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G. Eshwaraiah v. Mahendrappa Kheni

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Oct 18, 1968
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gopal Rao Ekbote, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter comprises a second appeal (arising from O.S. No. 53 of 1960) and two revision petitions (C.R.P. No. 85 of 1963 and C.R.P. No. 1540 of 1952) which were heard together because they raised common legal questions.

The respondent-plaintiff (landlord) filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2,391 as arrears of rent for house No. B.11-439, Risala Abdulla, Hyderabad, claiming rent at Rs. 140 per month under a rental agreement dated 5-6-1957. The tenant was said to be a regular defaulter; an earlier small causes suit for arrears up to 31-8-1958 had been decreed in favour of the landlord (Exhibit A-3). The tenant later defaulted again and the present suit for arrears was instituted.

One revision petition (C.R.P. No. 85 of 1963) arose from an eviction proceeding: the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition (order dated 22-9-1961) but the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court allowed the landlord's appeal and directed eviction.

The other revision petition (C.R.P. No. 1540 of 1952) concerned fixation of fair rent: the Rent Controller fixed fair rent at Rs. 61.75 per month by order dated 7-8-1951; on appeals both landlord and tenant appealed and the Chief Judge (order dated 24-2-1962) modified the Rent Controller's order to fix fair rent at Rs. 75 per month, dismissing the tenant's appeal.

The tenant in the present litigation consistently argued that the tenancy agreement was void because it contravened section 3 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act (XX of 1954). The trial court and the first appellate court reached determinations on related points; this Court considered whether the tenancy created in contravention of section 3 was void and unenforceable under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, and whether alternative relief such as compensation for use and occupation under section 65 of the Contract Act could be granted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a tenancy created in contravention of section 3 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act (XX of 1954) is void and unenforceable under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act as being forbidden by law and opposed to public policy.
  2. Whether, if the tenancy agreement is void, the landlord can nevertheless recover compensation for use and occupation under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act.
  3. Whether a previous final judgment (Exhibit A-3) rejecting the tenant's plea that the agreement was void operates as res judicata and estops the tenant from re‑raising the plea in the present suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant / Defendant

  • The tenancy agreement was entered in contravention of section 3 of the Hyderabad Houses Act and was therefore void; consequently, no suit could lie on the basis of such an agreement.
  • In earlier proceedings the tenant raised this defence and in the small causes suit the court rejected the contention; nevertheless this contention was pursued in subsequent litigation.

Landlord / Plaintiff

  • The landlord relied on precedent (B. Balaiah v. Ahmed Khan) and authorities (Sir William P. Anson; St. John Shipping Corporation v. Joseph Bank Ltd.) to argue that a statute imposing a penalty does not necessarily declare the contract unlawful or void and that the contract could be enforceable notwithstanding the penalty provision.
  • The landlord also relied on the trial court's alternative finding that even if the rent agreement were void, the landlord was entitled to compensation for use and occupation under section 65 of the Contract Act; the landlord sought recovery on that basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatima Bi v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1953 Madras 257 Considered whether a lease made in contravention of a statutory vacancy/notification procedure was void and whether tenant's possession was permissive (impacting compensation under Article 31(2)). The Court cited the decision as supporting the conclusion that a lease made in contravention of relevant statutory provisions can be void and that the tenant's possession may be deemed possession of the landlord; the Court treated it as supporting its conclusion here.
B. Balaiah v. Ahmed Khan, 1960 II An. W.R. 496 Held that the contract was not necessarily void despite contravention of the Hyderabad Act; authority for the proposition that contravention does not automatically render the contract void. The Court disagreed with that decision, finding it incorrect on the law and distinguishing it from the present facts; it held section 3 contravention did make the contract void.
Mahmoud and Ispahani In Re (1921) 2 K.B. 716 Illustrates that a statute may plainly and unequivocally declare a class of contracts forbidden for public interest (licence requirement making contracts unenforceable). The Court invoked this case as illustrative of a statutory prohibition that forbids enforcement of particular contracts; used it to analogise the clear prohibition in section 3(3).
St. John Shipping Corporation v. Joseph Bank Ltd., 1957 I Q.B. 267 Example where statute imposed a penalty for infringement (overloading) but did not render the underlying contract unlawful; shows distinction between penalty-only statutes and prohibitory statutes. The landlord relied on this; the Court distinguished it, finding the Hyderabad Act intended to prohibit letting in contravention of section 3 rather than merely imposing a penalty.
Halsbury's Laws of England (Simmonds ed.), Vol. 8, para 245 Principle: whether a statutory penalty implies prohibition is a question of construction; recurrent penalties aimed at public protection imply prohibition and may prevent enforcement. The Court used this exposition to support the view that the recurrent penalty in section 33, directed to public protection, implies prohibition of acts in contravention of section 3.
Chitty on Contracts (22nd Ed.), vol. I, paras 850–851 Explains analysis where a statute imposes penalties and whether such penalties render contracts illegal or merely expensive; notes public policy considerations. The Court cited Chitty to frame the inquiry as one of statutory purpose and to conclude that the Act intended to prohibit contracts contrary to section 3.
Bowmakers Ltd v. Barnet Instruments Ltd. (Court of Appeal) Where contract was illegal by statute, claimant could still recover ownership-based relief (conversion) provided the claimant did not rely on the illegal contract itself. The Court relied on this decision to justify that a landlord can obtain compensation for use and occupation (a restitutionary claim) even if the underlying tenancy contract is void, so long as the claim does not depend on enforcing the illegal contract.
Budhulal v. Deccan Bank N.G. Co., A.I.R. 1955 Hyderabad 69 (Full Bench) Held promissory note invalid under a currency statute imposing a penalty; nonetheless, the plaintiff could recover sums under the corresponding restitution provision (section 66 of Hyderabad Contract Act / section 65 Indian Contract Act). The Court cited this Full Bench decision to support the proposition that restitution under section 65 may be available even where the instrument is invalid under a penal statute.
Md. Amir Ali Khan v. Khaja Jamaluddin, 1964 II An. W.R. 183 Approval of the Budhulal decision. The Court noted this approval as further support for restitutionary relief when contracts are void under statute.
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banaimali Sen, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 33 On the conclusiveness of matters decided by a court of exclusive jurisdiction (res judicata). The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the earlier Small Causes Court's decision (a court of exclusive jurisdiction) operates as res judicata.
Valji Dayalji v. Firm of Nandlal, A.I.R. 1926 Sind 236 Support for the principle that a decision by a Small Causes Court can operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. The Court cited this authority as supporting precedent for the res judicata effect of the earlier Small Causes Court judgment.
Hemraj v. Hargolal, A.I.R. 1934 Sindh 112 Another decision supporting res judicata effect of Small Causes Court decisions. Used to reinforce the view that the earlier judgment is conclusive and estops the tenant from re‑raising the voidness plea.
Venkataseshayya v. Virayya, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 1 (Full Bench) Held there is no conflict between res judicata and prohibition of alienation by statute; courts can decide whether an alienation is void and that decision is final in subsequent suits. The Court relied on this Full Bench authority to emphasise the finality of previous competent court decisions and to uphold res judicata in the present context.
Balnath Prasad v. Ramphal, A.I.R. 1952 Patna 72–86 Discussed principles consistent with the interplay of res judicata and substantive invalidity of transactions. Cited to underscore that earlier adjudications have res judicata effect notwithstanding public policy prohibitions, where courts have jurisdiction to decide the issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis grounded on statutory construction, precedent and principles of contract law:

