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V.E.A. Annamalai Chettiar v. Vattiammai Achi And Another

Privy Council
Jul 30, 1945
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 3 November 1934 a Subordinate Judge at Devakottai passed a decree in Original Suit No. 118 of 1934 in favour of the present appellant for Rs.13,716-12-0 (with interest and costs) on a promissory note. The decree was made against the property of the joint family and against assets of the maker in the hands of the defendant, and was not executable against the private property of the two widow defendants.

On 14 December 1934 the judgment-creditor presented Execution Petition (E.P.) No. 418 of 1934 under Rule 11 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, seeking attachment of sums alleged to be due to a defendant. On 21 January 1935 the trial Judge made an order described as "rule absolute" in respect of that petition. The judgment-creditor then applied on 11 February 1935 (No. 123 of 1935 within E.P. No. 418) for appointment as receiver.

On 19 February 1935 defendant 2 applied (No. 175 of 1935 within E.P. No. 418) to set aside the attachment on grounds including lack of service and that the attached monies were her personal property. On 10 July 1935 the Subordinate Judge directed that the petitioner for setting aside should prefer a claim petition under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, and dismissed the receiver application (No. 123 of 1935) without prejudice to a later application after defendant 2's claim was disposed of.

Defendant 2 filed a claim under Section 47 as No. 527 of 1935 on 25 July 1935; because of that pendency, application No. 175 of 1935 for raising the attachment was dismissed on 2 August 1935. On 22 October 1936 the Subordinate Judge allowed defendant 2's application and raised the attachment (order recorded in E.A. No. 527 of 1935 in E.P. No. 418 of 1934 and O.S. No. 118 of 1934). The judgment-creditor appealed to the High Court (memorial filed 3 December 1936). The High Court dismissed that appeal on 27 September 1938.

On 25 November 1939 the judgment-creditor filed Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940 in O.S. No. 118 of 1934 asking that the 3 November 1934 decree be executed by attachment of certain movable property in the hands of the defendants. The key controversy was whether this petition was barred by the Limitation Act.

The present opinion is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 19 August 1942 affirming an order of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai dated 10 July 1940. The ultimate determination by Their Lordships was to allow the appeal, hold Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940 to be within time, and remit the matter to the High Court of Madras with directions to deal with it according to law; respondents were ordered to pay costs to date.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940 (filed 25 November 1939) for execution of the decree dated 3 November 1934 was barred by the Limitation Act, which required construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the proceedings (and their final disposal) in E.P. No. 418 of 1934 and the subsequent appeal brought the case within clause (5) of Article 182 (i.e., whether time runs from the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution).
  3. Whether the High Court of Madras was the "proper Court" within Article 182(5) so that time should run from the date of the High Court's final order disposing of the execution application.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (judgment-creditor) contended that his position fell within Article 182(5) because Execution Petition No. 418 of 1934 was an application made according to law for execution and it was finally disposed of by the High Court's order dated 27 September 1938; therefore time for presenting Execution Petition No. 72 should run from that final order and the petition filed on 25 November 1939 was within three years.
  • The appellant also asserted that the appeal filed on 3 December 1936 to the High Court to set aside the raising of the attachment was an application according to law to take a step in aid of execution of the decree.
  • The appellant contested the High Court's view (as recorded in the judgment under appeal) that no execution petition or application remained outstanding after 10 July 1935.

