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Maneklal Manilal, In Re

Bombay High Court
Jul 12, 1928
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Patkar, J.) — Reference under Section 61, Indian Stamp Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference by the Collector of Ahmedabad under section 61 of the Indian Stamp Act challenging the determination of the Joint First Class Subordinate Judge, Ahmedabad, concerning two documents produced as Exhibits 416 and 417. The Subordinate Judge had held Exhibit 416 to be an agreement (requiring a stamp of eight annas plus a Rs. 5 penalty) and had regarded Exhibit 417 as an agreement. The Collector took a different view on both documents and referred the matter for revision. The reference required the court to decide the character of each document for stamp-duty purposes and the duty and penalties payable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Exhibit 416 is properly characterized as (a) wholly an agreement, or (b) in part an agreement and in part a release, and what stamp duty and penalty are payable.
  2. Whether Exhibit 417 is an "agreement to lease" within the meaning of section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act (and related definitions under the Indian Registration Act), or whether it is a simple agreement.
  3. If Exhibit 417 were an agreement to lease, whether the Rs. 2 lakhs mentioned in it constitutes a fine or premium or money advanced in addition to rent such as to attract ad valorem duty under Article 35(c) (or another clause of Article 35) of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Collector of Ahmedabad

  • Regarding Exhibit 416: the Collector considered the document to be in part an agreement (first part) and in part a release (second part), and assessed a combined stamp duty of Rs. 10-8-0 in all, plus a penalty of Rs. 105.
  • Regarding Exhibit 417: the Collector's opinion was that an agreement to lease is a lease under clause (b) of section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act, that the Rs. 2 lakhs constituted a premium for the lease, and that the duty leviable was Rs. 2,000 under Article 35(c) of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act.

Learned Government Pleader

  • Urged that Exhibit 417 is an agreement of lease falling within the definition of "lease" and thus requires ad valorem stamping; reliance was placed on a prior Reference under Stamp Act, s.46, and on the proviso to Article 35 which limits duty on a subsequent lease where the agreement was properly stamped.
  • Also argued (as noted in the opinion) that under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act an advance (price paid or promised as consideration) may constitute a premium and hence could make the document fall under Article 35(c).

Joint First Class Subordinate Judge (original view as recorded)

  • Held Exhibit 416 to be an agreement requiring a stamp of eight annas plus Rs. 5 as penalty.
  • Held Exhibit 417 to be an agreement (implicitly an agreement of lease as per the context, though the exact classification at trial level is recorded simply as "an agreement").

Defendants

  • The defendants did not contest the Collector's position with regard to Exhibit 416 (the Collector's assessment as to its being partly a release and partly an agreement).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company (Privy Council) That an agreement to lease must effect a present demise (operate as a lease in proesenti) and not merely contemplate a future lease in certain contingencies. The court relied on this authority to conclude that Exhibit 417 did not amount to an agreement to lease because there was no present demise at the date of the document.
Chandrashankar v. Bai Magan That the Indian Stamp Act and Indian Registration Act may be read together in certain contexts, and definitions under one Act may inform questions under the other. The court referenced this decision to justify considering definitions in both Acts when determining whether Exhibit 417 was an agreement to lease.
Reference under Stamp Act, s.46 Support for the contention that an agreement of lease requires ad valorem stamping even if a regular deed is to be executed later (in that case there was a present demise). The court distinguished that reference from the present case because, in the cited reference, there was a present demise of existing property; Exhibit 417 lacked such a present demise.
Secretary of State v. Sir Mahomed Yusuf; Panchanan Bose v. Chandi Charan Misra; Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Ramaswami Mudaliar Collective High Court decisions reflecting a consensus that an agreement to lease must be an actual present demise for registration/statutory purposes. These authorities were invoked to support the proposition that an agreement to lease must amount to an actual demise; the court applied this consensus to hold Exhibit 417 was not an agreement to lease.
Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (textbook) Support for the proposition that premises to be let must be in existence to effect a lease. The court cited Woodfall to support its view that, because the premises to be let were not in existence at the time of Exhibit 417, the document could not create an agreement to lease.
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XVIII Statement (cited) that existence of premises is essential to create a lease. Used to reinforce the conclusion that Exhibit 417 did not create a present lease or an agreement amounting to a present demise because the premises and lessor's interest did not exist at the relevant time.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step statutory and factual analysis focused on the character of each document for stamp-duty purposes and on whether established principles concerning "agreement to lease" applied.

