Khosla, J.:— This reference to a Full Bench arose out of a revision petition which originally came up before me sitting singly. The petition was directed against an order made by the District Judge of Ambala acting as the “Appellate Authority” under section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that no revision was competent as, by virtue of section 15(4) of the Act, the order of the “Appellate Authority” was final and could not be “called in question in any Court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision.” It was also contended that the District Judge when acting as the “Appellate Authority” under section 15 of the Act could not be looked upon as a civil Court subordinate to the High Court and, therefore, his orders were not liable to revision by the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Nor, for the same reason, was the original order of the Rent Controller subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

2. On the other hand, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Rent Controller and the “Appellate Authority” were, by statute entrusted with judicial functions. It was their business to decide disputes of a civil nature and they, therefore, constituted civil Courts subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115, Civil Procedure Code. A further argument advanced was that inasmuch as the High Court had revisional jurisdiction over all civil Courts by virtue of section 224, Government of India Act of 1935, this jurisdiction could not betaken away by section the of the Rent Restriction Act by making the order of the “Appellate Authority” final because the Rent Restriction Act was a Governor's Act promulgated under the provisions of section 93, Government of India Act and the proviso to section 93 specifically bars the taking away of powers vested in the High Courts. As the questions raised were of some importance and were likely to arise on other cases of similar nature I framed two questions and referred the matter to my Lord the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench who should consider and give an authoritative pronouncement in answering the two questions. The questions are:—

(1) Whether the Rent Controller and the appellate authority appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, constitute civil Courts subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court and whether their orders are, for this reason, subject to revision by the High Court?

(2) Whether the provisions of clause (4) to section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act in so far as they take away the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of appeal or revision are ultra vires and ineffective because the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, was enacted by the Governor under the previous of section 93, Government of India Act?

3. It may be mentioned in passing that Civil Revision No. 279 of 1949 in which similar questions were raised was also subsequently referred to the same Bench by my learned brother Kapur. We have heard long and protracted arguments on the points referred to the Full Bench and a vast quantity of case law was discussed and reviewed by learned counsel on both sides. After giving the matter my most serious consideration I have come to the conclusion that both the questions referred to us must be answered in the negative.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners in both cases contended in the first place that the Rent Controller and the “Appellate Authority” were both civil Courts as they performed judicial functions in a judicial manner. They were both subordinate to the High Court inasmuch as the Rent Controller was none else than the Senior Subordinate Judge who was entrusted with the duties of a “Rent Controller” under the Act and the “Appellate Authority” was merely the District Judge whose jurisdiction was extended to embrace the duties of the “Appellate Authority” in cases arising out of the Rent Restriction Act. In the second place, it was contended that both the “Rent Controller” and the “Appellate Authority” were subordinate to the High Court (a) because they were judicial officers ordinarily subject to the superintendence of the High Court and (b) because all civil Courts are subordinate to the High Court by virtue of section 224, Government of India Act and section 18, Punjab Courts Act. In the third place, it was contended that the powers of superintendence and revision vesting in the High Court could not be taken away by a Governor's Act promulgated under the provisions of section 93 Government of India Act.

5. On the other side it was argued that neither the Rent Controller nor the “Appellate Authority” was a civil Court entrusted with judicial functions. Each of these persons acted as a persona designata who had been brought into existence for the specific purpose of performing certain functions which although savouring of a judicial character were in reality only quasi judicial. The intention of the Legislature was not to create civil Courts but to create executive functionaries whose task it was to perform certain specific duties described in the Rent Restriction Act. In the second place, it was argued that the Rent Controller and the “Appellate Authority” were not, in any event, subordinate to the High Court as not every civil Court is a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Lastly, it was contended that the provisions of section 15(4) of the Rent Restriction Act were not ultra vires as these provisions did not do any violence to the terms of the proviso to section 93, Government of India Act.

6. It may be stated at the outset that there is nothing unlawful, irregular or indeed unusual in the Legislature appointing a person to perform functions of a quasi judicial nature and the mere fact that the business entrusted to such a person may involve the consideration and decision of juristic rights would not give the appointed person the status of a civil Court. In all countries of the world too necessity arises of appointing some authority who may be called upon to perform duties which may be partly judicial and partly executive. It may be impracticable or inadvisable to entrust business of this type to Courts of law and though such persons will be expected to perform their duties honestly and justly and may even have to decide disputes of a civil nature between various parties they will not thereby assume the character of civil Courts. It was aptly remarked by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Shell Company of Australia Limited v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation . 1931 A.C 275.:—

“The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial powers.”

