- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Eramma And Another v. Veerpanna And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two separate petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court were filed: one by Eramma under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, and the other by Sidamma under Article 133(1)(a) and Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The dispute concerns property (lands, houses, a ginning factory, etc.) of the father of Baswan Gowda. Non-applicant plaintiffs had sued for possession as heirs.
Each widow (the petitioners) defended the suit by pleading adoption of a son pursuant to authority given by their husband. Eramma relied entirely on oral authority for the adoption; Sidamma produced a will showing permission given by her husband. The trial Court disbelieved Eramma's story but accepted Sidamma's, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. Two appeals were preferred to the High Court: one by the plaintiffs and one by Eramma. The High Court disagreed with the trial Court's acceptance of Sidamma's adoption, held that Sidamma's alleged authority was disproved, and consequently decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Eramma's appeal was disallowed by the High Court. Both widows then filed separate petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Sidamma is entitled to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution, given the valuation of the subject-matter and the nature of the High Court's judgment.
- Whether Eramma is entitled to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution (and, alternatively, under Article 133(1)(c)), taking into account (a) the valuation of the subject-matter in the court of first instance and on appeal, and (b) whether the High Court's judgment was one of affirmance or variance with respect to the subject-matter of her appeal (the proof and validity of her alleged adoption).
- Whether the grant of leave to one party (Sidamma) necessitates or requires the grant of leave to the other party (Eramma) in connected appeals, particularly where similar questions (adoption) are involved.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments Advanced on Behalf of Eramma (Petitioner)
- Relying on cited cases (including Abraham v. Page and Chitrapur Subbayamma v. Chitrapur Buchi Venkayya), it was argued that Eramma was entitled to leave under Article 133(1)(a) because the judgment of the High Court varied the judgment of the trial Court by ultimately passing a decree in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 2; thus, it could not be regarded as one of affirmance.
- It was asserted that, because the value of the subject-matter of the dispute in both the court of first instance and in appeal exceeded Rs. 20,000/-, the petitioner should be entitled to appeal as of right and should be granted a certificate of leave.
- In the alternative, counsel argued that leave ought not to be withheld from Eramma when a similar question of adoption in the connected appeal of Sidamma had been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court; i.e., parity between connected appeals was urged.
Arguments Advanced on Behalf of the Respondents / Other Side
- The sole point in Eramma's appeal was said to be whether the alleged adoption was proved. Both the trial Court and the High Court concluded it was not proved; therefore, the High Court's judgment was one of affirmance with respect to the subject-matter of Eramma's appeal.
- It was contended that no leave under Article 133(1)(a) can be granted unless a substantial question of law is shown, which was not done in Eramma's case.
- It was also urged that the fact that leave was granted to Sidamma was not, by itself, a sufficient ground to grant leave to Eramma.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Abraham v. Page; ILR 1956 Hyd 377 : AIR 1956 Hyd 145 | The High Court's grant of an enhanced amount on appeal (compared to the trial Court) was treated as variance rather than affirmance; whether the High Court differed from the lower court on a principle may determine variance. (As described in the opinion.) | The Court considered this authority but held that its observations did not support the petitioner's contention that the expression “judgment, decree or final order appealed from” must refer to the decree in its entirety. The Court explained the principle but found the case did not aid Eramma's position. |
| Chitrapur Subbayamma v. Chitrapur Buchi Venkayya; AIR 1954 Mad 876 | This information was not available in the provided opinion. |
The opinion records that the case was relied upon by counsel for the petitioner; the Court stated that the cases relied upon did not help the petitioner's contention. |
| Annapurna Bai v. Rup Rao; AIR 1925 PC 60 | The principle (as followed in subsequent decisions) that whether the High Court's decree is one of variance or affirmance may be judged by whether the High Court differed from the lower court on a principle. (Referenced as a Privy Council authority followed by many High Courts.) | The Court relied on the principle laid down in this Privy Council decision to explain how to determine whether a High Court judgment is of affirmance or variance and applied that understanding to the facts before it. |
| Fateh Kunwar v. Durbi Jai Singh; AIR 1952 All 942 (Full Bench) | The Full Bench held that the expression “judgment, decree or final order appealed from” in Article 133 does not necessarily refer to the High Court's entire judgment; it may refer only to that part which is the subject-matter of the proposed appeal. Variance or affirmance should be considered with reference to the particular matter challenged. | The Court followed and applied this authority directly: it treated the question of whether the High Court's decision was one of affirmance with reference to the specific issue (the adoption) which was the subject-matter of Eramma's proposed appeal. |
| Bansilal v. Mukund Das Page; AIR 1955 Hyd 216 | Illustrates refusal to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court where the High Court was one of affirmance on the matter in question and no substantial question of law arose. | The Court cited this decision as a supporting authority for refusing leave to Eramma because the High Court had affirmed the trial Court's conclusion on adoption and no substantial question of law was shown. |
| Radhakrishna v. Swami Nitha; AIR 1921 PC 25 | Used as an example (through Lord Buckmaster's observation) that Article 133(1)(c) can cover cases where the character of the dispute is incapable of valuation in money terms or where questions of wide public importance are involved. | The Court noted this principle in considering whether Eramma's case could properly fall under Article 133(1)(c) as a fit case for leave; the Court concluded that the present case did not satisfy those tests. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the two petitions separately and applied Article 133 principles with careful attention to whether the High Court's judgment was one of affirmance or variance in relation to the specific subject-matter challenged on appeal.
