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Shiv Kumar Dubey v. State Of U.P And Ors.

Allahabad High Court
Feb 6, 2014
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference made by a Division Bench to the Full Bench concerning the correctness of two prior decisions interpreting the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. The issue concerns compassionate appointments to dependents of deceased government employees who died while in service ("in harness"). The Full Bench was tasked with determining whether the interpretations in Subhash Yadav v. State of U.P and Vivek Yadav v. State of U.P on Rule 5(iii) and related provisions of the Rules correctly state the law. The Rules provide for recruitment of dependents of deceased government servants to alleviate financial hardship caused by the death of the breadwinner, subject to conditions, including a five-year application period from the date of death, with a discretionary power to relax this period in cases of undue hardship.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the judgments in Subhash Yadav v. State of U.P and Vivek Yadav v. State of U.P correctly interpret the provisions of Rule 5(iii) and the proviso thereto read with Rule 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subhash Yadav v. State of U.P (2011) 1 UPLBEC 494 Interpretation of Rule 5(iii) and discretionary relaxation of five-year application period for compassionate appointment. Held that authorities cannot reject applications after five years without rational consideration; discretion must be exercised reasonably.
Vivek Yadav v. State of U.P, 2010 (5) ALJ 325 Applicability of Rule 5(iii) when applicant was a minor at time of death; interpretation of time limit and relaxation. Clarified that application must be made by a competent person (major), but discretion to relax time limit applies if hardship continues.
Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138 Purpose of compassionate appointment to alleviate immediate financial crisis, not a vested right or post-for-post entitlement. Emphasized compassionate appointment is for immediate relief and cannot be claimed after unreasonable delay.
Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 192 Compassionate appointment as an exception to general recruitment rules and its impact on rights of other candidates. Held that compassionate appointment should not nullify the general recruitment rights of others.
General Manager (D & PB) v. Kunti Tiwary, (2004) 7 SCC 271 Consideration of family income and financial condition in compassionate appointment. Found family was not in penury; compassionate appointment not warranted.
Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja, 2004 AIR SCW 4602 Same principle as above regarding financial condition and need. Followed the view that compassionate appointment depends on financial need.
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation v. Nanak Chand, (2004) 12 SCC 487 Compassionate appointment is an exception, not a mode of recruitment. Reiterated the object is to prevent family deprivation of livelihood after employee's death.
Commissioner of Public Instructions v. K.R Vishwanath, (2005) 7 SCC 206 Compassionate appointment claims not strictly protected under Articles 14 and 16; must follow rules. Held that appointments on compassionate grounds cannot be granted outside the prescribed scheme.
Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 468 Minor applicants' eligibility and timing for compassionate appointment. Rejected claim that minor at time of death can apply after attaining majority without time limit.
State of J & K v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 General rule of open competitive appointment; compassionate appointment as exception. Held that if family survived long after death, compassionate appointment unnecessary.
V. Shivamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 13 SCC 730 Conditions and limitations on compassionate appointments under Articles 14 and 16. Outlined principles limiting compassionate appointment to immediate financial crisis and lower posts.
Santosh Kumar Dubey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 6 SCC 481 Time limit for application and immediate financial hardship requirement. Denied compassionate appointment after long survival of family without aid.
Local Administration Department v. M. Selvanayagam, (2011) 13 SCC 42 Requirement of immediate succour and financial deprivation for compassionate appointment. Stressed that late appointments without due consideration violate Articles 14 and 16.
Shreejith L. v. Deputy Director (Education) Kerala, (2012) 7 SCC 248 Reiteration of principles governing compassionate appointment. Confirmed prior principles on compassionate appointment.
Union of India v. Shashank Goswami, (2012) 11 SCC 307 Requirement of dependency and sudden crisis; compassionate appointment not a right. Emphasized appointment only on financial crisis and eligibility under rules.
State of U.P v. Pankaj Kumar Vishnoi, 2013 AIR SCW 5046 Application of Rule 5 of Uttar Pradesh Rules on compassionate appointment. Confirmed principles limiting compassionate appointment to immediate hardship cases.
Chief Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs v. Prabhat Singh, (2013) 1 UPLBEC 357 Strict adherence to norms and rejection of sympathy-based appointments. Warned courts against sympathy overriding prescribed norms.
Mgb Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, (2014) 13 SCC 583 Adherence to Articles 14 and 16; compassionate appointment as exception for immediate financial relief. Held compassionate employment not a vested right and must be timely.
Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 Application delay by minors and scope of compassionate relief. Rejected claims based on inheritance-like rights and long delays.
Jagdish Prasad v. The State of Bihar, JT 1995 (9) SC 131 Claims by minors after attaining majority and limitation on compassionate appointment. Denied appointment after long delay post majority, emphasizing immediacy.
Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tanwar, (1996) 8 SCC 23 Discretionary power to relax time limit and its limits. Set aside High Court decision allowing delayed application; emphasized immediacy.
Sanjay Kumar v. The State of Bihar, (2000) 7 SCC 192 Claims by minors reaching majority and timing of application. Held no reservation of vacancy during minority; relief is for immediate crisis.
Union of India v. Smt. Asha Mishra, C.M.W.P No. 13102 of 2010 Compassionate appointment principles and timing. Held compassionate appointment is not a vested right and must be proximate to death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reaffirming the statutory framework of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, emphasizing that compassionate appointment is an exception to the constitutional principles of equality and merit-based public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The object of compassionate appointment is to alleviate immediate financial hardship caused by the death of a government servant while in service.

