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H.D Chatterjee v. L.B Tribedi Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for fixing the standard rent of certain premises occupied by the Opposite Party as tenant. The Rent Controller examined the question of rent, expressed the view that the rent paid by the tenant was fair and in one place stated that the present rent may be the standard rent under section 2(f)(ii), but he did not formally fix the standard rent and dismissed the application.
The Petitioner then applied to the President of the Tribunal under section 18 of the Calcutta Rent Act seeking revision of the Rent Controller's order. The President held that, because the Rent Controller had not fixed the standard rent, his order could not be regarded as a decision fixing the standard rent and that section 18 did not confer jurisdiction upon the President to revise such an order. The Petitioner obtained a Rule in the High Court calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why the application under section 18 should not be heard by the President of the Improvement Tribunal or, alternatively, why the Rent Controller's order should not be set aside.
The Opposite Party raised a preliminary objection that the Rent Controller was not a Court of Civil Jurisdiction and that, even if he were, the High Court had no power to revise his orders. The High Court considered statutory rules and precedents and ultimately set aside the Rent Controller's order, directing him to fix the standard rent according to law. Costs of two gold mohurs were awarded, to abide the result, and the Rule was made absolute.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the absence of a decision by the Rent Controller fixing the standard rent, the President of the Tribunal has jurisdiction under section 18 of the Calcutta Rent Act to revise the Rent Controller's order.
- Whether the Rent Controller is a Court of Civil Jurisdiction such that the High Court may exercise powers of superintendence or revision over its orders (in particular under section 107 of the Government of India Act, previously section 15 of the Charter Act).
- Whether the High Court should set aside the Rent Controller's order and direct the Rent Controller to fix the standard rent in the present case.
Arguments of the Parties
Opposite Party's Arguments
- The Rent Controller is not a Court of Civil Jurisdiction and therefore the High Court lacks power to revise his orders.
- It was contended that the Petitioner had applied for fixing the standard rent and not for certifying the standard rent (the opinion records this contention by the Opposite Party).
Rent Controller's Position (as recorded)
- The Rent Controller stated that the application did not lie because it was made before the expiry of the lease (i.e., an objection based on prematurity of the application).
Petitioner (actions recorded)
- The Petitioner applied to the Rent Controller to fix the standard rent and, after the Controller's dismissal, applied under section 18 to the President of the Tribunal and subsequently obtained the Rule before the High Court when the President declined jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bata Krishna Pramanik… v. A.K. Roy… Opposite Party (Civil Revision Case No. 322 of 1921) | Used to support the view that the Rent Controller is a Court of Civil Jurisdiction and that the High Court has revised orders under the Rent Act. | Cited to corroborate the conclusion that the Rent Controller qualifies as a civil court for purposes of the High Court's supervisory/revisional jurisdiction. |
| Govind Coomar Chowdhuri v. Kristo Coomar Choudhuri | Full Bench holding that the High Court has power of revision over an order of the Deputy Collector under Act X of 1859. | Relied upon as an early authority that the High Court can revise orders of officials/courts exercising civil jurisdiction. |
| Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherjee | Judicial Committee decision that the High Court has power to interfere with orders of the Collector under Act X of 1859. | Used to support the proposition that the High Court's supervisory powers extend to courts or tribunals exercising civil jurisdiction. |
| Chaitan Patjosi Mohapatra, Judgment-Debtor, Applicant; v. Kunja Behary Patnaik, Execution-Purchaser | Referenced as an authority in the line of cases considering the High Court's power to revise orders of Collector's Courts (as noted in the opinion). | Cited as an additional supporting authority for the view that certain judicial acts of collectors/officials are subject to High Court revision. |
| Administrator-General of Bengal v. Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Pergunnahs | Held that the order of the Collector when acting judicially is subject to revision by the High Court under the Land Acquisition Act. | Invoked to show that decisions of officials acting judicially (here, the Collector) have been treated as revisable by the High Court under statutory supervisory powers. |
| Krishna Das Roy v. Land Acquisition Collector of Patna | Another authority holding that the Collector's orders (when acting judicially) are subject to High Court revision. | Used to reinforce the proposition, drawn from the Land Acquisition jurisprudence, that the High Court can revise judicial acts of executive/administrative tribunals. |
| Kali Dasi v. Kanai Lal De (Civil Revision Case No. 401 of 1921) | Noted instance where the High Court, Appellate Side, revised an order of the Rent Controller. | Directly cited as precedent for the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction over Rent Controller orders under the Calcutta Rent Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in several analytical steps, applying statutory text, procedural rules and precedent:
- Examination of procedural rules: The court relied on r. 24 of the Rules framed under section 23 of the Calcutta Rent Act, which states that in proceedings under the Act the Controller and the President of the Tribunal shall have all the powers possessed by a Civil Court for trial of suits; and r. 4, which requires that inquiries under the Act follow, as nearly as may be, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. From these provisions the court concluded that the Rent Controller is a Court of Civil Jurisdiction.
