- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ace Pipeline Contracts (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. .
Factual and Procedural Background
Ace Pipeline Contracts Pvt. Ltd. (the appellant) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL, the respondent) entered into a contract dated 10-6-2002 for laying a pipeline between Manmad (Maharashtra) and the M.P. border near Shirpur. Clause 91 of the contract provides for arbitration, stipulating that the Director (Marketing) of BPCL, or an officer nominated by him, shall act as the sole arbitrator.
When disputes over the appellant’s monetary claims arose, the appellant issued a notice dated 21-7-2005 invoking Clause 91 and simultaneously requested that a retired Supreme Court Judge be appointed to avoid doubts about impartiality. Receiving no nomination within what it considered to be the statutory period, the appellant filed Arbitration Petition No. 181/2005 in the Delhi High Court on 22-8-2005 under Sections 11(5) & 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”).
On the same date (22-8-2005) — after internal correspondence culminating on 17-8-2005 — the Director (Marketing) appointed Shri P. S. Bhargava, Executive Director (Quality Control), as sole arbitrator; the appointment letter reached the appellant on 26-8-2005. The High Court held that BPCL had acted with due dispatch and dismissed the petition on 18-1-2006. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, BPCL forfeited its contractual right to appoint an arbitrator by not making the appointment within thirty days of the appellant’s notice.
- Whether apprehension of bias arising from appointment of a serving BPCL officer as sole arbitrator justified judicial appointment of an independent arbitrator despite the contractual clause.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Director (Marketing) lost the right to appoint an arbitrator because thirty days from the notice dated 21-7-2005 had expired; hence only the court could appoint under Section 11(6).
- The appointment of a serving BPCL officer raises doubts as to independence and impartiality; a retired Supreme Court Judge should therefore be appointed.
- Cited a line of Supreme Court authorities (e.g., Datar Switchgears, Punj Lloyd, BSNL v. Subash Chandra Kanchan) and certain High Court rulings to support forfeiture of the contractual right after thirty days.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The notice was received on 26-7-2005; additional documents were sought on 12-8-2005 and supplied on 16-8-2005; the appointment was made on 22-8-2005 — well before the appellant moved the High Court — demonstrating “due dispatch”.
- Section 11(6) contains no statutory thirty-day limit; therefore the contractual right to appoint continued until the court was actually approached.
- Any issues of bias can be raised before the arbitrator himself or, if necessary, in post-award proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd. (2000) 8 SCC 151 | In cases under Section 11(6) a party’s right to appoint is not forfeited after 30 days; forfeiture occurs only if the appointment is made after the court is seized. | Treated as governing authority; relied upon to uphold BPCL’s appointment made on 22-8-2005 before the High Court was moved. |
| Punj Lloyd Ltd. v. Petronet MHB Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638 | Quoted part of Datar; no departure from its ratio. | Court noted that Punj Lloyd did not overrule Datar and hence did not assist the appellant. |
| BSNL v. Subash Chandra Kanchan (2006) 8 SCC 279 | Concerned consent to appointment; not about statutory time-limits. | Distinguished as irrelevant to the 30-day issue. |
| Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 628 | No expression on thirty-day question. | Cited only to show no contrary view existed; not determinative. |
| Union of India v. V.S. Engg. (P) Ltd. (2006) 13 SCC 240 | Courts may direct departmental appointment where contract prescribes it, though failure to act permits a party to approach the court. | Quoted to reinforce that contractual procedure prevails unless clearly frustrated. |
| Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 | Limitation under Section 34 of the Act is special and excludes Section 5 of the Limitation Act. | Held inapplicable because present case involves Section 11, not Section 34. |
| State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR 1961 SC 751 | Test for mandatory vs. directory statutory provisions. | Court found it irrelevant since Section 11(6) contains no time-limit to interpret. |
| Union of India v. M.P. Gupta (2004) 10 SCC 504 | Arbitrators must be appointed in accordance with the arbitration clause (Railways’ clause 64). | Cited as analogous precedent underscoring primacy of contractual mechanism. |
| J.V. v. Union of India (Delhi High Court, Full Bench) | Held 30-day limit applicable even under Section 11(6). | Supreme Court stated it was rendered in ignorance of Datar and declined to follow it. |
| Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta (2004) 3 CHN 37; (2005) 1 Arb LR 389 (Cal HC) | Similar to Delhi Full Bench view on thirty-day forfeiture. | Likewise discounted for being contrary to Datar. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Statutory Framework. Sections 11(4) and 11(5) of the Act specifically prescribe a thirty-day period; Section 11(6) — relevant here because the parties already agreed on an appointment procedure — does not.