  1. Statutory scheme and plain language: The Court examined sections 3, 4 and 33 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act. Section 3(1) required landlords to notify the Controller of vacancies; section 3(3) prohibited a landlord "without the permission of the controller" from letting a house and set temporal restrictions; section 4 authorised the Controller to lease vacant houses for public purposes and contained an explanation allowing the Controller to disregard unlawful let agreements; section 33 imposed a fine (up to Rs. 1,000) for contravention of section 3.
  2. Legal principle on statutory illegality: The Court reviewed the legal distinction between contracts illegal at common law and those rendered illegal by statute, and stated the correct inquiry is whether the statute intends to prohibit the contract or merely penalise it. The Court referred to authorities (Halsbury, Chitty, Mahmoud & Ispahani) to frame this inquiry.
  3. Purpose of the Act: The Court identified the legislative purpose of the Act: to remove congestion, make houses available at fair rents, and counter rent‑racketing. Given this public‑interest aim and the express prohibitory language of section 3(3), the Court concluded the statute intended to prohibit letting without compliance.
  4. Penalty as implication of prohibition: The Court held that the recurrent penalty in section 33—imposed to protect the public rather than merely to raise revenue—supports an inference that the Act intended to prohibit letting in contravention of section 3. Thus an agreement made in contravention of section 3 is void and unenforceable; section 23 of the Indian Contract Act (contracts forbidden by law) applies.
  5. Distinguishing contrary authority: The Court considered the decision in B. Balaiah v. Ahmed Khan (which held the contract was not void) and declined to follow it, finding it incorrect upon construction of sections 3, 4 and 33.
  6. Restitution/compensation under section 65: The Court examined whether restitutionary relief under section 65 of the Contract Act could be allowed when an agreement is discovered to be void. It discussed the legal complexity (including Pollock & Mulla's commentary) about recovering benefits conferred under agreements void for unlawful consideration, and surveyed equitable principles and exceptions to in pari delicto.
  7. Application of Bowmakers and Budhulal: The Court relied on Bowmakers (and Budhulal) to hold that a landlord may recover compensation for use and occupation (or exercise rights of ownership) provided the claim does not rest on enforcing the illegal contract itself; the claim must be framed on an independent right (title/ownership) or on restitution under section 65.
  8. Factual finding and trial court's alternative relief: The trial court had, in the alternative, granted a decree for use and occupation under section 65. The tenant did not effectively contest that alternative relief on appeal or before this Court. The Court held that the trial court was justified in granting compensation for use and occupation because that relief was not founded upon enforcement of the illegal contract.
  9. Res judicata: The Court further held that the earlier Small Causes Court judgment (Exhibit A-3), which had rejected the tenant's plea that the rent agreement was void, had become final and operated as res judicata under section 11 CPC principles. The Small Causes Court is a court of exclusive jurisdiction; its determination is conclusive. The Court cited multiple authorities (including Raj Lakshmi Dasi and Venkataseshayya) in support.
  10. Net outcome of reasoning: The Court combined the conclusions: (a) the tenancy contract made in contravention of section 3 is void and unenforceable under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act; (b) notwithstanding that voidness, restitutionary relief (compensation for use and occupation) was available to the landlord under section 65; and (c) the tenant was estopped by res judicata from contesting the contract's validity in this suit because that issue had been finally decided by the Small Causes Court in Exhibit A-3.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The second appeal is dismissed and the two revision petitions are dismissed (the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs; the revision petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs).

