Boppudi Punniah And Others v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy Varu, By Its Trustee, And Others .

Chandra Reddy, C.J:— The mening and effect of section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (XXXVII of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is the subject of discussion in these Writ Petitions.

2. This Act was passed in the year 1956 to abolish and convert certain inam lands into ryotwari, lands. Section 3 of the Act empowers the concerned Tahsildar to decide whether a particular piece of land within his jurisdiction is an inam land and, if so, whether it is held by any institution. It is section 4 of the Act that provides the machinery for abolition of the inam land? and converting them into ryotwari lands. By virtue of this section, every holder of an inam, be it in a ryotwari or a zamindari village, is entitled to a ryotwari patta. Tahsildars of the various parts of the Andhra area started enquiries contemplated by section 3 of the Act. We are here concerned only with inams that form the subject/matter of the present enquiry. At the enquiry concerning these inams, rival claims were put forward by the institutions and certain persons claiming to be either as personal grantees or as service holders in the particular temples. After holding the enquiries as required by section 3, the concerned Tahsildars gave their decisions upholding the claims of either the institutions or the individuals. These adjudications were subject to appeals before the Revenue Divisional Officers, who are constituted as appellate tribunals under sub-section (4) of section 3. In some cases, the Revenue Divisional Officers affirmed the orders of the Tahsildars while in others they reversed them. The aggrieved parties have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to remove on certiorari the determination of the Revenue Divisional Officers.

3. Before we discuss the problem created by section 4 of the Act, we have to advert to the nature of the inams in the several Writ Petitions. At the outset it has to be mentioned that though the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officers in four instances rejecting the claims of the institutions for ryotwari pattas were challenged by filing writ petitions, in W.P Nos. 739 and 856 of 1960, and 552 and 1228 of 1961 the learned Advocate-General appearing for the institutions submitted that the adjudications of the Revenue Divisional Officers could not be successfully impeached, having regard to the relevant entries in the extracts from the Inam Fair Register and the confirmation of the inams to named individuals which bring them within the scope of section 4. He, therefore, did not press the writ petition but he wanted that a clause should be introduced in the pattas to the effect that they are issued to the respondents subject to the obligation to perform the services. To this course the respondents are agreeable.

4. We have now to deal with the other inam lands, the pattas in regard to which have been claimed either by the institutions or by other persons claiming to be inamdars. All the inams involved in these Writ Petitions are described as “devadayams”. The expression “devadayam”, by itself, does not import that it constituted a grant to the institution. It only means that it is a gift for a religious purpose, i.e, a purpose connected with religion. As pointed out by Ramesam, J., who spoke for the Court in Tripura Sundaramma v. Secretary of State . A.I.R 1928 Mad. 282. when the British Government dealt with inams in 1859, they appointed an Inam Commission for enquiring into the genuineness of the inams so that they might be recognised and confirmed or not as the case required. They dealt with both classes of cases, namely, the grants to temples and mosques and grants to servants on condition of rendering services in temples and mosques together. Their policy was not to impose quit-rent on them but to recognise and continue the inam so long as the conditions of the grant were being fulfilled, that is, in the case of grants to mosques or temples, as long as the institutions themselves lasted, and, in the case of grants on condition of services, as long as the services continued to be performed. Both being directly or indirectly connected with religion both classes are indiscriminately described as ‘devadayam’.

5. The inams of this description fall into three classes, namely, (i) grants to the institution (ii) grants to an office to serve as emoluments annexed to that office, and (iii) grants to named individuals burdened with service. The inams belonging to classes (i) and (iii) do not present much difficulty in the present context. It is the problem connected with the second category that we have to wrestle with here.

6. The inams belonging to classes (i) and (iii) are not many in these petitions and, therefore, they could be easily disposed of. In W.P Nos. 739 of 1960, 856 of 1960, 522 of 1961, and 1226 of 1961, it was conceded that the inams in question were personal grants and therefore the institutions could not lay any claim to them. In that view of the matter, those petions were dismissed as withdrawn on 12th February, 1963 as already stated.

7. In regard to a few of them, a claim is made on behalf of named individuals that the inams pertained to the third category. This is the subject-matter of W.P Nos. 836, 837, 838, 839 of 1961 and W.P No. 877 of 1962. In all these cases, both the Inam Tahsildar and the Appellate Tribunal accepted the title of the institutions to these inams, rejecting the claim of the petitioners. It is to quash these orders that these writ petitions were filed in this Court.

