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P.R.M.P.R. Perichiappa Chettiar v. Nachiappan

Madras High Court
Oct 16, 1930
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (plaintiff in the original suit) instituted Original Suit No. 2 of 1924 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga against defendant 1 (his agent) for an account and recovery of amounts found due; the plaint valued the claim at Rs. 40,000. Pursuant to a preliminary decree, accounts were taken by a commissioner and the trial Court on 28 November 1927 passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 5,682-6-11 (with interest), to be recovered from the assets of the deceased defendant 1. Defendant 1 had died and defendant 2 was brought in as legal representative and appealed (Appeal No. 10 of 1928) to the High Court; the plaintiff filed cross-objections (a memorandum of cross-appeal) valued at Rs. 20,000.

On hearing, the High Court allowed defendant 2's appeal in part and reduced the decree by about Rs. 4,000; the plaintiff's cross-appeal was allowed only to the extent of about Rs. 150 and the remainder (about Rs. 19,850) was dismissed. As a result the plaintiff's decree on High Court judgment was reduced to about Rs. 2,000 (with interest). The petitioner applied under Section 109(a) and Section 110, Civil P.C., for a certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council (Privy Council), claiming that the conditions in Section 110 were satisfied (value thresholds exceeded and the High Court did not affirm the trial Court).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Sections 109(a) and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, the petitioner is entitled as of right to a certificate to appeal to His Majesty in Council (Privy Council), given (a) the value of the subject-matter of the original suit and of the proposed appeal and (b) the question whether the decree of the High Court "affirmed" the decision of the Court immediately below.
  2. Whether concurrent findings of fact on various items in an account suit mean that the appellate decree should be treated as an affirmance with respect to those items, and accordingly whether those items must be excluded in assessing the Rs. 10,000 threshold in Section 110.
  3. Whether the exceptions in Section 110 should be extended by judicially reading additional words into the proviso (i.e., whether separable parts or items of a single decree can be treated as separate subject-matters for the purpose of calculating the Rs. 10,000 limit).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance exceeded Rs. 10,000 (plaint value Rs. 40,000).
  • The value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council exceeded Rs. 10,000 (the cross-appeal and parts of the appeal together exceeded Rs. 20,000).
  • The decree of the High Court did not affirm the decision of the trial Court (the High Court materially reduced the decree and dismissed most of the cross-appeal), so the petitioner claims a certificate as of right under Section 110.