7. Speaking of the attributes of a Court of law their Lordships observed:—

“In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hear witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body.”

8. In another case Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation . 1938 A.C 415. which came up before the Privy Council it was held that a Municipal Board was primarily an administrative body and not a Court. In another case The Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works Ltd. . A.I.R 1949 P.C 129. the Labour Relations Board under the Trade Union Act, 1944, was held not to be a Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that not all tribunals which exercise judicial power will fall within the definition of ‘Court’. A reference may also be made to (Ippli) Raghunadha Patro v. Gobinda Patro . A.I.R 1928 Mad. 1032 F.B. in which a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that a Board of Revenue under the Madras Estates Land Act although its proceedings were governed by the Civil Procedure Code was not a civil Court. Another Full Bench of the Madras High Court came to the same conclusion in Srinivasa Rajamani Rajah Deo, Rajah of Mandasa v. Senapathi Jagganayakulu . A.I.R 1912 Mad. 612.. The Privy Council when considering the matter in George Edmund De Silva v. The Attorney-General of Ceylon . 53 C.W.N 825. while observing:

“Preliminary question must be asked whether it was ever the intention of creating a tribunal with the ordinary incident of an appeal to the Crown.”

9. Held that an Election Judge determining the validity of an election was not a Judge.

10. It is thus clear that a non-official or even an official may be appointed as a persona designata to perform certain functions which may in some respects be judicial but he does not thereby become a civil Court. There are even instances of a judicial officer or an officer presiding over a Court being entrusted with functions of quasi judicial nature and even in such cases it has been held that in so far as these special functions are concerned the officer cannot be said to be a Court. A District Magistrate was entrusted with certain duties under the Sarais Act and although the District Magistrate is a judicial officer it was held that he could not be considered to be a Court when he was performing duties under the Sarais Act vide Khwaja-Ghulam Sadid-ud-Din v. Emperor . A.I.R 1941 Lah. 71.. The Collector of a district is for some purposes a judicial officer but it has been held in many cases that when he acts under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act he is not a Court vide Erza v. Secretary of State for India . 1905 I.L.R 32 Cal. 605 P.C. and Abdul Sattar Sahib v. The Special Deputy Collector . A.I.R 1924 Mad. 442 F.B.. Similarly, a District Registrar was held not to be a Court although it is the District Magistrate of a district who performs the duties of the District Registrar vide Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddy . I.L.R 30 Mad. 326. and Queen Empress v. Tulja . I.L.R 12 Bom. 36.. A District Judge refusing to entertain a petition of appeal against the decree of an Assistant Collector under the terms of the Agra Tenancy Act was held not to be a Court vide Adya Saran v. Kali Charan . A.I.R 1923 All 580.. Instances of this type may be multiplied almost indefinitely. A distinction has been made between a Court performing judicial functions and a persona designata entrusted with specific duties of a judicial or quasi judicial nature. Sometimes such duties are entrusted to an official performing executive or administrative functions. At other times they are entrusted to a judicial officer who is experienced in assessing evidence, in analysing the essentials of a dispute and in adjudicating upon civic rights. The Legislature may take the view that the nature of the business is so complicated or of such importance that it should be entrusted to a person who has had experience of dealing with complicated civil disputes. But from this it does not follow that the Legislature is creating a civil Court or extending the jurisdiction of the judicial officer. Under the City of Bombay Municipal Act the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, Bombay, is entrusted with certain duties. It has been held that the Judge does not act as a Court but as a Persona designata vide Ahmed Suleman Dinanath v. The Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay . I.L.R 54 Bom. 224.. A contrary view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Municipality of Sholapur v. Tuljaram Krisknasa Chavan . A.I.R 1931 Bom. 582.. It appears from. The judgment that the learned Judges took into consideration the provisions of section 407, Government of India Act, 1918. In the subsequent Act of 1935 the provisions of section 407 were considerably modified and were embodied in section 224. No assistance can, therefore, be derived from this case. In Bahji Sakharam Gurav v. Marwanji Nowroji Antia . I.L.R 21 Bom. 279. and The Municipality of Belgaum v. Rudrappa Subarao Sutar . I.L.R 40 Bom. 509. it was held that a District Court acting under the Bombay District Municipalities Act is not a Court. The Madras High Court took a similar view of the functionary under the Madras City Municipal Act vide M. Vijiaragharalu Pillai v. P. Theagaroya Chetti . I.L.R 38 Mad. 581. and O.A.O.K Lakshmanan Chetty v. J.S Kannappar . I.L.R 50 Mad. 121.. In the latter case it was observed:—

