case being registered as Title Execution Case No. 187 of 1930, and it is admitted that no portion of the decretal dues has been realised up till now. On the 2.3rd of December, 1941, the judgment-debtor Akhoy died. The death was reported to the Court on the 10th of January, 1942, and on the 5th of March, 1942, the decree-holders made an application for continuing the execution proceedings against the widow and sons of the judgment-debtor on substitution of their names as legal heirs in place of the deceased. The widow whose name is Radha-rani and who figures as Respondent No. 1 in this appeal objected to the application for substitution made by the decree-holders on the ground that the judgment-debtor having died leaving behind him a Will by which she was appointed the sole executrix, she alone was the legal representative of the deceased and that there could be no substitution of the intestate heirs of the judgment-debtor in the execution proceeding. It was stated by her in the petition of objection that she had already applied for probate of the Will though no grant was actually made in her favour at that time. The Court by its order dated the 25th April, 1942, dismissed her objection and allowed substitution of all the intestate heirs of the judgment-debtor including Radharani, the widow. It is rather curious to notice that on the very same day orders for substitution were made in two Miscellaneous Cases (Miscellaneous Cases Nos. 39 of 1940 and 8 of 1941) which arose out of objections filed by the judgment-debtor in the same execution case, and in both of them Radharani was allowed to be substituted in her capacity as executrix as the sole legal representative of the deceased of the judgment-debtor. On the 8th of June, 1942, the probate Court made an order granting probate of the Will to Radharani and on the 16th of September, 1942, she brought this fact to the notice of the executing Court. On the 29th of September, 1942, the decree-holders applied for amendment of the execution petition by describing Radharani as the sole executrix and legal representative of the judgment-debtor and striking out the names of the other heirs from the execution record. On the 1st of October, 1942, this application was allowed, and the execution petition was amended. On the 3rd of October, 1942, Radharani filed a petition objecting to the execution of the decree contending inter alia that as the application for substituting her as the sole legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor was made more than 12 years after the date of the decree, it was in substance a fresh application, for execution and consequently the execution case was barred under sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Subordinate Judge by his order dated the 5th of April, 1943, overruled this contention and held that see. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be attracted to the facts of this case, as the application of, the decree-holders made on the 29th of September, 1942, was merely ancillary to the original petition for execution and could not be treated as a fresh application within the meaning of sec 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. Later on, however, there was an application made by Radharani for review of the order made on the 5th of April, 1943, and the learned Judge by a fresh order made on the 13th of May, 1943, vacated the earlier order and dismissed the execution case being of opinion that the application for bringing Radharani on the record as the sole legal representative of the judgment-debtor was a fresh application for execution as contemplated by sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code and as that application was presented more than 12 years after the date of the decree, the execution of the decree was barred. It is against this order that the decree-holder have come up on appeal to this Court Having heard the learned Advocates on both sides we are of the opinion that the order made by the Subordinate Judge on the 13th of May, 1943, is a wrong order and cannot be sustained. We agree with the learned Advocate for the Appellants that there were none of the grounds contemplated by Or. 47, r. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code upon which the Court could set aside, by way of review, the previous order made by it on the 5th of April, 1943. There was no error apparent on the face of the record nor discovery of any new and important piece of evidence subsequent to the passing of the order. If the decision was erroneous, it was open to the judgment-debtor to challenge it by way of appeal. But it is not necessary for us to base our decision on this somewhat technical point, for we are definitely of opinion that the view of law taken by the Subordinate Judge in the subsequent order made on the 13th of May, 1943, is not sound and cannot be accepted. The whole controversy really centres round the point as to whether the application made by the decree-holders on the 29th September, 1942, was in substance a fresh application for execution within the meaning of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is well settled by authorities that the expression “fresh application” as used in sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code means a fresh substantive application and not merely an ancillary one made with the object of moving the Court to proceed in the matter of a substantive application already on the file, vide Rahim All v. Phul Chand . I.L.R 18 All. 482 1896. and Ram Sarup v. Dasrath . I.L.R 33 All. 517 1911.. Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code does not lay down that as soon as the period of twelve years elapses from the date of the decree the executing Court becomes functus officio and cannot proceed with the execution of the decree any further. Provided no fresh application for execution is presented after the lapse of 12 years from the date of the decree the executing Court can certainly continue a proceeding in execution commenced but not completed before the expiry of 12 years and if an application has got to be made by the decree-holders in furtherance of and ancillary to the petition for execution already filed, sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code would have no application. Mr. Bose argues that if a judgment-debtor dies pending an execution proceeding and the decree-holder applies for continuation of the proceeding against his heirs under sec. 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, it amounts to a fresh application for execution and if it is made when 12 years have already passed from the date of the decree, it would come within the mischief of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. We cannot accept this contention as sound. When the judgment-debtor dies pending an execution proceeding, it is not necessary for the decree-holder to file a fresh application under Or. 21, r. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. He can continue the same execution proceeding against the heirs of the deceased by bringing them on record in place of the original judgment-debtor, vide Purushottam v. Rajabai . I.L.R 34 Bom. 142 1909.. It has been held further by the Bombay High Court that even if any separate” application is made in such circumstances, it would not be a fresh application within the meaning of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, vide Shankar v. Hiralal . 33 Bom. L.R 858 1931.. The Subordinate Judge has relied strongly on a decision of the Patna High Court which is to be found reported in Maharaja Ram Ram Bijaya v. Kesho Prasad . A.I.R [1940] Pat. 571.. The facts of that case, however, are quite different. We are quite prepared to hold that if the decree-holder after he has presented his petition for execution wants to proceed against any new party whose name was not mentioned in the petition or wants to attach and sell any new property not included in it, the application might be regarded as a fresh application for execution. But this principle cannot possibly apply where the decree-holder does not want to proceed against any new party but prays for continuation of the proceeding against an heir or legal representative of the judgment debtor originally on the record. In our opinion, therefore, if the application made by the decree-holders on the 29th of September, 1942, be regarded as a fresh application for execution against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor under sec. 5O of the Civil Procedure Code, it would be merely ancillary to the substantive petition against the original judgment-debtor and could not rank as a fresh application within the meaning of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. As under Or. 22, r. 12 of the Civil Procedure Code the provisions of rr. 3 and 4 of that order do not apply to execution proceedings, no other question of limitation regarding the time within which substitution has to be made can possibly arise.
2. Furthermore, it appears, as stated above, that in the two miscellaneous cases arising out of the same execution proceeding Radharani got herself substituted as the sole executrix and legal representative of her husband and the orders were made by the Court in the same execution record on the 25th April, 1942, when 12 years had not run out from the date of the decree. She thus introduced herself as a party to the execution case in her capacity as representative of her husband's estate. In these circumstances the application of the decree-holders presented on the 29th of September, 1942, can be treated a; a formal application for correcting the description of Radharani in the cause title of the execution case and nothing more, she being already made a party to the execution case on her own application and within 12 years from the date of the decree.
3. In the result therefore the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated the 13th May, 1943, is set aside and that made on the 5th April, 1943, restored. The Appellants will be entitled to the costs of this appeal, Hearing-fee, three gold mohurs.
Ellis, J.:— I agree.
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