Respondent's (Defendant 2's) Arguments

  • The disputes between the parties related to various individual items in the agent's account and the value of none of these individual items exceeded Rs. 10,000.
  • The High Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court on almost all items except a small number, and the total amount involved in items on which the High Court differed was only about Rs. 4,000; thus, the High Court's decree should be treated as affirming the trial Court except for that small portion.
  • Accordingly, the respondent argued the present case involved concurrent findings of fact and that, except for about Rs. 4,000, the High Court affirmed the trial Court—so no certificate as of right should be issued unless a substantial question of law is shown.
  • The respondent relied on earlier decisions of this Court (Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024 and an unreported Bench decision in C.M.P. 1674 of 1928) and on decisions of Calcutta and Bombay High Courts (Narendra v. Gopendra A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543; Kapurji v. Pannaji A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 359) to support the view that portions of the subject-matter on which there were concurrent findings should not be counted for the Rs. 10,000 threshold.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Annapurnabai v. Ruprao, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60 Privy Council held that if the appellate decree does not affirm the trial Court and the value thresholds in Section 110 are met, a party is entitled to leave to appeal to the Privy Council even if no substantial question of law is involved; special leave can be limited to particular questions. The Court treated this Privy Council decision as authoritative and dispositive: it relied on Annapurnabai to conclude that the petitioner is entitled to leave when the High Court did not affirm the trial Court and valuation thresholds are satisfied.
Rajah Sree Nath Roy Bahadur v. Secretary of State [Sree Nath v. Secy. of State], [1904] 8 C.W.N. 294 (Calcutta High Court) Held that a High Court decree which modified a lower court decree might nevertheless be treated as an affirmance for the purpose of Section 110 insofar as it agreed with the lower Court. The Court observed that this view involved implying words into Section 110 and that after Annapurnabai (Privy Council) the reasoning of Sree Nath cannot be taken to represent correct law; the Court declined to follow Sree Nath.
Narendra Lal Das v. Gopendra Lal Das, A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 Applied the concept of looking to the substance of the subject-matter and treating parts where Courts agreed as affirmances; questioned (post-Annapurnabai) whether that principle fully accords with Section 110. The Court cited Narendra and noted its cautious approach: Narendra doubted whether the substance-test perfectly matched Section 110, and the present Court did not accept an extension of Section 110 based on implied words as urged by respondent.
Kapurji Magniram v. Pannaji Debichand (Kapurji v. Pannaji), A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 359 Held that variation by the High Court on points not covered by the proposed appeal to the Privy Council does not suffice to entitle a certificate under Section 110. The Court referenced Kapurji as supportive of the respondent's contention but explicitly refused to follow the line of reasoning that would extend Section 110 by reading in additional limitations.
Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024 Decision of this Court refusing leave to appeal to the Privy Council where aspects of the subject-matter were said to be affirmed; used to argue that only amounts in reversed parts should be counted. The respondent relied on this decision; the Court discussed it and noted that later cases (Sundara Mudaliar) distinguished Ramanathan Chetti and that Ramanathan Chetti did not dictate denial of certificate in the present facts.
Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 429 Distinguished Ramanathan Chetti; recognized that in some suits (e.g., suit for general account) the subject-matter can be split and a part may justify leave to appeal. The Court regarded Sundara Mudaliar as supportive of the proposition that account suits may in some circumstances be split, and used it to distinguish Ramanathan Chetti; however, the present Court concluded that in the instant account suit the High Court's substantial variation prevented treating the decree as affirming the trial Court.
Dampanaboyina Gangi v. Addala Ramaswami, [1902] 25 Mad. 736 Discussed in relation to practice permitting suits involving multiple alienations or items to be tried together without objection of misjoinder where title ground is the same. The Court cited the case to explain that although suits involving several subject matters are sometimes treated together, that does not mean each item in an account suit is a separate subject-matter for Section 110 purposes in the present circumstances.
Kamal Nath v. Bithal Das, A.I.R. 1922 All. 89 Earlier decision (pre-Annapurnabai) relevant to the question of leave to appeal under Section 110. The Court mentioned Kamal Nath as a pre-Privy Council authority but relied on the Privy Council decision (Annapurnabai) as controlling.
Jamna Prasad Singh v. Jagannath Prasad, A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 561 Held in a manner supportive of petitioner's contention regarding construction of Section 110 and splitting of subject-matter. The Court cited this Patna High Court decision as supporting the petitioner's position that the limitations urged by the respondent were not mandated by the statute.
Bhagwan Singh v. Bhawani Das Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1921 All. 270 Cited among authorities on the question of construction of Section 110 and related procedural points. The Court noted this decision as one of several cited on behalf of the petitioner in support of his interpretation of Section 110.
Venkat Narayana v. Lahshmibayamma, A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 309 Cited as authority relevant to the petitioner's contention on construction of Section 110. The Court recorded that this case was cited by the petitioner; it formed part of the body of authority relied upon in support of granting the certificate.
Unreported Bench decision: C.M.P. 1674 of 1928 (this Court) Related to a suit to set aside various alienations: discussed whether subject-matter could be split and whether the High Court's affirming/reversing distinctions applied. The Court analyzed the unreported decision and concluded that where separate alienations form distinct subject-matters a split may be proper, but that the present account suit did not permit treating each item as a separate subject-matter for Section 110.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from the statutory text and binding precedent. Section 109(a) confers a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council (Privy Council) from any decree made on appeal by a High Court. Section 110 qualifies that right by creating two exceptions (value below Rs. 10,000 and affirmance of the lower court where no substantial question of law is involved). The Court emphasized that these exceptions are partial statutory limitations on the right of appeal and therefore must be strictly construed.