2. Authoritative Interpretation. The Court endorsed the ratio in Datar Switchgears, holding that under Section 11(6) the appointing party’s right subsists until the opposite party actually files an application before the Chief Justice.
3. Application to Facts. The Director (Marketing) appointed Shri P. S. Bhargava on 22-8-2005. Although this exceeded thirty days from the notice, it occurred before the High Court petition was filed the same day. Consequently, BPCL’s contractual right was validly exercised and not forfeited.
4. Bias Allegation. The arbitration clause explicitly allows appointment of a BPCL officer and bars objections on that ground. Any subsequent plea of bias can be raised before the arbitrator under Section 13 or in a challenge to the award under Section 34; it does not justify bypassing the agreed mechanism at the appointment stage.
5. Effect of Other Authorities. Decisions cited by the appellant either restate Datar or are distinguishable. High Court rulings contrary to Datar lack persuasive force once the Supreme Court precedent is applied.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the Delhi High Court’s refusal to appoint a new arbitrator and directed the already-appointed arbitrator to proceed expeditiously.
Implications: The judgment reiterates that Section 11(6) imposes no rigid thirty-day deadline; a contractual appointing authority retains power until the moment the court is approached. Parties must honour their arbitration clauses, and challenges to impartiality should ordinarily be taken up under Section 13 or Section 34, not at the appointment stage. No new legal doctrine has been created, but the ruling consolidates the authority of Datar Switchgears on this point.
A.K Mathur, J.— Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 18-1-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Arbitration Petition No. 181 of 2005 whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the application for appointment of arbitrator. Hence, the present appeal against the aforesaid order.
3. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that an application styled under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was moved by Ace Pipeline Contracts Private Limited, the appellant herein, for appointing a retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India to adjudicate the claims and disputes between the parties arising out of the contract between the parties dated 10-6-2002. The said contract pertained to the laying down of a pipeline and associated facilities for Section 1 (Manmad in Maharashtra to M.P border near Shirpur) for Mumbai-Manmad Pipeline Extension Project of the respondent, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as “BPCL”). The main issue was with regard to interpretation of clause 91 of the contract which pertains to appointment of arbitrator. Clause 91 of the contract reads as under:
“91. Arbitration
All disputes or differences whatsoever which shall at any time arise between the parties hereto touching or concerning the works or the execution or maintenance thereof under this contract or the right touching or concerning the works or the execution or the maintenance effect thereof or to the rights or liabilities of the parties or arising out of or in relation thereto whether during or after completion of the contract or whether before or after determination, foreclosure or breach of the contract (other than those in respect of which the decision of any person is by the contract expressed to be final and binding) shall after written notice by either party to the contract to the other of them and to the appointing authority be referred for adjudication, to a sole arbitrator to be appointed as hereinafter provided.
