1. This is an appeal on behalf of the plaintiffs in a suit for declaration of title to land and for recovery of possession. The plaintiffs claim title by purchase, and state that the property was acquired by their father in the name of their mother. The defendants resist the claim on the ground that the matter in controversy is res judicata. The Courts below have given effect to this plea and have dismissed the suit. Upon the present appeal the question of res judicata has been elaborately argued on behalf of the appellants. To appreciate the points raised it is necessary to remember that in 1905 the mother of the plaintiffs instituted a suit against the present defendants or their predecessors for declaration of her title to the property and for recovery of possession. The defendants pleaded that the then plaintiff had no title enforceable as against them and that she was in reality the ostensible owner for the benefit for her husband. They further contended that the claim was barred by limitation. The Court went into evidence, found in favour of the defendants upon each of these points, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs contended that the decision in the previous suit upon the question of limitation does not operate as res judicata, first because they were not parties litigant to the previous suit; secondly, because the decision on the question of limitation was not necessary for the determination of that suit in view of the finding of the Court that the then plaintiff was an ostensible owner and had no title; thirdly, because the principle of mutuality is inapplicable to the circumstances of the present case; and fourthly, because the decision upon the question of limitation was erroneous in law. In so far as the first ground is concerned, it is, in our opinion, entirely unsustainable. In the case of Gopi Nath v. Bhugwat Pershad . [1881] 10 Cal. 697., it was pointed out by Mitter and Norris, JJ., that, so long as the benami system is recognized;in this country, the proper rule is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to presume that the benamidar has instituted the suit with the full authority of the beneficial owner, and, if he does so, any decision come to in his presence would be as much binding upon the real owner as if the suit had been brought by the original owner himself. This statement of the law is unquestionably sound. The conclusive effect of a judgment is upon the real party-interest and it makes no difference that there are nominal parties on the record or that the action is prosecuted or defended by a nominal party; it is immaterial that the suit has been brought by or against the nominal party who had been set up by the true owner to represent him. Consequently, where a suit is prosecuted by one person for the benefit of another who is the real party-in-interest, it is the latter who is bound by the judgment: Wright v. Doede Tatham . 1 A. & E. 3, Stone v. Farmers Bank of Kentucky . 174 U.S 409, Wiswall v. Sampson . 14 Howard 52. This view is not opposed to the decisions in the cases of Mohunt Das v. Nilkomal Dewan . [1900] 4 C.W.N 283. and Joy Chandra v. Srinath . [1905] 32 Cal. 357, where the plaintiff had, under a mistake to which the defendant did in no way contribute, instituted a suit against a wrong person. It was ruled that the mere fact that the person really interested in the subject-matter of the litigation had assisted the person so sued did not make the ultimate judgment operative against him. This decision was based on the ground that the error of the plaintiff had not been initiated by the real owner and that no duty was cast upon him to apprise the plaintiff that the suit had been brought against a wrong party. The decision of Jadu Nath v. Prem Moni Dasi . [1910] 6 I.C 414. is distinguishable on similar grounds.

2. In the case before us the principle invoked is obviously inapplicable. The mother of the plaintiffs had been set up by their father as the ostensible owner of this property. She instituted the suit as owner against the defendants but, as the District Judge has found, the suit was brought nominally by her, while her husband was the real plaintiff. There is no force in the contention based on the decision of Maharaja Kumar Bindeswari Prosad Singh v. Lakpat Nath Singh . [1910] 8 I.C 26., that the defendants cannot approbate and reprobate; they have not taken up inconsistent positions in the two suits; in the former case, they contended that the real plaintiff must sue in his own name and not in the name of his benamidar they now contend that as the former suit was essentially by the real owner, he is bound by the result thereof even though he did not sue in his own name. Under the circumstances stated, it is impossible to hold that the present plaintiffs can ignore the result of that litigation. If the contrary view is adopted, a person has only to place his property in the name of another to enable him to escape from the operation of the salutary rule of res judicata: see also Bama Sundery v. Anundololl . Bourke O.C 44, Jointee Chunder Sein v. Anundo Lall . [1870] 14 W.R O.C 1., Juggessur v. Prossono . 1 Ind. Jur. n.s 282., Bamasundri v. Ramnarayan . [1872] 8 B.L.R Ap. 65., Ram Nidhy Koondo v. Ajoodhya Ram . [1873] 20 W.R 123, which indicate how a real litigant though not party to a suit may be made responsible for the result. Reliance however has been placed upon the principle that misrepresentation which does not mislead cannot work an estoppel, as laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose . [1903] 30 Cal. 539. With reference to this principle, it has been contended that as the defendants did discover in the previous litigation that the then plaintiff was not the real owner they are not entitled to claim the benefit of the doctrine of estoppel. This argument is clearly not well-founded on reason.

