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Amarjeet Singh And Others v. Devi Ratan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants and respondents were appointed as Excise Inspectors under the U.P. Excise Service (Class II) Rules, 1970. They later became eligible for promotion to Assistant Excise Commissioner (AEC) under the U.P. Assistant Excise Commissioners Service Rules, 1992. Originally, promotion was based on “merit”; an amendment effective 10-10-1994 changed the criterion to “seniority subject to rejection of unfit.”
Appellants challenged application of the amended criteria. The High Court (1995) directed that pre-10-10-1994 vacancies be filled on the earlier “merit” basis. During the State’s SLP, this Court allowed promotions under the amended Rules but made them expressly subject to the SLP’s result. Sixty-one Inspectors (later respondents) were promoted under that interim arrangement. The SLP was dismissed on 19-8-1998, yet the State did not revert those promotees.
A Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) on 19-12-1998 considered 42 pre-amendment vacancies; only 30 officers (appellants) were found fit on merit and promoted notionally w.e.f. 6-12-1995. Twelve vacancies remained and were carried forward; a second DPC on 22-1-1999 filled them under the amended Rules, promoting the respondents notionally w.e.f. 28-2-1997/13-8-1997.
The State’s seniority list dated 12-7-2000 placed appellants above respondents. The High Court (Lucknow Bench) quashed that list on 11-4-2002, holding that because both groups received notional promotions on the same date of posting, their seniority had to follow the Excise-Inspector cadre list. The present appeals challenge that judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in treating both sets of officers as having identical notional promotion dates and, on that basis, applying Rule 6 of the U.P. Government Servants’ Seniority Rules, 1991 to fix inter se seniority.
- Whether officers promoted under different criteria (pre-amendment “merit” vs. post-amendment “seniority subject to rejection of unfit”) against vacancies of different recruitment years can be equated for seniority purposes.
- What is the legal effect of interim orders of the Supreme Court once the underlying litigation is dismissed, particularly regarding benefits enjoyed during the pendency of such orders.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The respondents’ promotions were expressly made subject to the SLP; upon its dismissal they should have been reverted, rendering their continued service illegal.
- Promotions obtained on “merit” (appellants) cannot be equated with later promotions on “seniority subject to rejection of unfit” (respondents); hence the High Court’s parity finding is flawed.
- Appellants were given earlier notional dates (6-12-1995) than respondents (1997); Rule 6 of the 1991 Rules therefore does not equalise their seniority.
- The High Court’s interpretation of the statutory rules was unnecessary once the factual premise (same notional date) was incorrect.
- The seniority list dated 12-7-2000 should be restored; the list of 26-7-2002 and the High Court judgment must be set aside.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Because posting orders for both groups issued on the same date, Rule 6 mandates that their seniority mirror their relative positions in the Excise-Inspector cadre.
- The High Court therefore correctly quashed the 12-7-2000 list and directed preparation of a fresh list based on cadre seniority.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of U.P. v. Onkar Nath Tandon, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 202 | Candidate rejected in a common selection cannot regain seniority when promoted later. | Relied upon to show that respondents—found unsuitable in 1998 DPC—cannot claim seniority over appellants promoted earlier on merit. |
| Shiv Shankar v. U.P. SRTC, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 | Act of court should prejudice no one; benefit from interim orders must be neutralised. | Supports restitutionary approach: respondents cannot retain advantage gained under interim order once SLP dismissed. |
| GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1998) 3 SCC 376 | Interim orders merge into final judgment; undeserved benefit must be undone. | Cited in the same context as Shiv Shankar to neutralise respondents’ interim advantage. |
| Jaipur Municipal Corp. v. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423 | Court’s obligation to undo wrong caused by its interim orders. | Fortifies equitable relief to appellants. |
| Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P., (1992) 2 SCC 620 | No litigant may benefit from interim relief in ultimately unsuccessful litigation. | Used to justify restoring appellants’ seniority. |
| Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO, (1980) 2 SCC 191 | Interim benefits must be neutralised when petition fails. | Cited along with Ram Krishna Verma for restitution principle. |
| Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corp., (1995) 3 SCC 33 | Court may require security/compensation to offset loss from interim orders. | Illustrates equitable powers relevant to current dispute. |
