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Peyare Lal v. Banke Lal
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit originated from a dispute over a plot of land of about 20 bighas within the zamindari of the plaintiffs. Ratan Lal, a lambardar under whom the plaintiffs claim, sued the predecessor-in-title of the present defendants for ejectment under Section 57(b) of the Tenancy Act, alleging tenant's improper use of the land. The Assistant Collector (Court of first instance / Munsif) dismissed that ejectment suit. On appeal the plaintiff succeeded; the District Judge's judgment in the plaintiff's favour was, in turn, upheld on a second appeal to the High Court. In execution it was found that although the holding comprised about 20 bighas, the decree and delivery of possession related only to about 10 bighas 11 biswas. After possession was delivered, Ratan Lal died and the present defendants succeeded to the holding. The plaintiffs' attempts to secure mutation were resisted and the revenue court found the defendants in possession. The plaintiffs then instituted the suit which gave rise to the present proceedings. The trial Court (Munsif / Assistant Collector) dismissed this suit; on appeal the District Judge decreed it. The valuation and jurisdiction of the appeals became central to later proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Judge had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Assistant Collector when the legally fixed valuation of the suit (one year's rent) was Rs. 18, and an appeal to the District Judge from an Assistant Collector lies only where the subject-matter is valued at over Rs. 100.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal when the valuation for jurisdictional purposes was only Rs. 18.
- Whether a judgment or decree passed by a Court that was without jurisdiction can operate as res judicata and bind parties in subsequent litigation.
- Whether the parties' mutual acceptance of an exaggerated valuation (e.g., valuing an appeal at Rs. 125) can confer jurisdiction on a Court that the law otherwise denies.
- Whether an objection as to jurisdiction may be raised for the first time in appeal (i.e., whether such an objection is too late if not taken earlier).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The holding's yearly rent (and thus the legal valuation for jurisdiction) was only Rs. 18; under the applicable rules the appeal to the District Judge required valuation over Rs. 100, so the District Judge had no jurisdiction.
- Because no jurisdiction existed in the District Judge, no second appeal lay to the High Court; judgments of the District Judge and High Court must be treated as having been given without jurisdiction and thus cannot operate as res judicata in favour of the respondents.
- Consequently, the only binding judgment is that of the Assistant Collector dismissing the original ejectment suit, and the respondents' suit should have been dismissed.
Respondents' Arguments
- On behalf of the respondents an unpublished decision (Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1922) was cited in which the valuation of an appeal had been accepted by parties and the appellate Court (District Judge) had proceeded; in that decision the Court held that the objection to jurisdiction was taken too late and could not be entertained where the valuation had been accepted by both parties.
Other Counsel Submissions
- Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad cited the printed case Rampat Rai v. Harihar Rai (AIR 1919 All 447) — a decision in which an appellate Court entertained the appeal despite a later preliminary objection about procedural omission; the opinion notes this as a conflicting authority to the unpublished case cited for the respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1922 (unpublished; decision by Mr. Justice Daniels, 13 Feb 1924) | Where the valuation of an appeal has been accepted by both parties, an objection as to jurisdiction taken late may be held to be too late and not entertained. | The Court observed this decision but noted that the attention of the Judges who decided it had not been drawn to earlier Privy Council authorities; the present Court preferred earlier and Privy Council authorities over this recent unpublished decision. |
| Rampat Rai v. Harihar Rai, AIR 1919 All 447 | Illustrates a decision in which a preliminary objection (that a plea had not been raised before the Single Judge) was overruled and the appeal was decreed; used to show conflicting views on raising jurisdictional/ procedural objections at appellate stages. | The Court noted this case as part of the conflicting authorities and acknowledged the presence of conflicting precedents on whether such objections may be entertained late. |
| Ramlal Hargopal v. Kisanchandra, AIR 1924 PC 95 (Privy Council) | The Privy Council held that an objection as to jurisdiction must be entertained though raised for the first time in appeal, if it arises from facts that are admitted or proved. | The Court relied on this principle and preferred the Privy Council's rule to the unpublished decision; used to support entertaining a jurisdictional objection raised on appeal where facts concerning jurisdiction are admitted or proved. |
| Setrucherla v. Maharaja of Jeypore, AIR 1919 PC 150 (Privy Council) | Authority supporting the Privy Council's approach to jurisdictional objections and appellate review. | Cited alongside Ramlal Hargopal as supporting Privy Council authority that jurisdictional objections may be entertained on appeal. |
| Annammal v. Sambasiva Aiyar, AIR 1919 Mad 242 | Where jurisdiction depends on certain facts which are to be established by evidence and the Court has accepted those facts and given judgment, the party may not later contest jurisdiction by separate suit; the conclusion can be contested only by way of appeal. | The Court distinguished that case from the present case: Annammal concerned contested facts to be proved, whereas in the present case the relevant fact (valuation by law) was admitted and fixed by statute, so the distinction affected whether the jurisdictional objection could be entertained. |
| Ledgard v. Bull (1887) 9 App. Cas. (All E.R.) 191 (Privy Council) | Parties cannot, by mutual consent, confer jurisdiction on a Judge who has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter; however, where a Judge is competent, parties joining issue and going to trial may not later dispute jurisdiction on grounds of initial procedural irregularity. | The Court relied on the distinction in this authority: because valuation here fixed jurisdiction by law and made the District Judge incompetent to hear the appeal, consent/acceptance could not create jurisdiction; thus earlier appellate judgments were regarded as passed without jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining conflicting authorities and relevant statutory provisions, then applying legal principles to the admitted facts.