3. No doubt the defendants did make that discovery, but nevertheless they were drawn into that litigation by the then plaintiff who was nominally the mother but really the father of the present plaintiffs. They fought out the cases successfully, not merely upon the question, whether the then plaintiff was the real owner but also upon the question whether the real owner, whoever he might be, had a subsisting title at the date of the institution of the suit. In our opinion, the plaintiffs, who had unsuccessfully fought the previous litigation on the merits in the name of their mother, should not now be permitted to turn round and contend that the previous decision is not binding on them because in that suit the defendants had discovered the mask assumed by the real owner. The first ground consequently.

4. In so far as the second ground is-concerned, it has been urged that the question of limitation need not have been decided by the Court in the previous suit; in other words, as soon as the Court found that the then plaintiff had no title, the suit should have been dismissed on the ground that as ruled in Baroda Sundary v. Dino Bandhu . [1898] 25 Cal. 874, the ostensible owner could not suit in ejectment, and in this view, no inquiry need have been made into the merits. In support of this proposition reliance has been placed upon a dictum of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Walihan v. Jogeshwar Narayan . [1908] 35 Cal. 189. It has also been argued-that as the then plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit a decision upon the merits could not be taken to be a decision upon a question substantially in issue between the parties and in support of this position reliance has been placed upon the cases of Shib Charan Lal v. Baghu Nath . [1895] 17 All. 174, Jiwa Ram v. Kalyan . [1911] 9 I.C 983., Ahmedbhoy Habiboy v. Sir Dinshaw M. Petit . [1909] 3 I.C 124., Irawa Laxmana v. Satyappa . [1910] 7 I.C 967, Brindabun v. Dummjoy . [1910] 5 Cal. 246 and Poorendra Nath v. Hemangini Dasi . [1909] 1 I.C 523.

5. But it has not been disputed by the learned vakil for the appellant that his contention is negatived by the decision of this Court in the case of Peary Mohun Mukerjee v. Ambica Churn Bandopadhya . [1897] 24 Cal. 900.. He has consequently, been constrained to invite the Court to examine the grounds upon which the decision last mentioned is based, with a view to a possible reference to a Full Bench. In Peary Mohun Mukerjee v. Ambica Churn Bandophdhya a Division Bench of this Court declined to accept the contention that if a decision is based upon two findings of fact either of which would justify in law the decree actually made that one of such findings of fact, which should, in the logical sequence of necessary issues, have been first found and the finding whereon would have rendered the other finding unnecessary to support the decree made is the finding which operates as res judicata. After a careful consideration of the arguments addressed to us, we are not prepared to dissent from the view taken in Peary Mohun Mukerjee v. Ambica Churn Bandopadhya . [1886] 11 A.C 541, which is indisputably in strict accordance with the language of the Code. But it has been urged that considerable hardships may result to litigants if this view is adopted and uniformly applied, and reliance has been placed particularly upon passages from the judgment of Ahmedbhoy Habiboy v. Sir Dinshmv M. Petit, where the applicability of the principle of res judicata is made to depend on the test, whether the decision in the previous litigation was or was not open to appeal.