Implications / Consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The Court concluded that a tenancy contract made in contravention of section 3 of the Hyderabad Houses Act is void and unenforceable under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act because the statute, read with section 33 (penalty) and section 4, shows an intention to prohibit such contracts as being against public policy.
  • Because the contract is void, neither the tenant could properly file an application for fixation of fair rent under the Act nor the landlord could, in theory, file an eviction application before the Controller under the said Act on the basis of such a contract. (This is the logical consequence of the Court's finding that the contract is prohibited by statute.)
  • Nevertheless, the trial court's decree for compensation for use and occupation (restitution under section 65 of the Contract Act) was sustained: the landlord may recover compensation because the relief was not founded on enforcing the illegal contract but on an independent restitutionary principle.
  • Additionally, the prior Small Causes Court judgment (Exhibit A-3) that held the agreement enforceable operates as res judicata (section 11 CPC), estopping the tenant from disputing the validity of the contract in the present suit; on that basis the orders of the Rent Controller in the two revision petitions were not regarded as vitiated, and no interference was warranted.
  • No new precedent beyond the application and interpretation of the cited authorities was claimed to be established; the Court reached its conclusions by construing the Act and applying established principles of statutory illegality, restitution (section 65) and res judicata.

Sources for this summary: Extracted strictly from the provided judicial opinion text; no outside facts or inferences have been added.

Show all summary ...

Gopal Rao Ekbote, J.:— The Second appeal and the two revision petitions raise common questions of law. They can, therefore, be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The second appeal arises out of O.S No. 53 of 1960. The Respondent-plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 2,391/- for arrears of rent from 31-8-58 to 31-1-50 in regard to house No. B.11-439. Risala Abdulla, Hyderabad at the rate of Rs. 140/- per month. It was contended in the suit that the defendant executed a rental agreement in favour of the plaintiff on 5-6-1957 agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 140/-. The tenant was a regular defaulter. A suit for recovery of arrears of rent was filed against him in the court of small Causes for the period ending 31-8-1958. The suit was decreed. Even subsequent to that period, the tenant committed default in payment of the rents. A notice, therefore, was served upon him. As he failed to pay, the suit was laid for the recovery of rent. C.R.P No. 85 of 1963 arises out of an eviction proceeding instituted by the landlord against the tenant. The Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad by his order dated 22-9-1961 dismissed the eviction petition. In appeal, the Chief Judge, City Small Causes court allowed the appeal and directed the eviction of the tenant.

3. C.R.P No. 1540 of 1952 arises out of an application filed by the tenant for fixation of fair rent. The Additional Rent controller, Hyderabad by his order dated 7-8-1951 fixed fair rent of Rs. 61.75 Np. per month. Both the tenant as well as the landlord preferred appeals before the Chief Judge, City Small Causes court, Hyderabad. By his order d/- 24-2-1962, the learned Judge allowed the appeal of the landlord and modified the order of the Rent Controller and fixed the fair rent at Rs. 75/- per month. The appeal of the tenant was dismissed.

4. The second appeal and the two revision petitions came before one of us (Venkateswara Rao, J.) Having regard to the conflicting views expressed in Fatima Bi v. State of Madras . A.I.R 1953 Madras 257. and B. Balaiah…* v. Ahmed Khan…. . 1960 II An. W.R 496. the case has been referred to a Bench and that is how the matter has come before us.

5. The short but important question is whether a tenancy created in contravention of the provisions of section 3 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and lease) Control Act (XX of 1954) hereinafter called “the Act” is void and unenforceable under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act as being one that is forbidden by law and opposed to public policy.

6. Before we consider this question, it is necessary to mention that the house fell vacant. The landlord without giving any intimation as required under Sec. 3 of the Act let out the house on rent to the tenant under the suit agreement. The tenant became a defaulter. Consequently a small cause suit was filed for arrears of rent. The tenant raised the contention that the agreement of tenancy is void as it is in contravention of the provisions of the Act. This contention was negatived. The Small Cause Court ultimately after an enquiry decreed the plaintiff's suit. The judgment has become final. It is exhibit A-3.

7. The tenant fell again in arrears of rent. That was why the present suit, out of which the second appeal arises, was instituted against him. In this suit, one of the defences was that the rent agreement being inconsistent with section 3 of the Act is void and no suit on the basis of such an agreement can lie. The trial court followed. B. Balaiah…* v. Ahmed Khan…. and held that the contract is not void. The learned Third Assistant Judge also considered the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for use and occupation under section 65 of the Contract Act and held that the landlord can demand mesne profits for use and occupation of the house. Consequently, a decree for the suit amount deducting some amount was passed in favour of the plaintiff.

8. The defendant carried the matter in appeal. The 1st, Additional Chief Judge by his judgment dated 6th February 1962 negatived the only contention which was raised before him that the contract of tenancy was void as that was entered into in contravention of section 3 of the Act. He was not called upon to consider that in case the contract is found to be void whether the plaintiff would be entitled to compensation for use and occupation as was ruled by the trial court.

9. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, in so far as they are relevant, read as follows:—

“3(1). If any house situated in any area specified by the Government by notification in the official Gazettee is vacant on the date of such notification or becomes vacant after such date, the landlord of such house shall give intimation thereof in the prescribed form to the controller.

(3) A landlord shall not, without the permission of the controller, let, occupy or permit to be occupied such house without giving intimation and for a period of fifteen days from the date on which intimation is received or within a period of one week after the termination of the proceedings under clause 6, if any, whichever is later.

10. Section 4.

“The Controller may, for a public purpose, by order in writing served on the landlord, direct that any vacant house, whether intimation of its vacancy has been given by the landlord under sub-section (1) of section 3 or not, be given on lease to such person, as he may think fit.