The Court analyzed the provisions of Rule 5, which ordinarily requires an application within five years from the date of death, but allows the State Government discretionary power to relax this limit in cases of undue hardship, subject to the applicant providing a written explanation with supporting evidence.

The Court reviewed the two Division Bench decisions referred for consideration. It clarified that while a minor cannot apply during minority, the discretionary power to relax the time limit may be exercised if the applicant applies within a reasonable time after attaining majority and demonstrates continuing financial hardship. However, this discretion must be exercised on objective grounds and not as a blanket rule.

The Court extensively examined Supreme Court precedents, which consistently hold that compassionate appointment is not a vested right, must be confined to immediate financial crisis relief, and cannot be used as an alternative mode of recruitment. The principle of immediacy is critical; long delays or survival of the family without aid weaken the claim.

The Court emphasized that the discretion to relax the time limit is an exception and must be exercised with scrupulous care based on objective evidence of undue hardship. It rejected any interpretation that would suspend the operation of the five-year limit during minority or allow indefinite delay. The Court concluded by answering the reference that the interpretations in the two Division Bench judgments must be read in light of these principles, requiring rational and objective exercise of discretion under Rule 5.

Holding and Implications

The Full Bench held that the interpretation of Rule 5(iii) and the provisos thereto, as laid down in the Division Bench judgments of Subhash Yadav and Vivek Yadav, must be understood to require a rational and objective exercise of the discretionary power to relax the five-year application period, based on demonstrated undue hardship supported by written justification and evidence.

The Court clarified that compassionate appointment is an exception to the rule of open and merit-based recruitment, aimed solely at immediate financial relief to the bereaved family. The discretion to relax the time limit is not unfettered and cannot be applied as a general rule, particularly not to suspend the time limit during minority or to allow indefinite delay. This decision directs that the State Government must assess applications for compassionate appointment carefully, objectively, and in accordance with the statutory scheme and constitutional principles.

The ruling does not establish a new precedent beyond clarifying the correct interpretation of the relevant Rules and prior case law. It impacts the parties by requiring a reasoned and evidence-based exercise of discretion in future applications and appeals concerning compassionate appointments under the Uttar Pradesh Rules.

Show all summary ...

1. Compassionate appointment to dependents of employees of the State who the in harness has been the subject-matter of a considerable body of law. A Division Bench has referred the correctness of two decisions rendered by this Court on the interpretation of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 for consideration by the Full Bench. The principles which emerge from the judgments of the Supreme Court provide a binding framework within which the issue of interpretation which arises in this proceeding would have to be resolved. The question of law for decision of the Full Bench is:

(1) Whether the judgments in Subhash Yadav v. State of U.P, (2011) 1 UPLBEC 494 and Vivek Yadav v. State of U.P, 2010 (7) ADJ 1 : (2010 (5) ALJ 325) on the interpretation of the provisions of Rule 5(iii) and the proviso thereto read with Rule 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, lay down the correct position of law?”

2. The Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 (“the Rules”) came into force on 21 December, 1973. Rule 3 provides that the Rules shall apply to the recruitment of dependents of deceased government servants to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh, except those which are within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. The expression ‘government servant’ is defined in Rule 2(a) to mean a government servant employed in connection with the affairs of the State, who (i) was permanent in such employment; or (ii) though temporary had been regularly appointed in such employment; and (iii) though not regularly appointed, had put in three years' continuous service in a regular vacancy in such employment. The expression ‘regularly appointed’ is defined by the Explanation to Rule 2(a) to mean “appointed in accordance with the procedure laid down for recruitment to the post or service, as the case may be”. The expression ‘deceased government servant’ is defined by Clause (b) of Rule 2 to mean a government servant who dies while in service. Rule 2(c) of the Rules defines ‘family’. Rule 5 of the Rules provides as follows:

“5. Recruitment of a member of the family of the deceased.- (1) In case a Government servant dies in harness after the commencement of these rules and the spouse of the deceased Government servant is not already employed under the Central Government or a State Government or a Corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or a State Government, one member of his family who is not already employed under the Central Government or a State Government or a Corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or a State Government shall, on making an application for the purposes, be given a suitable employment in Government service on a post except the post which is within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Pub-he Service Commission, in relaxation of the normal recruitment rules if such person—

(i) fulfills the educational qualifications prescribed for the post,

(ii) is otherwise qualified for government service; and

(iii) makes the application for employment within five years from the date of the death of the government servant:

Provided that where the State Government is satisfied that the time limit fixed for making the application for employment causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may dispense with or relax the requirement as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner.