- Jurisdiction of the President under section 18: The court noted that section 18 contemplates an application to the President against a decision of the Controller fixing the standard rent. Because the Rent Controller had not in fact fixed the standard rent (though he discussed the matter and expressed an opinion that the present rent might be the standard rent), the President was correct in holding he had no jurisdiction under section 18 to revise the Controller's order.
- High Court's revisional power: The court considered statutory supervisory powers (section 15 of the Charter Act, now section 107 of the Government of India Act) and surveyed authorities concerning the High Court's power to revise orders of judicial acts by collectors and similar bodies (including decisions under Rent Act X of 1859 and the Land Acquisition Act). The court found these decisions support the view that the High Court may revise judicial orders of courts/officials exercising civil jurisdiction. The court further noted recent Calcutta Rent Act revision cases in which the High Court had revised Rent Controller and Tribunal orders.
- Application to present case: Given (a) the Rent Controller's failure to fix the standard rent despite considering the issue and (b) the High Court's revisional power under its general superintendence (section 107), the court concluded it had jurisdiction to revise the Rent Controller's order.
- On substantive remedial action: The court interpreted section 15(1) as requiring the Controller, on application by landlord or tenant, to grant a certificate certifying the standard rent once the standard rent is fixed. The court held that the Petitioner had asked the Rent Controller to fix and certify the standard rent under section 15. It rejected the Rent Controller's objection that the application was premature because made before expiry of the lease, stating nothing in the Act prevented making an application before expiry.
- Limitation on merits: The court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the rent question, leaving merit determinations to be handled by the Rent Controller upon further proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The High Court set aside the order of the Rent Controller and directed the Rent Controller to fix the standard rent according to law. The Rule was made absolute and costs of two gold mohurs were awarded, to abide the result.
Additional holdings and practical consequences:
- The court held that, for purposes of the High Court's supervisory/revisional jurisdiction, the Rent Controller is a Court of Civil Jurisdiction (relying on the Rules made under the Calcutta Rent Act and supporting precedents).
- The court held that the President of the Tribunal had no jurisdiction under section 18 to revise an order of the Rent Controller, unless the Rent Controller had actually fixed the standard rent; an application under section 18 is directed at decisions which fix the standard rent.
- The High Court concluded that it possesses the power of revision under its general powers of superintendence (section 107 of the Government of India Act) to intervene in respect of Rent Controller orders and accordingly exercised that power in this case to set aside the Controller's order and remand/directed the Controller to fix the standard rent.
- The court did not decide the substantive merits of what the standard rent should be; it directed the Rent Controller to address that question in accordance with law and requested that the case be taken up as early as possible.
No statement was made in the opinion that it was laying down a new principle of law; rather it applied established statutory provisions and precedents to the facts before it to reach the remedial outcome described above.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
This was a Rule calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why the application (made by the Petitioner) under sec. 18 of the Rent Act for revision of the order of the Rent Controller should not be heard by the President of the Improvement Tribunal: or, in the alternative, why the order of the Rent Controller should not be set aside and such other order passed as to this Court may seem proper.
It appears that the Petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for fixing the standard rent of certain premises occupied by the Opposite Party as tenant. The Kent Controller discussed certain matters in his judgment and was of opinion that the rent paid by the tenant was fair, but he did not fix the standard rent and dismissed the application. The Petitioner then applied to the President of the Tribunal under sec. 18 of the Rent Act. The learned President held that the order of the Controller could not be regarded es a decision fixing the standard rent of the premises concerned, and that sec. 18 of the Act did not confer any Jurisdiction upon him to revise such an order. The Petitioner thereupon obtained this Rule.
As there was no decision by the Rent Controller fixing the standard rent the learned President was right in holding that he had no jurisdiction under sec. 18 of the Rent Act to revise the order.
The next question is whether the order of the Rent Controller should be set aside by us and he should be directed to fix the standard rent.
