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Dhananjoy Manjhi v. Upendra Nath Deb Sarbadhikary
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (appellant) is a landlord whose estate contains two plots occupied by defendant No. 1 as a tenure-holder. A Record of Rights published in 1910 entered the land as liable to assessment with rent (jamajogya). The plaintiff brought suit for assessment of rent; defendant No. 1 defended on the basis that the land is held rent-free.
The plaintiff alleged he was not the sole landlord: half the mauza belonged to estate No. 1818 (of which he claims sole proprietorship) and the other half was revenue-free; he asserted ownership of a ten-annas share of the revenue-free moiety and joined as party defendants the proprietors of the remaining six-annas share.
At trial the Munsif framed five issues; the second, third and fourth were: (2) whether the plaintiff alone could maintain the suit; (3) whether the suit was barred by limitation; and (4) whether the land was liable to assessment and, if so, what the fair rent should be. The Munsif held that the plaintiff could maintain the suit (applying "principles of justice and equity"), held the suit within time (treating limitation as running from the Record of Rights), and found defendant No. 1 had no good title to hold the land rent-free and assessed fair rent at about Rs. 18. The Munsif decreed in the plaintiff's favour.
Defendant No. 1 appealed to the District Judge, who dismissed the suit. The District Judge reasoned that either (a) there was an agreed rent, in which case the plaintiff must sue for that rent and cannot seek assessment, or (b) there was no agreed rent and the right to have rent assessed accrued more than twelve years earlier, rendering the suit barred by Article 130 of the Limitation Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Can the plaintiff alone maintain the suit for assessment of rent, notwithstanding that co-sharers were not joined?
- Is the suit barred by limitation (specifically Article 130 of the Limitation Act) given the period of occupation and lack of payment?
- Is the plaint land liable to be assessed with rent, and if so, what is the fair rent?
- Is the suit maintainable in view of Section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (i.e., does non-joinder of co-sharers affect maintainability for matters a landlord is "required or authorised to do" under the Act)?
- Is a suit to assess rent maintainable under the general law (ordinary civil jurisdiction) irrespective of the procedural provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff / Appellant
- The plaintiff sought assessment of rent on the basis of the Record of Rights entry (1910) which recorded the land as liable to be assessed with rent.
- The plaintiff claimed proprietary interests: sole proprietorship of estate No. 1818 and a ten-annas share of the revenue-free moiety, and joined other proprietors as parties.
- Implicit in the trial outcome: the plaintiff relied on the record and on evidence to establish that the defendant held as tenant subject to liability to pay rent.
Defendant No. 1
- Asserted that the land was held rent-free, including a specific plea that the land formed part of a rent-free grant in favour of the idol "Krishna Rai Jiu." The Munsif rejected this plea at trial; the District Judge did not consider it.
- Raised a limitation defence (invoking Article 130 of the Limitation Act) on the ground that, if there was no agreed rent, the right to assessment had accrued more than twelve years before the suit.
- Contended the suit was not maintainable because Section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act required joinder of co-sharers for matters which a landlord is "required or authorised to do" under the Act.