Provided further that for the purpose of the aforesaid proviso, the person concerned shall explain the reasons and give proper justification in writing regarding the delay caused in making the application for employment after the expiry of the time limit fixed for making the application for employment along with the necessary documents/proof in support of such delay and the Government shall, after taking into consideration all the facts leading to such delay take the appropriate decision.

(2) As far as possible, such an employment should be given in the same department in which the deceased Government servant was employed prior to his death.

(3) Every appointment made under sub-rule (1) shall be subject to the condition that the person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall maintain other members of the family of deceased Government servant, who were dependent on the deceased Government servant immediately before his death and are unable to maintain themselves.

(4) Where the person appointed under sub-rule (1) neglects or refuses to maintain a person to whom he is liable to maintain under sub-rule (3), his services may be terminated in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, as amended from time to time.”

Rule 6 of the Rules provides for the contents of an application for employment in the following terms:

“6. Contents of application for employment. An application for appointment under these rules shall be addressed to the appointing authority in respect of the post for which appointment is sought but it shall be sent to the Head of Office where the deceased Government servant was serving prior to his death. The application shall, inter alia, contain the following information:

(a) the date of the death of the deceased Government servant; the department in which he was working and the post which he was holding-prior to his death;

(b) naines, age and other details pertaining to all the members of the family of the deceased, particularly about their marriage, employment and income;

(c) details of the financial condition of the family? and

(d) the educational and other qualifications, if any of the applicant.”

Rule 8 is in the following terms:

“8. Relaxation from age and other require-ments-(1) The candidate seeking appointinent under these rules must not be less than 18 years at the time of appointment.

(2) The procedural requirements for selection, such as written test or interview by a selection committee or any other authority shall be dispensed with, but it shall be open to the appointing authority to interview the candidate in order to satisfy itself that the candidate will be able to maintain the minimum standards of work and efficiency expected on the post.

(3) An appointment under these rules shall be made against an existing vacancy only.”

3. Before we elucidate the principles which emerge from the body of precedent on the subject, it would, at the outset, be necessary to emphasise certain basic precepts and interpret the provisions of the Rules as they stand. Appointments to public offices have to comply with the requirements of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution. Article 16 provides for equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Compassionate appointment is in the nature of an exception to the ordinary norm of allowing equality of opportunity to every eligible person to compete for public employment. The reason for the exception as envisaged in the Rules is that the immediacy of the financial hardship that is sustained by a bereaved family by the death of its earning member is sought to be alleviated in a situation in which the government servant died while in service. Rule 5 of the Rules applies where a government servant has died in harness after the commencement of the Rules. The first requirement under Rule, 5 is that the spouse of the deceased should not be already employed by the Central or State, Gov-ernments or by a Corporation owned prpon-trolled by them. Where this conditiop is met, one member of the family can be given suitable employment in government service-in relaxation of the normal recruitment rules, provided three conditions are fulfilled. The, first is that the applicant must fulfill the educational qualifications prescribed for the posit; the sec-ond is that the applicant must be other wise qualified for government service; and the third is that the application for employment must be made within five years from the date of death of the government servant. The first proviso to Rule 5 empowers the State Government to dispense with or relax the time limit for making an application for employment, for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner, where government is satisfied that the time limit of five years for making an application for employment causes undue hardship in any particular case. Under the second proviso, a burden is cast on the applicant to establish a case of undue hardship by explaining the reasons and furnishing a proper justification, in writing, regarding the delay caused in making the application for employment after the expiry of the time limit of five years. This explanation has to be accompanied by necessary documents and proof in support of the reasons for the delay. The Government has to take an appropriate decision after taking into consideration all the facts leading to such delay.

4. Rule 6 of the Rules, which deals with the contents of an application for employment, amplifies the basic purpose and object of providing compassionate appointment. Besides stating the date of death of the deceased government servant, the post and the department in which he was working, the application has to mention the names, ages and other details pertaining to all the members of the family of the deceased, particularly about their marriage, employment and income and the details of the financial condition of the family together with the educational and other qualifications of the applicant.