1. Exhibit 416: The Subordinate Judge had treated it as an agreement requiring an eight-anna stamp plus a Rs. 5 penalty; the Collector considered it to be partly an agreement and partly a release, requiring stamps accordingly (8 annas for the agreement part and Rs. 5 for the release part) and higher overall duty and penalty. The defendants did not contest the Collector's position. The court therefore accepted the Collector's classification and stamp assessment for Exhibit 416.

2. Exhibit 417 — factual matrix: The court set out the factual terms of Exhibit 417: Motilal passed the document in favour of Maneklal with reference to 4,260 square yards owned by Bai Dhanlaxmi; the parties contemplated that Maneklal would secure a registered lease from Dhanlaxmi; Motilal would then advance approximately Rs. 2 lakhs for building shops; after construction Motilal would take the shops on rent for 15 years at Rs. 455 per shop per year; payments to be made in staged advances; a registered lease was in fact executed in favour of Maneklal a week after Exhibit 417 was executed.

3. Legal question (statutory definitions): The court examined the definition of "lease" in section 2(16)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act and the parallel definition in section 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act (which includes "an agreement to lease"). It noted prior authority (Chandrashankar) permitting reading the two Acts together for definitional questions, and cited the Privy Council decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi as establishing that an agreement to lease must create a present demise.

4. Application of precedent and facts: Applying the Hemanta Kumari principle and relevant High Court decisions, the court found that Exhibit 417 contained no present demise; rather it contained contingencies (securing the registered lease from the owner; advances by Motilal; obtaining municipal permission to construct) which might or might not happen. The number of shops and the exact rent for the premises were not fixed; only a scale (Rs. 455 per shop) was fixed, and the premises themselves did not exist at the time. Moreover, Maneklal did not possess any demisable interest at the time (the registered lease was obtained only a week later).

5. Alternative analysis if treated as agreement to lease: The court considered, hypothetically, whether Exhibit 417 would fall under Article 35(c) as a lease "granted for a fine or premium or for money advanced in addition to rent reserved." The court concluded that the Rs. 2 lakhs was not a premium or money advanced in addition to rent; rather it was a loan/advance to be recouped from rents — effectively crediting Motilal as a creditor entitled to be repaid from future rents. Article 35(b) did not apply because rent was mentioned as payable. Article 35(a) (leases where rent is fixed and no premium is paid and where term exceeds three years) did not apply because the aggregate rent for the premises was not fixed (only a per-shop scale) and the premises did not yet exist.

6. Conclusion on Exhibit 417: On both the primary (no present demise; contingent arrangement) and alternative (analysis under Article 35) grounds, the court concluded Exhibit 417 is a simple agreement — essentially an agreement by Motilal to advance funds to enable Maneklal to obtain a lease and build shops, with a subsidiary promise to take any completed shops on rent — and not an agreement to lease attracting ad valorem duty. Accordingly, Exhibit 417 required only a stamp of eight annas.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

The reference is allowed in part: Exhibit 416 is held to be in part an agreement and in part a release (stamp duty: Rs. 10-8-0 total; penalty Rs. 105), and Exhibit 417 is held to be a simple agreement (not an agreement to lease) requiring a stamp of 8 annas (penalty Rs. 5).

Direct consequences for the parties (as recorded by the court):

  • Exhibit 416: Stamp duty payable recorded as Rs. 10/8 plus a penalty of Rs. 105.
  • Exhibit 417: Stamp duty payable recorded as 8 annas and penalty Rs. 5.
  • No order as to costs was made.

The opinion does not assert the establishment of any new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; the decision records the application of established principles to determine stamp liability on the two documents.