On Sidamma's petition:
- The Court observed that the valuation of the subject-matter in dispute in both the trial Court and in appeal was admittedly over Rs. 20,000/-, and that the judgment of the High Court in Sidamma's case was not one of affirmance. Consequently, Sidamma was entitled to leave under Article 133(1)(a). The petition was allowed and a certificate was to be given to the petitioner.
On Eramma's petition:
- The Court first examined entitlement under Article 133(1)(a). It noted that while the value of the subject-matter in the court of first instance was admittedly over Rs. 20,000/-, it was not so in the appeal filed by Eramma. Even accepting arguendo that the value in appeal might be Rs. 20,000 or over, entitlement to leave would still require a showing that the High Court's judgment was not one of affirmance in relation to the subject-matter of the proposed appeal.
- The Court analysed the nature of the contested question in Eramma's appeal: whether her alleged adoption was proved and valid. Both the trial Court and the High Court had held that the adoption was not proved. Therefore, with reference to Eramma's claim, the High Court's judgment amounted to an affirmance of the trial Court's conclusion on that matter.
- The Court reviewed and distinguished the decisions relied upon by Eramma's counsel (including ILR 1956 Hyd 377/AIR 1956 Hyd 145 and other authorities). It explained the relevant principle (from Annapurna Bai and followed in Fateh Kunwar) that the expression “judgment, decree or final order appealed from” in Article 133 can refer to the part of the High Court's judgment that is the subject-matter of the proposed appeal; variance or affirmance must be determined with respect to that particular matter. Applying this, since the adoption issue had been affirmed by the High Court, Eramma could not claim a right of appeal under Article 133(1)(a) without demonstrating a substantial question of law—something she did not do.
- The Court then considered whether the case fell within Article 133(1)(c) (discretionary leave) — specifically the contention that parity with Sidamma (who had been granted leave) required Eramma to be granted leave as well. The Court analysed the authorities (including the Madras decision cited) and concluded that leave was not granted in those cases as a matter of course merely because it had been granted to the opposite party; rather, leave was granted where a common question was in controversy or where the matter fell within other recognized grounds for discretionary leave (such as non-monetary character or questions of wide public importance). The present case satisfied none of those tests.
- Accordingly, the Court held that Eramma was not entitled to leave under Article 133(1)(a) as of right, and that this was not a fit case for discretionary leave under Article 133(1)(c).
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings
- Sidamma's petition: ALLOWED. The petitioner Sidamma was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(a), and a certificate was to be given to her.
- Eramma's petition: REJECTED. The petition by Eramma for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.
Implications and consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: Sidamma will receive a certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court; Eramma will not be granted leave and her petition is dismissed.
- The Court applied established principles about when a High Court judgment is to be regarded as one of affirmance or variance with respect to the specific subject-matter of an intended appeal. Because both the trial Court and the High Court rejected Eramma's claim of adoption, the High Court's judgment was treated as an affirmance on that point, and no substantial question of law having been shown, no right of appeal under Article 133(1)(a) arose for Eramma.
- The opinion makes clear that the grant of leave to one party in a connected appeal does not automatically or as a matter of course entitle the other party to leave; leave under Article 133(1)(c) may be appropriate where a common question is in controversy or where other recognized tests (e.g., non-monetary character, or questions of wide public importance) are met. The Court found those tests were not met in Eramma's case.
- No broader new precedent or novel legal rule was announced beyond the application of existing authorities and principles to the facts; the decision governs the connected petition as stated in the opinion.
Disposition: Petition of Sidamma allowed; petition of Eramma rejected. "This order shall govern the other connected petition."
1. These are two separate petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court: one on behalf of Eramma under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, and the other on behalf of Sidamma under Article 133(1)(a) and Sections 109 and 110 of the CPC.
