- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Murari And Others v. Union Of India And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Between 1959 and 1965 the Union Government issued a series of notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire several thousand acres for the “planned development of Delhi.” Declarations under Section 6 followed in 1966-1969, but the Collector’s awards were not passed until 1979-1980.
Hundreds of affected landowners filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court challenging the acquisition on multiple grounds. Eleven of those petitions were transferred to the Supreme Court in 1994 and re-registered as Transfer Cases Nos. 21-31 of 1995. Numerous other petitions remained before a Full Bench of the High Court and were dismissed by a common judgment dated 14-12-1995. The landowners then obtained special-leave and filed the present batch of civil appeals. Because all matters raised common questions, the Supreme Court clubbed the transfer cases with the appeals for disposal by a single judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a delay of 15-20 years between the Section 4 notifications and the Collector’s awards/possession vitiates the acquisition proceedings.
- Whether successive declarations under Section 6 can validly be issued on the basis of a single Section 4 notification.
- Whether land within an agriculturist’s ceiling limit is immune from acquisition under the second proviso to Article 31-A, or alternatively, whether compensation must be based on market value as on the date of possession/award rather than the Section 4 date.
- Whether failure of the Central Government to acquire “designated land” within six months of notice under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 nullifies the acquisition.
- Whether partial withdrawal of land under Section 48 (without formal denotification) compels quashing of the entire acquisition as violative of Article 14.
- Whether existing structures, farm houses, sports complexes or land shown in green in the Master Plan preclude compulsory acquisition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Unreasonable delay (15-20 years) shows acquisition was merely to “freeze” prices; awards based on outdated values amount to confiscation; Ram Chand (1994) 1 SCC 44 distinguishable because many owners remained in possession.
- Notification under Section 4 cannot serve as a “reservoir”; multiple Section 6 declarations are impermissible after Vishnu Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593.
- Article 31-A protects small agriculturists’ land within ceiling limits; hence either the land cannot be taken or market value must be assessed at possession/award date.
- Because certain owners served notice under Section 55(2) of the Delhi Development Act and the Government failed to act within six months, the land must be deemed released.
- A ministerial order dated 4-8-1995 allegedly withdrew some parcels under Section 48; differential treatment offends Article 14 and invalidates the whole scheme.
- Acquisition of already-developed plots, sports complexes, farm houses and land coloured green in the Master Plan lacks rational nexus with “planned development.”
Respondents’ Arguments
- Delay was caused largely by the landowners’ own objections, stays and writ petitions; Ram Chand squarely governs and permits only monetary relief, not quashing.
- The Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 expressly allows multiple Section 6 declarations; its validity has been upheld by Udai Ram Sharma 1968 3 SCR 41 and Aflatoon 1975 4 SCC 285.
- Article 31-A is confined to agrarian reforms, not urban development; Section 23’s mandate to value land as on the Section 4 date therefore applies.
- Section 55 is inapplicable because the land was never specifically “designated” in a zonal development plan, and Section 15(1) of the Delhi Act expressly permits resort to the Land Acquisition Act.
- No valid release occurred: possession had been taken in many cases, and in any event Section 48 withdrawal requires a gazetted denotification, which is absent.
- Incidental structures cannot impede large-scale urban planning; any genuine, authorised buildings will be considered separately by the Government.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sh. Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285 | Upheld validity of Delhi acquisition; compensation to be valued at Section 4 date; delay alone not fatal. | Used as the temporal starting point (23-8-1974) for additional 12% compensation; reaffirmed on all substantive principles. |
| Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 | Delay does not annul acquisition but warrants monetary relief. | Followed; same 12% per annum formula extended to present landowners. |
| State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593 | Original view that successive Section 6 declarations impermissible. | Held superseded by 1967 Validation Act; appellants’ reliance rejected. |
| Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India 1968 3 SCR 41 | Upheld constitutional validity of the 1967 Validation Act permitting multiple Section 6 declarations. | Cited to dismiss challenge against successive declarations. |
| Bihar State Housing Board v. Ban Bihari Mahato AIR 1988 SC 2134 | One of several cases discussing delay and public interest. | Quoted as part of chain of precedents supporting Ram Chand rationale. |
| Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri (1992) 1 SCC 328 | Effect of landowners’ conduct on delay analysis. | Relied upon to show owners also responsible for tardiness. |
| Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 2 SCC 548 | Scope of second proviso to Article 31-A; requirement of full market value. | Distinguished; Court held Article 31-A irrelevant to urban acquisition. |
| P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Dy. Collector 1965 1 SCR 614 | Compensation principles under Article 31 and adequacy non-justiciable after 25th Amendment. | Used to reinforce that Section 23 valuation scheme is constitutionally sound. |
| Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500 | Article 31-A pertains to agrarian reforms, not urban projects. | Cited to negate Article 31-A defence. |
| Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 4 SCC 316 | Invalid partial release does not annul entire notification. | Applied to reject argument that withdrawal of some land invalidates whole acquisition. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabhau (1996) 1 SCC 299 | Court cannot disregard acquisition absent Section 48 gazetted withdrawal. | Relied upon to hold alleged ministerial memo ineffective. |
| U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124 | Need for formal denotification to effect withdrawal. | Cited on the same point as Umashankar Rajabhau. |
| State of U.P. v. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 | Structures on small pockets do not derail large-scale, urgent acquisition. | Used to dismiss objections based on existing buildings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed each objection sequentially:
- Delay: Although awards were belated, both Government and landowners contributed to the lag through objections and litigation. Consistent with Ram Chand, public interest in completed development outweighed nullification of the entire scheme. Monetary relief—12% additional compensation from 23-8-1974 (Aflatoon decision) until each award—was deemed an equitable balance.