| South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648 | Doctrine of restitution; interim advantage must be reversed if party ultimately loses. | Core authority for placing parties in status quo ante. |
| Karnataka Rare Earth v. Dept. of Mines & Geology, (2004) 2 SCC 783 | Successful party should be placed in position it would have been but for interim order. | Applied to hold appellants should not suffer delay caused by earlier litigation. |
| A.R. Sircar v. State of U.P., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 734 | Equitable seniority relief where interim orders prevented earlier appointment. | Analogous factual scenario supporting appellants’ claim to seniority. |
| Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary, (1997) 4 SCC 388 | Regularisation during pendency of writ becomes ineffective if writ ultimately fails. | Used to emphasise respondents’ promotions could not override dismissal of SLP. |
| S.P. Kapoor v. State of H.P., (1981) 4 SCC 716 | Late entrants cannot get seniority over earlier entrants. | Quoted to show respondents cannot “steal a march” over appellants. |
| Shitla Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P., 1986 Supp SCC 185 | Same principle as S.P. Kapoor. | Cited to reinforce earlier-in-cadre priority. |
| Uttaranchal Forest Rangers’ Assn. v. State of U.P., (2006) 10 SCC 346 | Seniority cannot be granted prior to entry into cadre. | Supports conclusion that respondents rank below appellants. |
| P. Chitharanja Menon v. A. Balakrishnan, (1977) 3 SCC 255 | Consequential orders cannot be challenged without challenging basic promotion order. | Used to hold High Court erred in quashing seniority list without respondents challenging appellants’ promotions. |
| Roshan Lal v. International Airport Authority of India, 1980 Supp SCC 449 | Challenge to seniority fails if appointment orders not questioned. | Same line of reasoning as Chitharanja Menon. |
| H.V. Pardasani v. Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 468 | Seniority dispute fails absent proof of wrongful seniority fixation. | Cited while rejecting High Court’s approach. |
| Govt. of Maharashtra v. Deokar’s Distillery, (2003) 5 SCC 669 | Cannot seek relief on consequential order without attacking foundational order. | Bolsters conclusion that High Court relief was impermissible. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Supreme Court first identified the High Court’s factual error: promotions of the two groups were not from the same notional date. Appellants received notional promotion from 6-12-1995 against 1994-95 vacancies on a “merit” basis; respondents received notional promotion from 1997 against later vacancies on a different criterion.
2. Because promotions arose from separate DPCs, separate criteria and different recruitment years (as defined by Rule 3(1) of the 1992 Rules), Rule 6 of the 1991 Seniority Rules could not equate their seniority.
3. The Court invoked the doctrine of restitution: benefits obtained through an interim order vanish once the main case fails. Numerous precedents were cited to hold that respondents could not retain a seniority advantage derived solely from the interim order in the SLP.
4. Equitable considerations were emphasised—appellants should not suffer because the State delayed convening the DPC until after the SLP’s dismissal.
5. The Court further reasoned that seniority cannot be challenged in isolation; as respondents had not attacked the appellants’ promotions, the High Court erred in setting aside the consequential seniority list.
6. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the seniority list dated 12-7-2000, which ranked appellants above respondents, correctly reflected the lawful and equitable position.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS ALLOWED; the High Court judgment dated 11-4-2002 and the subsequent seniority list dated 26-7-2002 are quashed. The seniority list dated 12-7-2000 is restored.
Implications: The decision reinstates the appellants’ seniority and nullifies benefits respondents derived from interim orders. The ruling turns on established restitution and seniority principles rather than creating new precedent; its immediate effect is confined to the parties and their promotional prospects.
Order
1. These appeals have arisen from the judgment and order dated 11-4-2002 passed by the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) by which it has allowed the writ petitions filed by the respondents quashing the seniority list dated 12-7-2000 issued by the State Government for the Excise Inspectors.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that the appellants and the respondents in these cases were appointed as Excise Inspectors under the provisions of the U.P Excise Service (Class II) Rules, 1970 (hereinafter called as “the 1970 Rules”). The parties became eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of Superintendent of Excise under the said 1970 Rules. The criteria of promotion for the post of Superintendent of Excise and for the higher post of Assistant Excise Commissioner (hereinafter called “AEC”) had been “merit” under the provisions of the U.P Assistant Excise Commissioners Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter called as “the 1992 Rules”). The said Rules stood amended w.e.f 10-10-1994 and the criteria for promotion was changed from “merit” to “seniority subject to rejection of unfit”.