The Court then considered whether it was permissible to read additional limiting words into Section 110 so as to treat parts of a composite decree as excluded from valuation when they were effectively affirmed by the High Court. The respondent urged an interpretive device that would exclude affirming parts from the Rs. 10,000 calculation. The Court rejected any such expansion by implication, observing that reading additional words into the proviso is not permissible when the plain language does not contain them and that exceptions should receive a strict construction.

The Court treated the Privy Council decision in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao as controlling authority: when the High Court's decree does not affirm the trial Court and the value thresholds are met (both for the suit in the trial Court and for the subject-matter in dispute on the proposed appeal), the petitioner is entitled to leave to appeal to the Privy Council even if no substantial question of law is involved. The Court concluded that the High Court's modifications in the present case were substantial and adverse to the petitioner (a reduction of about Rs. 4,000 and dismissal of cross-appeal claims of about Rs. 19,850), so the High Court did not, in substance, affirm the trial Court's decision.

The Court also examined precedents relied upon by the respondent (including Sree Nath and decisions of some High Courts) and explained why those authorities could not be extended to produce the result urged by the respondent in this case. It recognized that some suits involving separate alienations or clearly separable subject-matters may be split for the purpose of appeals, but held that an account suit between principal and agent is not to be treated as consisting of separate subject-matters merely because the decree results from decisions on many individual items. Thus, the Court declined to treat the affirmed items as excluded from valuation in this case.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court certified and ordered that a certificate (leave) be issued to the petitioner for appeal to His Majesty in Council under Section 109(a) and Section 110, Civil P.C.; in other words, the petitioner is entitled to leave to appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: A certificate will be issued to the petitioner, enabling an appeal to the Privy Council. The Court certified that the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the trial Court was more than Rs. 10,000, the value of the subject-matter of the appeal to the Privy Council was upwards of Rs. 10,000, and the High Court's decree did not affirm the decision of the trial Court.
  • Interpretive consequence: The Court applied the Privy Council's interpretation in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao and refused to extend Section 110 by implication to exclude affirmed parts of a composite decree from valuation unless the statute itself or necessary implication allows such a separation. The proviso in Section 110 must be strictly construed; courts should not add words to it to enlarge its scope as urged by the respondent.
  • Scope: The decision affirms that in suits for accounts between principal and agent, individual items are not to be treated as separate subject-matters for Section 110 valuation simply because the decree arises from numerous itemised determinations; however, the Court acknowledged that truly separable decrees (for instance, distinct alienations in favour of different defendants) might properly be separated for appeal purposes where long-established practice permits.
  • Precedential note: The Court relied on and followed the Privy Council's decision in Annapurnabai; it declined to follow earlier High Court decisions that suggested a broader implied limitation on Section 110. The immediate practical consequence is issuance of the certificate to the petitioner; the Court did not purport to create a novel expansion of the law beyond the application of the Privy Council ruling and strict construction of the proviso.

Disposition: A certificate will be issued to the petitioner accordingly.

Show all summary ...

1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which my learned brother is about to deliver and with which I entirely agree.

2. Section 109(a), Civil P.C., gives a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from any decree made on appeal by a. High Court. Section 110, Civil P.C., qualifies that right of appeal by making two exceptions to it. First there is no appeal Under Section 109(a) if the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance or in dispute in the proposed appeal is less than Rs. 10,000 and the decree does not involve directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of that amount or value. Secondly there is no appeal Under Section 109(a) if the decree of the High Court affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the High Court and the proposed appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. These two exceptions, as they partially take away the right of appeal given by Section 109(a), must; be strictly construed. In the present case prima facie there is no difficulty in respect of the first exception, as admittedly the amount of the subject matter of the suit in the Court of first instance and in the proposed appeal is over Rs. 10,000.