5. The Rules have been framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The Rules make it abundantly clear that the purpose and object underlying the provision for compassionate appointment is not to reserve a post for a member of the family of a deceased government servant who has died while in service. The basic object and purpose is to provide a means to alleviate the financial distress of a family caused by the death of its member who was in government service. This is the underlying theme or thread which cuts across almost every provision of the Rules. Firstly, the spouse of the deceased government servant must not already be employed in the Central or State Governments or their Corporations. If the spouse is so employed, then obviously, there would be no warrant to grant compassionate appointment since the spouse would be expected to provide to the members of the family a nucleus for sustaining their livelihood. Secondly, the applicant himself should not be employed with the Central or State Governments or their Corporations. Thirdly, an application for appointment has to be made within five years from the date of death of the government servant. The rationale for imposing a limit of five years beyond which an application cannot be entertained is that the purpose of compassionate appointment is to bridge the immediacy of the loss of an earning member and the financial distress that is sustained in consequence. A lapse of time is regarded by the Rules as leading to a dilution of the immediacy of the requirement. The first proviso to Rule 5, however, confers upon the State Government a discretion to dispense with or relax the requirement of submitting an application in five years. This power is not unguided and is not left to the arbitrary discretion of the decision-making authority. Every discretionary power in public law has to be structured on objective principles. The first proviso requires the Government to be satisfied that the strict application of the norm of five years for submitting an application would cause undue hardship. The dispensation or relaxation is in order to deal with a case in a just and equitable manner. Under the second proviso, the burden has been cast on the applicant to furnish reasons and produce a justification together with evidence in the form of documents and proof in support of the cause for the delay in making an application within the stipulated period. Finally, on this aspect of interpretation, it must be emphasized that an applicant for employment under the Rules has to disclose in a full, true and candid manner, details of the financial condition of the family as well as all relevant details pertaining to the members of the family of the deceased including their names, age and status in regard to their marriage, employment and income. All these aspects have a bearing on the financial need of the family which has to be assessed before a de-cision is taken to grant compassionate appointment. The discretionary power to relax the time limit of five years is in the nature of an exception. It is a power which is vested in the State Government, a circumstance which is indicative of the fact that the subordinate legislation expects it to be exercised with scrupulous care. Ordinarily, the time limit of five years governs. The State Government may relax the norm on a careful evaluation of the circumstances mandated by the second proviso. It is but a matter of first principle that a discretionary power to relax the ordinary requirement should not swallow the main or substantive provision and render the basic purpose and object nugatory. The Rules indicate, in consequence, that an application for compassionate appointment, which is in relaxation of the normal recruitment Rules, must be made within a period of five years of the date of death of the government servant. But the State Government is conferred with a discretionary power to relax the requirement of five years in order to alleviate a situation of undue hardship so as to deal with a case in a just and equitable manner. The satisfaction of the State Government before it exercises the power of relaxation is not a subjective satisfaction but must be based on objective considerations founded on the disclosures made by the applicant for compassionate appointment. Those disclosures, in writing, must necessarily have a bearing on the reasons for the delay and on whether undue hardship within the meaning of the first proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules would be caused by the application of the time limit of five years. The expression ‘undue hardship’ has not been defined in the Rules. Undue hardship would necessarily postulate a consideration of relevant facts and circumstances including the income of the family, its financial condition and the extent of dependency.

6. Now, it is in this background that it is necessary to dwell on the two judgments of the Division Bench to which a reference has been made in the order of referral.

7. In Vivek Yadav (supra), the father of the appellant, who was working as an Assistant Agriculture Inspector, died on 26 May, 1986. The mother of the appellant was illiterate and did not claim compassionate appointment. The appellant was born on 2 February, 1984 and on completing the age of eighteen, filed a representation on 4 August, 2001 seeking compassionate appointment on the ground that the financial and social problems occasioned by the death of his father continued. The family consisted of the appellant, his mother, three sisters and another brother. The representation was rejected on the ground that it was barred by time. While interpreting the provisions of Rule 5, the Division Bench held as follows:

“… Reading of this rule would demonstrate that the application must be by a competent person, who is competent to make it. A minor, therefore, could not have made application. The time-limit for an application contemplated by the rule, therefore, could only be read to mean ‘by a competent person’, in other words, who has attained the age of majority. In a case, where the applicant is minor, it would not be possible for the minor to make an application for various reasons including that he is minor and as such he cannot be appointed to a post in the Government. Rule 5, therefore, will have to be read in such manner that it gives effect to the policy of the Government, which is to provide employment to a member of the family of a Government employee, who dies in harness, so as to mitigate the hardship. The issue whether the family of the deceased over long passage of time continues to face the hardship, would be examined on the merits of the claim….”

Read in isolation, these observations would seem to indicate that if the dependent of a de ceased employee was a minor at the time of death and, therefore, unable to apply for ap pointment, an application filed after attainment of majority would be valid irrespective of the length of time. That would not be reflective of the correct position in law. However, a later part of the same judgment, as we shall notice, explains the position.