Explanation:— A house may be directed to be leased under this section notwithstanding that it is subject to an agreement of lease or has been let or occupied in contravention of sub-section (3) of Section 3.”

11. Section 33, which is relevant, is in the following terms:

“Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of section 3, section 4, section 5, clause (a) of sub-Section (1), Clause (a) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (4) of section 12, section 12, section 16, sub-section (1) of section 17 and section 30 shall be punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/-

12. Even if all other requisites for the formation of a contract are complied with, yet, if the object of the contract is forbidden or discouraged by law and if that object was in contemplation of the parties when they entered into the agreement, the law will not allow any party to enforce it. It is an illegal agreement.

13. Now, an agreement may be invalidated either by express provision of law or by the rules of common law. Illegal contracts am are usually divided initially into two different classes. On the one hand, the courts will not enforce contracts entered into with the object of committing an illegal act or doing that which it is the policy of the law to prevent. These contract are illegal and veld at common law. On the other hand, the courts will not enforce contracts in so far as their making or performance is expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute. These may strike at the agreement itself, or, at some purpose which one or both of the parties intend to make of it. Further the law may refuse to assist in any way a person who founds the cause of action upon such an agreement or it may simply say that such an agreement is not to have legal effect. In the former case, the agreement is illegal, in the latter it is void. The distinction between the two is not always clear. We are here concerned with an agreement which is illegal or void by statute.

14. The effects of statutory illegality may vary considerably. A statute may declare that a certain type of contract is entirely prohibited. In such cases there can be 110 doubt about the intention of the legislature, that such a contract should not be enforced. It is clear that what is done in contravention of the provisions of an Act cannot be made the subject-matter of an action.

15. Every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited or made unlawful by an Act of legislature is void. It is not necessary in every such case that the law declares it as unlawful or void either expressly or by necessary implication. It is enough if the formation of any such contract is prohibited either expressly or by necessary implication. The material question in such cases to ask is about the purpose of the statute. Was it intended to interfere with the contract under consideration or merely to control its operation in a more efficient or orderly manner?

16. After examining the statute, we have no doubt that the intention of the Legislature is to prevent letting out of a house which fell vacant, without the permission of the Controller. The intention was not to lay down merely some terms and conditions on which the landlord can let out the building. The policy underlying section 3 is too obvious to call for a detailed reference, to remove the congestion and to make available houses at fair rent to needy people in areas to which the Act is made applicable, as it was experienced that there is acute shortage of residential as well as non-residential buildings in certain areas of the State as a consequence of which rent recketing was going on. In order to regulate the allotment of houses and stop the unhealthy trends, section 3 was enacted in the public interest and it is plain that what has been forbidden in the public interest, cannot be made lawful by payment of any penalty for it. Provision of penalty may be an additional ground to hold that the formation of a contract of tenancy without obtaining the permission of the Controller was forbidden. Anything therefore done in contravention of section 3 must necessarily be illegal and void.

17. In Mahmoud and Ispahani In Re, (1921 2 K.B 716) by a War time statutory order it was forbidden to buy or sell linseed oil without a licence from the Food Controller. The plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to the defendant a quantity of linseed oil, and, before the contract was made, asked the defendant whether he possessed a licence. The defendant falsely assured him that he did. Subsequently, however, he refused to accept the oil on the ground that he had no licence. The plaintiff brought an action for damages for non-acceptance. The court of Appeal refused to entertain the action. The order, said Bankes, L.J, is a clear and unequivocal declaration by the Legislature in the public interest that this particular kind of contract shall not be entered into.

18. If we view section 3(3) in this background, it is plain that it states in empirical language that “a landlord shall not, without the permission of the controller let, occupy or permit to be occupied such house without giving intimation etc.” Under sub-section (1) of that section, it is obligatory on the part of every landlord to inform about the vacancy and under section (3) he is prohibited from letting, occupying or permitting it to be occupied without obtaining, the permission or unless the other requirements of that section are fulfilled.

19. If a contract is expressly or by necessary implication forbidden by law or by public policy, then it is void and unenforceable though the parties may have been ignorant of the facts constituting illegality and do not intend to break the law. Such contracts are unlawful per se and the intention of the parties in such a case is irrelevant. What must follow is that when the contract is expressly prohibited or forbidden by section 3 no court will lend its assistance to give it effect.

20. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that section 33 of the Act provides penalty for any contravention of section 3. It makes the contravention of section 3 punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/-. The imposition of penalty by the Legislature on any specific act or omission is prima facie equivalent to an express prohibition and it is clear that a contract is void if prohibited by a statute under a penalty, even without express declaration that the contract is void, because such a penalty implies a prohibition. The sole question in either case is whether the statute intends to prohibit the contract so as to make a contract infringing the prohibition invalid. It is now well known that everything in respect of which a penalty is imposed by a statute must broadly be taken to be a thing forbidden.

21. A statute sometimes penalises the making of certain contracts or their formation in certain ways. It is then a question whether the statute not only imposes a penalty on one or both of the parties to the contract but also deprives either or both of them of their civil remedies under it. If the statute prohibits the contract, it is unenforceable whether the parties meant to break the law or not. A significant distinction between cases of illegality at common law and those cases of illegality by statute is that in the former case one has to look and see what acts the statute prohibits: it does not matter whether or not it prohibits a contract, if a contract is deliberately made to do a prohibited act that contract will be unenforceable. In the latter case one has to consider not what acts the statute prohibits but what contracts it prohibits, but one is not concerned at all with the intent of the parties, if the parties enter into prohibited contract, that contract is unenforceable.

22. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Simmonds Edition) 8th Volume, at page 141, in paragraph 245, it is observed.

“Where a penalty is imposed by a statute upon any person who does a particular act this may or may not imply a prohibition of that act. It is a question of construction in each case whether the legislature intended to prohibit the doing of the act altogether or merely to make the person who did it liable to pay the penalty. If the penalty is recurrent, that is to say, if it imposed not merely once for all but as often as the act is done, this amounts to a prohibition, where the object of the legislature in imposing the penalty is merely the protection of the revenue the statute will not be construed as prohibiting the act in respect of which the penalty is imposed; but where the penalty is imposed with the object of protecting the public though it may also be for the protection of the revenue, the act must be taken to be prohibited, and no action can be maintained by the offending party on a contract which is made in contravention of the statute”.

23. Chitty on Contracts (22nd Edition) volume I in paragraph 850 observe:

“Where a statute imposes a penalty on one or both of the parties to a contract as a result of their entering into the contract or of their manner of performing it, the court will consider whether on the construction and purpose of the statute the doing of the particular act is forbidden as illegal or whether it is merely rendered expensive. In the latter, it is clear that the contract itself is not prohibited”.

24. In paragraph 851, the learned author further observes:

“If on the other hand, the object of the statute is the protection of the public from possible injury or fraud or is the promotion of some object of public policy, the inference is that contracts made in contravention of its provisions are prohibited.”

25. We have therefore to find out upon the construction of the various provisions of the Act whether it was intended by the legislature to prohibit the doing of a certain act altogether or whether it was only intended to say that if the act was done, certain penalties should follow as a consequence.

26. If we can find out that the act is prohibited, then the principle is that no man can recover in an action founded on that which is a breach of the provisions of the statute. It seems to us plain from the language of sections 3, 4, and 33 that there is a prohibition on what has been done in this case by the landlord. We think no language could be plainer. Section 3 expressly prohibits the miking of any contract which would contravene section 3. Section 4 in respect of such unlawful contract authorises the Controller to ignore it and let out the house to any one else. Section 33 does the same thing when it imposes a penalty of fine upto Rs. 1,000/- for contravention of section 3. Not only the penalty is recurrent but is meant to protect the public. The fine is not imposed with a view to collect or protect revenue for the Government. It is true that it is possible for a statute to attach a penalty to make a particular kind of agreement and at the same time to provide that such an agreement, if made, shall not be, therefore, void. But this is not the case with the present Act.

27. The learned Advocate for the landlord relied upon a passage from the Principles of the English Law of Contract by Sir Williams P. Anson 22nd Edition at page 300. The passage runs as follows:—

“Further, a statute may simply impose a penalty on the parties to a contract, without declaring the contract to be unlawful either in its inception or in its performance. Thus in St. John Shipping Corporation v. Joseph Bank, Limited . 1957 I Q.B 267., the plaintiffs chartered their ship St. John to chaterers for the carriage of grain from the United States to England. In the course of this voyage they overloaded the ship contrary to the Merchant Shipping (Safety and Loadline conventions) Act 1932, and the master was prosecuted and fined for this offence. The defendants, consignees of part of the grain withheld a proportion of the freight due, viz. a sum equivalent to the freight on the excess cargo carried. Devlin, J. held that they were not entitled to do so. The Act did not render unlawful the contract of carriage but merely imposed a penalty in respect of its infringement.”

28. We do not think there is any similarity between the two situations. The learned author at the same page laid down the following test.

“The material question is, therefore, the purpose of the statute; was it intended to interfere with the contract under consideration? Or merely to control its operation in a more efficient or orderly manner?”

29. The answer to such a question in the light of sections 3, 4, and 33 cannot but be that the intention of the legislature is to prohibit any contract contravening section 3 altogether.

30. What must follow from the above said discussion is that the landlord could not have let out the house which had fallen vacant without obtaining such a permission under sec. 3. He had not obtained the necessary permission nor he waited for the necessary time after giving the intimation as per that section. It is conceded that the house was let out to the defendant without obtaining such a permission from the controller. The rent agreement, that is to say the contract of tenancy, is therefore void and no action for recovery of rent on the basis of such a void contract can be laid nor the court will render any assistance to the plaintiff if he found the action on the basis of such a void contract.

31. For such a case section 23 of the Indian Contract Act is attracted. Such a contract is not only forbidden by law, but is also of such a nature that if permitted it would defeat the purpose of section 3 of the Act and is also opposed to public policy underlying section 3. The object of such agreement being unlawful, the agreement is void.

32. Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J. (as he then was) in B. Balaiah…* v. Ahmed Khan…. in a similar case held:

“The contract in question obviously cannot fall within one or the other provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act as the same is not forbidden by law, that is, which is not declared as illegal or void by law. There is no question of any public policy involved in the case. The penalty for acting in contravention of section 3 is provided in section 33 of the Act which says that any person who contravenes any of the provisions of section 3 etc. shall be punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/-. This is not a case where the controller considered fit or proper to take action under section 33. If it was the intention of the legislature that every contract entered into in contravention of section 3 should be void it is open to the legislature to have stated so in section 3 by declaring in one of the sub-sections to that section that any contract of lease or tenancy entered in contravention of section 3 shall be void.”