(a) Any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or set-off of the Corporation against the vendor or regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director (Marketing) of the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Director (Marketing). The vendor will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the Corporation or that he has dealt with the matters to which the contract relates or that in the course of his duties as an officer of the Corporation he had expressed views on all or any other matters in dispute or difference. In the event of the arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for any reason, the Director (Marketing) as aforesaid at the time of such transfer, vacation of office or inability to act may in the discretion of the Director (Marketing) designate another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the agreement to the end and intent that the original arbitrator shall be entitled to continue the arbitration proceedings notwithstanding his transfer or vacation of office as an officer of the Corporation if the Director (Marketing) does not designate another person to act as arbitrator on such transfer, vacation of office or inability of original arbitrator. Such persons shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the point at which it was left by his predecessor. It is also a term of this contract that no person other than the Director (Marketing) or a person nominated by such Director (Marketing) of the corporation as aforesaid shall act as an arbitrator hereunder. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the agreement subject to the provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1996 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.”
4. Clause 91 provides that any dispute arising between the parties shall be settled through arbitration and the appointing authority i.e the Director (Marketing) himself or he may nominate any other person of the Corporation to act as an arbitrator to resolve the disputes and the vendor will not be entitled to raise any objection to such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the Corporation or that he has dealt with the matters to which the contract relates or that in the course of his duties as an officer of the Corporation he had expressed views on all or any other matters in dispute or difference.
5. Since some differences arose between the parties with regard to the claim of the appellant, a letter dated 21-7-2005 was written to the Director (Marketing) invoking clause 91 of the agreement and requesting him to refer the matter to arbitration for resolving the differences. It was also requested that the Director (Marketing) may accede to the request of the appellant for adjudication of the dispute by a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India so as to remove any justifiable doubts to the independence or impartiality of the said arbitrator. It was further submitted that on receiving the communication, the appellant would suggest the name of the retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India for the purpose of appointment as arbitrator. It was alleged that no one was appointed as arbitrator, therefore, on 22-8-2005 the appellant filed the present application before the High Court for appointment of arbitrator under Sections 11(5) and (6) of the Act. It was also pointed out that after presentation of the application on 22-8-2005, the appellant received a letter of the Director (Marketing) nominating Shri P.S Bhargava, Executive Director (Quality Control Cell) of the respondent BPCL to act as sole arbitrator. It was contended that the letter appointing Shri P.S Bhargava as sole arbitrator was received by the appellant subsequent to the filing of the petition before the High Court on 26-8-2005. It was also pointed out that Shri P.S Bhargava was appointed as arbitrator on 22-8-2005 and the same was communicated and received by the appellant through courier on 26-8-2005. Therefore, it was submitted before the High Court that since the appointment of arbitrator has been made after the filing of the petition by the appellant before the High Court, the Director (Marketing) ceased to have any right to appoint any arbitrator after expiry of thirty days. Therefore, a request was made that any retired Judge of the Supreme Court may be appointed as arbitrator.
6. This was contested by the respondent by filing a reply. It was pointed out that the notice dated 21-7-2005 was received by the Director (Marketing) on 26-7-2005 and a request was made to the appellant to supply copy of the arbitration agreement and other corresponding documents as he was not aware of the procedure for appointment of the arbitrator. The Director (Marketing) received reply to the communication dated 12-8-2005 on 16-8-2005 which was received in the office on 17-8-2005. After receiving the communication and all the materials on 17-8-2005, the appointing authority appointed Shri P.S Bhargava as arbitrator on 22-8-2005 and a communication was sent to the appellant through courier which was received by him on 26-8-2005. It was also pointed out after receipt of the reply to the communication dated 12-8-2005 on 16-8-2005, on 19-8-2005, 20-8-2005 and 21-8-2005 office remained closed on account of Raksha Bandhan and weekly holidays. The Director (Marketing) sent reply on 22-8-2005 appointing Shri P.S Bhargava as arbitrator. It was also pointed out that the whole action was done with urgency and there was no delay on the part of the administration.
7. The learned Single Judge after examining the matter came to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the appointing authority did not act with due dispatch. The learned Single Judge also held that as per the terms of the agreement in question with regard to independence and objectivity of the arbitrator can be examined in view of the agreement and it was observed that this question can be raised before the arbitrator and even if they fail, it can be agitated under Section 34 of the Act. However, the learned Single Judge concluded that the situation had not arisen to invoke the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Act at present and consequently, dismissed the petition. Aggrieved against the impugned order dated 18-1-2006, the present appeal was filed.
