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Ganpathmal Pusmal Marwadi v. Nandlal Tulsiram Marwadi

Bombay High Court
Apr 10, 1953
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gajendragadkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

A decree in a mortgage suit under s. 15-B of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was passed on March 13, 1926. The decree made the decretal amount payable by instalments, with the last instalment due in 1932, and provided that a single default entitled the decree-holder to recover the entire decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged property. The decree-holder filed several darkhasts between 1927 and 1938; the mortgaged property was sold in 1935, but the decretal amount remained unsatisfied.

The decree-holder sought to proceed against the surety (defendant No. 3) by filing a darkhast in 1945 to recover the balance, asserting the surety was personally liable for the unpaid balance. The original decree was amended on October 19, 1942, to clarify the surety's liability because the original drawn decree had not specifically referred to the surety's personal liability, although the judgment had indicated it.

The surety pleaded that the 1945 darkhast was barred by limitation under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both lower courts rejected the plea of limitation and directed the darkhast to proceed against the surety. The surety appealed; the referring judge (Dixit J.) considered the question of limitation important and referred the appeal to a Division Bench. The present opinion addresses whether s. 48's twelve-year limitation is computed from the date of the original decree or from the date of the amended decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the twelve-year limitation prescribed by s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure for execution applications is to be computed from the date of the original decree, or whether amendment of a decree restarts or otherwise affects that twelve-year period (i.e., whether computation should commence from the date of amendment).
  2. Whether the time at which the surety's liability became enforceable — specifically, the moment it was ascertained that sale proceeds of the mortgaged property were insufficient — should be treated as the starting point of limitation under s. 48 (a subsidiary contention raised by the decree-holder's counsel).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (represented by Mr. Samant on behalf of the surety)

  • The twelve-year period under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be computed from the date of the original decree, not from the date of any subsequent amendment of the decree.
  • Consequently, the 1945 darkhast was time-barred because more than twelve years had elapsed since the original decree of 13 March 1926.

Decree-holder / Plaintiffs' Arguments (represented by Mr. Patel)

  • As a subsidiary point, Mr. Patel argued that the surety's personal liability arose only after the mortgaged property had been sold and it became apparent that sale proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the decretal claim; therefore, the time when this insufficiency was ascertained should be treated as the starting point for limitation under s. 48.
  • Implicitly, the decree-holder relied on the 1942 amendment and subsequent events as making the 1945 application timely.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narsingrao Konher Inamdar v. Bando Krishna Held that for the purposes of s. 48 the date of the decree remains the date of the original judgment even if the decree is later amended; limitation computed from the original decree date. The Court cited this early decision as clearly deciding the point in favour of the appellant and relied on it as supporting the proposition that amendment does not extend the s. 48 period.
Faqir Chand v. Kundan Singh Allahabad High Court decision taking a view similar to Narsingrao's case regarding computation from original decree date under s. 48. Used to show consistency in High Court authority favoring computation from the original decree date.
Ramchandra Rao v. Parasuramayya Madras Full Bench—held that the twelve-year period should be computed from the date of the decree (i.e., did not accept that amendment restarts limitation); also addressed and rejected an alternate view from an unreported judgment. Cited as another High Court Full Bench authority consonant with the Court's view; the opinion notes the Full Bench confined its observation to s. 48.
Baldeo Shukul v. Syed Yusuf A Patna single-Judge decision held s. 48 could be read to permit computation from the date of amendment. Identified as one of the decisions taking the contrary view; the Court noted it was ultimately dissenting authority within the Patna High Court.
Musammat Dulhin v. Mahanth Harihar Gir Patna High Court (James and Rowland JJ.) dissented from the single-judge view in Baldeo Shukul, supporting computation from original decree date. Presented as supporting the majority consensus that s. 48's period is to be reckoned from the original decree date.
Basawa Chamabasawraj v. Somashekhararai Discussed an observation in the Madras Full Bench; Macklin and Bavdekar JJ. held that the Madras Full Bench's observation must be read in context and confined to s. 48, and rejected applying that observation to art. 182(4). The Court relied on this discussion to reject an argument that the Madras observation extended beyond s. 48; it accepted that Macklin and Bavdekar JJ. did not disapprove the Madras decision as to s. 48.
Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind Previously held a proposition supporting the decree-holder's minor contention (about starting point when insufficiency of sale proceeds was ascertained). The Court treated this decision as no longer good law and therefore not authoritative on the subsidiary point.
Rango Ramacharya v. Gopal Narayan Division Bench that re-examined Narhar Raghunath and concluded that Narhar Raghunath's view could no longer be treated as good law. Relied upon to hold Narhar Raghunath is not good law and to reject the decree-holder's subsidiary contention about the starting point of limitation.
Banku Behari Chaatterji v. Naraindas Dutt Privy Council opinion which, by necessary implication, overruled the view taken in Narhar Raghunath. Referred to (via Rango Ramacharya) as authority that implicitly overruled Narhar Raghunath; used to deny the decree-holder's subsidiary argument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Statutory construction of s. 48: The Court began with the plain language of s. 48(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no order for execution shall be made on any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed. The Court emphasized that these words are "clear and unambiguous" and indicate that the twelve years must be computed from the date of the original decree.
  2. Comparison with art. 182 of the Limitation Act: The Court contrasted s. 48 with art. 182 (and specifically paragraph 4 of art. 182) of the Limitation Act, which expressly provides a three-year period to run from the date of amendment where a decree has been amended. The Court observed that the Legislature's explicit provision for amended decrees in art. 182, and the absence of any similar provision in s. 48, demonstrates an intention that the s. 48 period is absolute and not to be extended by subsequent amendment.
  3. Interaction between art. 182 and s. 48: The Court noted that art. 182 provides a period of three years for execution in matters not covered by art. 183 or s. 48, thereby making art. 182 subject to s. 48. Consequently, the provisions of s. 48 are not displaced by art. 182.
  4. Effect of amendment power under s. 152: The Court acknowledged that courts possess the power to amend decrees under s. 152 with no time limit on the exercise of that discretion, but it held that this inherent or procedural power cannot be employed to evade or extend the statutory prescription of limitation in s. 48. If a decree-holder seeks an amendment, he must do so without offending s. 48; delay in seeking amendment beyond twelve years cannot be cured by relying on the Court's amendment.
  5. Judicial consensus and precedents: The Court surveyed conflicting authorities but concluded there is a consensus of judicial authority favoring computation from the original decree date. It relied on the early decision in Narsingrao Konher Inamdar v. Bando Krishna and other High Court decisions (Faqir Chand; Ramchandra Rao; Patna High Court dissenting decisions) to support its conclusion. The Court treated contrary decisions as minority views.
  6. Subsidiary point on accrual of surety liability: The Court dealt with the decree-holder's subordinate contention (that limitation should run from the date when insufficiency of sale proceeds was realized) and held that the authority relied upon for that proposition (Narhar Raghunath) is no longer good law, having been re-examined and disapproved by a later Division Bench (Rango Ramacharya) and implicitly overruled by a Privy Council opinion (Banku Behari Chaatterji v. Naraindas Dutt).