- Multiple Section 6 Declarations: The 1967 Validation Act expressly authorises different Section 6 notifications for parcels covered by a single Section 4 notification. Its constitutionality having been upheld (Udai Ram Sharma; Aflatoon), the challenge failed.
- Article 31-A and Ceiling-Limit Lands: Article 31-A concerns agrarian reforms, whereas the instant purpose is urban planning. Therefore, land within the ceiling limit is not immune, and Section 23 valuation as on the Section 4 date governs. Pre-Constitution origin of the Act and Article 31(5) foreclose adequacy challenges.
- Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act: The subject land was never specifically “designated” in a zonal plan, and Section 15(1) of that Act permits resort to the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, failure to acquire within six months of notice under Section 55(2) is irrelevant.
- Withdrawal under Section 48: Examination of the original file showed no formal Government order withdrawing land. Even if such intent existed, Section 48 requires a gazetted notification; none was issued. Hence, acquisition stands.
- Existing Constructions & Green Areas: Recreational zones are intrinsic to planned development. Structures erected after Section 4 notifications, or without sanction, confer no immunity. Nonetheless, the Government undertook to examine individual cases of authorised buildings.
- Lifespan of the Master Plan: Planned development of the national capital is a continuing exercise; the mere expiry of a 20-year plan period does not negate earlier acquisition.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Appeals DISMISSED; Transfer Cases ALLOWED only to the extent of granting additional compensation.
All challenges to the validity of the Delhi land-acquisition scheme failed. However, in line with Ram Chand, the Court directed payment of an additional 12% per annum on compensation, calculated from two years after the Aflatoon judgment (23-8-1974) until the date of each Collector’s award, with reference to market value as on the original Section 4 notification.
Implications are largely confined to the parties: acquisition is irrevocably affirmed, but landowners obtain enhanced monetary relief. The decision reinforces Ram Chand’s approach that excessive delay is remedied financially, not by voiding public-interest acquisitions, and confirms the post-1967 legality of successive Section 6 declarations.
Faizan Uddin, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellants in the appeals enumerated hereinabove had challenged the acquisition proceedings in respect of their respective lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for purposes of planned development of Delhi by filing various writ petitions before the High Court of Delhi. The said writ petitions were dismissed by a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court by judgment dated 14-12-1995 against which these appeals have been preferred by special leave. Various notifications were issued from time to time under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of land for the public purpose of planned development of Delhi. The said notification covered the land belonging to the transfer petitioners, appellants and some other persons. The transfer petitioners like others had also filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi being Writ Petitions Nos. 2179, 2178, 2140, 2139, 2197, 2083, 2138, 2144, 2199 of 1983 and Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 810-812 of 1984 challenging the acquisition of their respective lands on various grounds. These writ petitions were pending in the High Court. However, during the course of hearing of Writ Petition (C) No. 4677 of 1985 pending before this Court it was felt necessary to transfer all the aforesaid writ petitions from the Delhi High Court to this Court. Consequently on the basis of Interlocutory Applications Nos. 20 and 21 of 1995 in WP (C) No. 4677 of 1985 this Court by order dated 14-12-1994 directed that all the aforementioned writ petitions be transferred to this Court. This is how those writ petitions stand transferred to this Court which have been registered as Transfer Cases Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of 1995. As said earlier, besides the aforementioned transfer cases a large number of writ petitions filed by various persons were already pending before the High Court of Delhi challenging the acquisition of their respective lands for the public purpose of planned development of Delhi which were dismissed by a Full Bench of the High Court of Delhi by the impugned common judgment dated 14-12-1995 against which the appeals referred to above have been filed by special leave. Since the common question of law and facts arise in all these transfer cases and appeals and, therefore, they were clubbed together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
3. The facts in brief leading to the transfer cases and the appeals may be narrated thus:
Various notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) were issued from time to time between 1959 and 1965 for the acquisition of several thousand acres of land for the common public project, namely, planned development of Delhi. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were also made between the years 1966 and 1969, while the making of the awards was deferred till the year 1979-80. The master plan of Delhi was brought into force in September 1962 giving the details of the facts and circumstances under which it became imperative to have a development plan of the city of Delhi. It is common knowledge that after the partition of the country there was an enormous and huge migration of population into India, mainly at Delhi which resulted into a phenomenal growth of population of the settlers in Delhi besides considerable growth of industrial and commercial activities, which gave rise to various residential and occupational problems as a result of which various substandard structures, complexes and colonies came into being without proper layouts and other essentials of life. No land was available at reasonable price and within the reach of the common man. It was in these circumstances and with a view to give a proper shape to the city of Delhi, the capital of India, the Central Government had set up a Delhi Development Authority in 1955 and later in December 1955 a Town Planning Organisation was set up under the administrative control of Delhi Improvement Trust to monitor the planned development in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. It was in this background that planned development of Delhi was conceived of and to achieve that objective various notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued from time to time between the period from 13-11-1959 and 21-1-1965 whereby large chunks of land were sought to be acquired. After issuance of notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act a spate of writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition proceedings on various grounds whose lands were sought to be acquired, most of which were dismissed including the letters patent appeal by the High Court by an earlier judgment dated 29-4-1972 vide Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor ILR (1971) 2 Del 311.