33. With due respect to the learned Judge, we find it almost impossible to accept that view. We have already noticed that section 3(3) expressly forbids the formation of any contract without any permission of the controller. The imposition of penalty for contravention of section 3 is clear indication that a contract in contravention of section 3 is forbidden. Section 23 of the contract Act, therefore, gets attracted. A clear public policy underlies Sections 3, 4 and 33 of the Act. The policy is to make houses available to the public at fair rents and to remove the acute shortage of houses and consequent rent-racketing. We have already observed that it is not necessary in every case that the law should expressly or by necessary implication declare the contract made in contravention of a provision to be unlawful or void. It is a matter of construction of statute and we have no doubt on an interpretation of sections 3, 4, and 33 of the Act that a contract of tenancy contravening section 3 is prohibited by law and the basis of such prohibition is to regulate letting out of houses in the public interest. Merely because the controller has not taken any action for contravention made by the land-lord of section 3, it does not affect the invalidity of the contract. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the said decision does not decide the law correctly.

34. In Fathima Bi v. State Of Madras the facts were that the petitioner in that case was the owner of the house. On 15-1-1951, one Fernando wrote a letter to the Accommodation controller stating that he was a tenant of the said premises and that he was vacating the same on 15-1-1951. The Accommodation controller issued a notice to the petitioner under section 3(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and rent control) Act 1949 calling for particulars and intimating her that the premises have to be kept vacant for seven days from the date of the furnishing of particulars. The petitioner did not give reply. On 25-4-1951, a complaint was filed in the court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the petitioner was fined Rs. 75/-. The Accommodation controller allotted the house to one Waters. As the petitioner did not give peaceful possession on 4-8-1951 the respondent issued a notice under section 3(8) of the Act directing the petitioner to deliver possession and also stating that if no vacant possession was given necessary steps would be taken to obtain the same. It is against that notice that the writ petition was filed. A contention was raised before Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) that the provisions of the relevant section in so far as they authorise an officer to take possession of the property from the tenant without paying or providing for the payment of compensation contravene the provisions of article 31(2) of the Constitution of India and therefore ultra vires the constitution. The contention was that the tenant had a legal interest in the leasehold property and the State cannot dispossess him without paying compensation. While considering that question, it was observed:

“There would be considerable force in this argument if a person was in legal possession as a tenant and he was dispossessed; but if the tenancy was void the possession of the tenant would only be permissive possession not in his own right, but for and on behalf of the landlord, in which case it would be the dispossession of the landlord who would be compensated under the provisions of the Act. The question therefore turns upon the subsidiary question whether the lease in contravention of the provisions of S. 3 was void.

In my view, the object of the agreement of lease in the present case was not only forbidden by law, but if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of the Act within the meaning of S. 23 Contract Act. The landlord was prohibited from letting the building before the expiry of ten days from the receipt of notice by the authorised officer. She was liable to be prosecuted for contravention of sub-ss (1), (2) and (4) of S. 3 of the Act and indeed she was prosecuted and fined. She, therefore, let her building by committing an offence and also in the teeth of an express prohibition not to let till certain conditions were complied with. The lease was therefore void. In the circumstances, the possession of the tenant must be deemed to be the possession of the landlord. The tenant has no separate and distinct right to be compensated for within the meaning of article 31 of the Constitution”

35. It will thus be seen that although in that case a direct question in reference to section 3 had not arisen, nevertheless the learned judge for the purpose of deciding whether the tenant who was in possession of the house was entitled to any compensation held that his possession was possession of the landlord because he was let into possession of the house under a void contract. The above said observation nevertheless supports the conclusion to which we have arrived.

36. The next point is whether the decree of the courts below can be sustained in spite of what is decided above under section 65 of the Contract Act. It has already been noticed that the trial court in the alternative has granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for use and occupation of the house. Section 65 runs as follows:

“When an agreement is discovered to be void or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it.”

37. This section deals with two matters (a) the agreement which is discovered to be void: and (b) a contract which becomes void. We are concerned in this case with the first limb of section 65. The first matter is concerned with an agreement which never amounted to a contract because it was void ab initio, the fact of its being void being discovered at a later stage. The word ‘discovered’ in the first part of the section is used in contradistinction to the word “becomes” in the second part. The word ‘discovered’ connotes the pre-existence of that which is discovered. An agreement discovered to be void therefore would include an agreement destitute of legal effect from its inception. The principle under-lying section 63 is that a right to restitute may arise out of the failure of contract though the right be not itself a matter of contractual obligation.

38. The expression ‘discovered to be void’ presents some difficulty as regards agreements which are void for unlawful consideration under sections 23 and 24.

39. Pollock and Mullah on Indian Contract and Specific Reliefs Acts, Eighth edition, at page 390, observes:

“The expression ‘discovered to be void’ presents some difficulty as regards agreements which are void for unlawful consideration (sections 23 and 24). On the one hand it has been said that the words ‘agreement discovered to be void’ apply to all agreements based upon an unlawful consideration. If this view be Correct, it follows that the person who has paid money or transferred to another for an illegal purpose can recover it back from the transferee under this section, even if the illegal purpose is carried into execution and both the transferor and transferee are in pari delicto. It is difficult to support that such a result was contemplated by the legislature. Moreover it would not be correct to say that, where a person gives money for an unlawful purpose, the agreement under which the payment is made can be, on his part, discovered to be void. On the other hand, it has been said that the present section does not apply where the object of the agreement was illegal to the knowledge of both the parties at the time it was made. If this view be correct, a person who has paid money or transferred property to another for an unlawful purpose cannot recover it back even if the illegal purpose is not carried into execution and the transferor is not as guilty as the transferee. This is clearly against the provisions of S. 84 of the Indian Trusts Act 1882.

40. It was thus be seen that the border between illegal and void contracts is not altogether clear. Certain contracts are illegal in a severe sense. The courts will not only treat them as void but will refuse to facilitate a party implicated in the illegality in any way. Other contracts are ‘merely void’ and parties to those will not so completely be denied a remedy by the Court.