Judges: Patkar, J.; Baker, J. (Baker, J. concurred and reiterated the reasoning and conclusions).

Order: "Order accordingly." (J.G.R.)

Show all summary ...

Patkar, J.:—

This is a reference made by the Collector of Ahmedabad invoking our revisional powers under section 61 of the Indian Stamp Act with reference to the decision of the Joint First Class Subordinate Judge, Ahmedabad, before whom two documents, Exhibits 416 and 417, were produced. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion with regard to Exhibit 416 that it was an agreement, and required a stamp of eight annas plus Rs. 5 as penalty. The Collector of Ahmedabad is of opinion that the document is an agreement as to the first part and a release as to the second part, and therefore required a stamp of 8 annas with regard to the first part and Rs. 5 plus Rs. 5 on the second part, Rs. 10-8-0 in all plus penalty of Rs. 105. This position is not contested on behalf of the defendants. We, therefore, accept the view of the Collector, and hold that the document, Exhibit 416, is in part an agreement, and in part a release, and requires a stamp of 8 annas for the first part and Rs. 5 on the second part.

With regard to the second document, Exhibit 417, the Joint First Class Subordinate Judge was of opinion that it was an agreement. The Collector of Ahmedabad is of opinion that an agreement to lease is a lease as defined in clause (b) of section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act, that the amount of Rs. 2 lakhs constituted a premium for the lease, and the duty leviable was Rs. 2,000 under Article 35(c) of Schedule 1 of the Indian Stamp Act. The document, Exhibit 417, was passed in favour of Maneklal by Motilal Govindlal with reference to 4,260 square yards which belonged to one Bai Dhanlaxmi. The document was passed on the basis that Maneklal would secure a registered lease from Bai Dhanlaxmi, and after the lease was secured, Motilal was to advance a sum of about Rs. 2 lakhs for building shops on the land, and after the construction of the shops Motilal agreed to take the shops on rent for a period of 15 years. The rent was to commence after the shops became ready, and were delivered into the possession of Motilal. Out of the amount of 2 lakhs, Rs. 11,001 were paid in cash on the day of the execution of the document, and the balance out of Rs. 25,000 was to be paid within three or four days. The remaining amount of Rs. 1,75,000 was to be paid at the rate of Rs. 20,000 per month when the building would be under construction. The amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was to be recouped by Motilal by taking the same out of the rents. The document was passed on January 15, 1920. A registered lease was passed in favour of Maneklal by Dhanlaxmi on January 22, 1920, a week after this agreement. It is urged by the learned Government Pleader that the document, Exhibit 417, is an agreement of lease, and falls within the definition of “lease” under section 2(16)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act kabuliyat or other undertaking in writing to occupy or deliver rent for immoveable property, and reliance is placed on the case in Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, in support of the contention that an agreement of lease requires a stamp even though it was contemplated by the parties that a regular deed was to be effected afterwards. The proviso to Article 35 of the Indian Stamp Act lays down that “in any case when an agreement to lease is stamped with the ad valorem stamp required for a lease, and a lease in pursuance of such agreement is subsequently executed, the duty on such lease shall not exceed one rupee.” It is therefore contended that every agreement to lease must be stamped with an ad valorem stamp, and when a subsequent lease contemplated by the parties is actually effected, a stamp of one rupee would suffice. The question, therefore, in this reference is whether the document, Exhibit 417, is an agreement of lease within the meaning of section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act. “Lease” is also defined in the Indian Registration Act, section 2(7), as including a “counterpart, kabuliyat, an undertaking to cultivate or occupy, and an agreement to lease”. Both under the Indian Stamp Act and the Indian Registration Act an agreement to lease is included in the word “lease.” Though the Indian Stamp Act and the Indian Registration Act are not strictly in pari materia, it has been held in Chandrashankar v. Bai Magan, that the two Acts may be read together, and that the definition in the Indian Stamp Act with regard to a composition deed might be accepted in considering the question under the Indian Registration Act. According to the decision of the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debt v. Midnapur Zamindari Company, an agreement to lease must be a present demise. It must be a document which effects an actual demise or operates as a lease in proesenti, and not an agreement that in certain contingencies a lease will be granted. So far as the Indian Registration Act is concerned, there is consensus of opinion in the different High Courts as reflected in the decisions in Secretary of State v. Sir Mahomed Yusuf, Panchanan Bose v. Chandi Charan Misra, and Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Ramaswami Mudaliar, that an agreement to lease must be an actual demise. If this view accepted with regard to the Indian Registration Act can be applied in considering the question under the Indian Stamp Act, it must follow that an agreement to lease must amount to an actual demise and not an agreement that in certain contingencies a lease will be granted. In the present document there is no actual demise, but there is an agreement to lease the land under certain contingencies which may or may not happen. The first contingency was that Maneklal should secure a registered lease from Bai Dhanlaxmi with regard to 4,260 square yards. The second contingency was that Motilal should advance from time to time amounts to the extent of Rs. 2 lakhs to Maneklal. The third contingency, which though not contemplated in the document, must in the nature of things be inferred, was that the Municipality should give permission to construct the market which was proposed to be erected on the 4,260 square yards. If all these contingencies happened, then Motilal was to pay Rs. 455 per shop as rent for the shops that would be erected on the land, and the rent was to commence after the shops became ready and were delivered into the possession of Motilal. The number of shops to be built was not fixed under the agreement nor was the time fixed within which the shops were to be erected on the land. The document, Exhibit 417, is an agreement by Motilal to advance Rs. 2 lakhs in order to enable Maneklal, after securing a lease of the plot from Bai Dhanlaxmi, to build shops on the land, and there is a subsidiary agreement that if the shops were built and possession of the shops was delivered to Motilal, he was to pay Rs. 455 per shop per year as rent. The document is, therefore, a simple agreement and not an agreement to lease.