- Had earlier instituted (and subsequently withdrawn) proceedings before the Settlement Officer under Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to dispute the Record of Rights entry.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Prosonna Kumar Mukherjee v. Srikant Raut (16 Ind. Cas. 865 : 40 C. 173 : 16 C.L.J. 202 : 17 C.W.N. 137) | Principle that the right to have rent assessed continues so long as the landlord-tenant relationship exists; non-payment for more than twelve years is not by itself sufficient to bar assessment under Article 130. | Relied on to hold that Article 130 cannot be applied so long as the Record of Rights entry (prima facie) stands unrebutted; non-payment alone does not support dismissal. |
| Protap Chunder Chowdhry v. Shukhee Soonduree Dassee (2 C.L.R. 569) | Underlying principle concerning prima facie mal land and consequences until rebutted. | Cited as establishing a principle which, as explained in Bir Chunder Manikya, supports the presumption arising from the Record of Rights entry. |
| Bir Chunder Manikya v. Raj Mohun Goswami (16 C. 449 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 296) | Explanation of principle from Protap Chunder Chowdhry regarding presumption and consequences of mal land entries. | Used to reinforce the proposition that an entry in the Record of Rights is prima facie correct until rebutted. |
| Moheeb Ali v. Ameer Rai (17 C. 538 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 898) | Authority for the application of Section 188 to applications under the Bengal Tenancy Act as well as to suits to enhance rent under other sections. | Quoted for the proposition that Section 188 applies to applications under Section 158 (and to suits under Sections 7 or 30), supporting the view that non-joinder may affect certain claims under the Act. |
| Jatindra Nath v. Prasanna Kumar (8 Ind. Cas. 842 : 38 I.A. 1 : 38 C. 270 : 15 C.W.N. 74 ...) | Authority addressing application of Section 188 in the context of rent enhancement proceedings. | Referenced with other authorities to show that Section 188 governs procedural joinder requirements for landlord-initiated claims under the Bengal Tenancy Act. |
| Khondakar Abdul Hamid v. Mokini Kant Saha Chaudhuri (4 C.W.N. 508) | Held that a suit to assess rent is maintainable under the general law; relied on by the District Judge. | Noted as the case on which the District Judge relied to hold that a suit for assessment may be maintainable independently of the Bengal Tenancy Act; the present court examined this reliance in context with other authorities. |
| Barhamdat Missir v. Krishna Sahay (20 Ind. Cas. 910 : 18 C.W.N. 466) | Adverted to the question whether a suit for assessment lies under the general law; the question was mentioned but not decided in that case. | Referred to as an earlier treatment of the maintainability question; noted that the point was not decided there. |
| Assanullah Bahadur v. Mohini Mohan Das (26 C. 739) | Held that, in a suit where the plaintiff asked for assessment of rent, there was no reason why he should not be entitled to such relief under the ordinary law. | Used to support the proposition that a right to seek assessment of rent can be asserted under the ordinary civil law. |
| Abdul Hakim Shaha v. Rajendra Narain Roy (1 Ind. Cas. 312 : 13 C.W.N. 635) | Case in which aspects of Khondakar's decision were doubted but Khondakar was also followed in subsequent discussion. | Noted in the survey of authorities concerning whether a suit for assessment lies under the ordinary law; cited to show judicial inconsistency in earlier decisions. |
| Maharaj Kumar Krishna Das v. Girja Nath Ray Chowdhury (3 Ind. Cas. 472 : 10 C.L.J. 458) | Discusses whether land accreted to a holding could be treated as a separate tenancy. | Referred to in the context of earlier doubts about certain aspects of cases considering assessment rights; used as part of the comparative authority discussion. |
| Sati Prosad Garga v. Radha Nath Maity (18 Ind. Cas. 197 : 16 C.L.J. 427) | Also concerned with accreted land and tenancy questions. | Referenced alongside Maharaj Kumar Krishna Das in the survey of authorities regarding the scope of assessment claims. |
| Harihar Pande v. Karamat Hossein (4 Ind. Cas. 175 : 9 C.L.J. 493) | Where the claim was for assessment of rent and recovery for a period; the right to sue passed unquestioned. | Quoted as authority that claims for assessment and recovery were recognized and the right to sue was accepted. |
| Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Hossein (12 B.L.R. 210 : 20 W.R. 44) | Support for the proposition that both zemindar and tenure-holder are entitled to rent for mal land until right is lost. | Used to illustrate the general law and land revenue system principle that rights to rent persist for mal land unless and until lawfully lost. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by evaluating the legal and factual foundations underlying the dismissal by the District Judge and the decree of the Munsif. Key steps in the analysis were:
- The Munsif's error: the court accepted that the Munsif was wrong to treat the Record of Rights (ROR) entry as the starting point for limitation because an ROR entry "confers no title" and thus cannot, by itself, be the accrual date for limitation.