41. Even in cases of ‘illegal contract’ we must observe that the single word ‘illegal’ may embrace varying degrees of impropriety, and it should not be supposed that the effects of illegal contracts are always identical. Although general rules can be and have been set out in several cases, each case must be examined empirically in order to discover the precise effect of the illegality.

42. It must be remembered that most contracts are not legal or illegal in the same way that eggs are good or bad. The effect of illegality will in most cases turn on the intention of the parties, that is, whether one or both of them intended to do an act forbidden by the law. Their rights and remedies will depend upon whether they know of or participated in the illegal intention. If both parties share the unlawful intention no action can be brought by either party. A party to a contract will not be held to be innocent if he has full knowledge of the facts which constitute the illegality, but yet is ignorant of the law, for ignorance of law is no excuse and cannot be set up as defence in answer to the charge of illegality.

43. It is already noticed that considerable difficulty arises in deciding whether a particular statute or head of public policy renders the contract unlawful per se or merely prevents a guilty party from suing on it. But the modern tendency is to hold that a contracting party cannot be cast from the seat of judgment unless he participated in the unlawful intention. The state of mind of the parties is the crucial factor. Unless it is clear that the legislature intended, or public policy demands, that the contract be prohibited altogether the innocent party can sue on the agreement. We are however clear in our mind that in the instant case not only the intention of the Legislature is clear but public policy underlying sections 3, 4, and 33 demands and indicates that the contract is prohibited altogether, of course, within the legal set up in section 3 and therefore even an innocent party cannot sue on the basis of such an agreement. Sir Williams P. Anson however, observes at page 341 in his book on principles of the English Law of Contract.

“Moreover, even if the contract is one which is unlawful per se, the innocent party is not necessarily without remedy. If he has been induced to enter into the contract by the representation or promise of the other that it is unlawful, then he can recover damages for fraud if there is fraud, or for breach of a collateral warranty if he prove such to have been given, provided that he himself has not been guilty of culpable conduct on his part disabling him from that remedy.”

44. It is thus plain that there are two sides to this question. One is that no person can take any benefit from a contract, either directly or through his personal representations when that benefit results from the performance by him of an illegal Act. And the other is that the Courts will refuse to enforce an illegal contract at the suit of a person who is himself implicated in the illegality. This is based on the well known observation that “no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice.” This principle is expressed in the maxim in pari delicto portior est conditio defendants. The difficulty arises because of the interplay of the two maxims, the one preventing a party from pleading his own wrong doing and the other regarding pari delicto.

45. But there are exceptions to this maxim in pari delicto and in those cases a person will be relieved of the consequences of an illegal contract into which he has entered. They are said to fall into these broad classes (a) where the illegal purpose has not yet been substantially carried into effect before it is sought to recovery money paid or goods delivered in furtherance of it; (b) where the plaintiff is not in paridelicto with the defendant (c) where the plaintiff does not have to rely on the illegality to make out his claim.

46. We are not concerned in this case with the first and the second exceptions, but are concerned with the third exception.

47. If the plaintiff is not relying on the illegal contract, then he can get the relief which he could not have got if he had brought his suit on the illegal contract. Consequently a party who has delivered the possession of property to another in pursuance of an illegal transaction may be prevented from showing that no right or title passed to the transferee, if, in order to establish his case, he has to rely on his own illegal act. If, however, he can so frame his action that he is not forced to rely on the illegal transaction, he will be permitted to assert any independent right such as ownership which he may have to the property which has been transferred. Thus there can be no difficulty for allowing him to recover possession let to a tenant under an illegal agreement on the foot of his title. Likewise there can be no impediment in his way to get compensation for use and occupation of the house by the tenant in such cases as the action will be based on title and not on the illegal contract and no fault can be found.

48. This conclusion finds sufficient support from an often quoted decision of Bowmakers L.D v. Barner Instruments Ltd.. In that case, the defendants entered into a contract whereby they agreed to hire-purchase from the plaintiffs certain machine tools. Such an agreement was rendered, illegal by a Government order which prohibited the disposition of machine tools without a licence from the Ministry of supply. The defendants failed to make the agreed payments for hire. They further sold some of the tools and refused to deliver up to the plaintiffs others still in their possession. The plaintiffs sued for damages for conversion. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that since the contract of hire purchase was illegal, the plaintiffs could have no remedy on it. To this the plaintiff replied that they were not relying on the contract, but upon their paramount right of ownership, the bailment having come to an end. The latter argument was adopted by the Court of appeal. Du Parcq. I.J observed.

“In our opinion, a man's right to possess his own chattels will as a general rule be enforced against one who, without any claim of right, is detaining them or has converted them to his own use, even though it may appear either from the pleadings, or in the course of the trial, that the chattels in question came into the defendant's possession by reason of an illegal contract between himself and the plaintiff, provided that the plaintiff does not seek, and is not forced either to found his claim on the illegal contract or to plead its illegality in order to support his claim.”

49. The relief which a person asks for under section 65 of the Contract Act has not been forbidden by any law and it cannot be legitimately argued that in trying to secure such a relief he is attempting to do indirectly what he had been forbidden by law to do directly. In a suit on the basis of a contract, a party is trying to enforce its terms while in a suit under section 65, a party merely asks for restoration or compensation as the agreement has been discovered to be void and he wants to be placed in the position in which he would have been if no agreement had been entered into.

50. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Simmonds edition, volume 8, at page 149 it is stated.

