Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Smt. Madhulika Sameer Azad v. Sameer Mohan Azad

Allahabad High Court
Oct 12, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Bench Opinion Summary — Pankaj Mithal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (wife) challenged an order dated 4.9.2012 of the Family Court, Agra, which permitted the respondent (husband) to engage a lawyer to prosecute divorce proceedings pending in the Family Court. The husband had originally initiated divorce proceedings in Mumbai; at the wife's instance the Apex Court ordered transfer of those proceedings to the Family Court at Agra, where the wife resides.

The parties were married (registered) in Mumbai in 2006 but later lived separately: the wife in Agra and the husband employed in California (U.S.A.), with apparent residence in Mumbai. Earlier, two applications filed on the husband's behalf by a power of attorney holder for permission to engage a lawyer had been rejected because the husband himself had not appeared. The present application (paper No. 27 GA) was moved by the husband in person; he stated by affidavit that because he works in the U.S.A. it is not practically possible to attend every date, that he would appear personally when required by the Court, and that he needs legal assistance. The Family Court allowed his application. The wife invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court (Article 226) challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Family Court erred in permitting the respondent to engage a lawyer to represent him in the Family Court proceedings.
  2. Whether Section 13 of the Family Court Act, 1984 bars representation by a legal practitioner as of right and, if so, how that provision should be interpreted and applied in the present circumstances.
  3. Whether the Family Court's discretion to permit representation by counsel can be exercised when Rule 28 (regarding notice) and other Rules framed under the Act are considered — i.e., whether Rule 28 was violated and whether the Court's allowance was routine when reconciliation was still possible.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Wife's) Arguments

  • Two earlier applications on behalf of the respondent to engage a lawyer had been rejected; allowing the present application is inconsistent with those prior rejections.
  • Section 13 of the Family Court Act, 1984 prevents routine permission to engage a lawyer, particularly while the Court is attempting reconciliation.
  • The Family Court's discretion to permit engagement of a lawyer must be exercised in conformity with Rule 28 of the Rules (framed under the Act), and that rule was allegedly not complied with.

Respondent's (Husband's) Position, as reflected in the record

  • The husband personally moved the application (paper No. 27 GA) by affidavit stating he is employed in the U.S.A. and cannot practically attend every date; he undertook to appear when the Court considered it necessary.
  • He stated he was unable to pursue the proceedings without the aid of a legal expert and therefore sought permission to engage a lawyer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Banshidhar v. Seema, 1992 Crl. L.J. 1592 Holds that representation of a party by a legal practitioner before a Family Court depends upon the discretion of the Family Court; Section 13 does not impose a complete ban. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that Section 13 confers discretion on the Family Court to permit counsel in the interest of justice and does not operate as an absolute prohibition.
Prabhat Narain Tickoo v. Mrs. Mamta Tickoo, 1998 33 ALR 254 Explains that Section 13 gives discretion to permit lawyers though ordinarily lawyers are not allowed; counsel should not be permitted when Court is trying reconciliation or where divorce is by mutual consent, but ordinary allowance is advisable because family law has become complicated. The Court relied on this decision to show that while reconciliation phases may justify denial of counsel, where complications or practical difficulties arise (e.g., inability to attend), counsel may be permitted; it informed the balancing exercise in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court's reasoning proceeded in several linked steps:

  1. Treatment of earlier rejections: The Court observed that the two earlier applications (filed by the husband's power of attorney holder) were rejected on a technical ground because they were not moved by the husband in person. The Court held the merits of those earlier applications were not considered, and therefore those rejections did not vitiate the merits of the present application moved by the husband himself.
  2. Statutory interpretation of Section 13: The Court quoted Section 13 (Right to legal representation) and interpreted it to mean that the provision does not place an absolute bar on engagement of a lawyer. Instead, Section 13 leaves the matter to the Family Court's discretion: representation is not a right but may be permitted in certain contingencies in the interest of justice.
  3. Reading of applicable Rules: The Court considered Rule 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Family Court Rules, 1995 and Rule 27 of the U.P. Family Court (Courts) Rules, 2006 (framed under section 21 of the Act). Rule 24 permits the Family Court to seek assistance of a legal expert on legal issues; Rule 27 empowers the Family Court to permit parties to be represented by a lawyer where cases involve complicated questions of law, or where the court believes the party cannot adequately conduct the case, or "for any other reason." The Court concluded these Rules widen the scope for granting permission to engage counsel.
  4. Synthesis of law: By a conjoint reading of Section 13 and the relevant Rules, the Court concluded that Family Courts are authorized (in their wisdom and discretion) to permit parties to engage lawyers, including for reasons beyond the specific examples listed in the Rules.
  5. Precedent support: The Court relied on Banshidhar v. Seema and Prabhat Narain Tickoo to underscore that representation depends on Family Court discretion; while counsel should not ordinarily be permitted during reconciliation or mutual-consent divorce, the complexity of family law and practical difficulties may justify allowing counsel.
  6. Application to facts: The Court applied these principles to the present facts — the respondent is employed and living in the U.S.A. and cannot practically attend proceedings at Agra on every date, while undertaking to appear when required. Given this practical difficulty, the Family Court's decision to permit engagement of a lawyer was within its discretion.
  7. On Rule 28 (notice): The Court examined Rule 28 of the 2006 Rules (requiring an application after notice to the other side not less than one week prior to the date fixed for hearing). The High Court interpreted this rule as contemplating notice of the application before the hearing rather than necessarily providing a strict "one week's notice" in every circumstance. The purpose is to prevent surprise. In the present case, the Court found the copy of the application was served on the petitioner well before hearing (and in any event, no hearing date had yet been fixed), so Rule 28 was not violated.
  8. On prejudice and discretionary interference: The Court asked the petitioner's counsel what specific prejudice would ensue from allowing counsel. The counsel could not point to any concrete prejudice. Given that the petitioner could not legally deny the respondent a lawyer under the construed statutory/regulatory framework and could not show prejudice, the High Court found no ground to exercise extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the Family Court's order.
  9. Cautionary note: The Court clarified that permission to engage a lawyer does not exempt the party from personal attendance at all times. If the Family Court embarks on reconciliation efforts it can insist on personal attendance and deny participation of counsel during reconciliation.

