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T.R. Bhawani Shankar Joshi And Another v. Gordhandas Jamnadas And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sir George Rankin)
Factual and Procedural Background
On 19 February 1924 F. Friedmann's Diamanthandel Maatachappij (referred to in the opinion as "the Dutch company") obtained a decree in the High Court at Madras in its original jurisdiction for Rs. 24,207-4-0 with certain interest and costs against one Ramanath Joshi (the appellants' father). Ramanath Joshi died on 15 September 1924. On 8 February 1927 leave was given by the High Court to execute the decree against the appellants as his legal representatives. Appellant 2 was a minor at that time, which fact was initially overlooked.
On 26 January 1935 an application was made under Rule 16 of Order XXI, Civil Procedure Code by one Gordhandas Jamnadas, who claimed to have taken an assignment dated 8 November 1933 of the decree and sought sale of certain immovables of the judgment-debtors and attachment of a decree they had in West Tanjore. An order was irregularly made on 22 October 1935 without a guardian ad litem for the minor; consequently Venkatesa Tarwadi was appointed guardian in April 1936 and by affidavit dated 24 April 1936 set up objections alleging (i) the assignment had been executed by Shantilal Lallubhai Fandya whose power of attorney did not authorise assignment; (ii) the decree had been adjusted by an arrangement for payment of Rs. 4,277-4-0 at three annas in the rupee and that Gordhandas Jamnadas had agreed to and had in fact made that payment though it was unrecorded; and (iii) the assignment of 8 November 1933 was executed in fraud of the judgment-debtors.
Appellant 2 subsequently came of age and his guardian was discharged on 20 July 1937. On 3 September 1937 the Registrar allowed the application under Rule 16 and recognised the assignment, directing execution against the properties mentioned. On appeal to Gentle J. that order was set aside on 11 March 1938, the learned Judge holding that Shantilal's power of attorney did not authorise him to assign the decree and dismissing the application under Rule 16. On appeal to a Division Bench the Registrar's order was restored by decree dated 19 January 1939: Leach C.J. and Madhavan Nair J. held that although Shantilal lacked authority, the Dutch company had ratified his assignment; they rejected the allegation of fraud as unproved and declined to enquire into any alleged adjustment because none had been recorded under Rule 2 of Order XXI.
This appeal (the present proceeding) arises from the Division Bench's restoration of the Registrar's order and the finding of ratification by the Dutch company.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether ratification by the transferor (the Dutch company) can in law validate an assignment executed by an agent who was not authorised at the time of execution.
- Whether, in the absence of a certified or recorded payment or adjustment under cl.(8) of Rule 2 of Order XXI, a judgment-debtor can maintain that the assignment is invalid because the decree had been discharged by payment or by a new bargain.
- Whether an application under Rule 16 of Order XXI made by a transferee to the Court which passed the decree is to be treated as an application for execution (and the consequences of that characterisation for recognition of unrecorded adjustments).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants challenged the Division Bench's finding that the Dutch company ratified the assignment executed by Shantilal (an agent who, they contended, lacked authority to assign the decree).
- They alleged, via the guardian's affidavit (Venkatesa Tarwadi, dated 24 April 1936), that (a) Shantilal's power of attorney did not authorise assignment; (b) there had been an adjustment (composition) of the decree for Rs. 4,277-4-0 at the rate of three annas in the rupee, and payment had been made though not recorded; and (c) the assignment dated 8 November 1933 was executed in fraud of the judgment-debtors.
- Before the Board, Mr. Wallach (for the appellants) did not rely on a contention that respondent 1 (Gordhandas Jamnadas) was a benamidar for the judgment-debtors.
Respondent's Arguments
- Mr. Pringle (for Gordhandas Jamnadas) did not assert that Shantilal's power of attorney had conferred authority to assign the decree; instead the case for the transferee relied on the Dutch company's ratification of Shantilal's act.
- The respondent's position included that the Dutch company had been duly served in accordance with Rule 16, had appeared by an advocate before the Division Bench and had confirmed the ratification — facts relied upon to uphold the assignment.
- The respondent (and courts below) treated the alleged unrecorded payment/adjustment as not preventing execution under Rule 2(3) (cl. (8) of R.2 of O.21), which provides that an unrecorded payment or adjustment "shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree."