- The District Judge's error: the court held that the District Judge wrongly dismissed the suit in limine by applying Article 130 without first examining evidence. The ROR entry is presumed correct until rebutted by legal evidence; therefore until the entry is rebutted the suit is one for assessment of land "presumably liable to be assessed" rather than a suit for resumption or assessment of rent-free land. Consequently Article 130 did not automatically apply.
- The court identified factual alternatives that must be investigated on evidence: the defendant may show a valid rent-free title, a rent-free grant which cannot now be questioned, or title by adverse possession; alternatively the plaintiff may prove the defendant always held as tenant liable for rent. These alternatives depend on examination of evidence which the District Judge did not perform.
- The court observed that the defendant had also pursued (and withdrawn) proceedings before the Settlement Officer under Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to dispute the ROR entry; the District Judge made no reference to that fact, which was a relevant procedural circumstance.
- On maintainability under Section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the court accepted that where a landlord is "required or authorised to do" something under the Act, Section 188 makes non-joinder of co-sharers fatal so far as such matters are concerned. The Munsif's reliance on general equity principles could not override a specific statutory rule.
- The court then considered whether a suit to assess rent is maintainable under the general law irrespective of the Bengal Tenancy Act. After surveying previous decisions, regulations and statutory provisions (including Section 37 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, Section 11 of the Patni Taluk Regulation, Clause (2) of Section 105, and Section 111B of the Bengal Tenancy Act), the court concluded that the right to seek assessment under the general law exists and is consistent with the land revenue system and authorities cited.
- As a consequence, the court concluded there was no valid preliminary ground for dismissal: the District Judge should not have dismissed the appeal without considering the evidence and applying the correct legal framework.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court (District Judge) are set aside and the case is remitted to that Court for re-hearing in light of the observations in this opinion. Costs are to abide the result.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the District Judge's dismissal is vacated and the appeal must be re-heard; the trial findings and factual disputes (including whether the defendant holds rent-free or as tenant) must be examined on the evidence.
- The court affirmed that a suit for assessment may be maintainable under the general law, and that Article 130 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied in limine where a Record of Rights entry showing liability to assessment stands unrebutted; however, the opinion does not state that it is establishing a novel precedent beyond the reasoning applied to the present facts.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
1. The plaintiff in the suit and the appellant before us is a landlord and the defendant No. 1 is a tenure-holder in respect of two plots of land within the ambit of the plaintiff's estate. In a Record of Rights published in the year 1910, the land was entered as liable to be assessed with rent (jamajogya). The suit was brought for the purpose of having rent assessed and the defence of the defendant No. 1 is that the land is held rent-free.
2. The plaintiff, however, is not the sole land lord. His own case is that the land is situated in a Mauza of which an undivided half appertains to estate No. 1818 and the other half is revenue-free. He claims to be the sole proprietor of estate No. 1818 and to be the owner of a ten-annas share of the moiety of the village held free of revenue. He has made party defendants to the suit the proprietors of the remaining six-annas share of the revenue-free title.
3. In the trial Court the Munsif framed five issues, of which the second, third and fourth are as follows:
(2) Can the plaintiff alone maintain the suit? Can the suit as framed proceed?
(3) Is the suit barred by limitation?
(4) Is the plaint land liable to be assessed with rent? If so, what would be the fair rent payable for the land to the plaintiff?
4. On the second issue the learned Munsif held "on principles of justice and equity" that the plaintiffs do sharers being party defendants he was entitled to maintain the suit.
5. On the question of limitation the Munsif seems to have thought that limitation would run from the date of the Record of Rights and as the suit had been brought within twelve years from that date, he held that it was in time.
6. On the fourth issue the Munsif found, firstly, that the defendant No. 1 had no good title to hold the land rent-free and secondly, that the fair rent for the quantity of land held under the plaintiff, whether as a revenue paying or a revenue-free proprietor, was Rs. 18 odd.