Assuming that the document is an agreement to lease, the question would next arise whether the lease which includes agreement to lease falls under Article 35(c) of the Indian Stamp Act “where the lease is granted for a fine or premium or for money advanced in addition to rent reserved.” It is contended on behalf of the Collector that the Rs. 2 lakhs mentioned in the agreement is either a premium or money advanced in addition to rent reserved. We are of opinion that the amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was only a loan which was agreed to be paid by Motilal to Maneklal, and did not form part of the consideration of the lease. The amount was to be repaid out of the rents, and Motilal was to the extent of the advances a creditor of Maneklal, and was entitled to be recouped out of the rents which would become payable after the construction of the shops. The amount of Rs. 2 lakhs does not, in my opinion, constitute either a fine or premium or money advanced in addition to the rent. Article 35(b) also does not apply because rent is mentioned as being payable. The question remains whether it is a lease which falls under clause (a) of Article 35 “where by such lease the rent is fixed and no premium is paid or delivered” and where the lease purports to be for a term in excess of three years. It does not appear that any rent is fixed under this agreement. What is fixed is a scale of rent per shop. The number of shops is not mentioned in the agreement, and the rent for the year for the premises to be let is not fixed, and though the rent is said to commence from the time the possession is handed over to Motilal, there is no certain period from which the rent is to run. We think that for the purpose of effecting an agreement of lease it is necessary that the premises to be let should be in existence. This view is supported by Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant at page 158, and Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume XVIII, page 369. At the time of the agreement the lessor had no interest in the property to be let. The premises to be let were not in existence. In Reference Under Stamp Act, s. 46, the lessor had interest in the property agreed to be leased and there was a present demise of existing property. In our opinion the agreement, Exhibit 417, is an agreement to advance Rs. 2 lakhs for building shops, and in the eventuality of Maneklal getting a registered lease from Bai Dhanlaxmi and building shops out of the money advanced by Motilal, there was a further agreement that Motilal was to take the shops in lease for 15 years after they became ready and were delivered into the possession of Motilal. We think that this document does not amount to an agreement to lease, but falls under a simple agreement, and must be stamped with a stamp of 8 annas.