8. The short question that falls for consideration in these writ petitions is whether the inams could be described as grants to persons fulfilling a particular capacity, i.e, to persons holding a particular office in the temple of Sri Varahalakshminarasimhaswamy, Singarayakonda, Nellore district. The contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that they were grants made to named individuals subject to the obligation of rendering a particular service is mainly founded on the entries in columns 13, 16 and 17 wherein the names of the original grantees and the names of persons enjoying the properties at the time of the inam enquiry are given. These columns mention the names of the original grantees as also those of the owners at the relevant time. We do not think that these entries are in any way conclusive. If we turn to the entries under columns 8, 10, and 21, it would clearly show that the inams were intended to serve as emoluments annexed to an office. Column 8 shows that the inams were given for repeating vedas in the pagoda in the festivals and that service was being performed. Under column 10. namely; “Tenure hereditary unconditional for life only or for two or more lives” the entry made is “So long as service is performed”. Significantly enough, it does not say that it was hereditary. When we come to column 21, which is of a very decisive character, the recommendation of the Deputy Collector was that, it should be confirmed so long as the service was performed. In consonance with this recommendation, the Inam Commissioner confirmed the inams as recommended.

9. Could it be postulated in the light of these entries that the inams were personal to the grantee. We feel that they were not granted to named individuals subject to the condition of rendering service, but they were inams intended to form part of the emoluments of the office of particular service. If really the grant was to an individual with the added obligation, the grant would have been confirmed to a named individual so long as the service was performed. On the other hand, the confirmation is couched in passive language, namely, “so long as the service is performed”, which is a clear indication that it pertains to the office. In view of the recitals in columns 8, 10 and 20, the mention of the names of the grantees or the enjoyers of the property under columns 13, 16 and 17 cannot have much significance. These names, in our opinion, were mentioned as persons rendering service and enjoying the income from the lands and the grants could have been made to individuals indicated therein not as personal grants but as incumbents of a particular service.

10. It is unnecessary to pursue this matter any further except to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lakshminarasimhachari v. Agastheeswaramamivaru. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred with approval to the dictum of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao, wherein the distinction was prominently brought out between the words “to be confirmed so long as the service is performed” and “to be confirmed to the party so long as he continues the performance of the services”, the latter having been held to be a personal grant and the former not having been held so. So, in the absence of confirmation to a named individual with the added obligation of performance of service, the grant could not be regarded as a personal one. It follows that the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners based upon the entries mentioned above cannot be given effect to. At this juncture, it must be mentioned that in the light of the several decisive entries in the Inam Fair Registers, the conclusion of the Revenue Divisional Officer that these inams constituted endowments to the institution was not sought to be sustained and it was not disputed that they pertain to the second category.

11. But, it is urged by Sri Bhujanga Rao, learned counsel for the institution, that though the inam might not have been granted to the deity and though it falls only under class (ii), the institution must be regarded as holding the inam and not the service holder. This argument is built upon the fact that the temple derives some benefit from the performance of services. We do not think that this factor is a conclusive one. However, at this stage, it is not necessary to dilate elaborately on this topic as this will be dealt with presently in the context of the second category of inams. Suffice it for the present purpose to say that these inams do not fall either under class (i) or class (iii) but they pertain to class (ii).

12. To the same class also belong the inams that are involved in W.P Nos 609 of 1962 and 415 of 1960. Although the Revenue Divisional Officer decided in favour of the temples on the nature of the inams having regard to the relevant entries in the extracts from the Inam Fair Register, it was conceded by the learned Advocate-General that they should also be regarded as service inams. As to who should be entitled to ryotwari pattas in regard to this type of inams will be dealt with separately.

13. Before we proceed to consider the applicability of section 4 of the Act in relation to service inams, we will dispose of W.P Nos. 1150 of 1961, 1169 of 1961 and 381 of 1962. In W.P Nos. 1169 of 1961 and 381 of 1902, orders were entered by the Revenue Divisional Officer in favour of the temples, who took the view that they belong to the institutions. So far as W.P No 381 of 1962 is concerned, reliance is placed by the Revenue Divisional Officer on the entries in columns 16 and 17 which mention kunkanuru Ahobilaswamy Pagoda as the grantee and the enjoyer (the present enjoyer) and also the entries in the Inam ‘B’ register and Adangal which indicate that the temple was the pattadar it was recited in column 21 of the extracts of the Inam Fair Register:

Appayya is extinct and the inam is claimed by the representatives of the Pagoda on the ground of an alleged gift by him to it. It is supposed by no evidence whatever. The village officers have put the Pagoda in possession as favour. To be confirmed in one title deed on quit rent at Rs. 3-8-0 compulsory.”