8. Noting that the mother was illiterate the appellant himself was a minor and therewere elder sisters, the Division Bench in Vivek Yadav, (2010 (5) ALJ 325) held that in such cases the proviso to Rule 5 must, normally, be exercised for the purpose of dealing with the cases in a just and equitable manner. The Division Bench referred to a judgment of a learned single Judge in Manoj Kumar Saxena v. District Magistrate, Bareilly, 2000 (2) UPLBEC 1694, which had considered various judgments holding that when an application is moved for appointment on a compassionate basis of a member of the family on attaining majority who was a minor at the time of death of his father, it could not be said that there was delay in moving the application. The Division Bench specifically did not accept this to be a correct interpretation of Rule 5, for its consequence would be to suspend the operation of the Rule until the applicant had attained the age of majority. In that context, the Division Bench held as follows:—

“In our opinion, that really may not be a correct reading of the rule as that would contemplate that the rule would stand suspended till such time a minor attains majority and thereafter the minor within 5 years on attaining majority could make application. No provision whether it be primary or subordinate legislation must be read even if it be a beneficial piece of legislation which has the effect of adding words against the expression of language of the provision. The proviso, in our opinion, which confers power to relax the delay in making an application within five years, also must be read to include consideration of an application even after expiry of 5 years if the applicant was a minor at the time of death of the deceased employee and makes an application within reasonable time of attaining majority.”

The Division Bench observed that the test to be applied is whether the family of the deceased continues to suffer financial distress and hardship occasioned by the death of the breadwinner so as to relax the period within which the application could be made. These, it was held, are matters of fact which the competent authority would have to consider. Since the application was rejected merely because it was beyond the time prescribed, the order of the authority was set aside and a direction was issued to take a fresh decision within a stipu-latedperiod.

9. The subsequent judgment of the Divi sion Bench in Subhash Yadav (supra) deals with a situation where the father of the appellant had died in harness on 8 August, 1994 when the appellant was six years of age. The appellant attained the age of majority on 5 December, 2005 and made an application for compassionate appointment. The State Government declined to accord relaxation of the period of five years and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by a learned single Judge who held that since the appellant had been able to survive for sixteen years, that was indicative of a lack of immediacy. The Division Bench held that the Government erred in rejecting the application on the ground that there was an inordinate delay and such a blanket reason without considering anything else would not be in conformity with the power which has been conferred on the State, to relax the time period, which has to be exercised reasonably. Hence, the Division Bench held that the authorities cannot reject an application “blindfold” if it had been moved after five years and were required to apply their mind rationally, exercising the discretion in view of other factors relating to the case.

10. Now, it is in this background that it is necessary for the Court to consider the principles of law which emerge from the judgments of the Supreme Court on the subject.

11. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138 : (1994 AIR SCW 2305), the Supreme Court explained the basic purpose of providing compassionate appointment to the dependent of a deceased employee who has died in harness:

“The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency.

.…;For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the, crisis is over.”

12. In Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 192 : (AIR 1998 SC 2230), the Supreme Court held that compassionate appointment is an exception to the general provision and, being an exception, it should not interfere unduly with the rights of other persons. The Supreme Court held thus:

“The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out. of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependents of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Such a provision makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment on the post by following a particular proce-dure Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions. An exception cannot subsume the main provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. Care has, therefore, to be taken that a provision for grant of compassionate employment, which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions, does not unduly interfere with the right of other persons who are eligible for appointment of seek employment against the post which would have been available to them, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependent of a deceased employee.”

13. The decision in Umesh Kumar Nagpal (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in General Manager (D & PB) v. Kunti Tiwary, (2004) 7 SCC 271. The Su preme Court noted that under the Scheme which had been adopted by the Indian Banks Association, the terminal benefits received by the family of the deceased employee had to be considered together with the income of the family, employment of other members, the size of the family and liabilities, if any. The Su preme Court in that case held that the family of the deceased employee had not been left in penury or without any means of livelihood and its income was not such as to lead to the con clusion that the family was living hand to mouth.

The same view was followed in Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja, 2004 AIR SCW 4602 : ((2004) 7 SCC 265 : AIR 2004 SC 4155).

14. In National Hydroelectric Power Cor poration v. Nanak Chand, (2004) 12 SCC 487 : AIR 2005 SC 106, the principle was formulated as follows:

“It is to be seen that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of re cruitment but merely an exception to the requirement regarding appointments being made on open invitation of application on merits. Basic intention is that on the death of the em ployee concerned his family is not deprived of the means of livelihood. The object is to en able the family to get over sudden financial crises.”

15. In Commissioner of Public Instrutions v. K.R Vishwanath, (2005) 7 SCC 206 (AIR 2005 SC 3275), the following principles were laid down by the Supreme Court:

“…the claim of person concemed for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that he was dependent on the deceased employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right… High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplate such appointments.”