“As a general rule a person may recover property which has been transferred by reason of an illegal contract and which is being wrongfully detained by the transferee, provided he does not seek and is not forced either to found his claim on the illegal contract or to plead illegality in order to support his claim”.

51. In Budhulal v. Deccan Bank N.G Co. . A.I.R 1955 Hyderabad 69 F.B a Banking Company had laid an action on the foot of a promissory note executed in its favour of a stated sum. The defendant in his written statement admitted the execution of the promissory note, but raised an objection that in as much as the promissory note was payable to bearer, it contravened section 15 of the Hyderabad Paper Currency Act, corresponding to section 32 of the Reserve Bank of India Act. Section 15 of the Hyderabad Paper Currency Act declared that the making of an instrument in contravention of the provisions of section 15 was an offence punishable with a fine equal to the amount of the bill, hundi, note or engagement in respect whereof the offence was committed. Having regard to these provisions, it was held by the Full Bench consisting of five learned Judges that the promissory note was invalid. After holding this, the learned judges thought that by reason of section 66 of the Hyderabad Contract Act, corresponding to section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount advanced under the promissory note.

52. This case was cited before a bench of this court is Md. Amir Ali Khan v. Khaja Jamaluddin . 1964 II An. W.R 183. and was approved.

53. The trial court dealt with this question, and as stated earlier reached the conclusion that even if it is proved that the rent agreement is void since the tenant has occupied and used the premises he is liable to pay compensation for use and occupation to the owner of the house and it is on that basis that the trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit. The tenant in his appeal did not canvass anything contrary to this decision. Even before us no serious attempt was made to point out that the trial court was wrong in reaching that conclusion. For the reasons which we have already given, we are satisfied that the trial court was justified in decreeing the plaintiff's suit for use and occupation as the relief granted could not be said to have been granted on the foot of any illegal contract.

54. It is true that the claim under section 65 of the Contract Act was not made the basis in the plaint, nor any issue was framed. But the parties knew that matter was canvassed before the trial court. The trial court did in fact go into it and gave a judgment on it.

55. The decree of the lower courts can be sustained yet on another ground. It has already been pointed out that previous to the present suit, the landlord had filed a suit on the basis of this rent agreement for recovery of a certain rent. The tenant specifically raised a plea that the rent agreement is void in law. That plea was rejected by the court of small causes by holding that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant about the letting out of the house was not void in itself and is therefore enforceable. That judgment (Exhibit A-3) became final. In our view, that judgment operates as res judicata and the tenant is estopped from raising that plea in a subsequent suit, that is to say, the present one.

56. It is now firmly ruled that where the former court is a court of exclusive jurisdiction, matters decided by such a court will operate as res judicata. On general principles of res judicata, the decision of the former court of exclusive jurisdiction, in this case the Small Causes Court, will be conclusive on the matter decided irrespective of the limitation that the former court must be competent to decide the subsequent suit. See Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banaimali Sen . A.I.R 1953 Supreme Court 33..

57. That the decision of the Small causes court can operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings is well supported by the following two decisions Valji Dayalji v. Firm of Nandlal . A.I.R 1926 Sind 236. and Hemraj v. Hargolal . A.I.R 1934 Sindh 112..

58. We are fortified in our conclusion further by the Full bench decision of this court in Venkataseshayya v. Virayya . A.I.R 1958 A.P 1 F.B. It was held:

“There is no conflict between the principle of res judicata and that of prohibited alienation of particular properties on the ground of public policy. An alienation of properties prohibited by public policy or statute may be void. But the said prohibition cannot have the effect of depriving the jurisdiction of courts to decide in a particular suit whether the alienations is void or not. Nor can it override the principles for res judicata. The former belongs to the domain of substantive law and the latter to the rule giving finality to decrees of competent courts.”

“The sanctity of final judgment is as much based on public policy as prohibition against the alienation of properties annexed to certain public offices. The fundamental question in each case therefore is whether the court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain a particular suit. A duty is cast upon a court to raise relevant issues arising on the pleadings and give definite findings on each of the issues. The question whether a service inam is alienable is a mixed question of fact and law which is certainly within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. When it decides the question one way the finding will be res judicata in another suit. If the defence which ought to be raised is not raised the Court must be deemed to have decided against the contention not raised.

59. To the same effect is Balnath Prasad v. Ramphal . A.I.R 1952 Patna 72 to 86.

60. In this case we find from the judgment of the trial court and Exhibit A-3 that such a plea was raised by the tenant before the Small Cause Court and it was expressly negatived. That judgment, therefore, operates as res judicata and the tenant is estopped from raising the plea in this suit. The trial court in our view was therefore right in holding that the previous judgment operates as res judicate. Nothing was pointed out against that conclusion either before the first appellate court or to us. No serious attempt was made to show as to how the conclusion is incorrect.

61. For the reasons given, the judgment and decree of the court below cannot be interfered with as we agree with it in conclusion although for different reasons. Consequently, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs C.R.Ps 1540 of 1962 and 85 of 1963: We have already held that the contract of tenancy is unlawful and void. What must follow from the conclusion is that neither the tenant could file an application for fixation of fair rent under the Act before the Rent Controller nor the landlord could file an application for eviction before the Controller under the said Acts. But in view of the fact that we have also found that the judgment of the Small Causes court (Exhibit A-3) operates as res judicata and held that the tenant is estopped from disputing the validity of the contract under section 11, C.P.C the orders of the Rent Controller in both the petitions cannot be said to be bad. We do not find therefore any reason to interfere with those orders. Nothing was pointed out on merits in these two revision petitions as to why the judgments are vitiated.

62. The revision petitions therefore are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.