- Identification of the precise jurisdictional fact: the yearly rent of the holding (one year's rent) was Rs. 18, and for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction the valuation of the suit was fixed at Rs. 18 by law (references made to Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act in the opinion).
- Legal rule on appellate jurisdiction: an appeal to the District Judge from the judgment of an Assistant Collector of the first class is permitted only where the subject-matter is valued at over Rs. 100. Because the statutory valuation here was Rs. 18, the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal; consequently, no second appeal lay to the High Court.
- Examination of conflicting precedent: the Court considered an unpublished recent decision (Second Appeal No.1505/1922) which had held that acceptance of the valuation by parties precluded a later objection, but the Court observed that earlier Privy Council authorities had not been brought to the attention of the Judges in that decision.
- Reliance on Privy Council authorities and statutory rules: invoking Section 99 Civil P.C. (on reversal for irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction) and Privy Council rulings (notably Ramlal Hargopal v. Kisanchandra and Setrucherla v. Maharaja of Jeypore), the Court accepted the rule that an appellate Court must entertain an objection as to jurisdiction even if raised first in appeal where the jurisdictional facts are admitted or proved.
- Distinguishing contrary cases: the Court distinguished Annammal v. Sambasiva Aiyar (where jurisdiction depended on facts to be established by evidence and could only be challenged by appeal) from the present case because here the relevant fact (the statutory valuation of Rs. 18) was admitted and fixed by law. The Court also relied on Ledgard v. Bull for the principle that parties cannot, by consent, confer jurisdiction on a Court that lacks inherent competence.
- Application to the present facts: because the valuation for jurisdiction was fixed by law at Rs. 18 and not open to alteration by parties, the District Judge and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the respective appeals. Acceptance of an exaggerated valuation by the parties did not cure the lack of jurisdiction where the Court was inherently incompetent.
- Consequence on prior judgments: judgments of the District Judge and of this Court (High Court) were therefore regarded as passed without jurisdiction and could not operate as res judicata; the only binding judgment was the original Assistant Collector's decree dismissing the ejectment suit (dated 31st August 1914).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree appealed from, and restored the decree of the Court of first instance (the Assistant Collector's judgment dated 31st August 1914 dismissing the suit). The appellants were awarded their costs in this Court and in the Court of first appeal.
Implications:
- The direct legal effect on the parties is that the Assistant Collector's dismissal of the ejectment suit stands as the only binding judgment; the plaintiffs (respondents in this appeal) are not entitled to the relief claimed in the suit that led to the challenged appellate decrees.
- The Court reaffirmed the principle that a party's or parties' acceptance of an incorrect valuation cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which the law does not permit to hear the matter; consent does not create jurisdiction where the Court has no inherent competence.
- The opinion endorses Privy Council authority that objections as to jurisdiction may be entertained even if first raised on appeal when the jurisdictional facts are admitted or proved, and distinguishes situations in which jurisdiction depends on contested factual determinations that have been resolved by a competent Court.
- No new principle of law beyond applying and preferring established Privy Council and earlier authorities was formulated; the decision applies existing principles to the facts and alters the parties' rights by restoring the first-instance decree.
Costs: The appellants were awarded their costs in this Court and in the Court of first appeal, as stated in the opinion.