8. We have heard Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, and Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, and perused the records. Though the application moved by the appellant under Section 11 of the Act was of course very confusing as it also mentioned Section 11(5) as well as Section 11(6) of the Act, in fact the application under Section 11(5) of the Act was not maintainable. Be that as it may, the learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis of treating this application under Section 11(6) of the Act. This may be bona fide error. Mr Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, strenuously urged that after expiry of period of thirty days, the respondent has lost the right to appoint arbitrator under clause 91 of the agreement and in support thereof, invited our attention to the following decisions of this Court:
(i) Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd. (2000) 8 SCC 151;
(ii) Punj Lloyd Ltd. v. Petronet MHB Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638;
(iii) BSNL v. Subash Chandra Kanchan (2006) 8 SCC 279;
(iv) Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 628;
(v) Union of India v. V.S Engg. (P) Ltd. (2006) 13 SCC 240, (2006) 12 Scale 144;
9. Our attention was also invited to a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in J.V v. Union of India and a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta (2004) 3 CHN 37, (2005) 1 Arb LR 389.
10. Before we deal with each case cited above, it may be relevant to deal with scope of Section 11 of the Act. A person of any nationality may be appointed as arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed between the parties. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 says that subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. Sub-section (3) provides that failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), one arbitrator can be appointed by each party and the two arbitrators so appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall act as the presiding arbitrator. Sub-section (4) says that in case a party fails to make appointment within thirty days from the date of receipt of the request to do so from the other party, or that the two appointed arbitrators fail to nominate the third arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their appointment, the appointment shall be made by the Chief Justice or by any person or institution designated by him. Sub-section (5) says failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator within thirty days from receipt of a request by one party from the other party to so agree the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. Therefore, the concept of thirty days is there in sub-sections (4) and (5). This is in the event of the parties did not come to appoint arbitrator or the two nominated arbitrators fail to agree within thirty days for appointment of third arbitrator, application can be moved under Section 11(5) of the Act to the Chief Justice for appointment of arbitrator. But in sub-section (6), where, the procedure has already been agreed upon by the parties, as in the present case, and in that event, if a party fails to act as required under that procedure or the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure or a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may in that event, request the Chief Justice or a person or an institution designated by him to make necessary measures, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for appointment of arbitrator. Therefore, so far as the period of thirty days is concerned, it is not mentioned in sub-section (6). The period of limitation is only provided under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 11. As such, as per the statute, the period of limitation of thirty days cannot be invoked under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act. In this context, their Lordships in Datar Switchgears Ltd. (2000) 8 SCC 151 did not permit to count 30 days as such in sub-section (6). We cannot do any better than to reproduce paras 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment in that case:
“19. So far as cases falling under Section 11(6) are concerned—such as the one before us—no time-limit has been prescribed under the Act, whereas a period of 30 days has been prescribed under Section 11(4) and Section 11(5) of the Act. In our view, therefore, so far as Section 11(6) is concerned, if one party demands the opposite party to appoint an arbitrator and the opposite party does not make an appointment within 30 days of the demand, the right to appointment does not get automatically forfeited after expiry of 30 days. If the opposite party makes an appointment even after 30 days of the demand, but before the first party has moved the court under Section 11, that would be sufficient. In other words, in cases arising under Section 11(6), if the opposite party has not made an appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make appointment is not forfeited but continues, but an appointment has to be made before the former files application under Section 11 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. Only then the right of the opposite party ceases. We do not, therefore, agree with the observation in the above judgments that if the appointment is not made within 30 days of demand, the right to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) is forfeited.
20. In the present case the respondent made the appointment before the appellant filed the application under Section 11(6) though it was beyond 30 days from the date of demand. In our view, the appointment of the arbitrator by the respondent is valid and it cannot be said that the right was forfeited after expiry of 30 days from the date of demand.