3. It is not suggested that the proposed appeal involves any substantial question of law; but the petitioner will be entitled to appeal if the decree of the High Court did not affirm the decision of the Subordinate Judge. At one time it was held by the Calcutta High Court that, even when a decree of that Court had modified a decree of the lower Court on appeal it was an affirming decree for the purpose of Section 110, Civil P.C., so far as it agreed with the decision of the lower Court, and that, if the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council referred only to that part of the decree, some substantial question of law was necessary to give a right of appeal. That view, which it may be pointed out involved the implication of words not found in Section 110, was taken in Rajah Sree Nath Roy Bahadur v. Secy. of State, [1904] 8 C.W.N. 294 and Annapurna Rai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60, but has been shown to be incorrect by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the latter case. Although that implied extension of the exceptions to Section 109(a) is no longer possible, it is urged for defendant 2 that we are still entitled to effect a different extension of the exceptions by reading the last clause of Section 110 as if it ran:

provided that, so far as the decree or final order appealed from in respect of any separable part of the case affirms, etc. and that, if that part involves no substantial question of law, it should be excluded in calculating the necessary Rs. 10,000. That view appears to have been taken in Narendra Lal Das v. Gopendra Lal Das A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 and Kapurji Magniram v. Pannaji Debichand A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 359. But with great respect I am not prepared to follow these decisions. If a decree is really a composite decree or a series of decrees dealing with what should strictly be the subject of separate suits, e.g., a decree dealing with alienations in favour of different; defendants, which by long established practice we have allowed to be made the subject of one suit, then it may be proper to separate each decree of the series for the purpose of appeal to His Majesty in Council. But apart from that in my opinion we are bound by the plain language of Section 110, Civil P.C., and are not at liberty to read into it any words which are not to be found there actually or by necessary implication. A decree for the payment of a certain amount, which is the result of taking an account, is one decree, and not a series of decrees merely because it is the result of decisions in respect of a number of items. If the High Court's decree in such a case does not entirely affirm the decision of the Court immediately below it, then it is not an affirming decree within the meaning of Section 110, Civil P.C.'

4. I agree that in this case we must certify that the amount of the subject matter of the suit in the Court of first instance and the amount of the subject matter in dispute in the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council are each over Rs. 10,000 and that the decree of this Court did not affirm the decision of the Subordinate Judge.

Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.

5. The petitioner, who is the plaintiff in the original suit, being desirous of appealing to His Majesty in Council against the decision of this Court in Appeal No. 10 of 1928 has filed the present application under Section 109, Clause (a), and Section 110, Civil P.C., for the necessary certificate.

6. He instituted the Original Suit No. 2 of 1924 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga for a decree directing defendant 1, his agent, to render accounts for the period of his agency in the plaintiff's firm at Soomangai in Burma and to hand over to the plaintiff all documents relating to the agency and for the recovery of the amount found due on taking accounts. He valued the claim in the suit at Rs. 40,000. In pursuance of a preliminary decree passed by the Court, accounts were taken by a commissioner and after hearing the objections filed by the parties to the commissioner's report the trial Court, on 28th November 1927, passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 5,682-6-11 with interest thereon, to be recovered from, the assets of the deceased defendant 1 (defendant 1 having died in the meantime and defendant 2 having been brought on as the legal representative of defendant 1 as defendant 1's adopted son). Against that decree, defendant 2 preferred appeal No. 10 of 1928 to the High Court and the plaintiff preferred a memorandum of objections to the High Court claiming a decree for a further amount and valued his memorandum of cross-appeal at Rs. 20,000.