4. The said judgment was challenged in appeal before this Court which was also dismissed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077 in which amongst others the contentions before this Court were raised that (1) the public purpose specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Act was vague as neither master plan nor zonal plan was in existence on the date of notification; (2) that there was inordinate delay in finalising the acquisition proceedings by reason of which the landowners were deprived of the benefits of the appreciation of price between the date of notification under Section 4 and the date of taking possession of the property; (3) that provisions of Section 23 of the Act laying down that the compensation should be determined with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act was unreasonable restriction and affecting the fundamental rights of the landowners. But this Court repelled all the contentions and dismissed the appeals and the writ petitions by maintaining the validity of notices issued under Section 4 of the Act laying down that in the case of an acquisition of large areas of land belonging to different persons, the specification of public purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area for it may be difficult to specify the particular purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed but unlike the case of an acquisition of a small area. The said Constitution Bench of this Court dispelled the challenge of the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay by holding that the appellants of that case did not move the Court in the matter even after the declaration under Section 6 was published in the year 1966 but they preferred to approach the Court with their writ petitions only in 1970 when notices under Section 9 were issued. This Court further took the view that the appellants of that case allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the notifications under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act which were available to them at the time when the notifications were published and if their objection is allowed to stand it would amount to putting a premium on dilatory tactics adopted by them. On the question of delay in completing the acquisition proceedings the Constitution Bench in the aforementioned case observed that about 600 objections were filed under Section 5-A of the Act and civil writ petitions were also filed challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings. Consequently the Government unnecessarily had to wait for disposal of those objections and petitions before proceeding further in the matter and, therefore, it was bound to result in delay. It was further held that the Land Acquisition Act being a pre-Constitution Act its provisions are not liable to be challenged on the ground that they are not in conformity with the requirement of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The landowners, therefore, could not complain about the payment of compensation computing with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of notification under Section 5 and Section 23 of the Act could not be held to be bad, as such a challenge is precluded in view of Article 31(5) of the Constitution. This Court further held that it is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force but there was no inhibition in the acquisition of land for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the master plan was ready.
5. Before the High Court a number of controversies and objections were raised and the acquisition proceedings were sought to be challenged on various grounds including challenge to the validity of the declarations made from time to time under Section 6 of the Act using the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act as the reservoir and that more than one declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued which according to the transfer petitioners and the appellants were not permissible. A plea was raised that after the lapse of a long period and inordinate delay in completing the proceedings, the proceedings must result in the abandonment of the acquisition proceedings and no award on the basis of such proceedings can validly be made. It was also contended that more than one award is not contemplated by law in respect of the land, which was the subject-matter of one declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. A further contention raised before the High Court was with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Delhi Act’). It was contended that some of the landowners had issued notice to the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section 55 of the Delhi Act with regard to the requirement of the designated land under the master plan or a zonal development plan but the Central Government failed to acquire the land within a period of 6 months from the date of receipt of the said notice as required by sub-section (2) of Section 55 and, therefore, the said omission on the part of the authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings within the stipulated time would result in abandonment of the acquisition proceedings completely in respect of such land to which Section 55 of the Delhi Act was applicable. It was also contended before the High Court by some of the transfer petitioners and appellants that according to Article 31-A of the Constitution the appropriate value of the land forming part of an estate which is sought to be acquired would be the market value prevailing at the time of award and not the value prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act as contemplated in Section 23 thereof. The appellants of Civil Writ Petition No. 325 of 1982 (Ram Phal v. Union of India) before the High Court took the plea that the Central Government had issued an order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act withdrawing the acquisition proceedings in respect of their land and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said land be quashed. The High Court repelled all the aforementioned contentions as well as some other grounds on the basis of which the acquisition proceedings were sought to be quashed and dismissed the writ petitions by the common judgment as said earlier against which these appeals have been preferred. To some extent same grounds are advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the landowners in the transfer cases.