A preliminary objection has been taken by the Opposite Party to the hearing of this Rule on the ground that the Rent Controller is not a Court of Civil Jurisdiction, and that even if he is, the High Court has no power of revising his orders.
Now, r. 24 of the Rules framed by the Local Government under sec. 23 of the Calcutta Rent Act, lays down that in all proceedings before them under the Act, the Controller and the President of the Tribunal shall have all the powers possessed by a Civil Court for the trial of suits. See also r. 4 which says that in making inquiries under the Act, the Controller or President of the Tribunal shall follow, as nearly as may be, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the regular trial of suite, the substance only of the evidence being recorded as in appealable cases.
It is clear, therefore, that the Rent Controller is a Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The same view has been taken in Civil Revision Case No. 322 of 1921 [Bata Krishna Pramanik… v. A.K Roy…Opposite Party. (1)].
Then the question is whether the High Court has the power of revising the order of the Rent Controller under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act.
There is no doubt that under sec. 15 of the Charter Act (now sec. 107 of the Government of India Act), the High Court has powers of superintendence over all Courts subject to its Appellate Jurisdiction.
The question whether the High Court has the power of revising the orders of Courts (other than Civil Courts) exercising civil jurisdiction, under its general powers of Superintendence under sec. 15 of the Charter has been considered in several cases in connection with orders of the Collector's Court under Rent Act X of 1859, and under the Land Acquisition Act. One of the earliest cases on the point is Govind Coomar Chowdhuri v. Kristo Coomar Choudhuri (2), where it was held by the Full Bench that the High Court has the power of revising an order of the Deputy Collector under Act X of 1859. In the case of Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherjee (3), it was held by the Judicial Committee that the High Court has power to interfere with the orders of the Collector under Act X of 1859. See also the case of Chaitan Patjosi Mohapatra,…Judgment-Debtor, Applicant; v. Kunja Behary Patnaik…Execution-Purchaser. (4). Then, again, in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, it has been held that the order of the Collector when acting judicially is subject to revision by the High Court. See The Administrator-General of Bengal v. Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Pergunnahs (5) and Krishna Das Roy v. Land Acquisition Collector of Patna (6).
Under the Calcutta Rent Act in the recent Civil Revision Case No. 401 of 1921 [Kali Dasi v. Kanai Lal De (7)], the High Court, Appellate Side, revised in order of the Rent Controller and in Civil Revision Case No. 322 of 1921 [Bata Krishna Pramanik… v. A.K Roy…Opposite Party. ]. It revised an order of the President of the Tribunal.
It is to be observed that under sec. 18 of the Rent Act an application against the decision of the Controller fixing the standard rent is to be made to the President of the Tribunal appointed under sec. 72 of the Calcutta Improvement Act in respect of premises in Calcutta, and such an application in respect of premises outside Calcutta is to be made to the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in the District. Such principal Civil Court is certainly within the Appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court. As stated above, the President of the Tribunal is also within the Appellate (Revisional) Jurisdiction of this Court.
We are accordingly of opinion that this Court has the power of revision under its general powers of superintendence over the Rent Controller's Court under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act.
The next question is whether in the present case the order of the Rent Controller should be revised.
Now, sec. 15, sub-sec. (1) lays down that the Controller shall, on application made to him by any landlord or tenant, grant a certificate certifying the standard rent of any premises leased or rented by such landlord or tenant, as the case may be.
The Rent Controller has in the present case gone into the question of rent, and has expressed his opinion that the existing rent is fair, and even in one place of his judgment he has stated that the present rent may be the standard rent of the premises under sec. 2(f)(ii) but he has not fixed the standard rent. If he had fixed the standard rent, the Petitioner might have asked the President of the Tribunal to revise the order under sec. 18 of the Act.
It is contended on behalf of the Opposite Party that the Petitioner applied for fixing the standard rent and not for certifying the standard rent. But the standard rent cannot be certified unless it is first fixed.
The Rent Controller says that the application does not lie because it was made before the expiry of the lease. We do not see, however, anything to prevent an application being made before the expiry of the lease for fixing the standard rent.
We are of opinion that the Rent Controller was asked to fix the standard rent and certify it under the provisions of sec. 15 of the Act.
We do not express any opinion on any question as to the merits of the case which must be dealt with by the Rent Controller.
We accordingly set aside the order of the Rent Controller and direct him to fix the standard rent according to law. Costs two gold mohurs, to abide the result.
We trust the case will be taken up by the Rent Controller as early as possible.
N.G
Rule made absolute.
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