“Looking at the Municipal Act, it is clear that the draftsman of that Act was quite alive to the distinction between the Court of Small Causes (vide section 59) and the Chief Judge of that Court (vide section 54). It is difficult to resist the inference that when the Chief Judge is referred to in the Act he was meant to act as a persona designata and not as representing the Court.”

11. Vensimal Tarachand v. Karachi District Board . A.I.R 1948 Sind 116., Bishambar Nath v. Achal Singh . A.I.R 1932 All 651. and Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M.A Shakur . I.L.R 3 Rang. 560 are three more instances of judicial officers being entrusted with certain specific duties connected with Municipal Committee. The Bombay High Court in Spring Mills Ltd. v. G.D Ambekar . A.I.R 1949 Bom. 188. and the Nagpur High Court in Ramchandra v. Ratanlal . A.I.R 1944 Nag. 288. held that the official appointed as the authority to decide disputes under the Payment of Wages Act is not a civil Court subordinate to the High Court A contrary view was taken by the Nagpur High Court in Shrinivas Laxmanrao Pophali v. Supdt. Government Printing Press, Nagtpur . A.I.R 1945 Nag. 94. and Debidutt Dube v. Central India Electrical Supply Co. Ltd. Lahore . A.I.R 1945 Nag. 244. and by the Lahore High Court in Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Fhops, Moghal pura v. M.G Hashmat . 1946 Lah. 316. Similarly, a Commissioner acting under the Workmen's Compensation Act was held to be a Court in Mt. Dirji v. Smt. Goalin . A.I.R 1942 Pat. 65. and Mt. Dirji v. Smt. Goalin . A.I.R 1942 Pat. 33..

12. The fact that there are decisions on both sides only goes to show that Judges, when confronted with the question whether a certain functionary is or is not a Court, consider it necessary to enquire into the matter and are not disposed to give a clear cut answer immediately. It follows that they have universally recognised the proposition that a judicial officer, e.g, a Senior Subordinate Judge, a District Magistrate or a District Judge maybe entrusted with duties of a judicial or quasi judicial nature and yet while performing these duties he does not act as a Court. Whether this is so or not will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, namely, what was the intention of the Legislature, to create a Court or appoint a persona designata: what is the nature of the duties entrusted to him: what are his powers and what procedure does he follows: does he, when discharging these special duties, act in every way as a Court of law would act: does he satisfy all the tests usually applied to Courts of law?

13. Once it is conceded that the Senior Subordinate Judge when acting as the Rent Controller or too District Judge when acting as the “Appellate Authority” may or may not be acting as a civil Court an enquiry into the matter may be undertaken with complete freedom from bias and untrammelled by the pre-possession that a judicial officer always acts as a civil Court, no matter what duties he performs.