6. The main attack by learned counsel appearing for all the appellants and those representing the transfer petitioners was advanced for quashing the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. M/s Soli Sorabjee, Venugopal, P.N Lekhi, Kapil Sibal, Rajeev Dhavan, H.N Salve, G.L Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel and a host of other advocates appearing for the appellants made a concerted effort to show that there was unreasonable delay of about 15 to 20 years in completing the acquisition proceedings by the respondents by reason of which the landowners were deprived of the reasonable and real price of their properties who have been offered only a pittance of compensation after a long lapse of time while the prices have gone up many times high in between the period from the date of notification under Section 4 to the date of making the award and taking possession of the properties. It was submitted that the main purpose in issuing the notifications under Section 4 of the Act during the period from 1959-1965 was to freeze the price of the land causing great loss to the landowners. The decision rendered in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 was sought to be distinguished by contending that the same cannot stand as a bar in cases for the reason that though the award had been made in the year 1980 but no possession was taken from the landowners and, therefore, Ram Chand case (1994) 1 SCC 44 has no application to the facts of the present case. Shri Soli Sorabjee further added that there is internal inconsistency in the decision of Ram Chand case (1994) 1 SCC 44 and the same cannot be taken to be an authority on the proposition in all situations but different principles have to be applied on circumstances of each case when the fact-situation is different. It was vehemently urged by all the learned advocates that the award of interest at the rate of 12 per cent after the expiry of two years from August 1974 in respect of the awards made prior to the amendment of Section 23 of the Act would not mitigate the loss suffered by the landowners. The 18th Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the 7th Lok Sabha on the working of the Delhi Development Authority was also sought to be pressed in service to support the aforementioned submissions in addition to various decisions of this Court. It was stated that the Public Accounts Committee in its report dated 26-4-1981 at p. 101 stated in para 5.29 that it is a well-known fact that the DDA acquires land from the landowners at a very low rate and after development sells it at exorbitant rates thereby earning huge profits. It was stated that even where land is acquired for a public purpose, a reasonable compensation has to be paid but in cases where land is acquired and later sold by auction or for commercial purposes, as has happened in most cases, the Committee feels the landowners/farmers should not be compelled to part with their holdings at throw-away prices, the Committee therefore recommended that the Land Acquisition Act may be suitably amended so that the interests of the farmers are properly safeguarded.
7. After giving our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made above, it may be stated that the report of the Public Accounts Committee referred to above and on which great emphasis was laid is nothing but recommendations for the necessary amendment in the Act. The recommendations of any authority, howsoever high it may be, cannot be enforced unless the same take the shape of law. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as they stand today have to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the existing position of law and in its true sense of perspective in respect of which this Court has made authoritative pronouncements on the points raised and contended by the learned counsel. In the present case as stated earlier after issuance of the notifications and notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act not only a large number of objections were filed by the landowners whose land was sought to be acquired but a number of writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court challenging the validity of the notification under Section 4 as well as the declaration under Section 6 in which interim orders of stay were passed by the High Court which resulted in considerable delay. Thus the authorities alone were not responsible for the delay but the landowners were equally responsible for the same. In such circumstances and on consideration of several decisions of this Court including those rendered in the case of Bihar State Housing Board v. Ban Bihari Mahato AIR 1988 SC 2134 and Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri (1992) 1 SCC 328 this Court in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 took the view that in any case there was no justification for the authorities to make the award in 1980/1981/1983 when the declaration under Section 6 was made in 1966-69, but at the same time, in view of the facts of delay caused by the landowners themselves in approaching the courts and the developments already made on the lands for public use, quashing of acquisition proceedings would not be appropriate. But at the same time in the said decision this Court also took the view that the landowners alone were not responsible for the entire delay that was caused in completing the acquisition proceedings. This Court in the said decision pointed out that all those writ petitions were dismissed by this Court on 23-8-1974 in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077 yet no effective steps were taken by the respondents till 1980-81 and in some cases even till 1983 for which the respondents could give no justification for that delay on their part in completing the acquisition proceedings even after the judgment of this Court in Aflatoon case (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077. This Court having regard to the fact that the Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority after taking possession of the lands various developments have been made and third party interest have also been created and, therefore, having regard to the larger public interest declined to quash the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay but at the same time having regard to the interest of the landowners who were likely to suffer loss in rating the price of the land with reference to the date of notification under Section 4, directed payment of an additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum after expiry of two years from 23-8-1974, the date of judgment of this Court in Aflatoon case (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077 till the date of the making of the awards by the Collector to be calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in question on the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. We do not find any inconsistency in the said decision (Ram Chand case (1994) 1 SCC 44), and find ourselves in respectful agreement to the view taken by this Court in the case of Ram Chand (1994) 1 SCC 44. The same principle has to be applied in those cases in which the possession is not taken and there is no reason to distinguish such cases from the application of the principles laid down in Ram Chand case (1994) 1 SCC 44 merely on the ground that possession is not taken from some of the landowners. In this connection the fact could not be lost sight of that the landowners have enjoyed possession all these years and have taken the benefit of the usufruct and other advantages out of the said land and, therefore, they stand even in an advantageous position than those landowners from whom the possession was taken earlier.