3. The appellant Amarjeet Singh along with some other Excise Inspectors filed Writ Petition No. 1113 (SB) of 1994 before the Allahabad High Court challenging the selection process for promotion under the 1992 Rules. The High Court vide judgment and order dated 1-2-1995 held that the vacancies which had come into existence prior to 10-10-1994 i.e the date of amendment, be filled up as per the unamended Rules i.e on the basis of “merit” and not on the basis of “seniority subject to rejection of unfit”.
4. Being aggrieved, the State of U.P preferred a special leave petition before this Court and this Court vide order dated 30-10-1995 passed an interim order permitting the State authorities to make promotions as per the 1994 Amendment Rules but it was subject to the result of the petition as this Court made it clear that if the petition was dismissed, the respondents would be reverted to the lower post from which they would be promoted. In view of the said interim order of this Court, sixty-one Excise Inspectors stood promoted, subject to the final outcome of the special leave petition. This Court dismissed the said special leave petition vide order dated 19-8-1998 in limine. However, the State authorities for the reasons best known to them, did not revert the promoted officers and they continued to hold the higher posts.
5. The Departmental Promotional Committee (hereinafter called “DPC”) meant for filling up forty-two vacancies, which came into existence prior to 10-10-1994, met on 19-12-1998. After scanning the service records and determining the inter se merit of the candidates, the Committee came to the conclusion that only thirty candidates were suitable for promotion to the posts of AEC and they were to be promoted as per the availability of yearwise vacancies. The respondents, herein, were found unsuitable for promotion in the said selection process. After completing the aforesaid exercise, twelve vacancies for the post of AEC remained unfilled. Therefore, the twelve vacancies were carried forward to enable the State authorities to fill up the same under the amended Rules on a different criterion i.e “seniority subject to rejection of unfit”. Thus twelve officers/respondents were promoted under the amended Rules by another DPC held on 22-1-1999.
6. The State Government issued the Order dated 15-5-1999 reverting all Excise Inspectors promoted on 6-12-1995 under the interim order of this Court and gave notional promotions with retrospective effect to the appellants as well as to all the reverted officers/respondents. As a consequence, a seniority list dated 12-7-2000, was issued, wherein the appellants were placed over and above the respondents.
7. Being aggrieved, the respondents approached the High Court challenging the said seniority list dated 12-7-2000. The High Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 11-4-2002 held that as the postings to both sets of officers i.e those who had been promoted by DPC dated 19-12-1998 and another DPC dated 22-1-1999 had been made on the same day and had been given notional promotion from one and the same date, their inter se seniority was to be fixed as it existed in the feeding cadre of Excise Inspectors and thus quashed the seniority list dated 12-7-2000 and further directed the State to prepare a fresh seniority list placing the appellants below the respondents. Hence these appeals.
8. In these appeals, as most of the appellants and respondents have already availed the benefit of promotions and retired on attaining the age of superannuation, they lost interest in the litigation. Only two appellants and two to four respondents are still in service and the said appellants feel that they would be adversely affected, if the High Court judgment is given effect to. In these matters, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents sought discharge from the cases, as their clients did not respond. In spite of the service of notices to them, they did not engage any counsel. Therefore, this Court on 26-8-2009 requested Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned advocate to assist the Court as amicus curiae who was served with the paper book of the cases and appeared today for the respondents.
9. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the action of the State authorities has been in flagrant violation of the orders passed by this Court as promotion of the respondents to the post of AEC had been subject to the decision of the special leave petition, which stood dismissed. The said respondents ought to have been reverted forthwith after dismissal of the said petition. The question of permitting them to continue even after dismissal of the petition by this Court was not required and thus, could not be justified. Promotions made by DPC under the unamended Rules on the basis of “merit” could not be equated to the promotions made by another DPC under the amended Rules on the basis of “seniority subject to rejection of unfit” held at a later stage. The High Court erred in considering both the promotions to have been made notionally from one and the same date. In such a fact situation, the question of interpreting the statutory rules was an unwarranted exercise. The appellants had been promoted retrospectively, given notional promotion from the date much earlier than the respondents. Therefore, direction to fix the seniority in view of their inter se seniority as it existed in the feeding cadre was not permissible. The appeals deserve to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside along with the consequential seniority list dated 26-7-2002. The seniority list dated 12-7-2000 has to be upheld and remain intact.