7. When the appeal and the cross-appeal came on for hearing, the High Court allowed defendant 2's appeal in part and reduced the amount decreed by the trial Judge by about Rs. 4,000; the cross-appeal preferred by the plaintiff was allowed to a very small extent--namely, to the extent of about Rs. 150, and the cross-appeal in respect of about Rs. 19,850 (out of the Rs. 20,000 claimed in it) was dismissed. The result therefore is that whereas the trial Court gave the plaintiff a decree for about Rs. 5,000 odd with interest thereon, according to the decree of the High Court--the plaintiff gets a decree only for about Rs. 2,000 with interest thereon. The plaintiff in these circumstances has applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, and the question for consideration is whether he is entitled to a certificate as a matter of right.

8. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner (the plaintiff) that the value of the subject matter of, the suit in the Court of first instance was upwards of Rs. 10,000 (the plaint was in fact valued at Rs. 40,000) and that the amount in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council is also upwards of Rs. 10,000 (it is more than Rs. 20,000), and that the decree of the High Court did not affirm the decision of the trial Court. He therefore claims a certificate as a matter of right. On behalf of defendant 2 (respondent in this petition), his learned advocate argued that the question in dispute between the parties related really to various items in the account rendered by the agent, that the value of none of the items exceeded Rs. 10,000, and that, as the High Court has confirmed the findings of the trial Court on all the items excepting a very few, and even the total amount involved in the items in respect of which the High Court differed from the trial Court is very much less than Rs. 10,000 (the amount comes to only about Rs. 4,000) the present is a case of concurrent findings on questions of fact; and he urged that except with reference to about Rs. 4,000 the High Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court in respect of all the items, and that consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to a certificate as of right. In support of this contention, the learned advocate referred us to two decisions of this Court: one reported in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024 and the other an unreported one of a Bench of this Court in C.M.P. 1674 o 1928. We were also referred to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Narendra v. Gopendra A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 and another of the Bombay High Court reported in Kapurji v. Pannaji A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 359.

9. On the other hand we were referred to a decision of the Privy Council reported in Annapurabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60. The question before the Privy Council arose in this way. The plaintiff instituted a suit in the District Court of Amraoti against the defendants for possession of half of the estate of a deceased person alleging that he had been adopted by the senior widow of the deceased and denying the alleged adoption of defendant 2, defendant 1 being the junior widow of the deceased. The trial Court held that the plaintiff's adoption was proved, that the alleged adoption of defendant 2 was not proved, but held that the plaintiff was bound to provide maintenance for defendant 1 at the rate of Rs. 800 per annum, which was to be a charge upon the estate. On appeal the decree of the trial Court was modified by increasing the maintenance from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,200 per annum in all other respects the decree was confirmed. The defendants' application to the appellate Court for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was dismissed on the ground that the decree of the trial Court had been affirmed except in respect of a "small change "in favour of the defendants and that no question of law was involved.

10. The defendants applied to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal urging that the appellate Court was in error in having refused leave, it being urged that as the decree of the appellate. Court did not affirm the decision of the trial Court the defendants were entitled as of right to leave to appeal, the value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeding Rs. 10,000 as also the value of the subject matter of the proposed appeal. It was also contended that it was not material under the circumstances whether any substantial question of law was involved in the proposed appeal or not. The appellants desired however to appeal only with regard to the amount of the maintenance which was claimed at Rs. 3,000 per annum, and they did not desire to appeal with regard to the other portions of the decree, having regard to the concurrent findings against them on the question of adoption by both Courts in India. The Privy Council held that the contention of the defendants as to the effect of section 110 of the code was correct, and that they had therefore a right of appeal. Special leave to appeal was granted, but was limited to the question of maintenance. Their Lordships also remarked as follows: "The petitioner's chance of success is not material to their application."Prima facie therefore when the decree appealed from does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below, if the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the trial Court be Rs. 10,000 or upwards, as also the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council, the petitioner would be entitled as of right to leave to appeal to the Privy Council.