8. It was then contended that it was not open to the Government to issue more than one declaration under Section 6 of the Act with regard to the land comprised within one notification under Section 4 of the Act. In other words it was submitted that the notification under Section 4 cannot be treated as a reservoir from which land could be taken from time to time and declaration one after the other may be made under Section 6 of the Act which is not permissible under the Act and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground. In this connection we feel it necessary to mention some of the facts and circumstances which are relevant to the submissions made above and to see whether the submissions have any merit or not to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It may be stated that a similar question was raised before this Court in the case of State of M.P v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593, 1966 MPLJ 995 decided by a Bench comprised of three learned Judges of this Court. The majority view taken was that the provisions in Section 17(4) of the Act do not lead to the conclusion that Section 6 of the Act contemplates successive notification following the notification made under Section 4 of the Act. It was held that the intention of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act was not to have successive declarations under Section 6. It was observed that even in a case of emergency there can at the most be only two notifications under Section 6 following one notification under Section 4(1), one relating to the land which is covered by Section 17(1) and the other relating to the land which is not covered by Section 17(1), provided both kinds of land are notified by one notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In order to meet the situation created by the judgment in the case of Vishnu Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593, 1966 MPLJ 995 the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment Validation) Act No. 13 of 1967, Section 2 of which purported to amend Section 5-A of the Principal Act permitting more than one award in respect of the land which had been notified under Section 4 of the Act; Section 3 of the said Amendment Act purported to amend Section 6 of the Principal Act by empowering different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification made under Section 4(1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been made under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Principal Act. Further Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1967 purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or purported to have been made under the Principal Act before the commencement of the Ordinance dated 20-1-1967, notwithstanding that more than one declaration under Section 6 had been made in pursuance of the same notification under Section 4(1) and notwithstanding the judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary. The validity of the aforesaid Amending Act has been upheld by this Court in the case of Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 41, AIR 1968 SC 1138 which has been further reaffirmed by this Court in the case of Aflatoon (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077. Some of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the aforementioned Amending Act was promulgated with a view to overreach the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Vishnu Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593, 1966 MPLJ 995 but such a submission could not be accepted in view of the decision of this Court referred to above upholding the validity of the said Amending Act.
9. Dr Siddhu, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 2669 of 1978 as well as some other counsel contended that the land in Village Masodpur sought to be acquired is in personal cultivation of the landowner which is a small area and by virtue of the provisions contained in the second proviso of Article 31-A of the Constitution it will not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to the landowner under any law for the time being in force. It was also asserted that the market price of the land prevailing on the date of taking over the possession of the land should be ascertained and paid to the landowner and not the price prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 2 SCC 548, AIR 1977 SC 915 wherein it has been observed that the second proviso of Article 31-A confers a right and this right is higher than the one under clause (2) of Article 31 on a person in respect of such portion of land under his personal cultivation as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him and if the Act by creating an artificial concept of a family unit and fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such family unit, enables land within the ceiling limit to be acquired without payment of full market value, it would be taking away or abridging the right conferred by the second proviso. Thus even according to this decision the land within the ceiling limit may be acquired but on payment of the full market value. The question, therefore, arises whether the market value prevailing on the date of the award or taking of possession of the land or the one with reference to the date of notification made under Section 4(1) of the Act is payable as the just and proper compensation.
10. In the present case it may be noted that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act provide the payment of the compensation of such land, building or structure prevailing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, the validity of which was upheld by this Court in the case of Aflatoon (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077 wherein it was observed (at SCR p. 809-FG) as under:
“The Land Acquisition Act is a pre-Constitution Act. Its provisions are not, therefore, liable to be challenged on the ground that they are not in conformity with the requirement of Article 31(2). What the appellants and writ petitioners complain is that their properties were acquired by paying them compensation computed with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of the notification under Section 4 and that Section 23 is, therefore, bad. This, in substance, is nothing but a challenge to the adequacy of compensation. Such a challenge is precluded by reason of Article 31(5). In other words, the appellants and the writ petitioners cannot challenge the validity of Section 23 on the ground that compensation payable under its provisions is in any way inadequate, because, such a challenge would fly in the face of Article 31(5).”
That being so, the argument advanced by the learned counsel could not be accepted. Here a reference may also be made to the decision in the case of P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Dy. Collector (1965) 1 SCR 614, AIR 1965 SC 1017 SCR (621-H) in which it has been observed as under:
“Under Article 31(2) and (2-A) of the Constitution a State is prohibited from making a law for acquiring land unless it is for a public purpose and unless it fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles for determining the amount of compensation. But Article 31-A lifts the ban to enable the State to implement the pressing agrarian reforms. The said object of the Constitution is implicit in Article 31-A. If the argument of the respondents be accepted, it would enable the State to acquire the lands of citizens without reference to any agrarian reform in derogation of their fundamental rights without payment of compensation and thus deprive Article 31(2) practically of its content. If the intention of Parliament was to make Article 31(2) a dead letter, it would have clearly expressed its intention. This Court cannot by interpretation enlarge the scope of Article 31-A. On the other hand, the article, as pointed out by us earlier, by necessary implication, is confined only to agrarian reforms. Therefore, we held that Article 31-A would apply only to a law made for acquisition by the State of any ‘estate’ or any rights therein or for extinguishment or modification of such rights if such acquisition, extinguishment or modification is connected with agrarian reform.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the same report it has been further observed at p. 631-D as under:
“One of the elements that should properly be taken into account in fixing the compensation is omitted: it results in the inadequacy of the compensation, but that in itself does not constitute fraud on power, as we have explained earlier. We, therefore, hold that the Amending Act does not offend Article 31(2) of the Constitution.”