On this basis, the Court concluded that the 1945 darkhast was presented more than twelve years after the original 1926 decree and was therefore barred by s. 48.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISPOSED OF: The appeal is allowed; the order of the lower courts directing the darkhast to proceed against the surety is set aside, and the darkhast is ordered to be dismissed with costs throughout.

Implications:

  • The direct legal consequence for the parties is that the decree-holder's application (darkhast) filed in 1945 is held to be barred by limitation under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure because more than twelve years had elapsed since the original decree of 13 March 1926.
  • The Court applied and relied upon existing authorities and statutory construction to reach this conclusion; the opinion treats earlier conflicting decisions and subsequent clarifications of law (including the disapproval of Narhar Raghunath) as determining the proper rule. The opinion does not state that it is creating a novel principle of law beyond affirming the established rule that s. 48's twelve-year period is reckoned from the original decree date.
Appeal allowed. Darkhast dismissed with costs throughout.
Show all summary ...

Gajendragadkar, J.:—

This appeal has been referred to a Division Bench by Mr. Justice Dixit because, as he has pointed out in his referring judgment, the question of limitation which falls to be considered in this appeal is of some importance. That question arises in this way. A decree in a mortgage suit was passed under s. 15-B of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act on March 13, 1926. This decree made the decretal amount payable by instalments and it provided that in case of any single default the decree-bolder was entitled to recover the whole of the decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged property. Under the decree the last instalment was payable in 1932. The decree-holder filed several darkhasts between 1927 and 1938 and in fact the mortgaged property was sold in 1935. The decretal amount was still not satisfied and the decree-holder wanted to proceed against the surety, who was defendant No. 3 in the mortgage suit. With that object he filed the present darkhast in 1945 and he claimed to recover the balance from the surety on the ground that, like the mortgagor, the surety himself had been made personally liable to pay the balance which remained due after the sale proceeds from the mortgaged property were realised. It would appear that on October 19, 1942, the original decree was amended and the liability of the surety was clarified. This became necessary because, though in the judgment delivered by the learned Judge in the original suit on mortgage it was made clear that the personal liability of the mortgagor and his surety was to arise after the mortgaged property was sold, the decree which was drawn up did not specifically refer to the personal liability of the surety. An application was, therefore, made by the decree-holder to get this matter clarified and the decree was suitably amended. In the present darkhast, the surety pleaded that the darkhast was barred by limitation under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He raised other pleas, with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. Both the Courts below have rejected the plea of limitation and have directed the darkhast to proceed against the surety. It is this order which is challenged before us by Mr. Samant on behalf of the surety.