10. On the other hand, Shri Ravi Prakash Mehrotra and Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the appeals and made full efforts to defend the judgment and order of the High Court and subsequent seniority list dated 26-7-2002 contending that in case the posting orders have been issued on the same date, inter se seniority of the parties on the post of Excise Inspectors has to be given effect to. Therefore, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
11. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Indisputably, the High Court has decided the case interpreting the provisions of Rule 6 of the U.P Government Servants' Seniority Rules, 1991 (hereinafter called as “the 1991 Rules”). The High Court has considered the Rules elaborately giving effect to the said Rule 6 of the 1991 Rules and its proviso without examining its validity which had been under challenge before it in the connected writ petition. The High Court observed that there was no occasion for the petitioners therein to challenge the validity of Rule 6, as their seniority had already been fixed.
12. In Rule 3(1) of the 1992 Rules, the recruitment year is defined as under:
“3. (1) Year of recruitment means a period of twelve months commencing from the first day of July of calendar year.”
Therefore, we have to keep in mind that the year of recruitment is to be considered for the purpose of fixing inter se seniority of the officers taking into consideration the officers promoted within a period of twelve months from the first day of July of the year. Therefore, if the promotions have retrospectively been given to a particular set of officers in the year 1995 and to another set of officers in the years 1997 and 1998, they cannot be treated on a par and cannot be treated as equals merely because posting of all of them had been made on the same day.
13. The High Court committed an error in recording the finding of fact that notional promotion had been given to both sets of officers from one and the same date by virtue of Notification No. 1098 dated 15-5-1999 and therefore their seniority is to be determined in accordance with Rule 6 of the 1991 Rules irrespective of the Explanation. As the High Court has misdirected itself considering that both sets of officers had been given notional promotion from one and the same date, which, in fact, is not factually correct, the interpretation of the statutory rules or its Explanation becomes irrelevant.
14. This Court, in State of U.P v. Onkar Nath Tandon 1993 Supp (3) SCC 202, (1993) 25 ATC 374, AIR 1993 SC 1171 has held that a candidate who is rejected in a common selection and superseded, he would not regain seniority upon being promoted subsequently. The High Court wrongly distinguished the said judgment under the presumption that both sets of officers had been given notional promotions from one and the same date.
15. The High Court has decided the earlier writ petition observing that vacancies which occurred prior to the date of amendment of the Rules i.e 13-10-1994, had to be filled up as per the unamended Rules. The State Government filed a special leave petition, challenging the said order. This Court on 30-10-1995 passed the following order:
“During the pendency of the special leave petition appointments may be made as per the existing Rules, but all the appointees will be informed that appointments are subject to the result of the petition and if the Court rules that the revised rule has no application insofar as the respondent claimants are concerned, they will be liable to be reverted to the present post from which they would be promoted.”
In view of the above, the respondents had been promoted and allowed to continue. This Court, ultimately dismissed the said petition vide order dated 19-8-1998:
“We have heard Shri A.B Rohtagi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in support of the special leave petition and Shri G.L Sanghi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 5 and Shri Parag P. Tripathi, the learned counsel appearing for Respondents 1 to 4 and 6 and we have perused the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the record. Having regard to the facts of this case, we do not think that a case is made out for interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.”
In view of the above, the State Government ought to have reverted the respondents as their promotions were subject to the decisions of the said petition.
16. In view of the fact that the respondents continued on a higher post under the orders of this Court for years together and even after dismissal of the petition filed by the State, and the exercise for making promotions was not undertaken by the State authorities, the appellants should not suffer for no fault of theirs. It has fairly been conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that had the exercise of making promotions been undertaken immediately after the order of this Court dated 19-8-1998, the appellants could have been promoted much earlier and they could have been senior to the respondents. Thus the question does arise as to whether the appellants should be asked to suffer for the interim order passed by this Court in a case having no merits at all.
17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the court. (Vide Shiv Shankar v. U.P SRTC 1995 Supp (2) SCC 726, (1995) 30 ATC 317, GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 3 SCC 376, AIR 1998 SC 1566 and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423.)
18. In Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P (1992) 2 SCC 620, AIR 1992 SC 1888 this Court examined the similar issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO (1980) 2 SCC 191, AIR 1980 SC 656 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed and the petitioner takes advantage thereof and ultimately the petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised.
19. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corpn. (1995) 3 SCC 33 this Court observed that while granting the interim relief, the court in exercise of its discretionary power should also adopt the procedure of calling upon the plaintiff to file a bond to the satisfaction of the court that in the event of his failing in the suit to obtain the relief asked for in the plaint, he would adequately compensate the defendant for the loss ensued due to the order of injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff. Even otherwise the court while exercising its equity jurisdiction in granting injunction is also competent to grant adequate compensation to mitigate the damages caused to the defendant by grant of injunction. The pecuniary award of damages is consequential to the adjudication of the dispute and the result therein is incidental to the determination of the case by the court. The court can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in doing ex debito justitiae mitigating the damage suffered by the defendant by the act of the court in granting injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the action complained of in the suit. Such a procedure is necessary as a check on abuse of the process of the court and adequately compensate the damages or injury suffered by the defendant by act of the court at the behest of the plaintiff.
20. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P (2003) 8 SCC 648, AIR 2003 SC 4482 this Court examined this issue in detail and held that no one shall suffer by an act of the court. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences.
21. The Court further held: (South Eastern Coalfields case (2003) 8 SCC 648, AIR 2003 SC 4482)
“28. … Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated….”
22. Similarly, in Karnataka Rare Earth v. Deptt. of Mines & Geology (2004) 2 SCC 783 a similar view has been reiterated by this Court observing that the party which succeeds ultimately is to be placed in the same position in which it would have been if the court would not have passed an interim order.
23. In A.R Sircar (Dr.) v. State of U.P 1993 Supp (2) SCC 734, (1993) 24 ATC 832 a dispute arose regarding the seniority of direct recruits and promotees on the post of Professor of Medicine in a medical college. The appellant therein faced the selection process for direct appointment along with the respondents who had been working on the said post on ad hoc basis. The appellant was duly selected, however, the private respondents could not succeed. The respondents filed the writ petition before the High Court and precluded the appointment of the appellant pursuant to his selection, by obtaining an interim order and on the other hand they got their ad hoc promotion to the post regularised under the Rules. The appellant could succeed in obtaining the appointment only after dismissal of the writ petition against him after several years of his selection. This Court held that in addition to the relief under the statutory provisions the appellant was entitled in equity to get the seniority over the respondents as they succeeded in precluding his appointment to the post by obtaining an interim order in a case having no merits whatsoever.
24. In Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary (1997) 4 SCC 388, AIR 1997 SC 3071 the services of the respondent therein were terminated, however, he continued to be in service on the basis of an interim order passed by the High Court in the writ petition filed by him. During the pendency of the writ petition, the rules for regularisation of ad hoc appointees were amended and in pursuance thereof his services also stood regularised. Ultimately, the writ petition filed by the respondent was dismissed. This Court held that his continuity in service and regularisation had to be understood as it was subject to the result of the writ petition. As the writ petition was dismissed the order regularising his services, passed during the pendency of the writ petition, became inoperative.
25. In view of the above, the appellants are entitled to the relief purely on equitable grounds without going into any other legal issue and the appeals deserve to be allowed and the seniority list quashed by the High Court has to be restored.
26. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants and the respondents have been considered by DPC held on 19-12-1998 to fill up forty-two vacancies under the unamended Rules. However, at the cost of repetition, it may be pertinent to mention here that only thirty candidates/appellants were found suitable by DPC held on 19-12-1998 and had been promoted under the unamended Rules on the criterion of “merit”. The respondents had been promoted under the amended Rules by carrying forward twelve vacancies by another DPC held subsequently on 22-1-1999 on a different criterion i.e “seniority subject to rejection of unfit”. Indisputably, these twelve officers/respondents were found unsuitable for promotion under the unamended Rules by DPC held on 19-12-1998. Subsequent thereto, both sets of officers had been promoted notionally from the back dates. The appellants had been given promotions as AEC against the vacancies for the year 1994-1995 while the respondents were given notional promotions against the vacancies for the years 1996 and 1997. The seniority list dated 12-7-2000 was prepared accordingly. As the appellants had been given notional promotion w.e.f 6-12-1995 and the respondents w.e.f 28-2-1997 and 13-8-1997, their inter se seniority had rightly been determined while issuing the seniority list dated 12-7-2000.
27. The law permits promotion with retrospective effect only in exceptional circumstances when there has been some legal impediment in making the promotions, like an intervention by the court. An officer cannot be granted seniority prior to his birth in the cadre adversely affecting the seniority of other officers who had been appointed prior to him. “The latecomers to the regular stream cannot steal a march over the early arrivals in the regular queue.” [Vide S.P Kapoor (Dr.) v. State of H.P (1981) 4 SCC 716, AIR 1981 SC 2181; Shitla Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P 1986 Supp SCC 185, (1986) 1 ATC 236, AIR 1986 SC 1859 and Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P (2006) 10 SCC 346]
28. In the instant case, promotions had been made by two different DPCs held on 19-12-1998 and 22-1-1999. Both DPCs had made promotions under different Rules on different criterion and their promotions had been made with retrospective effect with different dates notionally. In the writ petition before the High Court, the promotion of the appellants had not been under challenge. The seniority which is consequential to the promotions could not be challenged without challenging the promotions. Challenging the consequential order without challenging the basic order is not permissible. (Vide P. Chitharanja Menon v. A. Balakrishnan (1977) 3 SCC 255, AIR 1977 SC 1720.)