1. The facts which have given rise to this appeal, which involves only a point of law, are as follows:
There was a plot of land measuring 20 bighas 'and odd within the zamindari of the plaintiffs. One Ratan Lal who was a lambardar of the mahal and under whom the plaintiffs of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen claim, instituted a suit against the predecessor in title of the present defendants for ejectment. It was alleged that the defendant was Ratan Lal's tenant, that he had put the land to a use which was inconsistent with the letting of it for agricultural purposes and that therefore, he had laid himself open to ejectment. The suit was instituted under Section 57(b) of the Tenancy Act. The suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance, but it succeeded on appeal. The judgment of the District Judge was upheld on a second appeal filed by the defendant. In the execution department it was found that although the holding had related to 20 bighas and odd the claim had been confined to only 10 bighas and odd and accordingly the plaintiff was put in possession of 10 bighas and odd area. After delivery of possession Ratan Lal died and was succeeded by the present defendants. The plaintiffs tried to obtain an order in their own favour in the mutation department, but were unsuccessful owing to an opposition on the part of the defendants. The revenue Court found that the defendants were in possession. Thereupon the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted. The plaintiffs stated that there was an arrangement by which the 10 bighas 11 biswas decreed in the former suit was marked off on the western side of the plot and this area was held by them.
2. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. On appeal the suit has been decreed.
3. The question that has been raised here and that was discussed in the Courts below was this. The rent for the holding from which the ejectment of the predecessor-in-title of the defendants was only Rs. 18. For the purposes of Jurisdiction the valuation of the suit would be one year's rent, viz., Rs, 18 [see Court Fees Act, Section 7. XI (cc) and Suits Valuation Act, Section 8.] Thus under the law, the valuation for the purposes of Court-fee and the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction was only a sum of Rs. 18, An appeal to the District Judge from a judgment of an Assistant Collector of the first class is allowed only where the subject matter of the suit is valued at over Rs. 100. The subject-matter of the suit was worth Rs. 18(and this has been found by the Court of first instance) and no appeal lay to the District Judge. The plaintiff however appealed having valued his appeal at the sum of Rs. 125. The defendant overlooked this over-valuation and accepting the plaintiff's valuation as correct filed a second appeal to this Court which, as already stated, was dismissed. The present appellants' argument is this. The District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, nor had this High Court any jurisdiction to hear a second appeal. The result is that the judgment of the Assistant Collector stands as the only final judgment in the case. That judgment dismissed the suit in toto and it follows that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. The suit is really barred as res judicata.
4. This argument found favour with the Court of first instance. The learned District Judge did not discuss the question of jurisdiction in extenso, but was of opinion that the judgment of the District Judge and of the High Court operated as res judicata in favour of the plaintiffs.
5. Good many cases have been cited for the parties. On behalf of the respondents an unpublished case has been cited, viz. Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1922. This was decided by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Daniels on the 13th of February 1924 and his decision was upheld by a short judgment by two other learned Judges of this Court. I thins case it appears the plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment of a tenant under Section 57(b) of the Tenancy Act. The plaintiff succeeded in the revenue Court. The real valuation of the suit was less than Rs. 100, being only one year's rent. The defendant exaggerated the valuation and filed an appeal before the District Judge. No exception was taken to the jurisdiction of the District Judge and the District Judge decreed the appeal. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a second appeal valuing it at the same amount at which the first appeal had been valued by the defendant, A plea was taken in the memorandum of appeal to the effect that no appeal lay to the District Judge. But apparently this plea was taken after the memorandum of appeal had been drawn up and on the date on which the appeal was heard for the purposes of admission. Daniels, J., was of opinion that the valuation at Rs. 125 had been accepted by both the parties and that, therefore it was not open to the plaintiff to object to the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Judge, A Letters Patent appeal failed. The judgment in the appeal was as follows:
We agree with the view taken by the learned Judge. Dr. Agarawala is quite right. Jurisdiction which does not exist cannot be created by consent, This objection is taken too late. It cannot be entertained. Appeal dismissed.
6. Evidently the learned Judges hearing the appeal were of opinion that the objection as to jurisdiction should have been taken in the Court of the District Judge.
7. As against this decision Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad has cited a printed case in 17 A.L.J., which again was decided by two learned Judges of this Court. The case is Rampat Rai v. Harihar Rai AIR 1919 All 447. The original suit was of a nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court. The valuation being lease than Rs. 500 no second appeal lay to the High Court. No objection having been taken before a learned Single Judge of this Court, he entertained the appeal and reversed the judgment of the lower Court. A preliminary objection was taken before the hearing of the Letters Patent appeal. The objection was to the effect that it was not open to the appellant to raise a plea which had not bean raised before the Single Judge. The objection was overruled and the appeal was decreed.