14. It was confirmed accordingly. On this material, the Revenue Divisional Officer reached the conclusion that the confirmation was to the deity.

15. We find it difficult to disagree with this opinion of the Revenue Divisional Officer, especially when at the time of the inam enquiry the temple was shown as the enjoyer and it was established subsequently also that the temple had been in possession and enjoyment of the property. At any rate, that finding cannot be disturbed in a writ petition. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer. W.P No. 381 of 1962 is therefore dismissed.

16. The inam relating to W.P No. 1169 of 1961 indubitably seems to have been granted to the deity. In column 8 it was stated that it was given for the support of the Pagoda Bhavani Sankaraswami in Mundlapadu and the present enjoyer was shown as Mundlapadu Bhavani Sankaraswamy. No doubt, the name of the worshipper also is mentioned. But that does not, in any way, detract from the value of the entries under columns 8 and 17. Obviously, the name of the worshipper was mentioned since it might not have had anyone else managing the institution. This need not detain us any longer as the view of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be successfully attacked in the writ petition. We do not, therefore, feel called upon to quash the order which is the subject-matter of W.P No. 1169 of 1961. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.

17. There remains W.P No. 1150 of 1960. The temple in question is Sri Venkateswaraswamy, Nandyal. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner this inam pertains to the same class. It is clear from the relevant entries in the extracts from the Inam Fair Register that it was granted “for the maintenance of servants entirely of the Pagoda of Sri Venkateswaraswami”, which means for maintenance of all the servants of the temple. Columns 16 and 17 show Sri Venkateswaraswami as the enjoyer of the inam at the time of the inam enquiry, though the names “Kondamala, Tirupatigadu and Subbadu” are coupled with that of the deity. The inam was to be confirmed and continued free of tax so long as the Paricharakam service was rendered in the Pagoda of Sri Venkateswaraswami. We feel that the various entries indicate that the inam was made to the deity for its upkeep, since all the servants of the temple are intended to be maintained out of the income from the property. This is not a case of the inam being annexed to any particular service. It looks to us that it was granted for general services in the temple akin to an inam granted for nithya naivedya deeparadhana in a temple interpreted by a number of decisions of the Madras High Court as a grant to the deity. We, therefore, think that the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer, reversing that of the Tahsildar, should be set aside and the order of the latter granting patta to the deity restored. We are told by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the income from this inam will be utilised by the institution only for maintenance of servants performing Paricharakam service in the temple. For these reasons, W.P No. 1150 of 1961 is allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.

18. We now come to the knotty problem as to who should be regarded as the holder of the inam in regard to service inams. The learned Advocate-General, appearing for the institutions, maintains that this class of inams fall outside the pale of the Act in question and it is not competent for the tribunals functioning under the Act to decide as to who the inamdar at the time of the commencement of the Act was. According to him, the Act deals only with classes (i) and (iii) mentioned above. The reason why the learned Advocate-General suggests that the Act was not comprehensive enough to take in inams serving as emoluments annexed to service is that there is no provision in the Act enabling the temple authorities to insist upon, performance of service and that when once a ryotwari patta is issued the pattadar cannot be deprived of the patta. He also submits that the expression ‘inamdar’ is inappropriate with reference to an office-holder, who is not an absolute owner of the property, and that an officeholder who could enjoy the property only so long as he renders service could not be conceived of as an ‘inamdar’. It may be mentioned here that Sri Bhujanga Rao, appearing on behalf of some other institutions, contends that the Act covers all types of inams not excluding service inams and that it is not correct to argue that the Act is inapplicable to inams pertaining to services. Of course, he contends that the temple should be deemed to be the holder of service inams. We will deal with it later on.

19. We are inclined to accept the arguments of Sri Bhujanga Rao as representing the correct law. We are not persuaded that the points presented by the learned Advocate-General are substantial. We are unable to agree that the Legislature was either ignorant of or overlooked the existence of the inams of this type which undoubtedly are in great number in the Andhra area. In fact, it may not be incorrect to say that this category of inams forms a considerable proportion of the inams in the Andhra area, be it in ryotwari or zamindari area. There is no justification for attributing ignorance to the Legislature of the existence of this class of inams.