29. In Roshan Lal v. International Airport Authority of India 1980 Supp SCC 449, AIR 1981 SC 597 the petitions were primarily confined to the seniority list and this Court held that challenge to appointment orders could not be entertained because of inordinate delay and in absence of the same, validity of consequential seniority could not be examined. In such a case, a party is under a legal obligation to challenge the basic order and if and only if the same is found to be wrong, consequential orders may be examined.
30. In H.V Pardasani v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 468, AIR 1985 SC 781 this Court observed that:
“9. … If the petitioners are not able to establish that the determination of their seniority is wrong and they have been prejudiced by such adverse determination, their ultimate claim to promotion would, indeed, not succeed.”
A similar view had been reiterated by this Court in Govt. of Maharashtra v. Deokar's Distillery (2003) 5 SCC 669.
31. These appeals are squarely covered by the aforesaid judgments. We are of the considered opinion that in absence of challenge to the promotion of the appellants, relief of quashing the consequential seniority list could not have been granted.
To sum up
32. Admittedly, the respondents were over and above the appellants in the seniority list of Excise Inspectors. The Rules of 1992 were amended in the year 1994, changing the criterion for promotion from “merit” to “seniority subject to rejection of unfit”. Forty-two posts of AEC were to be filled up from the Excise Inspectors, as no Excise Superintendent was available for being considered for promotion to the post of AEC. The State Government wanted to fill up the said vacancies by applying the amended Rules. On being challenged by some of the appellants, the High Court held that the vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of the 1992 Rules, namely, 10-10-1994 had to be filled up according to the unamended Rules. The operation of the judgment and order of the High Court was stayed by this Court making it crystal clear that promotions so made under the amended Rules would be subject to the decision in the special leave petition. Accordingly, sixty-one officers/respondents were promoted. Subsequently, this Court dismissed the special leave petition vide order dated 19-8-1998 in limine. The officers/respondents so promoted were not reverted.
33. DPC was held on 19-12-1998 to fill up the said forty-two vacancies, but only thirty candidates/appellants were found eligible to be promoted to the post of AEC. The respondents were found unsuitable. In order to give the said respondents a second chance, the State Government carried forward the remaining twelve vacancies and directed to fill up the same under the amended Rules, and for that purpose another DPC was convened on 22-1-1999 and they were promoted on the basis of a different criterion. Promotions were made with retrospective effect determining the yearwise vacancies. The appellants had been given promotion notionally against the vacancies, which occurred in the recruitment year 1995 while the respondents were promoted notionally against the vacancies of the recruitment years 1996 and 1997. Thus, the High Court committed an error while recording the finding of fact that both sets of officers had been promoted notionally from one and the same date.
34. Admittedly, promotions were not made with effect from one and the same date. The appellants and the respondents were promoted against the vacancies which had occurred in different recruitment years under different Rules and on different criteria. Thus, the respondents would rank below the appellants in seniority. Therefore, there could be no justification to hold that their inter se seniority in the feeding cadre would be relevant for determining the seniority of AECs. More so, had the interim order not been passed by this Court, the appellants could have been promoted under the unamended Rules much earlier. Thus, they are entitled for equitable relief, as the effect of the interim order of this Court was required to be neutralised. The appellants who had been promoted with an earlier date, thus, are bound to be senior than the respondents who had been promoted with respect from a later date. No employee can claim seniority prior to the date of his birth in the cadre.
35. In view of the above, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 11-4-2002 is set aside. The seniority list dated 12-7-2000 is directed to prevail and fresh seniority list dated 26-7-2002 is hereby quashed. No orders as to costs.
36. Before parting with these cases, we would record our appreciation for the services rendered by Shri Gaurav Agrawal, Amicus Curiae.
SLP (C) No. 9615 of 2002
37. This petition could not be dismissed by the High Court at the threshold without examining the case on merit. However, no order is required in this case in view of the order of this date passed in the connected Appeals Nos. 5790-92 of 2002. It is accordingly disposed of.
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