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Kashinath Laxman Bhide And Two Others v. The State Of Bombay And Two Others Opponents
Judgment Summary — Chagla, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Councillors of the Kalyan Municipality were elected at a general election in early 1949 for a three-year term. The Municipality held its first meeting on 29 April 1949. Sequentially, the following were elected President for the periods indicated:
- First petitioner: up to 31 March 1950.
- One Hande: 1 April 1950 to 31 March 1951.
- Second petitioner: 1 April 1951 to 31 March 1952.
- Opponent No. 2 (Mr. Shukla): 1 April 1952 to 31 May 1952 (elected for two months because Government extended the life of the municipality for two months).
The Government later extended the life of the municipality for seven months to 31 December 1952; on 1 June 1952 opponent No. 2 was again elected President for the seven-month period (to 31 December 1952). The Government further extended the life up to 29 April 1953. A meeting to elect a President called for 6 January 1953 could not be held; a routine meeting was called for 31 January 1953.
The petitioners wrote to the Collector of Thana on 29 January 1953 contending that opponent No. 2's term had expired on 31 December 1952 and asking the Collector to intervene. The Collector, by order dated 2 February 1953, held that it was not lawful for opponent No. 2 to call the 31 January 1953 meeting to conduct ordinary business. The Director of Local Authorities confirmed that view on 27 February 1953. On 13 March 1953 the Government, invoking powers under sub-section (3) of section 214 of the Municipal Boroughs Act, set aside the Collector's and Director's orders and directed that the President's action in calling the 31 January meeting was in order, stating that opponent No. 2's continuing in office could not be questioned because the municipality's life had been extended to 29 April 1953.
The present petition was filed challenging the Government's order and seeking a writ (in the nature of quo warranto) and an injunction restraining opponent No. 2 from functioning as President of the Kalyan Municipality. However, counsel for the petitioners (Mr. Tarkunde) clarified that he was not asking for any writ against the State of Bombay and did not seek to quash the Government's order; his precise relief sought was a declaration and injunction (quo warranto) against opponent No. 2 on the ground that he was not entitled in law to hold the office.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the election of opponent No. 2 (on 1 April 1952 for two months and again on 1 June 1952 for seven months) was valid in law in view of section 19(1) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1923/1925 which prescribes that a president shall hold office for a term not less than one year and not exceeding three years.
- If those elections were invalid, whether the proviso to section 19(1) operates to extend the term of the prior incumbent (the second petitioner) until a successor is legally and validly elected, thereby preventing opponent No. 2 from being a valid successor.
- Whether the court should issue a writ in the nature of quo warranto or an injunction to restrain opponent No. 2 from functioning as President despite arguments that he has been acting as de facto President since 1 April 1952.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Tarkunde)
- Section 19(1) requires that the President be elected for a term not less than one year and not exceeding three years; therefore, opponent No. 2 could not lawfully have been elected for only two months (or seven months) when the Government extended the municipality's life for shorter periods.
- Where it is impossible to elect a President for one year because the municipality's remaining life is less than one year, the section should be construed (by implication) to permit election for a shorter term—i.e., the municipality implicitly has power to elect a President for the shorter remaining period.
- In the alternative, the petition sought a declaration (quo warranto) that opponent No. 2 was not entitled to hold the office and an injunction restraining him from acting as President.
Respondent's Arguments (as summarized)
- The Advocate General submitted that opponent No. 2 had been functioning as President since 1 April 1952 and argued (implicitly) that because he had been acting as de facto President the Court should not interfere by issuing a writ of quo warranto at this stage.
- The Government took a view (by its 13 March 1953 order under s.214(3)) that opponent No. 2's action in calling the 31 January 1953 meeting was in order and that his continuing in office could not be questioned because the municipality's life had been extended to 29 April 1953.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds by close statutory interpretation of the Municipal Boroughs Act provisions referred to in the record:
- The court identified the plain terms of section 19(1): a president "shall hold his office for such term, not less than one year and not exceeding three years, as the municipality shall, previous to the election ... determine." The language is explicit and prescriptive as to minimum duration (one year).