A reference may also be made to the decision in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500 which reads as under:
“The learned counsel was not able to satisfy us that the above case was distinguishable. We are of the opinion that the case was rightly decided and must govern this case. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer to all the cases referred to us at the Bar. We may mention that Mr Tarkunde also placed reliance on Article 31(A)(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is now well settled that Article 31(A)(1)(a) has relevance to agrarian reforms and development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of land for building of a capital of a State.”
11. Further, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vajravelu v. Special Dy. Collector (1965) 1 SCR 614, AIR 1965 SC 1017 observed (in AIR para 14, p. 1023, col. II) as under:
“A scrutiny of the amended article discloses that it accepted the meaning of the expressions ‘compensation’ and ‘principles’ as defined by this Court in Bela Banerjee case 1954 SCR 558, AIR 1954 SC 170. It may be recalled that this Court in the said case defined the scope of the said expressions and then stated whether the principles laid down take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the properly appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the court. Under the amended article, the law fixing the amount of compensation or laying down the principles governing the said fixation cannot be questioned in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law was inadequate.”
12. It is thus clear from these decisions that Article 31-A has got nothing to do with acquisition of land for building of a capital of a State. In the present case before us also the land is not said to be acquired for purposes of any agrarian reforms and development but for the planned development of Delhi and that being so the argument advanced by the learned counsel in this behalf that the land belonging to a small agriculturist within ceiling limit cannot be acquired or the value of the land of the agriculturists sought to be acquired should be determined on the price/value prevailing on the date of award or taking of possession and not on the value prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4(1) cannot be accepted. In the case of Ram Chand (1994) 1 SCC 44 also in para 4 of the report this Court while dealing with Article 31-A took the view that the Constitution ensures under the second proviso to Article 31-A that where any law makes provision for the acquisition by the State, of land held by a person, under his personal cultivation, within the ceiling limit, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land “unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof”. It has been further observed in the same para that by Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, clause (f) of Article 19 and Article 31 have been deleted and, as such, to hold property is no more a fundamental right. But still the mandate under second proviso to Article 31-A continues regarding payment of market value in respect of the land, the subject-matter of acquisition, and that the Act provides for payment of compensation in respect of the acquisition made, at the market value of the land, as such it is consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A. But in view of sub-section (1) of Section 11 and sub-section (1) of Section 23 the market value of such land is to be fixed with reference to the date of the publication of notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of the dates on which declaration under Section 6 or award under Section 11 are made or possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. In this view of the matter the contentions raised with regard to Article 31-A could not be accepted and are accordingly rejected. The acquisition proceedings, therefore, could not be quashed on that account also.
13. Dr Sidhu, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 2669 of 1996 further submitted that Khasra No. 364/21 was not notified under Section 6 of the Act as the land to be acquired yet an award has been made in respect thereto also which deserves to be quashed to the extent of the land of the said khasra no. He submitted that forgery was committed by changing Khasra No. 264/21 into Khasra No. 364/21 as in the Gazette notification the land notified was Khasra No. 264/21 and not Khasra No. 364/21. This contention of the learned counsel may be disposed of without going into the merits of the submissions in view of the fact that the learned counsel himself admitted that a review against the said mistake is pending in the High Court itself.
14. Learned counsel for the appellants as well as the counsel appearing for the transfer petitioners also strenuously urged with great force that the land was sought to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi and, therefore, the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 became applicable to such acquisition of land and the acquisition of land can be made only in accordance with the master plan and zonal plans to be framed under the Delhi Development Act. It was contended that on the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of the land for planned development of Delhi it has to be inferred that the land which was notified under Section 4 of the Act for planned development of Delhi is the land designated for compulsory acquisition within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 55 of the Delhi Act but as the land sought to be acquired was not so acquired within the period of six months from the date of service of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 55 of the said Act by the landowners, therefore, after the expiry of the period of 10 years of the coming into force of the master plan, the land sought to be acquired went out of the compulsory acquisition and the same would be deemed to have been released from acquisition. It was submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 55 provides that the owner of the land may serve on the Central Government a notice requiring his interest in the land to be acquired and if the Central Government fails to acquire the land within the period of six months the same shall have the effect as if the land were not required to be kept as an open space or unbuilt or were not designated as subject to compulsory acquisition. It was asserted that since some of the landowners whose land was sought to be acquired had given such notice to the Central Government but the Central Government did not acquire the land within the specified period, therefore, the acquisition proceedings must be quashed on that account. After a careful consideration of the submissions made above, we are of the view that there is absolutely no merit in this contention. It must be shown that the particular land is designated in the master plan or zonal development plan which is the subject-matter of acquisition.