14. We may first attempt to formulate a definition of a civil Court. As far as I am aware no exhaustive definition of the term has been given in any judicial pronouncement English or Indian, though various tests have been laid down whereby the true nature of a tribunal or authority may be determined. Broadly speaking, a Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. It is, however, clear that to say this much is not enough. Further analysis of the authorities shows that there are certain ingredients or essential attributes of a Court of law without any of which the tribunal he authority ceases to enjoy the dignity or character of a Court. It is necessary, for instance, that judicial duties be entrusted to the tribunal by operation of law and not by voluntary submission by the parties to a dispute. An arbitrator, therefore, cannot be considered as a Court of law. Again, the tribunal must adjudicate upon civil disputes. To adjudicate means 10 give a definitive decision which is final until it is set aside or modified by an “Appellate Authority”. It is not enough that the tribunal should give an opinion or act in an advisory capacity. Therefore, a Collector acting under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act who acts merely in an advisory capacity cannot be looked upon as a Court. Civil disputes again menu disputes whose nature is justiciable i.e, where the law of the land recognises the wrong and provides a remedy. The decision of nonjudicial disputes cannot be treated as the administration of justice. Again, it is not enough that a Court of law should conduct its proceedings with fairness and impartiality. It must decide them according to the law of the land. It must not be affected by ulterior considerations or matters of executive policy. The Privy Council in Shell Company of Australia Limited v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation . I.L.R 3 Rang. 410 held that a Board of Revenue was not a Court because it has to take into consideration matters of executive policy. In Manavala Gaundon v. Kumarappa Reddy a District Registrar was held not to be a Court because he did not administer justice judicially. Again, the rules of procedure which the Court of law must follow cannot be arbitrary. The procedure must be defined by statute or recognised by law. In The Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M.A Shakur a full bench of the Rangoon High Court held that the Chief Judge of the Rangoon Small Cause Court acting under section 14 of the Rangoon Municipal Act could not be said to act as a Court because he was free to disregard the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code. The Judge was entitled under section 14 of the Rangoon Municipal Act to make such enquiry as he deemed necessary and this departure from the ordinary rules of Procedure as laid down by the Civil Procedure Code was considered sufficient to take him out of the category of a Court of law. In Spring Mills Ltd. v. G.D Ambekar the authority acting under the Payment of Wages was held not to be a Court of law because (1) the procedure followed was not the procedure prescribed for a civil Court and (2) the authority was treated as a special body set up to adjudicate upon civil rights and a distinction had been made between an application to the authority and a suit filed in a civil Court. Similarly, in Sudagar Chaudhari v. Radharamon Prasad . A.I.R 1949 Pat. 333. it was held that the District Judge when exercising jurisdiction under section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act was not a Court because (1) the District Judge acted as a revisional Court although ordinarily it had no such power in respect of the Panchayat and (2) the procedure which he could follow was unfettered. For instance, he could dispense with the rules of evidence and legal practitioners were not allowed to appear before him. In many cases it has been held that where the Presiding Officer of the Court rather than the Court is entrusted with special powers the Presiding Officer is to be looked upon as a persona designata.

15. A Court of law may, therefore, be defined as a tribunal, dealing with and adjudicating upon civil disputes by operation of law in a judicial manner untroubled by ulterior considerations or matters of executive policy and observing certain definite rules of procedure which are either defined by statute or recognised by practice. It may be that a tribunal falling under this definition may yet not be a Court of law, but from the above discussion it will be clear that if any of these attributes are missing the tribunal certainly fall short of being a Court of law.

16. Applying this test to the Controller and the “Appellate Authority” appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act we find that in the first place that Act does not entrust the functions of a Controller to the Senior Subordinate Judge as such, nor does it appoint the District Judge as the “Appellate Authority”. The Act reserves to the Provincial Government the power: of appointing Controllers and “Appellate Authority”. Non-judicial officers or indeed non-officials could easily have been appointed to function as Controllers and “Appellate Authorities” under the Act and in that case it could not have been said that the persons so appointed were civil Courts. It was by a subsequent notification that the Government appointed Senior Sub Judges as Rent Controllers and the District Judges as “Appellate Authorities”. In the second place, the procedure laid down is not the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code except in two or three respects e.g, power has been given to the Rent Controller and the “Appellate Authority” to summon and examine witnesses. The orders made by the Controller or the “Appellate Authority” can be enforced by a civil court as if they were decrees of that Court. A modification of the principle of res judicata has also been introduced by the provisions of section 14. None of the other incidents of a Court of law, however, obtain. The “Appellate Authority” in hearing an appeal from the decision of the Controller can make any further enquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller and this contemplates even a private enquiry, should the “Appellate Authority” consider it necessary. Such a course would be wholly foreign to the duties of a Court of law. Again, it is to be noted that section 15 sub-section (4) makes a distinction between a Court of law and the Controller for it says that the order of the Controller can not be called in question in any Court of law. It is by itself sufficient to indicate that it was not the intention of the Legislature to create a Court of law but to appoint a persona designata who would be entrusted with certain specific functions. We thus find that many of the attributes of a Court of law are not to be found in the Controller or the “Appellate Authority”.