16. Specifically dealing with a situation where a dependent was a minor at the date of death of the employee, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 468 : (AIR 1989 SC 1976) and observed thus:

“The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread-earner in the family. Such appointments should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. The fact that the ward was a minor at the time of death of his father is no ground, unless the scheme itself envisages specifically otherwise, to state that as and when such minor becomes a major he can be appointed without any time consciousness or limit. The above view was reiterated in Phoolwati (Smt.) v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 689 : (AIR 1991 SC 469) and Union of India v. Bhagwan Singh, (1995) 6 SCC 476. In Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 192 : (AIR 1998 SC 2230), it was observed that in matter of compassionate appointment there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment. Care has, however, to be taken that provision for grant of compassionate employment which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions does not unduly interfere with the right of those other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek appointment against the post which would have been available, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependant of the deceased-employee. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision.”

17. In State of J & K v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 : (AIR 2006 SC 2743), the principle was followed as follows:

“Normally, an employment in Government or Other public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates who can come forward to apply and compete with each other. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of the sole breadwinner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the set back. Once it is proved that in spite of death of bread earner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say ‘goodbye’ to the normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

18. The principles of law which emerge from the decided cases were summarized in a judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Shivamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 13 SCC 730 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 488), Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.V Raveendran speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges formulated those principles thus:

“(a) Compassionate appointment based only on descent is impermissible. Appointments in public service should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and comparative merit, having regard to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Though no other mode of appointment is permissible, appointments on compassionate grounds are a well recognised exception to the said general rule, carved out in the interest of justice to meet certain contingencies.

(b) Two well recognized contingencies which are carved out as exceptions to the gen eral rule are:

(i) appointment on compassionate grounds to meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family on account of the death of the bread-winner while in service.

(ii) appointment on compassionate ground to meet the crisis in a family on account of medical invalidation of the bread winner.

Another contingency, though less recognized, is where land holders lose their entire land for a public project, the scheme provides for compassionate appointment to members of the families of project affected persons. (Particularly where the law under which the acquisition is made does provide for market value and solatium, as compensation).

(c) Compassionate appointment can neither be claimed, nor be granted, unless the rules governing the service permit such appoint ments. Such appointments shall be strictly in accordance with the scheme governing such appointments and against existing vacancies.

(d) Compassionate appointments are permissible only in the case of a dependant member, of the family of the employee concerned, that is, spouse, son or daughter and not other relatives. Such appointments should be only to posts in the lower category, that is, Classes in and IV posts and the crises cannot be permitted to be converted into a boon by seeking employment in Class I or II posts.”

19. The provisions of Rule 5 of the Rules in the State of Uttar Pradesh specifically came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar Dubey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 6 SCC 481, In that case the father of the appellant was untraced from 1981. The Supreme Court held that without going into the issue as to whether compassionate appointment could be sought in a case or deemed death under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, such a right could have been exercised in 1988 itself and the period of five years under Rule 5 would not enable the appellant to compute the period until 1993. In that context, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“11. The very concept of giving a compassionate appointment is to tide over the financial difficulties that are faced by the families of the deceased due to the death of the earning member of the family. There is immediate loss of earning for which the family suffers financial hardship. The benefit is given so that the family can tide over such financial constraints.

12. The request for appointment on compassionate grounds should be reasonable and proximate to the time of the death of the bread earner of the family, inasmuch as the very purpose of giving such benefit is to make financial help available to the family to overcome sudden economic crisis occurring in the family of the deceased who has died in harness. But this, however, cannot be another source of recruitment. This also cannot be treated as a bonanza and also as a right to get an appointment in Government service.

13. In the present case, the father of the appellant became untraceable in the year-1981 and for about 18 years, the family could survive and successfully faced and overcame the financial difficulties that they faced on missing of the earning member. That being the position, in our considered opinion, this is not a fit case for exercise of our jurisdiction. This is also not a case where any direction could be issued for giving the appellant a compassionate appointment as the prevalent rules governing the subject do not permit us for issuing any such directions.”

20. In Local Administration Department & An. v. M. Selvanayagam alias Kumarayelu, (2011) 13 SCC 42 : AIR 2011 SC 1880, the principle has been set out in the following observations of the Supreme Court:

“It has been said a number of times earlier but it needs to be recalled here that under the scheme of compassionate appointment in case of an employee dying in harness one of his eligible dependents is given a job with the sole objective to provide immediate succour to the family which may suddenly find itself in dire straits as a result of the death of the bread winner. An appointment made many years after the death of the employee or without due consideration of the financial resources available to his/her dependents and the financial deprivation caused to the dependents as a result of his death, simply because the claimant happened to be one of the dependents of the deceased employee would be directly in conflict with Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and hence, quite bad and illegal. In dealing with cases of compassionate appointment, it is imperative to keep this vital aspect in mind.”

21. In Shreejith L. v. Deputy Director (Education) Kerala, (2012) 7 SCC 248 : (AIR 2012 SC 2665), these principles have been reiterated.

22. In Union of India v. Shashank Goswami, (2012) 11 SCC 307 : (AIR 2012 SC 2294), the Supreme Court held thus:

“9. There can be no quarrel to the settled legal proposition that the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is based on the premise that the applicant was dependent on the deceased employee. Strictly, such a claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right.

