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Union Of India v. Ram Kishan .
Factual and Procedural Background
Ram Kishan, a Foot Constable in Delhi Police, was dismissed from service by an order dated 25 October 1960 passed by Shri M.K. Saxena, Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi. He filed a civil suit before the Sub-Judge Ist Class, Delhi, challenging the dismissal on the grounds that the dismissing authority lacked competence and that mandatory safeguards in Punjab Police Rule 16.38 were ignored. The trial court declared the dismissal void and awarded the constable Rs 1,151. The Government’s first appeal was rejected by the Additional District Judge. A second appeal to the Delhi High Court was also dismissed; the High Court relied on an earlier Division Bench decision holding that the Superintendent of Police (Traffic) was not competent to dismiss. The Government obtained special leave, bringing the case before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi, was competent to issue the dismissal order.
- Whether the requirements of Punjab Police Rules 16.38 and 16.24 were complied with, and the effect of any non-compliance.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff (Foot Constable Ram Kishan)
- The dismissing officer, being Superintendent of Police (Traffic) and not a District Superintendent of Police, lacked authority to dismiss.
- Mandatory provisions of Rule 16.38 were violated: the District Magistrate was not promptly informed, did not decide the mode of investigation, and did not record reasons for permitting departmental action.
Government (Appellant)
- Relied on prior permission allegedly granted by the District Magistrate (Memo agreeing to departmental action) as compliance with Rule 16.38(2).
- Contended that Rule 16.24 had been fully observed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Jagjit Singh (1969) 2 SCC 108; (1970) 1 SCR 163 | Established that a Superintendent of Police (Traffic) is competent to dismiss a constable. | Following this authority, the Supreme Court decided Issue 1 against the plaintiff, holding the dismissing authority competent. |
| Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah (1969) 1 SCC 737; (1969) 3 SCR 653 | Explained the scope of Rule 16.38 and the necessity of substantive compliance, even if regarded as directory. | The Court adopted the reasoning to find that absence of immediate information to, and decision by, the District Magistrate vitiates departmental proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Competence of Dismissing Authority: The Court applied its earlier ruling in Jagjit Singh to hold that Superintendent of Police (Traffic) possesses the requisite authority, thereby resolving the first issue in the Government’s favour.
2. Compliance with Rule 16.38: The Court scrutinised the procedural safeguards under Rule 16.38. It noted that:
- No “immediate information” about the complaint was conveyed to the District Magistrate.
- The District Magistrate never decided whether investigation should be conducted by police or a selected First-Class Magistrate, as mandated by sub-rule (1).
- The subsequent memo—merely stating agreement to departmental action—did not cure the initial non-compliance and revealed no application of mind or recorded reasons as required by sub-rule (2).
Relying on Chanan Shah, the Court held that such procedural defects, even if the rule were deemed directory, amounted to lack of “substantial compliance,” thereby invalidating the departmental inquiry.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ declaration that Ram Kishan’s dismissal was illegal because Rule 16.38 was not followed. The decision reinstates the plaintiff’s position and monetary relief. The ruling reiterates the necessity for strict (or at least substantive) adherence to procedural safeguards under Rule 16.38, but does not establish a new principle beyond reaffirming existing precedent.
S.M Sikri, C.J— The respondent Ram Kishan, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, a Foot Constable, filed a suit in the Court of Sub-Judge Ist Class, Delhi, challenging his dismissal from service by an order, dated October 25, 1960. This order was passed by Shri M.K Saxena, Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi. It was alleged by the plaintiff that this order was bad and illegal on various grounds. Two grounds may be mentioned here: (1) That Shri M.K Saxena, Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi was not a District Superintendent of Police; (2) That the mandatory provisions of Punjab Police Rule 16.38 had been violated inasmuch as no information was given to the District Magistrate as laid down in the Punjab Police Rule 16.38(1) and the District Magistrate never decided whether the preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the police or by a selected Magistrate 1st Class. It was further alleged that even the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16.38 ware not observed. The learned Sub-Judge decreed the suit and gave a declaration that the dismissal of the plaintiff was void. Aecdree for Rs 1151 was passed in favour of the Foot Constable. Among other issues framed, the following issues may be noticed:
(1) Whether the Superintendent of Police (Traffic) was not competent to pass the impugned order as alleged?
(2) Whether the provisions of Rules 16.38 and 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules were complied with by the defendant? If not, to what effect!
The learned Sub-Judge held and decided Issue 1 against the Government and held the order of dismissal to be vitiated. Regarding Issue No. 2, however, he held that there was a complete compliance of Rule 16.24 He further held that even as regards Rule 16.38, the necessary permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi for taking the departmental action against the plaintiff was obtained from the District Magistrate vide Exhibit P. 9-A.
2. The Government filed an appeal and the Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal.
3. The Government then filed an appeal before the High Court. Mehar Singh, J. following an earlier decision 258-D of 1962 of the Division Bench of that Court, dated March 4, 1964, held that Mr M.K Saxena, Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi, was not competent to dismiss the plaintiff. The learned Judge did not give leave to file letters patent appeal and the Government having obtained Special Leave, the appeal is now before us.
4. The first issue is now concluded against the plaintiff by a decision of this Court in the case Union of India v. Jagjit Singh (1969) 2 SCC 108, (1970) 1 SCR 163. However, the appeal must fail on the ground that the provisions of Rule 16.38 were not complied with in this case. In a similar case Delhi Admn. v. Chanan Shah (1969) 1 SCC 737, (1969) 3 SCR 653 this Court observed:
“It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules are mandatory or directory. Even assuming that the rule is directory we find that there has been no substantial compliance with its provisions. The complaint fell within Rule 16.38, and it was for the District Magistrate to decide who should investigate the case. No investigation of any kind was made under his directions. Without obtaining his directions, the Superintendent of Police held an inquiry and passed an order of censure. The order was set aside by the Deputy Inspector-General. Thereafter by DO Letter No. 2165-C, the Superintendent of Police, asked for the sanction of the District Magistrate to proceed departmentally. Even at this stage, the District Magistrate was not informed that the Superintendent of Police held an inquiry and passed an order of censure and that his order was set aside by the Deputy Inspector-General. The inquiry held by the Superintendent of Police was not authorised by the District Magistrate nor did it receive his approval. The District Magistrate gave his sanction without recording any reasons and without applying his mind to the requirement of Rule 16.38 In the circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the departmental action taken against the respondent is invalid.”
5. In this case the permission relied on by the Government is in the following terms:
“MEMO
Referring your memorandum No. 4425.T, dated February 9, 1960, on the subject noted above.
I agree to departmental action being taken against F.C Ram Kishan No. 4494.”
We may here reproduce relevant part of Rule 16.38:
16.38 (1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st Class powers.
(2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in Rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed.”
6. In the present case no immediate information was given to the District Magistrate in respect of the complaint received against the plaintiff nor did the District Magistrate decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st Class powers. It is true that the District Magistrate purported to give permission under sub-rule (2) of Rule 16.38 but as the Ist part of the rule was not complied with at all the departmental inquiry is vitiated and the order of dismissal must be declared illegal. In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs.
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