- The court observed a "lacuna" arising where the Government extends the municipality's life for a period shorter than one year (as happened when the life was extended only for two months). Section 19(1) contemplates the ordinary case where the municipality continues for three years or the municipality determines a term of at least one year, but it does not expressly contemplate an instance when the municipal life is to continue for less than one year.
- The court considered section 23(1) and found it inapplicable because that section addresses filling vacancies arising by death, resignation or removal during a president's term. Section 23(1A) was noted to be mandatory in requiring election of a new president within 25 days of expiry of a term determined under section 19(1), but the court recognized a practical impossibility: if the remaining municipal life is less than one year, a new president could not lawfully be elected under the strict terms of s.19(1).
- The petitioners' counsel invoked a canon of construction—reading statutory words to effectuate legislative intent and to adapt general words to the matter's fitness. The court rejected this approach here because the words of s.19(1) are "express and precise" (specifying "not less than one year") and thus not open to being altered by implication to allow elections for shorter periods in particular cases. The court stated that where precise words are used the court must not speculate beyond them.
- To resolve the impasse, the court turned to the proviso to s.19(1): "Provided that the term of office of such president ... shall be deemed to extend to and expire with the date on which his successor is elected." The court interpreted this proviso to mean that once a president is legally and validly elected under s.19(1) he continues in office until a successor is legally and validly elected.
- Applying that interpretation: if opponent No. 2's election on 1 April 1952 was not valid because it was for a term shorter than one year, then the second petitioner (whose term had expired 31 March 1952) continued in office under the proviso until a lawful successor was elected. The court further found that the 1 June 1952 election of opponent No. 2 was similarly invalid (also for a term less than one year). Consequently, no valid successor to the second petitioner had ever been elected, and under the proviso the second petitioner remained the incumbent.
- Addressing the Advocate General's de facto argument, the court acknowledged that opponent No. 2 had been functioning as President since 1 April 1952 and expressed reluctance at the result; nonetheless, the court held that it is the court's duty, when shown that an unqualified person is holding public office, to declare that the person is not entitled to the office and to prevent him from acting as such.
- The court observed that section 57 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 contains validating provisions that appear to cover acts done by a person acting as President, and the court hoped no difficulty would arise with respect to acts performed by opponent No. 2 while acting as President.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Opponent No. 2 (the second opponent) is not entitled to hold the office of President of the Kalyan Municipality; an injunction was issued restraining him from functioning as President and from discharging any duties as President.
Direct consequences and orders made by the Court:
- The Court made the rule absolute to the extent indicated in the judgment (i.e., declared opponent No. 2 not entitled to hold office and issued an injunction restraining him from acting as President).
- There was no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The opinion resolves the specific statutory construction question by insisting on the plain meaning of the minimum one-year term in s.19(1) and by applying the proviso to protect an incumbent where no lawful successor has been elected. The judgment does not elaborate broader precedent-setting consequences beyond applying these statutory provisions to the facts; it also notes the statutory validation mechanism in s.57 for acts performed by a person acting as President.
Result
Rule made absolute.
(Opinion delivered by Chagla, C.J.; note records reference to sections cited in the judgment including s.19(1), proviso to s.19(1), s.23(1), s.23(1A), s.214(3) and s.57 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act.)