Respondent / Defendant Arguments

  • Defendant 2's contentions in the trial court (as recorded) were that she had not been served with the application for attachment and that the monies attached were her personal property and therefore not subject to the decree.
  • The view adopted by the High Court under appeal was that from 10 July 1935 there was no execution petition or application outstanding and that Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940, having been presented more than three years after that date, was out of time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
('22) 9 AIR 1922 Mad 79 : 45 Mad 466 : 70 IC 324,
Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar
Held that there could not be a "step in aid of execution" if there was not an application for execution then pending. The Court noted this decision as representing one view in the Indian authorities but did not rely on it to decide the present case; the Court found it unnecessary to express an opinion on the general question because in the present case an application for execution was at all material times pending.
('26) 13 AIR 1926 Mad 1178 : 50 Mad 49 : 98 IC 156,
Krishna Pattar v. Seetharama Pattar
Held that a "step in aid of execution" must be one in furtherance of execution and not merely one seeking to remove an obstruction to possible future execution. The Court recorded this contrary authority as showing that there is difference of opinion on what constitutes a step in aid of execution; again the Court did not decide the abstract question because it found an execution application to have been pending and treated the application to set aside the attachment as a step in aid of execution in the circumstances of the case.
('23) 10 AIR 1923 Bom 431 : 47 Bom 783 : 73 IC 1030,
Govinddas Rajaramdas v. Ganpatdas Narotamdas
The Appeal Bench of the Bombay High Court held that an appeal to the High Court against an order in execution was not an application according to law to the "proper Court" (within the meaning of Article 182). The Court under appeal (Privy Council) considered this ruling and rejected its reasoning as fallacious: relying on Section 107, Civil Procedure Code, the Privy Council held that an appellate Court has, as nearly as may be, the same powers and duties and can be the proper Court for execution under Article 182(5); thus the Privy Council did not follow the Govinddas decision and treated the High Court as the proper Court in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing Article 182 of the Limitation Act. Article 182 prescribes a three-year period for "the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court not provided for by Art. 183 or by S. 48, Civil PC, 1908" and provides several possible dates from which the three-year period may run (paragraphs 1–5). The Court observed that paragraph 1 (time from "the date of the decree or order") would, on its face, render the application barred unless one of the later paragraphs applied. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 were found inapplicable on the facts (no appeal affecting the decree, no review, paragraph 4 irrelevant).

The central analytical issue thus became whether paragraph 5 applied. Paragraph 5 requires that there have been "an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order," and provides that time runs from the date of the final order passed on such application.

The Court closely examined the chronology of proceedings. It found that Execution Petition No. 418 of 1934 was presented on 14 December 1934 and that a sequence of interlocutory applications followed (including the order "rule absolute" on 21 January 1935, the receiver application of 11 February 1935, the defendant's application of 19 February 1935 to set aside attachment, directions on 10 July 1935 to prefer a Section 47 claim petition, and the eventual raising of the attachment by the Subordinate Judge on 22 October 1936). The judgment-creditor then appealed the order raising the attachment to the High Court on 3 December 1936; the High Court dismissed that appeal on 27 September 1938.

The Court rejected the High Court of Madras's view (in the judgment under appeal) that no execution petition or application remained outstanding after 10 July 1935. The Privy Council observed that the records showed an application (and related proceedings) pending and that the High Court's final order of 27 September 1938 finally disposed of the relevant Execution Petition (E.P. No. 418 of 1934).

The Court then addressed whether the High Court of Madras was the "proper Court" under Article 182(5). It noted Explanation 2 to Article 182, which defines "proper Court" as the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order. The Court considered the decision in Govinddas (Bombay) which held that an appeal to the High Court against an order in execution was not an application to the proper Court. The Privy Council rejected that view as fallacious, reasoning that Section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code gives an appellate Court, as nearly as may be, the same powers and duties as Courts of original jurisdiction. Where the lower Court has dismissed an application for execution, the appellate Court is the proper and indeed the only Court that can then execute the decree; in practice a High Court may direct the lower Court to execute but could execute itself in a proper case.

Applying these legal points to the facts, the Court concluded that (a) E.P. No. 418 of 1934 was an application made according to law for execution and was finally disposed of by the High Court's order of 27 September 1938 (bringing the matter within the first branch of paragraph 5), and (b) the appeal to the High Court to set aside the order raising the attachment was an application according to law to take a step in aid of execution. As a result, time for Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940 ran from the final order of the High Court, and the petition filed on 25 November 1939 was within the three-year period.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940 is held to be within time under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, and the matter is remitted to the High Court of Madras with directions that Execution Petition No. 72 is within time and should be dealt with according to law.

Direct consequences mandated by the Court's order:

  • The High Court of Madras is to proceed with Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940 as being within the statutory limitation period.
  • The respondents were ordered to pay the costs to date of Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940, including the costs of this appeal.

Broader legal implications (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The Privy Council rejected the rigid proposition (as stated in the Govinddas/Bombay decision) that an appeal to a High Court against an order in execution can never be treated as an application to the "proper Court" under Article 182(5). Relying on Section 107, Civil Procedure Code, the Court held that an appellate Court may be the proper Court whose duty it is to execute the decree in appropriate circumstances.
  • The Court declined to lay down a general rule on what constitutes a "step in aid of execution" in the abstract, observing divergent decisions; instead it resolved the present case on its specific facts (existence of a pending application for execution and the application to set aside the attachment being, in the circumstances, a step in aid of execution).