11. But it was argued that when there were concurrent findings of fact with reference to some of the items included in the valuation, the decree of the appellate Court should be taken to affirm that portion of the decree of the trial Court relating to these items, and that unless a substantial question of law be involved in the proposed appeal to the Privy Council, in so far as these items are concerned, the value of these items should not be taken into account in considering the valuation of the subject matter of the appeal to the Privy Council, and that only the amounts involved in the other items in respect of which the decision of the trial Court was reversed by the High Court should be taken into account in considering the limit of Rs. 10,000 prescribed by section 110 of the code. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision reported in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024. That was a decision of Phillips and Odgers, JJ., and their Lordships refused leave to appeal to the Privy Council in that case. In a later case, reported in Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 429 in which the same learned Judges granted leave to appeal to the Privy Council, their decision in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024 was distinguished in these terms:

There the memorandum of cross-objections related to a matter entirely distinct from the subject-matter of the appeal: see page 526.

12. It would seem that in the High Court the petitioner's appeal was dismissed whereas the memorandum of objections filed by the respondents was allowed and the lower Court's decree modified to the extent of about Rs. 300 in respect of some rent disallowed in the trial Court: see p. 296 (of 51 M. L. J.) Ramanathan Chetti's case A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024. We may here observe that the question for decision in Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 429 arose in a suit for a general account against a trustee, and the suit out of which the application before us has arisen was also a suit for a general account against an agent. The only other decision of this Court to which our attention was drawn is that passed by Ramesam, J., and Wallace, J., in C.M.P. 1674 of 1928 (unreported). It related to a suit by a reversionary heir to set aside various alienations made by a Hindu widow and to recover possession of the items from the various alienees, the widow having died just prior to the suit. The trial Court held against the validity of some of the alienations, but the High Court on appeal reversed the decision of the trial Court with reference to some of the alienations while confirming it as regards others. The plaintiff applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and relied on Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60 Their Lordships refused leave, and observed as follows:

The leave to appeal now applied for relates to items 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Of these items the judgment of the High Court affirms the judgment of the trial Court as to items 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. As to item 9, it is a reversing judgment but taken separately its value is not above Rs. 10,000. The learned advocate for the petitioners referred to Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60 and. Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 429. But these cases do not help him. In those cases, the subject matter of the appeal could not be split into parts, and it could not be said that it was partly an affirming judgment and partly a reversing judgment. They were cases of modifying judgments and therefore not cases of affirming judgments. The reasoning in Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 429 shows that the subject matter of the litigation can be split up into separate parts. The principle of affirming and reversing judgments should be separately applied to each of these parts. Holding that there was no substantial question of law, the application for leave was dismissed. A suit to set aside various alienations made by a. Hindu widow should really be taken to be a suit relating to different subject matters, the subject matter of each alienation being different though, as observed by Sir V. Bhashyam Ayyangar in the case reported in Dampanaboyina Gangi v. Addala Ramaswami [1902] 25 Mad 736, at p. 745, a course of decisions in this Presidency has held that such a suit is not open to the objection of misjoinder of parties and of causes of action when the plaintiff's ground of title to all the properties included in the suit is the same.

13. In our view it could not be said that different items in dispute between parties in a suit by a principal against his agent for an account constitute separate subject-matters in the sense contemplated by the learned Judges in C.M.P. 1674 of 1928. No other decision of this Court was brought to our notice. Two decisions of the Calcutta High Court were relied on by the learned advocate for the respondent. In Sree Nath v. Secy. of State [1904] 8 C.W.N. 294, a Bench of three learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court declined to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council in a land acquisition case where an applicant claimed Rs. 77,000 before the Collector who assessed the value of the land at Rs. 28,287. The District Judge on a reference to him upheld the Collector's award. The applicant then appealed to the High Court valuing his appeal at Rs. 49,000 being the difference between the Collector's award and the amount claimed. The High Court allowed the appeal in part by giving the appellant an additional sum of about Rs. 7,000. In these circumstances the appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The Court held that the decree of the High Court was properly one of affirmance of the decree of the first Court as ragards the subject matter of the proposed appeal, and as there was no substantial question of law, the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was refused. The learned Judges observed as follows:

The question is whether under these circumstances the decree appealed against affirms the decision of the Court below. No doubt in one sense it may bo said that this Court did not confirm the decision of the Court below, because it gave the petitioner an additional Rs. 7,000; but we must look to the substance of the case. What is the decree from which the present applicant now desires to appeal to the Privy Conncil? He desires to appeal only against the decision of this Court so far as it affirmed the decision of the Court below; nothing else. This seems to be, in substance, as far as the subject matter of appeal goes, a decree of affirmance. If the decree of this Court had been properly drawn, it would have dismissed the appeal except to the extent that the additional sum was given. In other words, whilst the decree of this Court modifies, in the petitioner's favour, the original decree, as regards the subject matter of the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council it most certainly affirmed the decree of the first Court. No question of law is involved. The application is refused.

14. This decision was passed in 1904; and after the decision of the Privy Council given in 1924 in the case reported in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60, the decision in Sree Nath v. Secy. of State [1904] 8 C.W.N. 294 could not be said to represent the law on the point correctly and must be taken to have been overruled by the decision of the Privy Council. The decision in the other case cited for the respondent, viz., Narendra v. Gopendra A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 was passed in 1927. The learned Judges remarked that the Privy Council decision in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60 has not overruled the principle that if on an examination of the subject matter that is to be in debate before the Privy Council it be found that on that point the two Courts have been in agreement, the decree of the appellate Court is to be treated as a decree of affirmance within the meaning of Section 110, Civil P.C., that for leave to appeal to the Privy Council in such a matter, the applicant has to prove a substantial question of law, and that the Privy Council has only decreed that the particular application of the doctrine in Sree Nath v. Secy. of State [1904] 8 C.W.N. 294 was erroneous. The learned Chief Justice remarked as follows at p. 576:

I do not think that the decision shows that it is an erroneous view that we have to look to the substance and see what is the subject matter of the appeal to His Majesty in Council. I have, I confess, some doubt as to whether in the end even that principle would be found to be in accordance with the construction to be put upon Section 110, but this Court and other High Courts have for many years acted upon that principle.

15. Similarly in Kapurji v. Pannaji A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 359, it was held that it was not enough to entitle the applicant to a certificate Under Section 110, Civil P.C., that the decree of the lower Court is varied by the High Court on points not covered by the appeal to the Privy Council.

16. In our present case, in respect of a portion of the subject matter of the appeal to the Privy Council the High Court substantially varied the decree of the trial Court to the prejudice of the petitioner. Further, it is not quite correct to say with reference to the decision in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60 that the appeal to the Privy Council was limited by the Privy Council--against the wishes of the appellants--to the question of maintenance allowance. The appellants appealed against the whole decree; but, having regard to the concurrent findings of fact on the question of adoption, their learned Counsel desired special leave to appeal only with reference to the question of maintenance. It would therefore appear that it is not a case where their Lordships limited special leave to the question of maintenance only, on their own accord; they intimated that in the circumstances special leave to appeal should be granted but should be limited to the question of maintenance, evidently to give notice of that circumstance to the respondents who did not then appear be fore their Lordships. This would seem to follow from what their Lordships say about the construction of Section 110, Civil P.C. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent necessitates that very many words should be implied in Section 110 to justify the interpretation of the section contended for by him. We feel that it is not open to us to do so. Section 109 gives a right of appeal to the Privy Council. Section 110 is a proviso to Section 109. It is a rule of law that a proviso should receive a strict construction. It is not open to the Court to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the scope of the proviso. The proviso must be restricted to the scope reasonably conveyed by the words used therein.