Chagla, C.J:—
The Councillors of the Kalyan Municipality were elected by a general election in the beginning of 1949 and their term of office was three years. The first meeting of the Municipality was held on April 29, 1949, and the first petitioner was elected President up to March 31, 1950. One Hande was elected President from April 1, 1950, to March 31, 1951, and the second petitioner was elected President for the period April 1, 1951 to March 31, 1952. Opponent No. 2 was elected President from April 1, 1952, to May 31, 1952. He was elected only for a period of two months because Government had extended the life of the Kalyan Municipality for a period of two months. Under the law the ordinary term of office, as already pointed out, of the Municipality is three years, but Government, have been given the power to extend it for one year. Government further extended the life of the Municipality for seven months up to December 31, 1952, and on June 1, 1952, the second opponent was again elected President for seven months up to December 31, 1952. Government further extended the life of the Municipality up to April 29, 1953. A meeting was called by the second opponent for January 6, 1953, to elect a President, but for some reason the meeting could not be held and no election of the President took place. On January 31, 1953, the second opponent called a routine meeting of the Municipality. On January 29, 1953, the petitioners addressed a letter to the Collector of Thana pointing out that the second opponent was only elected up to December 31, 1952, and no meeting had been called for election of another President and the Collector should interfere and take necessary action. On February 2, 1953, the Collector passed an order holding that it was not lawful for the second opponent to call the meeting on January 31, 1953 to conduct the ordinary business. On February 16, 1953, an application was made to the Collector to call a meeting for the election of a President and on March 13, 1953, the Collector passed an order calling a meeting for March 19, 1953. It may be pointed out that on February 27, 1953, the Director of Local Authorities confirmed the action taken by the Collector on February 2, 1953, and he took the view that the President's action in calling a meeting on January 31, 1953, for conducting the ordinary business after his term as President had expired was ultra vires of the provisions of the Act. On March 13, 1953, the Government passed an order purporting to be under powers vested in them under sub-s. (3) of s. 214 of the Municipal Boroughs Act, setting aside the orders issued by the Collector of Thana and confirmed by the Director of Local Authorities, and directing that the action of the President of the Kalyan Municipality in calling a meeting on January 31, 1953, for conducting the ordinary business was in order. In this order the Government expressed the opinion that the term of the Municipality having been extended up to April 29, 1953, and as Mr. Shukla, the second opponent, would be holding the office of the President for not less than one year, his continuing in office could not now be questioned. The present petition has been preferred challeng the order passed by Government and also for an order restraining the second opponent from functioning as the President of the Municipality.
Mr. Tarkunde has made it clear that he is not asking for any writ against the State of Bombay, nor does he want the order of the Government to be quashed. He says that he is not interested in challenging that order. What he really wants in this petition is a writ in the nature of quo warranto and his contention is that the second opponent is not entitled in law to hold the office of President of the Kalyan Municipality, and that we should give a declaration to that effect and pass an injunction restraining the second opponent from functioning as President of the Kalyan Municipality.
Section 19(1) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1923, provides:
“Save as otherwise provided in this Act a president or vice-president shall hold his office for such term, not less than one year and not exceeding three years, as the municipality shall, previous to the election of the president or vice-president determine, or until the expiry within the said term of his term of office as councillor, but shall be eligible for re-election.”
Therefore, under this section the term of office of the president has been fixed at not less than one year and not exceeding three years and the term of office has to be determined by the municipality previous to the election. In the case of the first petitioner, in the case of Mr. Hande and in the case of the second petitioner, the term of office was in each case not less than one year, but when we come to the election of the second opponent on April 1, 1952, the term of his office was only two months. This was unavoidable because the life of the municipality was only extended for two months, and the life being extended only for two months the municipality while electing him as President specifically fixed the period of his office up to May 31, 1952. Now, there is a very curious lacuna in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. Section 19(1) only deals with the ordinary case where the municipality continues for three years and the section provides that the President may be elected either for the whole period of three years or for a period of not less than one year. But this sub-section obviously does not contemplate the contigency that has arisen here where after the three years have expired Government does not choose to extend the life of the municipality by one year but by a shorter term, viz. two months. If the Government had extended the life of the municipality for one year, no difficulty could have arisen because the second opponent could have been elected President for one year. But as the Government chose to extend the life of the municipality only for two months the municipality thought that a President had to be elected and naturally he could only be elected for the remaining term of the municipality. Section 23(1) deals with vacancies in the office of president and vice-president and how it should be filled up. That section has no application to the present case because that deals with a case where the president either dies or resigns or is removed from his office during the term of his office and the section provides for filling up the vacancy which has arisen under those circumstances. Then s. 23(1A) provides:
“In the event of the expiry of the term of office of the president or vice-president determined by the municipality under sub-s. (1) of s. 19, unless s. 19A applies, a new president or vice-president as the case may be shall be elected within 25 days from the date of such expiry.”
Therefore there is a mandatory provision for the election of a new president after the term of office of the president fixed under sub-s. (1) of s. 19 expires and it is pointed out that it was incumbent upon the municipality under this sub-section to elect a new president within 25 days after the term of office of the second petitioner expired. But although it was incumbent upon the municipality to proceed to elect a new president, a new president in law could not be elected because the remaining term of the municipality was only two months and under s. 19(1) a president could not be elected for that short duration. Therefore the question that arises is whether the election of the second opponent on April 1, 1952, was a valid election.