20. We must proceed on the assumption that the Legislature was aware of the fact, that there are large number of inams belonging to this category. If that were so, there is no reason why we should suppose that the Legislature thought of keeping out of the purview of the Act this class of inams, especially when the intendment of the Act was to abolish and convert inam lands into ryotwari lands. The absence of a provision enabling the authorities concerned to insist upon performance of service could not lead us to the conclusion that all service inams were excluded from the purview of the enactment. Further, it is argued on behalf of the respondents that it is open to the authorities concerned to insert a clause that the patta is issued to individuals as incumbents of a particular service and that the inam could be enjoyed only so long as service is rendered. That may safeguard amply the interests of the institution. Even if it were not sufficient, it could only be stated that it is a lacuna in the enactment and it is for the Legislature to fill it up and this Court cannot do anything in the matter. Moreover, if the argument of the learned Advocate-General were to prevail, it must be held that the inams of the third category are also outside the Act, because there is no provision enabling the authorities concerned to compel the discharge of the obligations imposed upon them under the terms of the original grant. We cannot make any distinction in that behalf between the two classes of inams. But it is not contended that the Act is inapplicable to personal grants. On the parity of this re???asoning, the service inams also must be held as inams governed by this enactment. Consequently, we are not very much impressed with the argument based upon the absence of a provision indicated above.

21. Nor are we able to give weight to the argument that the holder of an office enjoying the inam cannot be regarded as an inamdar. At this stage, it is convenient to read the terms of section 4, in so far as it is of immediate relevancy.

“4. (1) In the case of an inam land in a ryotwari or zamindari village the person or institution holding such land as inamdar on the date of commencement of this Act shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect thereof.”

22. So, in order to entitle a person to claim a ryowari patta, it should be shown that he was holding such land as inamdar. In our opinion the word ‘inamdar’ is not a term of art. It only means “one who is in possession and enjoyment of the land”. We are not satisfied that it connotes absolute ownership of the land in the sense that he could alienate it. In Wilson's Glossary, the meaning of the word, ‘inamdar’ is given as “the holder of a rent-free grant”. Some of the meanings given to the word ‘hold’ in the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary are; “to keep; to have; to grasp; to have in one's possession, keeping or power”. Therefore, the expression ‘inamdar’ only means “one who is in possession and enjoyment of a rent-free land”. It does not further imply that he must have absolute title to the property. It cannot be stated that the concept of the word ‘inamdar’ is foreign to a service-holder.

23. In this context, we may refer to the inam rules embodied in the Board's Standing Orders. Standing Order No. 55(2) which deals with resumption of an artisan inam, says:

“2. (a) The Collector may order resumption of an artisan inam in the following cases:

(i) When the holder of the inam has alienated the inam land or a portion of it, where the inam consists of the land and not merely the assessment on it.

(ii) When the holder of the inam consisting of only the assessment has alienated the inam land or a portion of it, without securing to the working incumbent, the payment of assessment on the land.

(iii) When the holder of the inam has refused or failed to perform the prescribed service.”

24. It is plain that the expression ‘Inamdar’ is used in relation to artisan inams. Similarly, in Appendix III (under Standing Order No. 55, paragraph 2), which is the Form in which proposals for the resumption of artisan inams should be submitted to the Collector, the word ‘inamdar’ is used. Column 7 reads:

“Whether the service is now rendered by the inamdar; if not, date of cessation of service by the inamdar.”

25. We, therefore, find nothing inappropriate in the use of the word ‘inamdar’ as regards service inams.

26. We cannot also agree with the learned Advocate-General that there is no case in which the expression ‘inamdar’ has occurred as respects a service inam. On the other hand, we feel that there are number of decisions in which this expression has been employed in the context of service inams.

27. Anjaneyulu v. Sri Venugopala Rice Mill, Ltd. dealt with Swastivackakam inam and the grant was confirmed so long as the service was performed. There it was pointed out that by ‘owner’ of an inam is meant ‘inamdar for the time being’. In Kotayya v. Yellamanda . 1928 65 M.L.J 54., which bears on piper service inams, it was stated that the temple pipers were having service inams and that the inams held by a temple servant fell within the scope of section 44 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (II of 1927). In Venkata Narayana v. Lakshmaiah . 1953 2 M.L.J 167., it was observed by a Bench of the Madras High Court that if the inam was attached to a spiritual office, the office-holder was entitled to hold it so long as he rendered service and any alienation of the land made to a stranger would be void as against the rightful holder.