Holding and Implications

WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Family Court, Agra's order permitting the respondent husband to engage a lawyer stands and need not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in this case.
  • The practical consequence for the parties is that the husband may be represented by a legal practitioner in the Family Court while remaining subject to directions of that Court (including being required to appear personally when the Court so directs, especially for reconciliation efforts).
  • The Court reiterated existing principles (as drawn from statute, rules and cited precedents) that representation in Family Court is discretionary and not an absolute right; this decision applies those established principles to the facts but does not purport to create a new watershed precedent beyond the applications of those principles to the circumstances described.

Disposition in the record: "The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed... Petition Dismissed."

Show all summary ...

Pankaj Mithal, J.:— Heard Sri H.P Dubey, learned Counsel for the petitioner.

2. Petitioner wife has filed this petition aggrieved by the order dated 4.9.2012 passed by the Family Court Agra allowing the respondent husband to engage a lawyer for prosecuting the divorce case on his behalf. A little experience of the matrimonial disputes on a bare glance on the facts and circumstances of this petition would reveal that the petitioner wife has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court not because the order impugned is illegal or causes prejudice to her or infringes her rights but to harass the respondent husband which is sheer abuse of the process of law.

3. The petitioner and respondent are husband and wife. The marriage between them was solemnized and registered at Mumbai sometime in the year 2006. There was a discord between them. They started living separately. The wife at Agra whereas the husband in job at California (U.S.A). The husband appears to be a resident of Mumbai.

4. The husband initiated proceedings for divorce against the wife at Mumbai. The said proceedings at the instance of wife were ordered to be transferred by the Apex Court to the Family Court at Agra where she is residing.

5. Previously, on behalf of the husband his power of attorney holder moved two applications for engaging a lawyer. The said applications were re-je???d on the ground that the husband himself had not appeared before the Cost for seeking permission to eng???ge a lawyer.

6. The present application paper No. 27 Ga seeking permission of the Court for engaging a lawyer to represent him before the Family Court was moved by him in person. In the said application supported by an affidavit it is stated that he has come from U.S.A wherein he is in job to attend the proceedings. It is not practically possible for him to be present in Court on each and every date fixed in the proceedings but he undertakes to appear in person whenever it would be desired and felt necessary by the Court. He is also unable to pursue the proceedings himself without the aid of legal expert.

7. The aforesaid application has been allowed and he has been permitted to engage the services of a lawyer.

8. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is three fold; first, that in the past two similar applications moved on behalf of the respondent have been rejected; second, in view of section 13 of the Family Court Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as an Act) the Court cannot permit engagement of a lawyer in a routine manner particularly when the matter is yet to be reconciled; lastly, the discretion of engagement of a lawyer cannot be exercised in violation of Rule 28 of the Rules framed under the Act.

9. The earlier applications filed on behalf of the husband for engaging a lawyer were rejected on a technical ground that they were not moved by the husband in person. The merits of the applications were not considered. The rejection of the said applications therefore would not hamper or vitiate the merits of the order passed on the present application. The submission in this regard is of no value.

10. Section 13 of the Family Court Act reads as under:

13. Right to legal representation.— Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no party to a suit or proceedings before a Family Court shall be entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner:

Provided that if the Family Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice, it may seek the assistance of a legal expert as amicus curaie.”

11. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that it does not place an absolute bar upon the engagement of a lawyer and that the family Court at its discretion can always seek assistance of a lawyer. In other words, engagement of a lawyer in Family Court is not permissible as of right but nonetheless in certain contingencies a party can be allowed to be represented by a legal practitioner.