21. We need not decide whether for purposes of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 11, which expressly prescribe 30 days, the period of 30 days is mandatory or not.”
(emphasis in original)
11. The observations made by their Lordships are very clear and their Lordships negatived the contention that 30 days should not (sic) be read in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act; if the opposite party has not made an appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make appointment is not forfeited but continues. Their Lordships in para 20 have also very categorically held that in the present case the respondent made the appointment before the appellant filed the application under Section 11(6), though it was beyond 30 days from the date of demand, the appointment of the arbitrator by the respondent was valid and it cannot be said that the right was forfeited after expiry of 30 days from the date of demand. Their Lordships were also very clear in their mind in para 21 and observed: (Datar Switchgears Ltd. case (2000) 8 SCC 151)
“21. We need not decide whether for purposes of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 11, which expressly prescribe 30 days, the period of 30 days is mandatory or not.”
We are only concerned with reading of 30 days within sub-section (6) of Section 11. So far as the period of 30 days with regard to Section 11(6) is concerned, there is no manner of doubt that their Lordships had not invoked 30 days as mandatory period under Section 11(6) and beyond that it cannot be invoked by the appointing authority. Therefore, it is totally a misnomer to read 30 days in Section 11(6) of the Act, though Shri Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant tried to emphasise that the decision in Datar (2000) 8 SCC 151 has been affirmed by a three-Judge Bench and therefore, that 30 days should be read in Section 11(6) of the Act is also not correct.
12. In Punj Lloyd Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638 their Lordships only quoted para 19 in part and not in full. Full para 19 of the judgment in Datar (2000) 8 SCC 151 has been reproduced above. In fact subsequent observation of their Lordships,
“[w]e do not, therefore, agree with the observation in the above judgments that if the appointment is not made within 30 days of demand, the right to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) is forfeited”,
this portion of order was not reproduced. Therefore, it is not a case that the decision given by two-Judge Bench in Datar (2000) 8 SCC 151 has been reaffirmed and this is binding on us. We regret to say this is not correct. In Punj Llyod Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638 their Lordships only set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for appointment of arbitrator by the Chief Justice. But the ratio laid down in Datar (2000) 8 SCC 151 holds good and it is not negatived, the period of 30 days cannot be read in Section 11(6) of the Act. The relevant portion of Punj Lloyd case (2006) 2 SCC 638 reads as under:
“5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the appeal deserves to be allowed. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the law laid down by this Court in Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd. (2000) 8 SCC 151 wherein this Court has held as under:
‘[S]o far as Section 11(6) is concerned, if one party demands the opposite party to appoint an arbitrator and the opposite party does not make an appointment within 30 days of the demand, the right to appointment does not get automatically forfeited after expiry of 30 days. If the opposite party makes an appointment even after 30 days of the demand, but before the first party has moved the court under Section 11, that would be sufficient. In other words, in cases arising under Section 11(6), if the opposite party has not made an appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make appointment is not forfeited but continues, but an appointment has to be made before the former files application under Section 11 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. Only then the right of the opposite party ceases.’ ”
(emphasis in original)
The aforesaid quotation would clearly reveal that the crucial words in para 5 were not quoted in the aforesaid case which has been reproduced above.
13. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 This was in relation to Section 34(3) of the Act. This is with regard to the period of limitation for moving the court under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award i.e the period of limitation was prescribed in Section 34 itself. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not made applicable. This is not the case before us in the present controversy.
14. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of U.P v. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR 1961 SC 751, (1961) 2 SCR 679. In that case, their Lordships have dealt with the interpretation of the statute and they have referred to Statute Law by Craies and The Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell. Their Lordships have quoted (at AIR p. 765, para 28) a passage from Maxwell which reads as under:
“On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them.”
This observation, so far as this case is concerned, has no relevance as we have already mentioned above that the period of 30 days cannot be read in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act as the statute does not permit it. Therefore, this case does not help the case of the appellant in any manner.