- The Division Bench rejected the fraud allegation as unproved on the evidence before it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1822) 1 Dowl. & Ry. 32 : 24 RR 631, Soames v. Spencer | English Statute of Frauds authority considered to show that the Statute's requirement of signature did not exclude the possibility of ratification (i.e., that ratification may validate an unauthorised act). | The decision was regarded as in point on the question of ratification; the court considered the English authority but emphasised that the question depends on the precise statutory language and must be examined with reference to Indian law (Ss.196–200 Indian Contract Act). |
| '32) 19 AIR 1932 Mad 372 : 137 IC 28 : 55 Mad 720 : 62 MLJ 562 (Full Bench), Subramanyam v. Ramaswami | Held that where no certified adjustment is recorded, a judgment-debtor cannot maintain that there is no decree to be transferred; however, the debtor may attack the transferee's character (e.g., benamidar) or allege fraud. | Their Lordships agreed with the Madras Full Bench's view and applied its reasoning to uphold the assignment and to hold that an unrecorded adjustment/payment cannot be recognised by an executing court as extinguishing the decree. |
| '23) 10 AIR 1923 Bom 404 : 75 IC 893 : 47 Bom 643 : 25 Bom LR 474, Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu (Bombay) | Adopted a contrary view — proceeded on the ground that an application under Rule 16 of Order XXI is made to the Court which passed the decree and not as a Court executing the decree (bearing on recognition of unrecorded adjustments). | Their Lordships held that the Bombay decision was not sustainable and rejected its reasoning, aligning instead with the Madras Full Bench and other High Courts which treated the Rule 16 application as an application for execution. |
| ('34) 21 AIR 1934 All 209 : 148 IC 1118 : 56 All 694 : 1934 ALJ 198, Murari Lal v. Raghubir Saran (Allâhabad) | High Court view adopting the Madras Full Bench approach that an unrecorded payment/adjustment is not recognised on execution and that a transferee may apply for execution under Rule 16. | Their Lordships noted that Allahabad took the same view as Madras and relied on that alignment in preferring the Madras-style analysis over the Bombay decision. |
| ('35) 62 CLJ 316 : 40 CWN 301, Sm. Saheden Bibi t. Mir Ali (Calcutta) | Calcutta High Court similarly adopted the Madras Full Bench view on the non-recognition of unrecorded adjustments on execution and on the characterisation of a Rule 16 application as an application for execution. | Their Lordships cited Calcutta as another High Court in agreement with Madras and relied on these authorities in concluding that the Bombay precedent should not be followed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion proceeds in two broad analytical stages corresponding to the principal legal contentions before the Court.
1. Ratification of an unauthorised agent's assignment
- The Court first addressed the legal question whether ratification can validate an assignment executed by an agent who lacked authority at the time of execution. The learned Chief Justice below had answered this in the affirmative, referring to Rule 16 of Order XXI and S.130 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Their Lordships considered relevant English authority (Soames v. Spencer) under the Statute of Frauds but emphasised that the conclusion depends upon the precise statutory language and must be examined under Indian law.
- They examined Ss.196–200 of the Indian Contract Act (the general Indian law on ratification) and held that, on those provisions, it was open to the Dutch company to ratify Shantilal's purported assignment. The Court stated that ratification is equivalent in law to prior authority and may be express or implied by conduct.
- On the facts, the Court stressed that Rule 16 requires notice to alleged assignors and that the Dutch company had been duly served; they appeared by advocate to the Division Bench and confirmed ratification. The Dutch company are parties to the present appeal and did not complain at the hearing that they retained their rights as decree-holders. The High Court was not under an obligation to investigate who instructed the company's advocate. Given these circumstances, the Court upheld the assignment as valid with respect to Shantilal's authority.
2. Effect of an unrecorded payment or adjustment under Rule 2(3) (cl. (8) of Rule 2, Order XXI)
- The Court quoted cl.(8) of Rule 2 of Order XXI: "A payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree." Noting that neither payment nor adjustment had been recorded in the present case, the Court addressed whether the appellants could maintain that the assignment was invalid because the decree had been discharged by payment or a new bargain.
- Their Lordships reviewed conflicting High Court authorities. They accepted the Madras Full Bench approach (Subramanyam v. Ramaswami) and similar decisions in Allahabad and Calcutta, which hold that, in the absence of a recorded adjustment, the judgment-debtor cannot maintain that there is no decree to be transferred; but the judgment-debtor may still, if competent, attack the transferee's position on grounds such as benami status or fraud.
- The Court rejected the contrary Bombay decision (Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu), stating that Rule 16 expressly provides that "the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it," and that the application is, on its face, an application for execution. The Court reasoned that if this were otherwise, a decree-holder could not in practice assign his right to execution, which would be inconsistent with the structure of the rules.
- Their Lordships noted that the reservations made by the Madras and Calcutta courts — permitting the debtor to show that the assignee is the debtor's agent or that the assignment was in fraud — were sound. In the present case the fraud/benami allegations were disbelieved by the Registrar and the Division Bench; the appellants' counsel before the Board abandoned the benami contention.