Note: The summary above is confined to matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or reasoning beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

Sir John Beaumont.-

This is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated 19th August 1942, affirming an order of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, dated 10th July 1940. The appeal raises the question whether an application for execution, No. 72 of 1940, preferred on 25th November 1939, for execution of a decree dated 3rd November 1934, is barred by the Limitation Act, and that depends on the construction of Art. 182 of the Act. That article is in the following terms :

Description of Application. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. 182. For the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court not provided for by Art. 183 or by S. 48, Civil PC, 1908. Three years. 1. The date of the decree or order, or

2. (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or

3. (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review,

4.......

5. (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order, or......

The application is clearly barred by para,1 of Art. 182 unless it can be brought within one of the later paragraphs. Paragraph 2 has no application since there was no appeal against, or affecting the validity of, the decree; nor does para.3 apply since there was no application for review of judgment. Paragraph 4 is irrelevant so far as this case is concerned.

The question therefore is whether the case falls within para.5. To bring the case within that paragraph it must be shown that there was an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court, either for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree, and if there was such an application time runs from the date of the final order passed thereon. It is necessary, therefore, to look somewhat closely at the facts, which are not in dispute, in order to see whether the requisite application was made and finally disposed of within three years from 25th November 1939.

On 3rd November 1934 a decree was passed on a promissory note in Original Suit No.118 of 1934 by the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, decreeing in favour of the present appellant payment of a sum of Rs.13,716-12-0, with interest and costs by the defendants who were two widows. It was ordered that the decree should be against the property of the joint family of which the husbands of the two widows had been members, and against the assets of a maker of the promissory note in the hands of the defendant. So the decree was not executable against the private property of the widows. For the purposes of this appeal it may be taken that the respondents represent the judgment-debtors under that decree, the appellant being the judgment-creditor.

On 14th December 1934, the judgment-creditor presented a petition which was numbered E. P. No. 418 of 1934, under R.11 of O.21, Civil P. C., asking that the decree should be executed by the attachment of two sums of money in the hands of garnishees, alleged to be owing to defendant J.

On 21st January 1935, the learned Judge made an order on this petition "rule absolute," which presumably meant that there was an order absolute for attachment of the monies in the hands of the garnishees.

On 11th February 1935, the judgment-creditor made an application, No. 123 of 1935 in E. P. No. 418 of 1934, asking that he might be appointed receiver to realise the amounts in the hands of the garnishees.

On 19th February 1935, an application No. 175 of 1935 was made in E. P. no. 418 of 1934 by defendant 2 in the suit, asking that the order of attachment of the amounts in the hands of the garnishees might be set aside, her contentions being, in short, that she had not been served with the application for attachment and that the monies attached were her personal property and therefore not subject to the decree.

On 10th July 1935, the learned Subordinate Judge on this application directed that there was no need to set aside the order of attachment but that the petitioner should prefer a claim petition which might be enquired into under S.47, Civil PC, and the matter was adjourned to 25th July. On the same date, namely, 10th July 1935, the learned Judge dismissed the judgment-creditor's application, No. 123 of 1935, for his appointment as receiver, directing that he could make an application after defendant 2's claim was disposed of.

On 25th July 1935, defendant 2 made an application, No. 527 of 1935, in E. P. No. 418 of 1934, under S. 47 of the Code, praying that the attachment of the monies in the hands of the garnishees be raised, and on 2nd August 1935, in view of the pendency of the last mentioned application, application No. 175 of 1935 for the raising of the attachment was dismissed. On 22nd October 1936, the learned Subordinate Judge allowed defendant 2's application and raised the attachment and it is to be noticed that that order was made in E. A. No. 527 of 1935, in E.P . No. 418 of 1934, and in O. S. No. 118 of 1934. On the making of this order the execution of the decree was open ; the judgment-creditor could either accept the order and seek to execute his decree by some method other than that asked for in E.P. no. 418 of 1934, or he could appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge. He elected to adopt the latter course and on 3rd December 1936, be presented a memorandum of appeal to the High Court at Madras in E. A. No. 527 of 1935 in E. P. No. 418 of 1934 and in O. S. No. 118 of 1934, asking that the order of the lower Court be set aside, and on 27th September 1938 this appeal was dismissed by the High Court.