2. The petitioners are the widows of the father of Baswan Gowda in relation to whose property consisting of lands, houses, ginning factory etc. the non-applicant plaintiffs had brought a suit for possession as his heirs. Each of the petitioners set up in defence a plea that in pursuance of the authority given exclusively to her by her husband, she had adopted a son. While Eramma entirely depended on oral authority to adopt, Sidamma produced a will showing permission granted to her by her husband. The trial Court disbelieved the story of Eramma and on the evidence adduced on behalf of Sidamma held her adoption as proved and valid in law and thus dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Two appeals were preferred to this Court: One on behalf of the plaintiffs and the other on behalf of Eramma. This Court differed from the conclusion of the trial Court and held that the authority to adopt alleged to have been given to Sidamma was also disproved and consequently decreed the suit of the plaintiffs 1 and 2. In the result, the appeal of Eramma was disallowed. It is, in these circumstances, that both the widows have filed separate petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
3. So far as the petition of Sidamma is concerned, we are of the opinion that it should be allowed. Admittedly, the valuation of the subject matter in dispute both in the Court of first instance and in appeal is over Rs. 20,000/-. The judgment of this Court is not of affirmance. The petitioner is therefore, entitled to leave under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. We, therefore, allow the petition. A certificate may accordingly be given to the petitioner.
4. In the petition of Eramma, Shri Govind Das Mehta, relying on the cases of Abraham v. Page: 25Hyderaabad Construction Co. Ltd., ILR 1956 Hyd 377 : (AIR 1956 Hyd 145 (A)) and Chitrapur Subbayamma v. Chitrapur Buchi Venkayya, AIR 1954 Mad 876 (B), argued first that the petitioner was entitled to leave under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. It was submitted that inasmuch as the judgment of this Court varied the judgment of the Court below by passing a decree in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 2, it cannot be said to be one of affirmance and as the value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance as well as in appeal was over Rs. 20,000/- she was entitled to appeal as of right and a certificate of leave, therefore, ought to be granted to her. It was further argued in the alternative that when similar question of adoption was in dispute in the connected appeal of Sidamma and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been granted to her (Sidamma) leave ought not to be withheld from the petition.
5. On behalf of the other side, it is contended that the only point for determination in the appeal of Eramma was whether the alleged adoption was proved and when this Court agreed with the view of the original Court that adoption was not proved, no leave can be granted unless substantial question of law was shown. It was further urged that the fact that leave was granted to Sidamma cannot be a sufficient ground to grant leave to the petitioner also.
6. We will first consider whether the petitioner is entitled to leave under Article 133(1)(a). The value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance admittedly was over Rs. 20,000/-, but, it was not so in the appeal filed by the petitioner. Even if we assume that the value of the subject-matter of dispute in appeal was and is still Rs. 20,000/- or over, the petitioner could only be entitled to leave if she shows further that the judgment of this Court was not one of affirmance.
7. It is contended, however, that since the suit of the plaintiff which was dismissed by the trial Court, has been decreed by this Court, it cannot be deemed to be a judgment of affirmance. In our opinion, that is not the true test for determining the nature of the judgment, decree or final order for purposes of Article 133 of the Constitution. The matter in dispute in appeal was whether the adoption alleged to have been made by Eramma was valid and proved according to law. The trial Court held the adoption of Eramma as not proved and on appeal we also agreed with that view. It follows, therefore, that in relation to the claim or dispute of the petitioner in appeal, our judgment was one of affirmance.
8. We have carefully considered the cases relied on by the learned advocate in support of a contrary view. We are clear in our mind that they do not help the contention of the petitioner. In ILR 1956 Hyd 377 : (AIR 1956 Hyd 145 (A)) the petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as against a decree of this Court which varied he decree of the trial Court. That was a suit or the recovery of a sum of Rs. 29,263/4/8. The trial Court had decreed the claim only to the extent of Rs. 2,270/11/8 with costs and future interest.
9. On appeal, the High Court awarded a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,111/11/4 with costs and future interest. The sum awarded being less than the amount claimed, the plaintiff applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The question arose whether the judgment of this Court was one of affirmance or variance. It was observed that whether the decree of the High Court is of variance or not may be judged by the fact whether the High Court has differed from the lower court on a, principle. Following the principle laid down to Annapurna Bai v. Rup Rao, AIR 1925 PC 60 (C) by the Privy Council to which reference is invariably made in almost all the decisions of various. High Courts on the subject, it was held, since the High Court had under its decree granted enhanced amount in appeal, it could not be said to be a decree of affirmance.