15. It may be pointed out that in the present case before us no zonal development plans were prepared with regard to the said land. In the master plan there is no particularisation of any land which can be said to be required for compulsory acquisition under the Delhi Act. Neither Section 55 nor any other provisions of the Delhi Act contain any inhibition for acquisition of the land for the public purposes of planned development of Delhi under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. As said earlier, the notifications under Section 4 of the Act were already issued between the period from 1959 to 1965 as a result of which the application of Section 55 of the Delhi Act was locked up by virtue of acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act. This apart the land cannot be acquired within the period of six months as contemplated in Section 55 of the Delhi Act unless an agreement under Section 11(2) of the Act has reached because if the objections are filed under Section 5-A or in response to notice under Sections 9 and 10 the proceedings are bound to consume considerable time beyond the prescribed limit of six months contained in Section 55 of the Delhi Act. It is for these reasons that Section 15(1) was enacted in the Delhi Act which provides inter alia that if in the opinion of the Central Government, any land is required for the purpose of development, or for any other purpose, under the said Act (Delhi Act), the Central Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is thus distinctly clear that despite the enforcement of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 Section 15(1) thereof lays down that the land for the purposes of development may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This contention was also advanced before the High Court. The Full Bench of the High Court after considering the arguments at length and taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration recorded the following conclusion:
“Assuming that the argument advanced by Mr Lekhi is correct that once the land is notified for compulsory acquisition in Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be deemed to have been so designated in the master plan, even then the provisions of Section 55 would not come into force till the zonal development plan is also prepared and thereafter 10 years' period had elapsed and the land so designated is not acquired within the stipulated period after service of notice, only in that situation, it may be possible to say that the land has gone out of the expression of compulsory acquisition used in Section 55 of the Act. It is not possible to agree with the contentions that the land is deemed to be designated for the purpose of master plan, it would not be deemed to be designated by same inference for the purpose of zonal development plan.”
We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court referred to above. Thus the argument based on the provision of Sections 55(1) and (2) of the Delhi Act have no merit and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained.
16. A half-hearted argument was also advanced to the effect that the life span of the master plan was 20 years but the acquisition proceedings are not yet complete and, therefore, the notifications issued for acquisition of the land for planned development of Delhi have lost their value and the acquisition proceedings should be quashed. This argument is also without any merit for the simple reason that Delhi is the capital of the largest democratic country of the world. There is inflow of more than one lakh of people every year to this city. It is an ever-expanding, cosmopolitan, commercial and industrial city with multifarious national and international activities. The city of Delhi is confronted with serious housing problems due to enormous growth and ever-expanding population. Consequently Delhi development is a continuous unending process for which no terminal point for the completion of such process can be visualised. In these facts and circumstances simply because there is a delay which in the facts and circumstances of the present case was bound to occur, it cannot justifiably be contended that the notifications issued were rendered ineffective. As pointed out by the High Court, and in our opinion rightly so, that large tracts of land were sought to be acquired for the purpose of constructing huge residential colonies and commercial areas and, therefore, the delay was bound to occur in completing the acquisition proceedings. However, the legislature appears to have taken notice of such delays and it was for these reasons that it came to the rescue of landowners by amending the Land Acquisition Act by introducing Section 11-A in the Act providing the completion of the acquisition proceedings within the time-frame stipulated therein in order to save the landowners from undue loss with regard to the price of land sought to be acquired compulsorily.
17. Shri P.N Lekhi, Dr Rajeev Dhavan and various other counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the Government by its order dated 4-8-1995 had withdrawn its notification issued under Section 4 of the Act involving certain areas of land sought to be acquired in exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Act and, therefore, it was submitted that if one part of the land is released for the public purpose the whole land covered under the notification will stand released as the Government cannot give a differential treatment which will be hit by the principles enunciated in Article 14 of the Constitution. As against this the learned counsel for the respondents refuted the allegation with regard to the withdrawal of certain land from the acquisition for the planned development of the city of Delhi. Alternatively it was submitted that the withdrawal of certain land included in the notification under Section 4 could be effected only by denotifying the release and since there is no such notification denotifying the release it could not be regarded as a release within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act. In other words Section 48 of the Act may be applied only when the release is published in the Official Gazette in the same manner as the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act are published in view of the provisions contained in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and since no such notification was published in the Official Gazette, mere information given with regard to the withdrawal from acquisition will be of no consequence. Various decisions were cited for and against by the parties at the Bar but we do not propose to burden this judgment by citing them all except those which are most relevant on the point in controversy.
18. It may be noticed that sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act contemplates that except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. This section thus confers power on the Government to withdraw any land from the acquisition but such power can be exercised only before taking possession of the land sought to be acquired. In this connection before we proceed to examine the relevant decisions it would be appropriate to refer to the observations made by the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment with regard to this controversy. The original record in which the Minister concerned is said to have passed the order for withdrawal was produced before the High Court which was perused by the Full Bench. The photostat copies of the notings were also placed on record of the High Court and after the perusal of the original record the Full Bench found that in fact no order has been made by the Minister concerned which may be said to be an order for withdrawal of acquisition. The High Court observed that mere communication of the misconstrued orders by the officials would not have the effect of an order of the Government withdrawing from acquisition. The High Court on a careful perusal of the original file and the noting contained therein and approved by the Minister came to the definite conclusion that the Minister had directed that the matter be taken up with the NCT Delhi for denotifying and for release of the land immediately which was indicative of the fact that the Minister had not himself passed the order for releasing the land from acquisition and the release from acquisition was left to the decision of NCT, Delhi and since NCT Delhi did not give its consent the release of the said land was not denotified. The High Court, therefore, took the view that the communication sent to the appellants concerned purporting to be an order under Section 48 of the Act is invalid and the land acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of such invalid communication. In our opinion the view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be erroneous calling for any interference by this Court.