6. But it is worthy of note that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Bholabhai v. Adesang . [1885] 9 Bom. 75. was repudiated by this Court in the case of Rai Charan Ghose v. Kumud Mohun Dutt . [1898] 25 Cal. 571, where it was ruled that the judgment in a previous suit may operate as res judicata notwithstanding the fact that no appeal was allowed by law against the decision. The position consequently is that the principle, upon which the decisions of the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts are based, has not been accepted in this Court in decisions which have remained unchallenged for many years. We are not prepared to hold that the view taken by this Court is erroneous. We find on the other hand that the view adopted by this Court is in accord with what has been accepted elsewhere as well founded on reason. To take one illustration: in the case of Four hundred-twenty Mining Company v. Bakim Mining Company . 3 Sauyer 634, it was ruled upon an elaborate examination of the principle applicable to cases of this description, that if the questions involved in a suit are tried and decided in favour of the defendant, no matter how numerous they may be, the estoppel of the judgment will apply to each point so settled in the same degree as if it were the sole issue in the case. Thus where a statute authorizes a defendant to set up in the same answer as many defences as, he has, if a judgment is entered in his favour, which contains no provision that it shall be without prejudice or any other limitation or restriction, the estoppel; raised by it will extend to every matter, or fact in issue actually found by the Court in favour of the defendant. To the same effect is the decision of Clark v. Knoz . 32 Colorado 342, in which it was ruled that where an appellate Court found distinctly on a given issue in favour of the defendant, the estoppel of the judgment cannot be escaped by contending that the determination of such question was unnecessary, since the defendant being authorized to interpose as many defences as he has, the Court might determine them all, although the decision upon any one might be sufficient to determine the whole cause. The second ground cannot thus be supported.

7. In so far as the third ground is concerned, it has been argued for the appellants that the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied to this case, as that would contravene the principle of mutuality. In support of this proposition reliance has been placed upon a passage from the judgment of Lord Herschell in Concha v. Concha. The contention in substance is that if the decision upon the question of limitation in the previous litigation had been adverse to the defendants, inasmuch as they would not have been bound by that finding in a subsequent suit, the contrary finding in their favour should not be treated as res judicata against the plain-tiffs. This proposition does not find support from the judgment of Lord Herschell, who referred to decisions upon points not necessary for the determination of the previous litigation. Here it was open to the Court to base its judgment in favour of the defendants upon more than one ground. Indeed, it was incumbent upon the defendants to put forward all the defences available to them. Both the parties asked to Court to investigate the facts essential for the determination of those defences. They went to trial, evidence was given, and the Court, at their invitation, decided each of the points in issue, although the decision in favour of the defendants upon either point would have been sufficient to support the decree. In our opinion it is not open to the plaintiffs to turn round now and contend that, although the question of limitation was decided against them in the previous litigation, the decision does not bind them. The principle of mutuality cannot be successfully invoked under these circumstances, and the third ground must be overruled.

8. In so far as the fourth ground is concerned, it has been urged that the decision upon the question of limitation in the previous litigation was erroneous in law and does not operate as res judicata. In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Aghore Nath Mukeriee v. Kamini Debi . [1910] 6 I.C 554., Puma Chandra Sarbajna v. Rasik Chandra Chakravarty . [1911] 9 I.C 568. and Baij Nath Goenka v. Padmanand Singh . [1912] 14 I.C 124. None of these decisions is plainly of any assistance to the appellants. The determination upon the question of limitation was a decision upon a mixed question of fact and law, and it is unquestionable, as fully explained in Aghore Nath Mukerjee v. Kamini Debi, that a decision upon such a matter does operate as res judicata. It may be further remarked that, as pointed out in the case of Rai Churn Ghose v. Kumud Mohon Dutta . [1897] 1 C.W.N 687., a decision upon a pure question of law, even though erroneous, may under certain circumstances operate as res judicata. It is however needless to enter into a further examination of this point, because, as we have already stated, the decision here was, not upon a pure question of law, but upon a mixed question of fact and law. The fourth ground, consequently, fails. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.

V.B/R.K

9. Appeal dismissed.