- Addressing the evidentiary record, the Court criticised the affidavit of 24 April 1936 by the guardian (Venkatesa Tarwadi) as hearsay and unsupported by personal knowledge; the elder brother (appellant 1) gave no corroborating affidavit. Consequently the Court found no weight in that evidence to sustain the fraud allegation.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be DISMISSED. The appellants are ordered to pay respondent 1's costs.
Implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The assignment dated 8 November 1933 is upheld so far as concerns the question of Shantilal's authority by reason of ratification by the Dutch company (ratification being legally equivalent to prior authority and capable of being express or implied).
- The Court endorses the view taken by the Madras Full Bench (Subramanyam v. Ramaswami) and by the High Courts of Allahabad and Calcutta that, in the absence of a certified or recorded payment or adjustment under Rule 2 of Order XXI, an executing court will not recognise such an unrecorded payment/adjustment as extinguishing the decree; accordingly, a judgment-debtor cannot simply assert there is no decree to be transferred where no recorded adjustment exists.
- The Court disapproved the contrary Bombay decision (Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu), stating that that decision is not sustainable with respect to the issues decided in this case.
- The opinion reiterates that a judgment-debtor remains able (where evidence permits) to challenge the transferee's title by proving the transferee is a benamidar, is the debtor's agent, or that the assignment was procured by fraud; however, on the facts before the Court those allegations were not proved.
Direct procedural effect: the appeal is dismissed and respondent 1's costs are awarded against the appellants.
Sir George Rankin.-
This appeal arises out of an application made under R.16 of O. 21, Civil PC :
16. Where a decree ... is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it, and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder.
Provided that where the decree .... has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution.
On 19th February 1924, F. Friedmann's Diamanthandel Maatachappij (F. Friedmann's Diamond Trading Co., Ltd.), herein called "the Dutch company," obtained from the High Court at Madras in its original jurisdiction a decree for Rs. 24,207-4-0 with certain interest and costs against one Ramanath Joshi the appellants' father. He died on 15th September 1924, and on 8th February 1927, leave was given by the High Court to execute the decree against the appellants as his legal representatives. Appellant 2 was at that time a minor but this fact was at first overlooked. On 26th January 1985, application was made to the High Court under the rule above cited by one Gordhandas Jamnadas, who claimed to have taken an assignment dated 8th November 1933, of the decree and asked for sale of certain immovables of the judgment-debtors situate within the High Court's original jurisdiction and for an attachment of a decree which they had obtained in a Court at West Tanjore. An order having been irregularly made on 22nd October 1935, without any guardian ad litem for the minor, one Venkatesa Tarwadi was appointed guardian in April 1936, and by affidavit dated 24th April 1936, he set up certain objections to the application. He said first that the assignment of 8th November 1938, had been executed by one Shantilal Lallubhai Fandya whose power of attorney did not authorise him to assign the decree : secondly, that the decree had been adjusted by an arrangement for payment to the Dutch company of a sum of Rs. 4277-4-0 by way of composition at the rate of three annas in the rupee; that the alleged transferee Gordhandas Jamnadas had agreed to make this payment on the judgment-debtors' behalf and had in fact paid it to the Dutch company though no steps had been taken to get the payment recorded: thirdly, thereafter Shantilal and Gordhandas Jamnadas had in fraud of the judgment-debtors executed the assignment of 8th November 1933.
Appellant 2 came of age and his guardian was discharged by order of 20th July 1987. On 3rd September1937, the Registrar allowed the application under R.16, recognised the assignment and directed execution to proceed against the properties which had been mentioned in the application. On appeal to Gentle J. this order was set aside on 11th March 1938. The learned Judge held that Shantilal's power of attorney did not authorise him to assign the decree and dismissed the application under R.16. On appeal to a Division Bench the Registrar's order was restored by decree dated 19th January 1939. Leach C. J., and Madhavan Nair J. held that though Shantilal's power of attorney did not authorise him to assign the decree, his principals the Dutch company had ratified his action in making the assignment. They rejected the allegation of fraud as unproved and refused to enquire into any alleged adjustment of the decree as none had been recorded under R. 2 of O. 21.