10. Obviously, there is nothing in the observations-made in the case relied on to support the contention of the applicant that the expression “judgment, decree or final order appealed from” used in Article 133 of the Constitution does not refer to the part of the decree or order or judgment which is the subject-matter of the proposed appeal, but must of necessity refer to the decree or order in its entirety passed in the case.
11. It must be noted, however, in the Privy Council case, AIR 1925 PC 60 (C) where the suit for possession of the adopted son was decreed with a direction to pay maintenance to the widow of the deceased which shall be a charge upon the estate and in appeal this decree was modified to the extent of the quantum of maintenance, the Privy Council granting special leave limited it to the question of maintenance only. The final decree-appealed from was a decree of affirmance in all other respects and the petitioners also had desired to appeal only with regard to the quantum of maintenance.
12. A question almost identical with the one in the case before us had arisen in Fateh Kunwar v. Durbi Jai Singh, AIR 1952 All 942 (FB) (D). In that case an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was filed against the judgment of the High Court which allowed the appeal of the defendant and set aside the order of the trial Court granting maintenance, and dismissed the cross-objections filed by the other side. In that petition, a question arose as to what was meant by the expression “judgment, decree or final order appealed from”. The majority view of the Full Bench was expressed in the following words:
“The expression ‘judgment, decree or final order appealed from’ in Article 133 does not necessarily refer to the judgment, decree or final order of the High Court in its entirety but means that part of the judgment, decree or final order of the High Court which is the subject-matter of the proposed appeal. If the whole of the judgment, decree or final order is the subject-matter of the proposed appeal then obviously it is the whole of the judgment, decree or final order that has to be taken into consideration; but, if only a part of the judgment, decree or final order of the High Court is challenged in the proposed appeal then it is that part alone which is covered by the expression ‘judgment, decree or final order appealed from’ “.
13. It was further observed that variance on or affirmance of one out of several matters decided by the Court below should be considered with reference to the decision of that particular matter which is the subject-matter of the proposed appeal & not with reference to the other matters. It was also-held that if there are two appeals in the High Court from one decree of the lower Court then the decree of the High Court in each of the appeals will be separately considered and if the proposed appeal to the Supreme Court arising out of one of such decrees relates to a matter on Which the decree of the High Court has affirmed the decision of the Court below; the petitioner will not be entitled to leave unless some substantial question of law is shown.
14. Following this authority a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bansilal v. Mukund Das Page: 26AIR 1955 Hyd 216 (E) refused to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on a matter on which the decree of the High Court was one of affirmance and no substantial question of law was involved. In the light of these authorities, if we were to consider the petition of Eramma, we find that in her appeal the only point to be considered is whether the adoption was proved and valid. Both the Courts have held against her.
15. In other words, this Court had affirmed the judgment of the Court below to the extent of adoption. Under the provisions of the Constitution, therefore, she is not entitled as of right to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court unless the dispute which is the subject-matter of appeal involves a substantial question of law; but, admittedly there is no such question of law involved. It is next contended that it is otherwise a fit case within the meaning of Article 133(1)(C) where leave ought to be granted inasmuch as leave to appeal in relation to similar question was granted to the other party. Reliance is placed on the case of AIR 1954 Mad 876 (B). But, this does not help the contention of the petitioner. No doubt, in this case leave was granted under Article 133(1)(C), but, it was evidently, because a common question was involved. Justice Mack observed:
“When leave was granted to one party, the other party should not be denied”.
16. Whereas Krishnaswamy Naidu J. observed:
“It cannot be laid down as a general principle of law that when leave is granted to one of the parties to appeal to the Supreme Court, the other party also was entitled to appeal as a matter of course”.
17. It would, therefore, appear that leave was granted not on the ground that when one party was given leave, the other party should also be given, but, because of the fact that common question was in controversy in both the appeals. Apart from cases where a common question is in controversy there can also be cases falling within the ambit of Article 133(1)(C) of the Constitution wherein the value of the exact character of the dispute may be incapable of determination in terms of money or they may relate to questions of wide public importance as has been observed by Lord Buckmaster in Radhakrishna v. Swami Nitha, AIR 1921 PC 25 (P).
18. The present case does not satisfy any of these tests so as to be regarded as a fit case where leave ought to be granted. For the above stated reasons, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in all cases where leave is granted to one of the parties to appeal to the Supreme Court, the other party also is entitled to leave as a matter of course. We are clearly of the view that this is not a fit case under Article 133(1)(C) of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, rejected. This order shall govern the other connected petition.
19. Petition rejected.
Alert