17. Turning to the other Courts: the decision in Kamal Nath v. Bithal Das A.I.R. 1922 All. 89 was before the decision of the Privy Council in the case reported in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60. The decision of the Patna High Court in the case reported in Jamna Prasad Singh v. Jagannath Prasad A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 561 supports the contention of the petitioner before us. There the learned Judge observed as follows with reference to the decision reported in Narendra v. Gopendra A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543. In Narendra v. Gopendra A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 Sir George Rankin, C.J., says:

I have, I confess, some doubt as to whether in the end even that principle would be found to be in accordance with the construction to be put upon Section 110, but this Court and other High Courts have for many years acted upon that principle.

18. The learned Chief Justice there felt that the limitation placed upon the construction of the section is not in consonance with the language used in the statute. Bhagwan Singh v. Bhawani Das Bhagwan Das A.I.R. 1921 All. 270, Venkat Narayana v. Lahshmibayamma A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 309 and Jumna Prasad v. Jagannath A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 561 were also cited on behalf of the petitioner.

19. When a petitioner is given a right of appeal to the Privy Council, and he prima facie satisfies the conditions prescribed by the section, we think it is our duty to grant him leave to appeal in such a case. As remarked by the Privy Council, ' the chance of success of the appellant in the proposed appeal to the Privy Council is not material to such an application for leave. The Privy Council has repeatedly remarked in several cases that as regards the amount of maintenance to be decreed to a litigant in India, the Privy Council will not ordinarily interfere, and yet the Privy Council granted leave to appeal in the case reported in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60 regarding the amount of maintenance. The Privy Council will not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of facts arrived at by Courts in India on any particular point; yet if the decree of the High Court did not affirm the decision of the trial Court, and if the value of the subject matter of the suit in the trial Court and in the appeal to the Privy Council be Rs. 10,000 or upwards, a party desirous of appealing to the Privy Council would seem to be entitled to leave to appeal from the decree of the High Court Under Section 110, Civil P.C., as interpreted by the Privy 'Council in the case reported in Annapurnabai v. Ruprao A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60, though no substantial question of law is involved in the proposed appeal. In the present case, the decree of the High Court worked to the prejudice of the present appellant (the petitioner before us) to the extent of about Rs. 4,000, and thus the decree of the appellate Court substantially varied the decree of the trial Court to the prejudice of the petitioner (the appellant in the proposed Privy Council appeal). We are not here concerned with a case of a mere formal or immaterial alteration of the trial Court's decree by the appellate Court. Nor . are we here concerned with a case where the appellate decree modified the decree of the first Court only in respect of costs. The modification in the present case being substantial and against the appellant, we are unable to say that the decree of the High Court affirmed the decree of the trial Court. Further, in a suit for an account by the principal against his agent, it could not, in our opinion, be said that each objection raised by, the plaintiff or the defendant to the commissioner's report is a different subject matter, or that a decree passed in such a suit should be taken to be "several decrees relating to several subject-matters, but written in one piece of paper "as argued for the respondent.

20. The proposed appeal to the Privy Council is not only against that portion of the decree of the High Court which modified the decree of the trial Court to the extent of about Rs. 4,000 to the prejudice of the petitioner, but is also against that portion of the decree of the High Court which dismissed the cross appeal (memorandum of objections) filed by the petitioner to the extent of more than Rs. 19,000. The value of the subject-matter of the appeal to the Privy Council is thus much more than ten thousand rupees and not being an affirming decision, it is not incumbent on the petitioner to show that there is a substantial question of law involved in the proposed appeal. The section gives us no discretion in the matter in such circumstances; though there is no substantial question of law involved in the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council the condition relating to valuation has been satisfied, and the decree of the High Court did not affirm the decision of the trial Court.

21. In my opinion, the appellant is entitled to leave Under Section 110, Civil P.C., construed in the light of the decision of the Privy Council in the case reported in Annapurnabai V. Ruprdo A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 60; and we accordingly cartify that the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the trial Court was more than Rs. 10,000 and that the value of the subject-matter of the appeal to the Privy Council is also upwards of Rs. 10,000, and that the decree of the High Court in appeal did not affirm the decision of the trial Court.

22. A certificate will be issued to the petitioner accordingly.