17. At this stage it is necessary to examine a decision of the Lahore High Court in Kishan Chand and Co. v. Nur Mohammad . A.I.R 1949 Lah. 94. where 3 Division Bench consisting of Mohammad Shari and Cornelius, JJ., held that a Rent Controller under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, acts as a civil Court and not a persona designata. The learned Judges based their decision in the main upon five grounds. They drew attention to the fact that the notification appointing Senior Sub Judge as Rent Controller and District Judges as “Appellate Authorities” was issued on the same day an which the Act was promulgated arid, therefore, it may be assumed that the Legislature merely intended to extend the jurisdiction of the two Courts over which the two judicial officers preside. In the second place, section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code is not exhaustive and there may be subordinate Courts not mentioned in this section. The Controller and the “Appellate Authority” could, therefore, be said to be subordinate Courts without doing violence to the terms of section 3, Civil Procedure Code. In the third place, the Judges took the view that, the Senior Subordinate Judge could not apply his time to any work otherwise than under the fufil control and superintendence of the High Court and therefore, the work done by him as Controller was also subject to the revision jurisdiction be the High Court. In he fourth place, the jurisdiction and the new Act was merely a continuation of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Senior Sub-Judge as a judicial officer and lastly, it was argued that the officers selected to act as Controllers and “Appellate Authorities” were such as were under the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court I am not disposed to agree with them on any of this points. In fast place, the simultaneity of the notification appointing Senior sub-Judges as Controllers and the promulgation of the Act is a matter of no significance unless it be taken to mean that the Legislature was not entrusting the business of fixing rents etc., to a Court of law as such. Therefore, it was found necessary to issue a separate notification rather than say in the Act itself that the Senior Sub-Judges would do the business of a Rent Controller and appeals from the orders of Rent Controllers would lie to the District Judges or District Courts as such. The terms of section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code appear to me to have no bearing whatsoever on the facts of the case. That section 3 is not exhaustive dies not necessarily imply that a Controller is a Court of law. I have already discussed this question at sufficient length and a judicial officer appointed to perform certain functions may or may not act as a Court of law. The third argument that everything that the Senior Sub-Judges do is under the supervision of the High Court appears to me to be devoid of all force. There are official duties which may be entrusted to Senior Sub-Judges or District Judges which do not come under the supervision of the High Court. Recently rehabilitation work was entrusted to some subordinate Judges in this province and it is clear that such work does not come within the superintendence of the High Court. The last two arguments are merely a Judicial of the third argument. The reason why Senior Sub-Judges and is Act Judges were appointed was because the Provincial Government were anxious to entrust this work to persons experienced in inquiring into and deciding civil disputes. Questions of a complicated nature might arise and these can best be disposed of by officers having judicial experience, but this does not necessarily mean that even when performing these special duties the judicial officers act as Courts of Law. With great respect, therefore, I must differ from the pronouncement of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court and it is clear to me that the intention of the Legislature was to appoint personae designatae to perform specific duties and it was further the intention that these persons would not be governed by the ordinary rules of procedure, nor would their decisions be subject to appeal or revision in a Court of law and I must, therefore, hold that the Rent Controller and the “Appellate Authority” are not Courts of law subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115, Civil Procedure Code.

18. The argument based on section 18 of the Punjab Courts Act may be disposed of in one word. If the Controller and the “Appellate Authority” are not civil Courts they cannot be said to come within the purview of section 18. It is only the civil Courts established under any “enactment for the time being in force,” that can be said to be subordinate civil courts and in the view I have taken of the matter section 18 does not come into Play.

19. Nor is it necessary to dwell at any great length on interpreting the proviso to section 93 and section 222, Government of India Act of 1935. It is to be observed that some old rulings to which a reference has already been made took the view that section 107 of the Government of India Act of 1918 invested the High Courts with certain supervisional powers. In the Government of India Act of 1935, however, the provisions of the old section 107 where incorporated with certain modifications in section 224. Sub-section (2) of this section is in the following terns:—

“Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision.”

20. Therefore, it is clear that the provisions of section 223 do not confer any additional powers on the High Court. The Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act brought into existence new rights and new tribunals which did not automatically by the very fact of their creation come under the superintendence of the High Court. Therefore, it cannot by said that section 15(4) of the Act deprived the High Court of any rights which it possessed in the matter of appeal or revision, nor were such powers assume by the Governor. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of section 15(4) did not do any violence to the proviso to section 93 and these provisions were, therefore, not ultra vires. I would thus answer both the questions referred to us in the negative and hold that a revision petition against an order of the Rent Controller or an order of the “Appellate Authority” is not competent.

21. S.R Dat, C.J:— I agree with the conclusions of my learned brother Khosla and with his reasons and have nothing more to add.

22. Kapur, J.:— I am of the same opinion and have nothing to add.

23. Reference answered in the negative.