28. It is the same expression ‘inamdar’ that is employed in a number of cases vide Kalamegha Perumal Devasthanam v. Kalamegha Ayyangar . 1957 2 M.L.J 579., Madana Gopalaswami Temple v. Manikyam . 1957 1 An. W.R 60., and Subrahmanya v. Kailasanatha . A.I.R 1934 Mad. 258..

29. The Supreme Court has also described in Bheemasena Rao v. Pesda Yella Reddi . 1961 A.L.T 606 the holder of the inam as the inamdar. It is true that their Lordships were dealing with a personal grant. But in our opinion, there is no material difference, in designating the enjoyers as inamdars, between the two types of inams on this aspect of the matter. Even in the case of personal grants, the enjoyment is restricted to the owner personally, the owner being the inamdar for the time being. It should be noted that even as regards these grants the holders of them could not convey an absolute title as the inams are liable to be resumed either when they fail to fulfill the obligations annexed to the grants or when they alienate them. The main difference between the categories of inams in this regard is that, when a service-holder neglects to perform his duties, he can be removed and another person appointed and the succeeding service holder could recover the inams whereas in regard to the grant burdened with service, the authorities could move for the resumption of the inam. But, in both the cases the holder has no absolute powers of disposition. Notwithstanding this, the holders of these lands were described in innumerable cases as inamdars. It is seen from the cited rulings that the service-holder is described as an holder of the inam or inamdar. It is unnecessary to multiply citations on the subject. Suffice it to say that the person in possession and enjoyment of the inam answers the requirement of section 4 of the Act, viz., that he should hold such land is inamdar.

30. We are reinforced in this opinion of ours by a Judgment of the Madras High Court in Sundareswarar Devasthanams v. Shanmuga Sundara. That ruling related to an inam grant for the performance of service in a temple. The question arose as to who was entitled to the compensation deposited in respect of the inam abolished under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, the temple or the service-holder. The Division Bench answered it in favour of the service-holder. It ruled that the Devasthanam was not the principal holder of the inam estate and consequently it could not claim any compensation or any portion of it. The argument advanced on behalf of the institution, that as the Devasthanam was interested in the continuance of the services even after the inam vested in the Government the compensation should be paid to the Devasthanam, was negatived by the learned Judges.

31. We express our respectful accord with the raison ed’etre of this ruling. The learned Advocate-General contends that this decision was rendered under section 38 of the Estates Abolition Act and it is inapplicable to the Act which does not embody any corresponding provision. We are not convinced that there is any real distinction between the two. It is true that the above-cited decision concerned with section 38 but it will be seen from the wording of the section that the principle underlying both is the same.

32. Section 33 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1948, recites:

“(1) In the following cases, namely:—

(a) where an inam estate or a part thereof was held immediately before the notified date, by any religious, educational or charitable institution, and

(b) where a zamin or under-tenure estate or a part thereof was held immediately before the notified date by any such institution, such estate or part having been endowed for its maintenance, the Government shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3A) and (4-A) pay to the institution every year as a tasdik allowance—

33. It will be seen that there is similarity between this section and section 4 of the present Act.

34. We may here read section 2, clause (12) of the Madras Estates Abolition Act to which our attention was invited by the learned Advocate-General and according to whom there is dissimilarity between the content of that definition and that of ‘inamdar’ occurring in section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956. Section 2, clause (12) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 reads:

“Principal landholder” means the person who held the estate immediately before the notified date.

35. According to section 4, in order to qualify a person to claim a patta, he should be a person or an institution holding the estate as inamdar. Thus, the essential ingredients are practically the same in both.

36. A reading of the judgment under citation clearly establishes that its basis was the conclusion that it was the service-holder that held the estate and not the institution. It is useful in this context to refer to the observations in the cited judgment containing a discussion on the question as to whether it was the temple or the service-holder that should be deemed to be holding the estate. Says the learned Judge at page 221 of the report:

“The grant in the first instance may have been to a holder of an office in a temple, or the grant may have included both the office and the inam grant which was to constitute the emoluments of that office. In either case, the grant was to the holder of the office, and he and his successors-it should be remembered the offices were hereditary-were entitled to hold what had been granted in inam so long as they held the office. When they held the office they also had the emoluments of the office. The inam estate which (constituted the emoluments of the office was held by the holder of the office. It is true the holder of the office was liable to be removed from his office by the Devasthanam. If he lost his office, he lost his rights to the emoluments of that office; where the inam estate constituted the emoluments of the office which he lost, he lost his right to hold that estate. The right to hold that estate as emoluments of the office would then vest in the new holder of the office. No more than the liability of an inam, including an inam estate, to resumption, does the liability for the removal from office affect the determination of the question, who is the holder of the estate at a given point of time.”