19. Here it would be relevant to refer to some of the decisions of this Court on the question of release of the land under Section 48 and its validity under the law. In the case of Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 4 SCC 316 this Court observed that perhaps the appellants wanted to persuade this Court to strike down the entire notification so that when a fresh notification is issued they may be able to get a higher compensation in view of sudden spurt and rise in the price of land and other commodities in between the period when the acquisition was made and when the actual possession was taken. This Court took the view that it was not acceptable to uphold the aforesaid process of reasoning. The release was declared to be bad as a result of which the entire notification issued under Section 4 would be deemed to be valid and the land specially belonging to the landowner would form part of the acquisition. It has been further held that the release being a separate and subsequent act of the Collector, could not invalidate the entire notification but would only invalidate the portion released, with the result that the original notification would be restored to its position as it stood on the date of its notification. Assuming therefore, that there was release of certain areas of land belonging to certain landowners, the entire notification could not be rendered invalid. Further this Court in a recent decision rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabhau (1996) 1 SCC 299, JT (1995) 8 SC 508 took the view as follows:
“It is brought to our notice that after the notification was quashed by the High Court, no further steps were taken by the Government. It is not necessary since it is being challenged in the appeal in respect of these three plots. A submission was made that the Corporation does not need these three plots of lands for the employees. So long as there is no notification published under Section 48(1) of the Act withdrawing from the acquisition, the Court cannot take notice of any subsequent disinclination on the part of the beneficiary.”
20. The same view was expressed by this Court in yet another decision in the case of U.P Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124 In this view of the matter even if we assume that there was an order for release of certain land from acquisition the same could not be given effect to in the absence of a notification denotifying the acquisition of land.
21. Some of the learned counsel for the appellants also submitted that even the land shown in green colour in the master plan which has been sought to be acquired but it is not understood as to for what purpose the said land is being acquired. It was also submitted that there are a large number of structures and complexes raised on the land sought to be acquired in which schools, sports and other recreational activities are going on. Shri G.L Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5771 of 1996 and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 740 of 1996 as well as other advocates appearing for some other appellants submitted that there exist factories, workshops, godowns and MCD school besides residential houses and quarters over the land belonging to the appellant Partap Singh situated at Roshanara Road, Sabzi Mandi, Delhi which has been acquired and that there exists modern and well-developed farmhouse with modern facilities in the land belonging to the appellant Roshanara Begum, where there are a good number of other structures and fruit-bearing trees. Consequently these areas do not require further development as they are already developed and, therefore, the said land should be released from acquisition. Mr Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for some of the appellants urged that the appellant concerned had developed a sports complex providing modern amenities therein and if the same is demolished it would be a great national waste. It was, therefore, urged that such complexes and built-up areas should be deleted from the acquisition. It may be pointed out that in the master plan the land indicated in green colour is reserved for recreational facilities. The recreational facilities are also part of the planned development of Delhi and it cannot be disputed that recreational amenities are also part of the life of the people and an important feature of a developed society. Therefore, no legitimate objection can be made in the acquisition of such land which is shown in green colour. So far as the structures and constructions made on the land are concerned there is no material to show that they were made before the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is also not clear whether such constructions were raised with or without necessary sanction/approval of the competent authority. No grievance therefore can legitimately be raised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as unauthorised and made at the risk of the landowners. Here a reference of a decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P v. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 may be made with advantage, para 7 of which reads as under:
“It was next contended that in the large extent of land acquired which was about 412 acres there were some buildings here and there and so the acquisition of these parts of the land on which buildings were situated was unjustified since those portions were not either waste or arable lands which could be dealt with under Section 17(1) of the Act. This contention has not been considered by the High Court. We do not, however, find any substance in it. The Government was not acquiring any property which was substantially covered by buildings. It acquired about 412 acres of land on the outskirts of Meerut city which was described as arable land by the Collector. It may be true that here and there there were a few super-structures. In a case of this nature where a large extent of land is being acquired for planned development of the urban area it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which some superstructures have been constructed out of the development scheme. In such a situation where there is real urgency it would be difficult to apply Section 5-A of the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its application.”
In the present case also a large extent of land measuring thousands of acres has been acquired and, therefore, it would not be proper to leave out some small portions here and there over which some structures are said to be constructed out of the planned development of Delhi. We may, however, add here that during the course of the arguments Shri Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-State made a statement that the Government will consider each of the structures and take a decision in that respect. We, therefore, leave this issue to the discretion of the respondent.
22. After overall consideration of the issues involved in these transfer cases and the appeals we find no ground to take a different view than the one taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings could not be quashed on any grounds. We also find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in the case of Ram Chand (1994) 1 SCC 44. Consequently, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. The transfer cases are allowed in terms of the order made in the case of Ram Chand (1994) 1 SCC 44 directing that the transfer petitioners and the appellants shall be paid an additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, after the expiry of two years from the date of decision of Aflatoon case (1975) 4 SCC 285, (1975) 1 SCR 802, AIR 1974 SC 2077 i.e 23-8-1974 till the date of making of the awards by the Collector, to be calculated with reference to the market value of the land in question on the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
Alert