10. As a rule public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of the employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sud-den financial crisis and not to confer a status on the family. Thus, the applicant cannot claim appointment in a particular class/group of post. Appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased.”

23. These principles have been reiterated in a more recent judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P v. Pankaj Kumar Vishnoi, 2013 (5) AWC 5062 (SC) : (2013 AIR SCW 5046), specifically in the context of Rule 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974.

24. In Chief Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs, Lucknow v. Prabhat Singh ((2013) 1 UPLBEC 357), the Supreme Court has addressed words of caution in the following observations:

“We are constrained to record that even compassionate appointments are regulated by norms. Where such norms have been laid down, the same have to be strictly followed… The very object of making provision for appointment on compassionate ground, is to provide succor to a family dependent on a government employee, who has unfortunately died in harness. On such death, the family suddenly finds itself in dire straits, on account of the absence of its sole bread winner. Delay in seeking such a claim, is an anti thesis, for the purpose for which compassionate appointment was conceived. Delay in raising such a claim, is contradictory to the object sought to be achieved… Courts and Tribunals should not fall prey to any sympathy syndrome, so as to issue directions for compassionate appointments, without reference to the prescribed norms. Courts are not supposed to carry Santa Claus's big bag on Christmas eve, to disburse the gift of compassionate appointment, to all those who seek a court's intervention. Courts and Tribunals must understand, that every such act of sympathy, compassion and discretion, wherein directions are issued for appointment on compassionate ground, could deprive a really needy family requiring financial support, and thereby, push into penury a truly indigent, destitute and impoverished family. Discretion is therefore ruled out. So are, misplaced sympathy and compassion.”

25. Once again, in Mgb Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, (2014) 13 SCC 583 : AIR 2013 SC 3365, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“Every appointment to public office must be made by strictly adhering to the mandatory requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An exception by providing employment on compassionate grounds has been carved out in order to remove the financial constraints on the bereaved family, which has lost its bread-earner. Mere death of a Government employee in harness does not entitle the family to claim compassionate employment. The Competent Authority has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased employee and it is only if it is satisfied that without providing employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis, that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. Moreso, the person claiming such appointment must possess required eligibility for the post. The consistent view that has been taken by the Court is that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as it is not a vested right.

The Court should not stretch the provision by liberal interpretation beyond permissible limits on humanitarian grounds.

Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years.”

26. In several decisions, the Supreme Court has dealt with cases of minors seeking compassionate appointment. In Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 : (AIR 1997 SC 3887), the Supreme Court dealt with a case of a widow who had applied, after a period of 18 years for appointing her son who was four years old when his father died in harness, contending that she could make the application only when her son attained majority. The High Court had allowed the writ petition. While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

We are of the view that the High Court has erred in overstretching the scope of the compassionate relief provided by the Board in the circulars as above. It appears that High Court would have treated the provision as a lien created by the Board for a dependent of the deceased employee. If the family members of the deceased employee can manage for fourteen years after his death one of his legal heirs cannot put forward a claim as though it is a line of succession by virtue of a right of inheritance. The object of the provisions should not be forgotten that it is to give succor to the family to tide over the sudden financial crisis be-fallen the dependents on account of the untimely demise of its sole earning member.”

27. Similarly, in Jagdish Prasad v. The State of Bihar, JT 1995 (9) SC 131, the Su preme Court rejected the case of a minor who had claimed compassionate appointment after he had attained majority while observing as follows:—

“It is contended for the appellant that when his father died in harness, the appellant was minor; the compassionate circumstances con tinue to subsist even till date and that, there fore, the Court is required to examine whether the appointment should be made on compas sionate grounds. We are afraid, we cannot accede to the contention. The very object of appointment of a dependent of the deceased employees who the in harness is to relieve unexpected immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning member of the family. Since the death occurred way back in 1971, in which year the appellant was four years old, it cannot be said that he is entitled to be appointed after he at tained majority long thereafter. In other Words, if that contention is accepted, it amounts to another mode of recruitment of the dependent of a deceased Government servant which can not be encouraged, de hors the recruitment rules.”

28. In Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tanwar, (1996) 8 SCC 23, the widow of a deceased employee had made an application after twelve years claiming compassionate appointment for her son who had since attained majority. The High Court al lowed the writ petition holding that compas sionate appointment could not be restricted to a period of three years and if assistance to the members of the family of a deceased em ployee is required to be given, the member of the family must necessarily attain majority before becoming eligible to apply for appointment. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“It has been indicated in the decision of Umesh Kumar Nagpal (1994) AIR SCW 2305) (supra) that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a long lapse of reasonable period and the very purpose of compassionate appointment, as an exception to the general rule of open recruitment, is intended to, meet the immediate financial problem being suffered by the members of the family of the deceased employee. In the other decision of this Court in Jagdish Prasad's case, it has been also indicated that the very object of appointment of dependent of deceased-employee who died in harness is to relieve immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning member of the family and such consideration cannot be kept binding for years.