On 25th November 1939, as already mentioned, the judgment-creditor filed Execution Petition No. 72 of 1940, in O.S. No. 118 of 1934, asking that the decree of 3rd November 1934 might be executed by attachment of certain moveable property in the hands of defendants 2 and 3. The question for determination is whether this petition is in time.

The High Court of Madras in the judgment under appeal took the view that from 10th July 1935 there was no execution petition or application outstanding and that the petition No. 72 of 1940, being presented more than three years after that date, was out of time. Their Lordships are unable to appreciate this view which ignores the fact that on 10th July 1935 an application by one of the judgment-debtors to set aside the " attachment" was pending on the records of the Court and the further fact that on 27th September 1938 this application was finally disposed of by an order made by the High Court of Madras in E. P. No. 418 of 1934, which could not have been done had that petition terminated in July 1935.

Subject to the question whether the High Court of Madras was the proper Court within Art. 182 (5), their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the appellant brings his case within both branches of that paragraph. Execution Petition No. 418 of 1934 was an application made according to law for execution of the decree, and it was finally disposed of by the order of the Court of appeal made on 27th September 1938, which brings the case within the first branch. Further, the application to the Court of appeal of 3rd December 1936, to set aside the order of the Subordinate Court raising the attachment was an application according to law to take a step in aid of execution of the decree. There has been some difference of opinion in the Courts in India as to what amounts to taking a step in aid of execution and the judgment under appeal discusses various decisions, including a decision of the High Court of Madras in ('22) 9 AIR 1922 Mad 79 : 45 Mad 466 : 70 IC 324, Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar in which it was held that there could not be a step in aid of execution if there was not an application for execution then pending and another decision of the same Court in ('26) 13 AIR 1926 Mad 1178 : 50 Mad 49 : 98 IC 156, Krishna Pattar v. Seetharama Pattar in which it was held that a step in aid of execution must be one in furtherance of execution and not merely one seeking to remove an obstruction to possible future execution. Their Lordships do not find it necessary to express any opinion on these questions since in the present case there was at all material times an application for execution pending, and upon any view of the matter an application to set aside an attachment is a step, in the circumstances the only step open, in aid of execution.

The only other point to be considered, and this was the point principally stressed on this appeal, is whether the High Court of Madras was the proper Court within Art. 182 (5). Explanation 2 to Art. 182 enacts that the proper Court means the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order. In ('23) 10 AIR 1923 Bom 431 : 47 Bom 783 : 73 IC 1030, Govinddas Rajaramdas v. Ganpatdas Narotamdas an Appeal Bench of the Bombay High Court held that an appeal to the High Court against an order in execution was not an application according to law to the proper Court, and Macleod C. J. stated :

"It certainly cannot be said that an appeal to the High Court against an order in a dharkast is an application in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution. The High Court is not a Court whose duty it is to execute decrees passed by the lower Courts."

This view was accepted by the High Courts in the judgment under appeal, but their Lordships think that it is fallacious. Under S.107, Civil PC, an appeal Court has the same powers, and is required to perform, as nearly as may be, the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction. Where an application for execution is dismissed by the lower Court, the appeal Court is the proper and indeed the only Court which can then execute the decree. No doubt in practice a High Court does not itself generally execute the decrees of lower Courts; normally it remands the case to the lower Court with directions to execute according to law on the basis of the High Court's decision; but in a proper case the High Court would no doubt execute the decree or order itself. In their Lordships' view there can be no doubt that the High Court of Madras was the Court whose duty it was to execute the decree of 3rd November 1934 in the manner asked for in E. P. No. 418 of 1934, if such manner were legal, after the attachment had been raised by the lower Court. The appellant therefore has brought himself within para. 5 of Art. 182 and his Petition No. 72 of 1940 being presented within three years of the order of the High Court finally disposing of the Execution Petition no. 418 of 1934 is in time. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and that the matter should be remitted to the High Court of Madras with directions that the Execution petition No. 72 is within time and should be dealt with according to law. The respondents must pay the costs to date of Execution petition No. 72 of 1940 including the costs of this appeal.

Appeal allowed.