Balvinder Singh Constable No. 863 (Petitioner) v. State Of Punjab And Another (S).

Pritpal Singh, J.:— The petitioner Balvinder Singh is a Police Constable. A regular departmental enquiry was held against him on the charge of remaining absent from duty without leave. A charge-sheet was served on him on 23rd of November, 1972 (Annexure P-1). The departmental enquiry was held by a Deputy Superintendent of Police who, in his report, held the petitioner guilty of the charge. On the basis of the enquiry report, the Superintendent of Police dismissed the petitioner from service on 5th of May, 1973. The petitioner challenged the order of dismissal in a civil suit. This order was set aside by the Civil Court on the ground that no proper enquiry had been held because full opportunity was not granted to the petitioner to defend himself. Pursuant to the decree passed by the Civil Court the petitioner was reinstated vide an order dated 22nd of September, 1976. More than two years thereafter a second enquiry on the same charge was initiated against the petitioner and replica of the previous charge-sheet was served on him. This charge-sheet dated 11th of April, 1979, is annexure P-3. In the present writ petition the initiation of the second enquiry has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the previous dismissal order in pursuance of similar charge-sheet having been set aside by the Civil Court, the matter cannot be reopened.

2. The State of Punjab opposed this writ petition on the plea that the previous dismissal order was set aside by the Civil Court on a technical ground of the petitioner not having been granted full opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry proceedings and not because he was exonerated of the charge.

3. It is pleaded that the second equiry in such circumstances is not barred,

4. The judgment of the Civil Court by which the petitioner's suit was decreed is Annexure P-4. It dearly shows that the petitioner's dismissal from service in pursuance of the earlier enquiry was set aside because the Inquiry Officer did not afford a reasonable opportunity to him to defend himself. It is evident from the judgment that the enquiry against the petitioner was held to be improper and violative of the principles of natural justice and it was on that basis that the petitioner's suit was decreed. It is plain that the effect of this judgment is that the Inquiry ‘Officer's report was quashed and the State of Punjab was left at liberty to institute a fresh enquiry The Civil Court did not comment on the merits of the charge levelled against the petitioner and he was not absolved of the same. The Punjab State, therefore, cannot be considered barred to institute a fresh enquiry on the same charge. In this context, the Supreme Court's observations in The State of Assam v. J.N Roy Biswas, (1976) 1 SCC 234 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 2277, are pertinent. It was observed that no Government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. The Supreme Court clarified that only if a disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated on full exoneration the Government cannot restart the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise vested by rules in some authority. In the present case, the disciplinary case against the petitioner was never closed by the State of Punjab. It was the Civil Court which had set aside the petitioner's dismissal from service due to the procedural defect in the enquiry holding that full opportunity had not been granted to the petitioner to defend himself.

5. The learned petitioner's counsel contended that the reinstatement of the petitioner in pursuance of the Civil Court decree amounts to exoneration from the charge. There seems to be no merit in this contention. If a Government servant is reinstated in pursuance of a Civil Court decree holding the enquiry bad in law, without going into the merits of the charges, it cannot be considered reinstatement on full exoneration. In such circumstanbes the disciplinary case cannot to be deemed to be closed. This precise view has been expresssd by the Supreme Court in J.F Roy Biswas's case (supra).

6. The learned petitioner's counsel in support of his contention cited two judgments, one of the Mysore High Court in C.D Prabhu v. The Deputy Commissioner South Kanara District Bangalore, 1969 S.L.R 362, and the other of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in P.R Kohli v. State, 1976 Lab IC 992. However, both the judgments are distinguishable. In C.D Prabhu's case (supra), the first enquiry was completed against the delinquent official and it had reached the state where the disciplinary proceedings had either to result in punishment or in exoneration. The Mysore High Court held that if these disciplinary proceedings had not been terminated in that way the commencement of another disciplinary proceedings with respect to those charges was plainly incompetent. In P.M Kohli's case (supra) one Executive Engineer, one Supervisor and one Overseer working in Public Health Department were demoted in pursuance of a departmental enquiry. They moved the High Court in writ for quashing their demotion. The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the order of the Government. Thereafter, the Government rescinded the order of demotion and as a further follow up action created a new post of Executive Engineer Page: 492and reinstated on that post the Government servant who was earlier working as Executive Engineer and had been demoted. The other two Government servants who were working as Supervisor and Overseer respectively were promoted. Subsequently, the Government ordered to hold a de novo enquiry against them. In such circumstances it was held that when the Government decided to rescind the order of demotion and also further decided to reinstate the petitioners retrospectively and even promoted two of them, it followed that the Government intended not to pursue the case any further and the order of reinstatement had the effect of closing the enquiry. It was held that it could be presumed that the Government servants had been exonerated and, therefore, they could not be proceeded against afresh. It is self-evident that these two judgments are entirely inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In this case neither the petitioner had been exonerated nor the disciplinary case against him has been closed by the State Government. In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot urge that a second enquiry cannot be launched against him.

7. It is next contended by the petitioner's counsel that the second enquiry having been, delayed for more than two years would indicate that the Government in the wake of the Civil Court judgment (Annexure P-4) had closed the disciplinary case against the petitioner presumbly on full exoneration. In his submission there was now no power with the Government to reopen the case. I find no substance in this contention. Simply because of the delay in the initiation of the second enquiry no presumption can be drawn that the State Government had closed the disciplinary case against the petitioner and had exonerated him of the charge. The learned counsel did not cite any judgment in support of the contention. On the contrary, this Court held in Parkash Nath Saida v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) Punjab, 1971 S.L.R 683 that the starting of a second enquiry after a long time is no doubt to be deprecated but it does not vitiate the enquiry. It was clearly held that delay in the holding of second enquiry in itself cannot lead to the conclusion that the State Government had dropped the entire proceedings.

8. In view of the above I find no merit in this petition and dismiss the same. The parties to bear their own costs.

9. Petition dismissed.