8. It is clear, therefore that there is a conflict of opinion on this point.
9. I have been asked by Dr. Agarwala that having regard to the importance of the question involved I should refer the matter to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice with a view to the constitution of a Full Bench to hear the appeal. I however find that the attention of the learned Judges of this Court who decided the Letters Patent Appeal in Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1922 was not drawn to the earlier cases of this Court or to the several Privy Council cages that bear on the point. I therefore propose to follow the earlier cases and the Privy Council cases in preference to the recently decided one, viz., Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1922.
10. Section 99 of the Civil P.C., lays down:
No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied... on account of... any irregularity... not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
11. It is clear, therefore that if a question of jurisdiction is raised in appeal, the mere fact that there has not been a miscarriage of justice will not prevent the appellate Court from interfering. The Privy Council laid down this rule in the case of Ramlal Hargopal v. Kisanchandra AIR 1924 PC 95. See also Setrucherla v. Maharaja of Jeypore AIR 1919 PC 150. It was hold in Ramlal's case AIR 1924 PC 95 that the objection as to jurisdiction must be entertained though raised for the first time in the appeal, if it be from the facts involved which are admitted or proved. This case is also reported in I.L.R. 51 Cal. 361. It is clear therefore that if the attention of the learned Judges of this Court who decided Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1922 had been drawn to the Privy Council case they would probably have decided it in another way.
12. In the case before me, however the question has been raised not in the suit itself, but in another litigation. Section 4.4 of the Indian Evidence Act; deals with this question. A judgment inter partes previously obtained would ordinarily bind them as res judicata provided the judgment was not obtained by fraud or collusion and the judgment was given by a Court competent to deliver it. It follows that where a judgment has been delivered by a Court of incompetent jurisdiction, that is to say, by a Court which had no jurisdiction to hear the case, the judgment cannot be pleaded as res judicata. It requires no authority to establish that consent does not give jurisdiction. This has been said by Hon'ble Walsh and Ryves, JJ., in their short judgment delivered in the second appeal mentioned. There may, however be eases in which jurisdiction depends on certain allegations of facts. Where those facts have been established and have been accepted by a Court and on foot of those facts a judgment has been delivered it has been held that a party was not at liberty to question the jurisdiction of the Court. This was held in Annammal v. Sambasiva Aiyar AIR 1919 mad 242. In such cases the facts which give the. Court jurisdiction were facts to be established by evidence and it was open to a Court to come to a conclusion on the evidence. The conclusion could be in such cases contested only by way of appeal and not by a separate suit. This principle has been accepted and adopted in Section 21 of the Civil P.C.
13. In the case before me however the facts are all admitted. The holding had a yearly rental of Rs. 18. The valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction is fixed by law and it is not open to any party to make any other allegation as to the valuation. Whatever might be the market value of the holding, the valuation for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction was one and the same, viz., Rs. 18. This case therefore must be differentiated from a case like the case of Annammal v. Sambasiva Aiyar AIR 1919 Mad 242. In the case of Ledgard v. Bull (1887) 9 All 191,. their Lordships of the Privy Council delivered themselves as follows:
When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him.
14. Their Lordships, however go on to make further remarks and on these remarks Dr. Agarwala relies. Their Lordships say:
But there are numerous authorities which establish that when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit.
15. It will be noticed that in this dictum their Lordships talk of a Judge who is competent to try. Where a Judge is not competent to try a suit or hear an appeal it is not open to the parties to give the Judge a jurisdiction by apparently submitting to it. In the case before me the valuation is fixed by law and it was not open to either party to say that he would value the appeal at something other than what the law says. The Judge therefore (District Judge) was not competent to hear the appeal at all. No second appeal lay to this Court. The result is that the judgments of this Court and the Court of the District Judge must be regarded as passed without jurisdiction.
16. It follows that the only judgment which is binding on the parties in law is the judgment of the Assistant Collector given on 31st August 1914 dismissing the suit of Ratan Lal against the predecessor, in-title of the defendants. In this view the respondents' suit should have been dismissed by the learned District Judge as it was dismissed by the learned Munsif. I allow the appeal, Bet aside the decree appealed from and restore the decree of the Court of first instance. The appellants will have their costs in this Court and in the Court of first appeal.
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