12. Rule 24 of. The Uttar Pradesh Family Court Rules, 1995 provides that where Family Court considers necessary in the interest of justice, it may seek the assistance of a legal expert on legal issues. At the same time, Rule 27 of the U.P Family Court (Courts) Rules, 2006 which have been framed in exercise of powers under section 21 of the Act, empowers the family Court to permit the parties to be represented by a lawyer in Court not only where the cases involve complicated questions of law but also where the Court is of the view that the party will not be in a position to conduct his or her case himself/herself adequately or for any other reason. The above Rule widens the scope for granting permission to parties to be represented by a lawyer before the Family Court by using the term “or for any other reason.

13. In short, the conjoint reading of section 13 of the Act and the aforesaid Rules in no way completely prohibits the presence of lawyers in Family Courts rather it authorizes family Court in its wisdom and discretion to permit the parties to engage lawyers even for any reason other than the reasons specified.

14. A Division Bench of this Court in Banshidhar v. Seema 1992 Crl. L.J 1592. considered the provision of section 13 of the Act and held that a representation of a party by a legal practitioner depends upon the discretion of the Family Court. The aforesaid provision does not impose a complete ban on the representation of the party by a legal practitioner rather it allows the family Court to permit parties to be represented by Counsel in the interest of justice.

15. In Prabhat Narain Tickoo v. Mrs. Mamta Tickoo 1998 33 ALR 254. a Division Bench of this Court which has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner it has opined that section 13 of the Act gives a discretion to the Family Court to permit a lawyer to appear on behalf of a party, though ordinarily lawyers are not permitted. The Court further observed that service of a lawyer should not be permitted when the Court is trying reconciliation between the parties and where divorce is being sought by mutual consent of the parties. However, as divorce law and other family laws have become complicated branch of law and an ordinary person cannot be expected to know it, the Court should ordinarily allow the lawyers to appear on behalf of the parties.

16. The legal position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised as under:

(i) Ordinarily, lawyers are not permitted before Family Court especially where the Court is in the process of reconciliation of the dispute between the parties and the divorce is applied by mutual consent;

(ii) There is no absolute prohibition in engaging a lawyer where complicated legal issues are involved or where parties are not in a position to conduct there case for want of legal knowledge or of any other reason; and

(iii) The Court can always seek legal assistance of a lawyer, if considered necessary;

17. Thus, the Family Court in addition to the above specified occasions in its discretion and wisdom can allow engagement of lawyers for any other reason which may include conditions of the nature where it is practically not possible for a party to attend the proceedings personally on every date/dates in the present case.

18. In the instant case, the respondent is working and living in U.S.A and it is not practically possible for him to attend the proceedings at Agra on every date. He is not denying his appearance whenever it would be required by the Court. Thus, in the circumstances, if the family Court has permitted him to engage a lawyer, no exception to it can be taken so as to require any interference in exercise of extra ordinary discretionary jurisdiction.

19. Rule 28 of Rules, 2006 provides for notice to other side on the application by a party seeking permission for representation by a lawyer. It reads as under:

“Rule 28, Any application for representation by a lawyer in Court shall be made by such party to Court after notice to the other side, not less than one week prior to the date fixed for hearing of the petition. The case shall not be adjourned on this ground.”

20. It mandates' for filing such application at least a week prior to the date fixed for hearing of the petition after notice to the other party. The aforesaid Rule contemplates notice of the application a week before hearing but not a week's notice.

21. The said rule is to intimate the other side that a party is thinking of engaging a lawyer/legal expert so that the other side may not be taken by surprise and is pitted against a legal expert unarmed or unprepared.

22. In the present case, a copy of the application to engage a lawyer moved by the respondent was served upon the petitioner well before hearing as by then no date was fixed for hearing. Therefore, there is (sic. no?) violation of the aforesaid Rule.

23. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner wanted to file objections against the said application.

24. The Court inquired from the learned Counsel for the petitioner as to what possible objections the petitioner wanted to take against the engagement of lawyer by the respondent. He appears to be in a predicament and unable to point out any possible objections to it. He could not inform the Court as to the prejudice the petitioner would suffer, if the respondent is allowed to engage a lawyer. In the totality of the facts and circumstances, as the petitioner cannot legally deny the respondent the services of a lawyer and that she is unable to show any prejudice to her, I am of the view that matter requires no intervention of this Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, it goes without saying that in case the Court below enters into an exercise for reconciliation it can always insist for the personal appearance of the parties and deny participation of the lawyer during reconciliation. The engagement of lawyer should not be taken to mean that the personal appearance of the party is exempted for all times. The Court is always free to have the attendance of the parties, if considered necessary, despite permitting engagement of lawyers.

25. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed with the above observation.

26. Petition Dismissed.