15. Our attention was invited to a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Delhi (J.V v. Union of India and a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. (2004) 3 CHN 37, (2005) 1 Arb LR 389 Both these decisions are in total ignorance of the law laid down by this Court in Datar (2000) 8 SCC 151. Therefore, they cannot hold good. We again reemphasise that in paras 19, 20 and 21 their Lordships have clearly negatived the submission that period of 30 days cannot (sic can) be read in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act.
16. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 628 This decision was given by Hon'ble C.K Thakker, J. in chambers. There also, no such view has been taken by learned Judge that the period of 30 days should be read in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act.
17. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in BSNL v. Subash Chandra Kanchan (2006) 8 SCC 279. There also, the question was whether the appellant was consenting party to appointment of arbitrator or not. Appointment of arbitrator was made by the High Court with the consent of parties which was subsequently sought to be revoked on the ground that no instruction in that behalf was given. But that contention was negatived by the Court and there also, the question of appointment of arbitrator within the period of 30 days was not decided.
18. In this connection a reference may also be made to a decision of this Court in Union of India v. M.P Gupta (2004) 10 SCC 504. In that case, arbitrator was appointed by the High Court directly, a judge of the High Court because no arbitrator was appointed by the Railway Authorities as per clause 64 of their agreement. Their Lordships after considering the matter observed that the appointment of arbitrator by the High Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 cannot be upheld in view of clause 64 of the agreement because as per clause 64 of the agreement, two arbitrators have to be appointed who should be gazetted railway officers. Therefore, as per the terms of the agreement their Lordships held that the appointment of arbitrator by the High Court was not correct and set aside the order and directed the Railways to appoint arbitrators within 30 days.
19. Similar issue came up before this Court in Union of India v. V.S Engg. (P) Ltd. (2006) 13 SCC 240, (2006) 12 Scale 144 This Court after considering the decision in Union of India v. M.P Gupta (2004) 10 SCC 504 and Datar Switchgears Ltd. (2000) 8 SCC 151 directed that as per clauses 63 and 64 of the General Clauses of the Contract, only two gazetted officers of the Railways have to be appointed as arbitrators. However, it was observed that failure on the part of the Department to take a decision for appointment of arbitrators would not defeat the right of the party to approach the High Court for appointment of arbitrator. Direction was given to the Department for appointment of arbitrators within 30 days.
20. It may also not be out of place to mention that we are aware of the departmental lethargy in making appointment of arbitrators in terms of the arbitration clause. Therefore, mandamus can be issued by the courts in exercise of powers under Section 11(6) of the Act but the demand should be in the event of failure by the authorities to appoint arbitrators within the reasonable time. Courts are not powerless to issue mandamus to the authorities to appoint arbitrators as far as possible as per the arbitration clause. But in large number of cases if it is found that it would not be conducive in the interest of parties or for any other reasons to be recorded in writing, choice can go beyond the designated persons or institutions in appropriate cases. But it should normally be adhered to the terms of arbitration clause and appoint the arbitrator/arbitrators named therein except in exceptional cases for reasons to be recorded or where both parties agree for common name.
21. In the present case, in fact the appellant's demand was to get some retired Judge of the Supreme Court to be appointed as arbitrator on the ground that if any person nominated in the arbitration clause is appointed, then it may suffer from bias or the arbitrator may not be impartial or independent in taking decision. Once a party has entered into an agreement with eyes wide open it cannot wriggle out of the situation that if any person of the respondent BPCL is appointed as arbitrator he will not be impartial or objective. However, if the appellant feels that the arbitrator has not acted independently or impartially, or he has suffered from any bias, it will always be open to the party to make an application under Section 34 of the Act to set aside the award on the ground that arbitrator acted with bias or malice in law or fact.
22. In view of our above discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Arbitration Petition No. 181 of 2005. The arbitrator has already been appointed. He should proceed in the matter and decide the dispute expeditiously. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Alert