7. The Munsif made a decree in the plaintiff's favour in accordance with these findings.
8. The defendant No. 1 thereupon appealed to the District Judge, who has dismissed the suit.
9. The view of the learned District Judge is that the plaintiff is on the horns of a dilemma. Either there is an agreed rent for the land, in which case the plaintiff can sue for such rent and cannot sue for assessment; or there is no agreed rent, in which case regard being had to the period during which the defendant No. 1 has admittedly been in occupation, the right to have rent assessed accrued more than twelve years before the suit was instituted and the suit is barred by limitation under Article 130 of the Limitation Act.
10. Now, the Munsif was no doubt wrong in taking the entry in the Record of Rights as the starting point for limitation. Such an entry confers no title. On the other hand the District Judge has lost sight of the fact that the entry is presumably correct until the contrary is established by legal evidence. According to the entry the plaintiff and his co-sharers are entitled to some rent for the land. If the plaintiff is able to prove an existing rent that may be the rent proper to be fixed. But the defendant denies that there is an existing rent and if no existing rent is established, the plaintiff and his co-sharers are still, as I have said, according to the entry entitled to some rent.
11. The District Judge, therefore, erred in law in dismissing the suit in limine, as he has done. It may be that the defendant No. 1 has given evidence sufficient to show either that he has a good rent-free title to the land or that the land is held under a rent-free grant which in its origin was invalid but which it is now too late to question, or that by adverse possession he has acquired a title to hold the land rent-free. On the other hand the plaintiff may have established that the defendant No. 1 has all along held the land as tenant subject to the liability to pay rent. But these various alternatives depend on the evidence adduced by the parties which the District Judge has not examined. As matters stand, he has erred in dismissing the suit without going into the evidence. Until the evidence afforded by the entry is found to have been rebutted, Article 130 can have no application because the suit is not a suit "for the resumption or assessment of rent-free land" within the meaning of the Article. It is a suit for the assessment of land presumably liable to be assessed. In that state of things the circumstance that rent has not in fact been paid for more than twelve years before suit is not per se sufficient to support a decree of dismissal [of Prosonna Kumar Mukherjee v. Srikant Raut 16 Ind. Cas. 865 : 40 C. 173 : 16 C.L.J. 202 : 17 C.W.N. 137. The right to have rent assessed must continue so long as the relationship continues of landlord and tenant of land liable to be assessed. The right can only be lost by one or other of the modes recognized by law. The land is prima facie mal land and until the presumption and the consequences flowing from it are rebutted, the principle applies which underlies the decision in Protap Chunder Chowdhry v. Shukhee Soonduree Dassee 2 C.L.R. 569, as explained in Bir Chunder Manikya v. Raj Mohun Goswami 16 C. 449 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 296.
12. In the trial Court the defendant No. 1's case was that the land was part and parcel of a rent-free grant in favour of the idol "Krishna Rai Jiu" but the learned Munsif found against this plea. The District Judge has not considered it. The Munsif mentions that the defendant No. 1 instituted a suit before the Settlement Officer under Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to dispute the correctness of the entry in the Record of Rights, but withdrew from the case me District Judge makes no reference to this.
13. The defendant No. 1 has a second line of defence, which is touched upon in the judgment of the Courts below and was the subject of argument before us. It is that the suit as framed is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The learned Munsif's reference in this connection to the general principles of equity is out of place because those principles, or the individual Judge's view of the effect of those principles, must give way to a specific rule of law, whether the rule be a rule established by the general law applicable to the topic or a rule enacted by the Legislature.
14. Now it is clear that the plaintiff's co-sharers not having joined as plaintiffs, the suit is not well framed so far as it relates to anything which the landlord is "required or authorised to do" under the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider whether an application for the assessment of rent can be made under Clause (d) of Section 158. Section 188 applies to an application under the terms of that section [Moheeb Ali v. Ameer Rai 17 C 538 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 898] just as it does to a suit to enhance rent under Section 7 or Section 30 [jatindra Nath v. Prasanna Kumar 8 Ind Cas. 842 : 38 I.A. 1 : 38 C. 270 : 15 C.W.N. 74 : 9 M.L.T. 1 : 13 C.L.J. 5l; 8 A.L.J. 1 : 13 Bom. L.R. 1 : 21 M.L.J. 94 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 119 (P.C.)].