37. This indicates that the ratio decidendi of the ruling was possession and enjoyment by the service-holder. We fail to see how this doctrine does not govern a determination under section 4 of Act XXXVII of 1956. We are of opinion that these writ petitions fall within the principle of that case. The learned Advocate-General alternatively urged that the law embodied in this decision is not sound and that it required reconsideration. We do not think that we can subscribe to this view. In our judgment, this ruling is in consonance with the letter and spirit of the law and does not require reconsideration.

38. We will now proceed to consider the argument of Sri Bhujanga Rao, learned counsel for the institutions, that pattas must be issued to the temples, as the object of the grantor was to get services performed in the temples. Since the inam constitutes the emoluments of persons performing certain services, it is it is the institution that gets the advantages of services, and in the fitness of things the institution that should get the patta, continues the learned counsel. We are unable to assent to this proposition. It is no doubt true that the purpose of the grant was that it should serve as a source of maintenance for service-holders in the temple; but that does not entitle the temple to get the patta. The criterion is not whether the temple got any benefit from the grant by reason of services rendered there. The question is as to whom the inam was made and to whom it was confirmed at the time of the inam enquiry. It has been laid down in several decisions that service inams or personal inams could not be treated as endowments to the deity merely because the temple stood to gain by performance of services in the temple.

39. Further, the problem has to be solved with reference to section 4 which says that patta should be issued to the person or institution “holding the land as inamdar”. Incontestably, the service-holders have been in possession and enjoyment of these lands. As already stated, the inam was confirmed to the holder of the office and not to the institution.

40. There is another consideration in the context of the present enquiry. It is not disputed that these inams have been in the possession of service-holders and would have continued to be so but for the abolition of the inams. Could it be posited that the Legislature intended that service-holders should be in a worse position by the conversion of the inams into ryotwari tenures? We are hesitant to express such an opinion. It would not have been the intendment of this enactment to deprive the service holders of the possession and enjoyment of these lands.

41. Sri Bhujanga Rao asked us and quite perhaps legitimately—as to what guarantee is there that the service-holder would continue to render service after the ryotwari patta is issued to the service-holders. The answer furnished on behalf of the service-holders is that, as already stated, they are quite willing to have the patta issued to the individuals as incumbents of the particular office and a clause might also be introduced in the patta to the effect that it would enure only for the benefit of the persons fulfilling the character of the particular office.

42. They further suggest that if there is any difficulty in the insertion of such conditions and clauses in the patta, it is open to the Legislature to make a suitable provision in the statute itself by introducing necessary amendments. If the statute needs any changes, it is for the Legislature and the concerned authorities to consider the matter. That, however, cannot stand in the way of interpreting the law as it stands. In these circumstances, we think that in regard to this type of inams. i.e, service inams, ryotwari pattas should be issued to the service-holders. In such circumstances, we are unable to gram the request to quash the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officers holding that the institutions could not be regarded as holding the inams.

43. In the result, W.P Nos. 813 of 1960, 520 of 1961, 1230 of 1961, 1244 of 1961, 1250 of 1961, 1304 of 1961, 1318 of 1961, 1407 of 1961, 135 of 1962 and 564 of 1962 fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

44. W P. Nos. 836, 837, 839 of 1961, 877 of 1962, 609 of 1962 and 415 of 1960 are allowed but not on the grounds on which the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officers were impugned but on a different ground, namely, that the inams which are the subject-matter of these petitions belong to the second category. In the result, the service-holders must be given the ryotwari pattas

45. With regard to W.P No. 838 of 1961, we are told that the inam was alienated in favour of the petitioner by the inamdar long before the commencement of the Inams Abolition Act (XXXVII of 1956.). This led to the initiation of assessment proceedings and the matter is pending. If it is left to the Government, they will grant patta to the appropriate person under section 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. In the circumstances of the case, we cannot give any directions at this juncture as to whom the patta should be issued and it is for the Government to decide it in the light of the relevant statutory provisions. For these reasons we dismiss this writ petition.

46. Petitions Nos. 415 of 1960; 836, 837, 839 and 1150 of 1961; and 609 and 877 of 1962 allowed on other grounds. Petitions Ms. 739 and 856 of 1960; 552 and 1226 of 1961 dismissed as withdrawn. Rest dismissed.