We, therefore, under section 61(2) of the Indian. Stamp Act record a declaration that with regard to Exhibit 416 the stamp duty payable was Rs. 10/8 plus, a penalty of Rs. 105, and with regard to Exhibit 417 the stamp duty payable was 8 annas and the penalty Rs. 5. We make no order as to costs.

Baker, J.:—I agree. The document in question, Exhibit 417, is passed by Motilal to Maneklal, and after stating that Maneklal has taken on rent from Bai Dhanlaxmi the property in question, the executant Motilal binds himself to take on rent all the shops to be constructed on the said land according to the first plan for a period of 15 years. After reciting the payment of Rs. 25,000 as earnest money, he undertakes to advance Rs. 1,75,000, that is, in all Rs. 2 lakhs for the construction of buildings on this land. Credit for this advance is to be given to him by Maneklal out of the rents. The rents are fixed at Rs. 455 per year for each shop. After the registration of Maneklal's lease Motilal is to execute a fair document in respect of the same as agreed. The first question is whether under Article 35 of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act this document constitutes a lease or agreement to lease. The Collector in his letter of reference has given his opinion that the document falls under Article 35(c), that is, where the lease is granted for a fine or premium or for money advanced in addition to rent reserved. It has been contended by the learned Government Pleader that under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act the transfer of a right to enjoy immoveable property in consideration of a price paid or promised (which price is called the premium) is a lease, and that this advance of Rs. 2 lakhs made or to be made by Motilal constitutes the premium. But as a matter of fact this money advanced by Motilal is not a premium, because it is not a price paid to the lessor, but an advance which was to be repaid out of the rent payable as it accrued due. It is then contended that it is money advanced under Article 35(c). But that clause speaks of money advanced in addition to rent reserved. This is not money advanced in addition to rent reserved. It is as a matter of fact a payment of rent in advance, and it forms part of the rent itself, and is not a separate payment. I am, therefore, of opinion that under no circumstances could this document fall under Article 35(c). Obviously it cannot fall under Article 35(b), which refers to a case where the lease is granted for a fine or premium, or for money advanced and where no rent is reserved. In the present case rent is reserved. It follows therefore that the only article under which this document could fall would be Article 35(a), and as the lease purports to be for a term of 15 years it would fall under clause (iii) of Article 35(a). There are, however, other considerations which have been put forward which lead me to agree with the view that the document does not conform to the definition of a lease at all. In view of the ruling of the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company, that there must be a present interest created in order to satisfy the definition of a lease under the Indian Registration Act (and there is no reason why, the definition in the two statutes being almost entirely the same, the same considerations should not apply here), it will appear that there is no present demise in this case. As a matter of fact the alleged lessor Maneklal did not obtain a lease from the owner Bai Dhanlaxmi until a week later than the execution of the document in question, and, therefore, at the date of Exhibit 417 he was not in possession of any interest in this land which was capable of being demised by him. I need not refer to the other cases which have already been quoted in the judgment of my learned colleague. Again, this document refers to buildings which have yet to be built. The learned Government Pleader has referred to a distinction between section 122 and section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Although there is no definition of immoveable property in the Transfer of Property Act, he has pointed out that in section 122, which refers to gifts, the word “existing” is used, and he argues that therefore immoveable property dealt with by section 105, which refers to leases, need not be in existence. There does not appear to be any ruling in this country directly on this point, although there are several English cases, but it has been laid down by Lord Halsbury at page 369 of Volume XVIII of his Laws of England, as well as at page 158 of Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, 21st Edition, that in order to create a lease the existence of the premises to be leased is essential. We find, therefore, that in the present case not only were the premises purporting to be agreed to be leased not in existence, but the ostensible lessor had no interest in the property which was to be leased at the time of the agreement, and in these circumstances I agree that this document does not fulfil the conditions of an agreement to lease. If there could be no lease of the property at that time, the document could not amount to an agreement to lease, for the property was not in existence. I, therefore, concur in the order which has been made.

Order accordingly.
J.G.R