Mr. Samant contends that the Courts below were wrong in coming to the conclusion that the limitation prescribed by s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure was to commence from the date when the decree was amended in 1942. His case is that the period of twelve years prescribed by s. 48 of the Code has reference to the date of original decree. In other words, even if a decree is subsequently amended, the period of twelve years which has commenced on the making of the decree is not affected at all. The Courts below have held that the period must be reckoned from the date of the amendment of the decree. That is how the only question which we have to consider in the present appeal is: What is the correct view as to the effect of the provisions of s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

The terms of s. 48 themselves do not present any difficulty in this matter because they clearly and unmistakably indicate that the twelve years have to be computed from the date of the decree. Section 48 sub-s. (1) provides that, where an application to execute a decree has been made, no order for the execution of the same shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed. (I am not referring to the other words of this sub-section with which we are not concerned in the present appeal.) In other words, if a decree is passed on a particular date, the executing Court will not pass any order for the execution of such a decree if the application for execution is presented after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed. On these words, it seems to me clear that there is no scope for extending the period prescribed by s. 48 on the ground that the decree which is sought to be executed was subsequently amended and in a sense the application for execution is an application for the execution of the amended decree.

It is quite true that art. 182 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the limitation of three years for the purpose of applications in execution, expressly refers to the amendment of the decree and makes provision for a specific period of limitation in respect of the amended decree. Paragraph 4 of art. 182 provides a period of three years, where the decree has been amended, from the date of amendment. That is to say, if a decree is amended, the three years which have to be computed for the purpose of deciding the question of limitation under art. 182 have to be computed from the date of the amendment and not from the date of the original decree. The fact that the Legislature has provided for the computation of the period under art. 182 from the date of the amendment and has made no such provision in s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure emphasizes, in my opinion, the policy of the Legislature that the period of twelve years which was prescribed under s. 48 was intended to be absolute and without any exception. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to another part of the provisions of art. 182 again. Article 182 provides a period of three years for the execution of a decree or order made by any Civil Court not provided for by art. 183 or by s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The effect of this latter clause in art. 182 clearly is to make it subject to the provisions of s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that the provisions contained in s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not affected by the provisions in art. 182. That is the plain effect of the clause in art. 182 to which I have just referred. Therefore, it seems clear that, whereas the Legislature made a specific provision for amended decrees in regard to the limitation prescribed under art. 182, it was not thought advisable by the Legislature to make a similar provision in respect of amended decrees under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not difficult to understand the policy underlying the absolute character of the prescription of limitation made by s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Legislature must have intended that, in regard to execution of decrees, the chapter of execution should be over within twelve years from the date when the decree is passed. It is true that the power to amend decrees has been conferred upon Courts under s. 152 and it is also true that there is no limitation prescribed for the exercise of this discretionary power to make amendments in decrees. But it does not follow therefrom that the discretionary power can be invoked so as to affect the provision of limitation made by s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the decree-holder is required to apply for the amendment of the decree passed in his favour, he must take the necessary steps so as not to offend against the provisions of s. 48 of the Code. If he is not diligent in that behalf, and if an amendment is made at his instance more than twelve years after the decree is passed, it would not be open to him to apply for the execution of the decree on the ground that the Court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, has allowed the amendment and it is the amended decree which he seeks to execute. The words used in s. 48 of the Code are clear and unambiguous and they do not admit of any exception being made in favour of decrees on the ground that they have been subsequently amended.

This question has given rise to a conflict of judicial decisions; but, on the whole, the concensus of judicial authority is in favour of the view which we have taken. In fact, an early decision of this Court in Narsingrao Konher Inamdar v. Bando Krishna,(15) has clearly decided this point in favour of the appellant, though it must be conceded that the judgments of both the learned Judges have not elaborately set out reasons in support of their conclusion on this point. In Narsingrao's case, a decree was passed on an award in 1897. It was subsequently amended in 1899 and the application for execution was made in 1909. The plea raised by the judgment-debtor under s. 48 of the Code was upheld by this Court. If the period of twelve years was computed from the date when the decree was amended, the application for execution was clearly in time. On the other hand, if the said period was computed from the date when the decree was originally passed, the application was dearly beyond time. Both Batchelor and Kemp JJ. came to the conclusion that, even the amended decree must, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, bear the date of the judgment and the date of the original judgment was in that particular case of November 17, 1897. The effect of this decision was that for the purposes of s. 48 of the Code, whenever the amendment may be made and however long after the date of the decree it may be made, the date of the decree will still remain the date of the judgment. That is one way of looking at the question of limitation which arises under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and if this view is adopted the answer to the question of limitation must clearly be in favour of the appellant in the present case.