15. The question is whether, as the District Judge has held, relying on Khondakar Abdul Hamid v. Mokini Kant Saha Chaudhuri 4 C.W.N. 508, a suit to assess rent is maintainable under the general law, irrespective of anything in the Bengal Tenancy Act. The question was adverted to but not decided in Barhamdat Missir v. Krishna Sahay 20 Ind. Cas. 910 : 18 C.W.N. 466. The case cited by the District Judge was decided in 1900 by Banerjee and Stevens, JJ. In the previous year Ghose and Banerjee. JJ., had held, in a suit in the course of which the plaintiff asked for assessment of rent that there was no reason why he should not be entitled to such relief [ Assanullah Bahadur v. Mohini Mohan Das 26 C. 739 at p. 745 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N. s.) 1072]. In Abdul Hakim Shaha v. Rajendra Narain Roy 1 Ind. Cas. 312 : 13 C.W.N. 635 and Khondakar's case 4 C.W.N. 508 was doubted but followed; there, however, the claim was for compensation for use and occupation and the doubt had reference, not to the question whether a suit for assessment would lie under the ordinary law, but to the question whether land accreted to a holding could be treated as a separate tenancy [Maharaj Kumar Krishna Das v. Girja Nath Ray Chowdhury 3 Ind. Cas. 472 : 10 C.L.J. 458 at p. 461 and Sati Prosad Garga v. Radha Nath Maity 18 Ind. Cas. 197 : 16 C.L.J. 427 at p. 429]. In Harihar Pande v. Karamat Hossein 4 Ind. Cas. 175 : 9 C.L.J. 493 the claim was for "assessment of rent and for recovery of such rent for a certain period" (page 494 Page of 9 C.L.J.--Ed.), and the right to sue passed unquestioned.
16. Such a right is consistent with, and arises out of, the general law and land revenue system of the country. The Zemindar is responsible to the Government under severe penalties for the punctual payment of his revenue. The tenure-holder is responsible to the landlord under similar penalties for the payment of his rent. On the other hand the Zemindar and the tenure-holder are alike entitled--until the right is lost to rent for every bigha of mal land [Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Hossein 12 B.L.R. 210 at p. 215 : 20 W.R. 44. The right to have rent assessed is recognized by the old Regulation relating to the resumption of revenue-free and rent-free grants. It is recognized and still frequently asserted under such provisions as those contained in Section 37 of the Bengal Land revenue Sales Act (No. XI of 1859) and in Section 11 of the Patni Taluk Regulation of 1819. It is recognized, again, in Clause (2) of Section 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and there is no ground for saying that after a Record of Rights has been prepared the only mode of obtaining assessment is by application under that section such an application has to be made within two months of the date of the certificate of final publication of the record. The effect of Section 111B is that subject to the provision of section 109, the parties are at liberty after three months from the same date to seek any remedies open to them in the ordinary Civil Courts. Clause (4) of Section 111B provides for the suspension of limitation during the period of three months. Clause (1)(a) expressly mentions a suit for the decision of the issue "whether the land is or is not liable to the payment of rent." In a suit by the landlord, if that issue is decided in his favour, he must have, as a necessary consequence or corollary, the right to have rent assessed.
17. Both in principle, therefore, and in view of the authorities, I agree with the District Judge that it was open to the plaintiff to bring such a suit as the present under the general law. That being so, no valid objection can be taken to the frame of the suit.
18. The result is that there being no preliminary ground to justify the dismissal of the suit, the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court should be set aside and the case remitted to that Court in order that the appeal thereto may be re-heard with reference to the observations I have made. Costs will abide the result.
Beachcroft, J.
19. I agree.
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