Mr. Tarkunde says that we must construe s. 19(1) so as to read that the election of the president for a period not less than one year and not exceeding three years only applies to cases where the municipality is to continue to be in existence for one year at least, and that when a situation arises where the municipality is to continue in existence for a period less than one year then s. 19(1) should be applied with the necessary modification. In other words, Mr. Tarkunde's contention is that impliedly power is given to the municipality under s. 19(1) to elect a president for a shorter term where a situation arises in which it is impossible to elect a president for not less than one year, and Mr. Tarkunde says that it was open to the municipality to elect the second opponent for a period of two months as the circumstances then existing made it impossible for his being elected for a longer period. Mr. Tarkunde has requisitioned to his aid the well known canon of construction which permits a Court to construe words in order to bring them in accordance with the intention of the Legislature, and Mr. Tarkunde says that in this case also it is necessary to give the words used in s. 19(1) the meaning which best suits the scope and object of the statute. Now, this canon of construction can only be availed of when general words are used and those general words can be restricted to the fitness of the matter, but this canon of construction cannot be availed of when the words used by the Legislature are express and precise, and in this particular case the Legislature has used express and precise terms and provided that the president shall hold his office for such term not less than one year and not exceeding three years. Under those circumstances it is impossible for us to hold that in a particular case a president can hold office for a term which is less than one year. It will be construing s. 19(1) contrary to the precise and exact words used by the Legislature. When exact and precise words are used, they clearly show the intention of the Legislature and it is not open to the Court to speculate as to what the intention of the Legislature might be because a case not covered by the exact and precise words used by the Legislature has arisen. But in our opinion the way out of this impasse is to be found in the proviso to s. 19(1) and that proviso is in the following terms:
“Provided that the term of office of such president or vice-president shall be deemed to extend to and expire with the date on which his successor is elected.”
Therefore, once a president is legally and validly elected under s. 19(1), he does not cease to hold office until his successor is elected, and elected in this context must mean legally and validly elected. Therefore till there is a successor who is elected president in accordance with law, the incumbent who holds office as president must continue to hold office under the proviso to s. 19(1). Therefore, if our view is that on April 1, 1952, opponent No. 2 was not validly elected inasmuch as he was elected for a term shorter than provided under s. 19(1), the second petitioner continued to hold office and his term of office was extended by reason of the proviso to s. 19(1) and that term of office would only expire when his successor was elected. In the election of the second opponent was not in accordance with law on April 1, 1952, for precisely the same reasons, his election was invalid on June 1, 1952, because that election was also for a period less than one year. Therefore the result today is that no successor of the second petitioner has been validly elected and under the proviso to s. 19(1) his term of office is extended till today and that office must continue till his successor is validly elected. In our opinion, therefore, the second opponent is not entitled to hold the office of President of the Kalyan Municipality as he has not been validly elected to that office.
We would therefore issue an injunction restraining the second opponent from functioning as the President of the Kalyan Municipality and from discharging any duties as President of the Kalyan Municipality. It is with some reluctance that we have come to this conclusion because we are impressed by what the Advocate General told us that the second opponent has been functioning as the President from April 1, 1952. No reflection is intended against the second opponent because the municipality as a whole took the view that it could elect him President for a shorter period than one year. At both the meetings on April 1, 1952, and June 1, 1952, he was elected by the municipality. The difficulty only started when after December 31, 1952, no further meeting was called for electing a President to hold the office after December 31, 1952. The Advocate General says that inasmuch as the second opponent has been acting as de facto President, we should not interfere at this stage by issuing a writ of quo warranto. In our opinion it is the duty of the Court, as soon as its attention is drawn to the fact that a person who is not qualified is holding a public office, to declare that he is not entitled to that office and to prevent him from acting as such. Fortunately, the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 seems to have provided for a contingency like the present by enacting s. 57 and we hope that no difficulty would arise with regard to the acts performed by the second opponent as President of the Kalyan Municipality by reason of the validating provisions contained in that section.
The result is that the rule, to the extent that we have indicated in the judgment, will be made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
Rule made absolute.
K.B.S
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