In Faqir Chand v. Kundan Singh,(16) the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court have taken a similar view of the effect of the provisions of s. 48 of the Code. In fact, the learned Judges have cited with approval the judgment of this Court in Narsingrao's case. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court have taken a similar view in Ramchandra Rao v. Parasuramayya.(17) We may add that Leach C.J, who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, has referred to an unreported judgment of the Madras High Court in which Madhavan Nair and Cornish JJ. had, without giving any reasons, come to the conclusion that the period of twelve years prescribed under s. 48 of the Code should be computed from the date of the amendment whenever the decree originally passed is subsequently amended. This view the Full Bench did not accept. Similarly, in Baldeo Shukul v. Syed Yusuf,(18) a single Judge of the Patna High Court had also held that s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be read to permit computation of the period of twelve years from the date of the amendment made in the decree. But that view has likewise been dissented from by James and Rowland JJ. of the Patna High Court in Musammat Dulhin v. Mahanth Harihar Gir.(19) Thus, on the whole, the concensus of opinion is in favour of the view that the period of limitation prescribed by s. 48 of the Code has to be determined by reference to the date of the decree and the twelve years' period is not extended even if the decree as originally passed comes to be subsequently amended.

It remains now to refer to a decision of this Court in Basawa Chamabasawraj v. Somashekhararai,(20) in which Mr. Justice Mackline and Mr. Justice Bavdekar have commented upon a certain observation made by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the Full Bench decision in Ramchandra Rao v. Parasuramayya, to which I have already referred. It would appear that, in dealing with the question as to the effect of the provisions of s. 48, it was observed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court that an amendment of a decree to bring it in accordance with the judgment does not have the effect of starting a fresh point of limitation; and this observation was relied upon before Macklin and Bavdekar JJ. in Basawa's case in support of the contention that, even in regard to the decision of the question of limitation under art. 182(4) it should be held that an amendment of the decree makes no difference. The learned Judges rejected this argument and, with respect, rightly. They pointed out that the particular observation made in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court must be read in the context of the point which the learned Judges were then called upon to consider. They were called upon to consider the question of limitation under s. 48 of the Code and the particular observation must, therefore, be read as confined to s. 48 of the Code. With respect, we think that this comment is fully justified. Therefore, in our opinion, it would not be accurate to say that Macklin and Bavdekar JJ. have expressed, even indirectly, any disapproval of the conclusion of the Madras High Court so far as the position of limitation under s. 48 of the Code is concerned. On the other hand, both the learned Judges have expressly stated that, so far as the period of limitation under s. 48 is concerned, the observation made in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court was perfectly right.

Therefore, in our opinion, the Courts below were wrong in holding that the application for darkhast which was presented by the decree-holder in 1945 was in time. It is more than twelve years from the date of the decree and under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure it must be held to be barred.

There is another minor point which is raised before us by Mr. Patel on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Patel contends that the liability of the surety arose only after the mortgaged property had been sold and it was found that the assets realised by the sale were not sufficient to satisfy the decretal claim. Mr. Patel says that the time when this position was realised should be treated as the starting point of limitation under s. 48 of the Code. In support of this contention, Mr. Patel has relied upon a decision of this Court in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind.(21) Unfortunately for Mr. Patel, however, this decision is no longer good law. The question which was decided by the learned Judges in this case has been subsequently considered by another Division Bench of this Court in Rango Ramacharya v. Gopal Narayan,(22) and Mr. Justice Broomfield, who delivered the judgment of the Bench, has examined the position in detail, considered all the relevant decisions bearing on this point and has come to the conclusion that the view expressed in Narhar Raghunath's case can no longer be treated as good law. In fact, as Broomfield J. has pointed out, the opinion expressed by the Privy Council in Banku Behari Chaatterji v. Naraindas Dutt,(23) has by necessary implication over-ruled the view taken by this Court in Narhar Raghunath's case. Therefore, we must hold that this minor point also must fail.

The result is that the appeal succeeds, the order passed by the lower Courts is set aside and darkhast is ordered to be dismissed with costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.
M.W.P