It appears to us that the principle of compassionate appointment as indicated in the aforesaid decisions of this Court, is not only reasonable but consistent with the principle of employment in government and public sector. The impugned decisions of the High Court therefore cannot be sustained.”

29. In Sanjay Kumar v. The State of Bihar, (2000) 7 SCC 192 : (AIR 2000 SC 2782), the Supreme Court again dealt with a case of compassionate appointment of a minor who had made an application upon attaining majority. The Supreme Court observed as follows:

“This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread-earner who had left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood….on the date when the first application was made by the petitioner on 2.6.88, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time, as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compaissionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief.”

30. In a Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sunil Ambwani and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amreshwar Pratap Sahi delivered on 7 May, 2010 in Union of India v. Smt. Asha Mishra C.M.W.P No. 13102 of 2010, the same principle was formulated in the fol lowing observation:

“The principles of consideration for compassionate appointment have been firmly settled and have been reiterated from time to time. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right or an alternate mode of employment. It has to be considered and granted under the relevant rules. The object of compassionate appointment is to tide over an immediate financial crisis. It is not a heritable right to be considered after an unreasonable period, for the vacancies cannot be held up for long and that appointment should not ordinarily await the attainment of majority. Where the family has survived for long, its circumstances must be seen before the competent authority may consider such appointment. It is not to be ordinarily granted, where a person died close to his retirement.”

31. We now proceed to formulate the prin ciples which must govern compassionate ap pointment in pursuance of Dying in Harness Rules:

(i) A provision for compassionate appointment is an exception to the principle that there must be an equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. The exception to be constitutionally valid has to be carefully structured and implemented in order to confine compassionate appointment to only those situations which subserve the basic object and purpose which is sought to be achieved;

(ii) There is no general or vested right to compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment can be claimed only where a scheme or rules provide for such appointment. Where such a provision is made in an administrative scheme or statutory rules, compassionate appointment must fall strictly within the scheme or, as the case may be, the rules;

(iii) The object and purpose of providing compassionate appointment is to enable the dependent members of the family of a deceased employee to tide over the immediate financial crisis caused by the death of the bread-earner;

(iv) In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family; its liabilities, the terminal benefits received by the family; the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other sources of employment;

(v) Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out;

(vi) Rule 5 mandates that ordinarily, an application for compassionate appointment must be made within five years of the date of death of the deceased employee. The power conferred by the first proviso is a discretion to relax the period in a case of undue hardship and for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner;

(vii) The burden lies on the applicant, where there is a delay in making an application within the period of five years to establish a case on the basis of reasons and a justification supported by documentary and other evidence. It is for the State Government after considering all the facts to take an appropriate decision. The power to relax is in the nature of an exception and is conditioned by the existence of objective considerations to the satisfaction of the government;

(viii) Provisions for the grant of compas-sionateappointment do not constitute a reservation of a post in favour of a member of the family of the deceased employee. Hence, there is no general right which can be asserted to the effect that a member of the family who was a minor at the time of death would be entitled to claim compassionate appointment upon attaining majority. Where the rules provide for a period of time within which an application has to be made, the operation of the rule is not suspended during the minority of a member of the family.

32. As regards the judgment of the Divi sion Bench in Vivek Yadav (supra), the first part of the judgment of the Division Bench in Vivek Yadav's case, (2010 (5) ALJ 325) holds in paragraph 4 that since Rule 5 contemplates an application by a competent person, in a case where the applicant is a minor, it will not be possible for a minor to make an application during the period of his minority. Therefore, considering the object of the Rules, it was held that the proviso to Rule 5 must normally be exercised in such cases. This observation, with respect, requiring that the proviso to Rule 5 must normally be exercised for the pur pose of dealing with a case in a just and equi table manner would not be reflective of the correct position in law. The subsequent decision in Subhash Yadav (supra) only holds that the Government cannot dismiss an ap plication which has been moved after five years blindfolded but has to apply its mind rationally to all the facts and circumstances of the case. In this regard, we clarify that the second proviso to Rule 5 requires an ap plicant, who invokes the power of dispensation or relaxation under the first proviso of the time limit of five years, to make out a case of undue hardship by elucidating, in writing, with necessary documentary evidence and proof, the reasons and justification for the delay. The Government may, in an ap propriate case, when it is satisfied on the ba sis of the material that a case of undue hard ship is made out, exercise the power which is conferred upon it under the first proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules but this power has to be exercised where a demonstrated case of un due hardship is made out to the satisfaction of the State Government. We answer the ref erence accordingly in the aforesaid terms. These special appeals along with other connected appeals shall now be placed before the appropriate Bench in accordance with the roster of work.

33. Order accordingly.