In this appeal, Mr. Wallach for the appellants does not rely on any case to the effect that Gordhandas Jamnadas respondent 1 was benamidar for the judgment-debtors. Mr. Pringle for Gordhandas Jamnadas does not contend that Shantilal's power of attorney conferred on him authority from the Dutch company to assign the decree. The appellants' main complaint is against the finding that the Dutch company ratified the assignment of the decree. On this the first question is whether ratification would in law validate an assignment executed by an agent who was not authorised at the time of execution. The learned Chief Justice answered this question of law in the affirmative, having in mind not only the terms of R. 16 above cited but also the requirement of S.130, T.P. Act. By that section "an instrument in writing signed by the transferor or his duly authorised agent" is the only method of effecting the transfer of an "actionable claim." Their Lordships are not to be taken as deciding that a decree is an "actionable claim" within the definition of that phrase given in S.3 of the Act. The decisions in India afford considerable support to a contrary view and they have not been discussed in argument at the bar. The cases upon which the learned Judges of the Division Bench proceeded were (1822) 1 Dowl. and Ry. 32 : 24 RR 631, Soames v. Spencer. and (1822) 1 Dowl. and Ry. 32 : 24 RR 631, Soames v. Spencer - English cases upon the Statute of Frauds. These were considered to be in point as showing that S. 4 of that Statute did not exclude the possibility of ratification by the phrase "signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised." The question must depend on the exact language of the enactment to be construed, and must in India be examined in the light of Ss.196 to 200, Indian Contract Act, which contain the general law of India upon the point. On these sections their Lordships hold that it was open to the Dutch company to ratify the act of Shantilal who had purported to act on the company's behalf in assigning the decree to Gordhandas Jamnadas. Ratification is in law equivalent to previous authority; it may be express or it may be effected impliedly by conduct. Upon the question of fact the appellants are in extreme difficulty. Notice must go to the alleged assignors by the terms of Rule 16 and the Dutch company have been duly served. They appeared by their advocate before the Division Bench and confirmed the ratification. They are parties to the appeal now before the Board and do not appear at the hearing to complain that they still retain their rights as decree-holders. The High Court was under no duty to enquire who instructed the advocate who appeared for the Dutch company. In these circumstances the assignment of 8th November 1933, must be upheld so far as regards the question of Shantilal's authority.The next question arises upon the terms of cl.(8) of R.2 of O.21 :
3. A payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree.
Neither payment nor adjustment of any kind had been recorded in the present case. Can the appellants be permitted to maintain that the assignment is invalid because the decree had been discharged by payment or by a new bargain ? A Full Bench decision of the High Court at Madras has held that while in these circumstances it may be open to the judgment-debtor to attack the transferee's position by showing that he cannot legally possess that character, or that he is a benamidar or for reasons of a similar nature, the judgment-debtor cannot, when there has been no certified adjustment, maintain that there is no decree to be transferred: ('32) 19 AIR 1932 Mad 372 : 137 IC 28 : 55 Mad 720: 62 MLJ 562 (FB), Subramanyam v. Ramaswami. A contrary view had been taken in Bombay, ('23) 10 AIR 1923 Bom 404 : 75 IC 893 : 47 Bom 643 : 25 Bom LR 474, Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu which proceeded on the ground that an application under R.16 of O.21 was made to the Court as the Court which passed the decree and not as a Court which is executing the decree. The question has been recently before the High Courts at Allahabad, (('34) 21 AIR 1934 All 209 : 148 IC 1118 : 56 All 694 : 1934 ALJ 198, Murari Lal v. Raghubir Saran), and Calcutta (('35) 62 CLJ 316 : 40 CWN 301, Sm. Saheden Bibi t. Mir Ali) which have taken the same view as the Madras Full Bench and have amplified the same reasoning. Their Lordships are of opinion that the Bombay decision is not sustainable. The rule says that "the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it." On the face of the rule, the application to be made thereunder is an application for execution : that it is made to the Court which passed the decree does not tend to show the contrary. A consideration which strengthens the words just cited is that otherwise the decree-holder, who certainly can take out execution himself, cannot assign this right to another. Their Lordships are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Madras in the Full Bench case and in the present case.
In the Madras and Calcutta cases above mentioned the Court expressly refused to hold that a failure to record satisfaction or adjustment of the decree would prevent the judgment-debtor from showing, if he could, that the decree-holder's assignee was really a benamidar for the judgment-debtor, or that the assignment was made in fraud of the latter. Their Lordships see no reason to doubt the correctness of this reservation in any case where it becomes necessary to consider whether the assignment was taken by the debtor's agent or with the debtor's money. A case upon these lines was made by the present appellants but was disbelieved on the evidence by the Registrar and by the Division Bench, who have negatived the charge of fraud brought against Gordhandas Jamnadas. The case that he was benamidar for the judgment-debtors has been abandoned by Mr. Wallach before the Board. On these points, their Lordships are of opinion that the appellants have made out no case. In-deed, the affidavit of 24th April 1936, made by Venkatesa Tanvadi, appellant 2's brother-in-law, while acting as his guardian ad litem, is of such a character that no weight can be attached to it. He does not profess to speak of his own knowledge and does not give the source of his information: much of what he states is, if true, within the knowledge of the elder brother, appellant 1, who has not deposed to any such effect. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will pay respondent 1's costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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