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National Insurance Company & Others v. Kamal Prakash Rohila .
Analytical Summary of the Opinion (B.S. Chauhan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal challenges the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 10.7.1995 in Writ Petition No. 825/91, which had allowed the respondent's claim for stepping up his pay scale relying upon a Single Judge's decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. General Insurance Corporation, 1994 (1) RLR 757. The appellants (the employer company) have also appealed against the Radhey Shyam Gupta decision and its operation was stayed by a Division Bench; that appeal remains pending.
The respondent was an employee of the appellant company. The company introduced a rationalisation scheme in 1985 (amending the earlier 1974 scheme) which restructured pay scales by bracketing consecutive grades together and invited employees to opt for refixation either from 1.4.1983 or from 15.10.1985. The options and consequences were explained and employees, including the respondent, chose after assessing gains and losses. The respondent opted for refixation from 1.4.1983 and received benefits in 1985 onwards. By a representation dated 22.6.1989 the respondent claimed that opting for 1.4.1983 caused him financial loss compared to juniors who had opted for 15.10.1985 and sought relief by re-opting the date (and offered to refund arrears if required). The company's national management rejected the representation by letter dated 7.11.1990. The respondent then filed the writ petition which the Single Judge allowed, leading to this appeal by the employer.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the principle of "stepping up" the pay of a senior employee to remove an anomaly (where a junior draws higher pay) applies in the facts of this case.
- Whether the respondent, having made an informed option for refixation from 1.4.1983 and taken benefits for several years, could subsequently seek to re-opt the date and claim relief — i.e., whether principles of acquiescence, approbation and reprobation or estoppel prevent such challenge.
- Whether the classification of employees who opted for different refixation dates gives rise to hostile discrimination violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (and hence whether the court should interfere with the rationalisation policy).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Once the respondent opted for the rationalisation scheme effective from 1.4.1983 "with his eyes open" and obtained benefits for years, he cannot later challenge that choice.
- Employees who opted for different dates (1.4.1983 vs 15.10.1985) form distinct categories; that classification is not arbitrary and does not violate Article 14. Persons in one category have no right to parity with persons in another category.
- No one in the respondent's category (those who opted 1.4.1983) has been given benefits so as to create an anomaly vis-à-vis the respondent.
Respondent's Arguments
- The rationalisation scheme created hostile discrimination because juniors who opted for 15.10.1985 obtained higher pay than the respondent, who was senior; hence Article 14 is violated and the anomaly must be removed by stepping up the respondent's pay.
- Reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. P. Jagdish (1997) for the principle of stepping up of pay to correct anomalies where juniors draw higher pay on a promotional post.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Radhey Shyam Gupta v. General Insurance Corporation, 1994 (1) RLR 757 | The Single Judge's decision applied by the Single Judge below to allow respondent's claim for stepping up. | The Single Judge below relied upon this decision; the Division Bench has stayed its operation in a separate appeal, and this decision was the basis of the Single Judge's order which the present Court reviewed and set aside. |
| Union of India v. P. Jagdish, (1997) 3 SCC 176 | Explanation of the principle of stepping up of pay where a junior on promotion draws higher pay; stepping up may be applied to remove anomaly; stepping up on a notional basis is consonant with Article 39(d) but can be made applicable only prospectively; the Court did not lay down a universally applicable rule. | The Court acknowledged the principle as explained but found the cited case distinguishable on facts and concluded that the principle of stepping up was not applicable to the facts before it. |
| State of Punjab v. Dharam Paul, (1996) 7 SCC 295 | Contrary view: where juniors received higher pay by addition to their personal pay (special pay), stepping up may not apply because the special pay is personal to them; individual facts must be strictly examined. | The Court relied on this contrary approach to illustrate that each case must be examined on its own merits and that stepping up is not automatically applicable in all situations. |
| Associate Bank Officers Association v. State Bank of India, JT 1997 (8) SC 422 : 1997 (5) SLR 778 (SC) | Principle that mere difference in pay does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. | The Court invoked this authority to support the proposition that a mere difference in treatment arising from choices/options does not necessarily amount to hostile discrimination. |
| Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 | Doctrine of acquiescence: if an order is accepted and acted upon and benefits derived, the party cannot subsequently challenge it. | The Court applied the acquiescence principle to hold that the respondent, having opted and taken benefits for years, could not challenge the option later. |
| Ajit Singh v. State Of Punjab & Another, AIR 1967 SC 856 | Reaffirmation of the principle of acquiescence/non-challenge after acceptance and acting upon an order. | Used to reinforce the conclusion that acceptance and acting upon an option/or benefit precludes later challenge. |
| Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 | Reiterates the principle relating to acceptance and subsequent challenge of an order. | Cited as supporting authority for the acquiescence principle applied by the Court. |
| State of Punjab v. Krishan Niwas, (1997) 9 SCC 31 : AIR 1997 SC 2349 | Another authority cited to support the doctrine that a party cannot accept an arrangement and later challenge it after deriving benefits. | Relied upon to support the Court's reliance on acquiescence and estoppel-type reasoning. |
| R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 : AIR 1993 SC 352 | Doctrine of approbate and reprobate (a person cannot both approbate and reprobate); election doctrine that one cannot accept benefits on a transaction and later treat it as void to gain another advantage. | The Court cited this doctrine to hold that the respondent could not on the one hand accept the benefits of his option and on the other challenge that option to obtain different relief. |
| Action Committee, South Eastern Railway v. Union of India, JT 1991 (5) SC 8 : 1991 (1) SLR 771 (SC) | Where an option is given and acted upon, it is not open to the party to withdraw that option at a later stage. | The Court applied this principle directly to the respondent's case, observing that having acted upon the option he could not later rescind it. |
| Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Service Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1980) 3 SCC 97 : AIR 1980 SC 379 | Policy decisions such as restructuring by bracketing are matters of policy; courts should not invalidate such policy absent arbitrariness or irrationality; a few instances of hardship do not invalidate a rational policy. | The Court relied on this authority to support the view that restructuring pay scales by bracketing grades is a policy decision not open to interference unless shown to be arbitrary; respondent had not challenged rationality. |
| Maharashtra S.B.O.S & H.S. Education v. P.B. Kurmarseth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543 | Reiteration of non-interference with rational policy absent arbitrariness. | Cited among several cases to reinforce the Court's hands-off approach to policy decisions absent arbitrariness. |
| G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91 | Support for the principle that courts should not interfere with policy decisions that are rational. | Used to buttress the Court's conclusion on non-interference with the rationalisation scheme. |
| State of Bihar v. Mohd. Kalimuddin, (1996) 2 SCC 7 : 1996 (1) SLR 676 (SC) | Authority supporting judicial restraint regarding policy matters and restructuring decisions. | Cited to support the Court's view that absent a showing of arbitrariness, courts should not examine merits of the policy. |
| U.P. Kattha Factories Association v. State of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC 97 | Further authority on non-interference with policy decisions unless arbitrary or irrational. | Placed alongside other authorities to support the Court's policy-deference approach. |
| S.B. International Ltd. v. Asstt. Director General of Foreign Trade, (1996) 2 SCC 439 | Authority cited for the principle of judicial restraint in review of policy decisions. | Relied upon as part of a group of cases establishing the Court's hands-off stance on rational policy choices. |
| Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 9 SCC 709 | Another authority supporting non-interference with rational administrative policy. | Cited with other cases to underline that restructuring decisions are for the executive unless irrational or arbitrary. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations grounded in the facts and the authorities cited in the record.
- Distinguishing precedents on stepping up: The Court acknowledged the principle explained in Union of India v. P. Jagdish about stepping up pay to remove anomalies where juniors obtain higher pay, but emphasized that the principle is not of universal application and must be applied according to the facts of each case. The Court also noted the contrary approach in State of Punjab v. Dharam Paul, which requires strict adherence to the individual facts where special pay is personal to juniors.
- On discrimination and Article 14: The Court accepted the proposition that mere difference does not amount to hostile discrimination (citing Associate Bank Officers Association v. State Bank of India). Given that employees had been invited to choose between two distinct options, those who opted for one date formed a distinct category from those who opted for the other; thus, parity claims across those categories were not automatically tenable.
- On the respondent's conduct and doctrines barring relief: The Court found that the respondent had made an informed option for refixation from 1.4.1983 "with his eyes open," had been given the benefit accordingly, and had taken the benefits for a period (about four years). Relying on the doctrines of acquiescence, approbate and reprobate, and the rule that an option once exercised and acted upon cannot later be withdrawn (citing Maharashtra State RTC v. Balwant, R.N. Gosain, Action Committee South Eastern Railway, and other authorities), the Court held that the respondent could not challenge his own option after deriving benefits for several years.
- On scope of judicial review of policy: The Court reiterated that restructuring pay scales by bracketing consecutive grades is a policy decision and that courts should not interfere unless the policy is shown to be arbitrary or irrational. The respondent did not challenge the validity or rationality of the 1985 rationalisation scheme nor seek to quash it. Consequently, there was no basis for judicial intervention into the policy choice itself.
- Conclusion of analysis: Because the stepping up principle was not applicable on the facts, the respondent had accepted and enjoyed the benefits of his option, and no arbitrariness in the scheme was demonstrated, the Court found no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought and held that the Single Judge's order had to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
CORE HOLDING: APPEAL ALLOWED; the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 10.7.1995 is set aside.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The respondent's claim for stepping up of pay (seeking re-option and adjustment after having opted for refixation from 1.4.1983 and having taken benefits) is rejected by this Court's decision.
- The Court concluded that the respondent could not, after several years of enjoying the advantages of his option, re-open that choice — applying doctrines of acquiescence, approbate and reprobate, and the rule that an exercised option cannot be withdrawn.
- The Court emphasized that it would not interfere with the rationalisation scheme as a policy decision in the absence of any challenge to its validity or any material demonstrating arbitrariness; thus, no broader declaration was made invalidating the scheme itself.
- There shall be no order as to costs (as expressly stated in the opinion).
- No novel legal principle or universal rule was established by this opinion; the Court applied existing doctrines and precedents to the facts and set aside the Single Judge's order. (The opinion does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond its factual conclusion.)
Disposition: Appeal allowed.
B.S Chauhan, J.:— This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge passed on 10.7.1995 in Writ Petition No. 825/91, by which the claim of the respondent of stepping up the pay scale has been allowed, by placing reliance upon the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. General Insurance Corporation, 1994 (1) RLR 757. The present appellants have also filed appeal against the said judgment and order in Radhey Shyam Gupta (Supra), wherein the operation of the said judgment and order has been stayed by the Division Bench and the appeal is pending for final hearing before the Jaipur Bench of this Court.
2. Respondent is an employee of the appellant-Company which floated a rationalisation scheme in 1985, amending the earlier rationalisation scheme of 1974, bracketing/bounching the employees in two or more consecutive stages together and fixing a revised pay scale for them. Thus, the scheme provided for restructuring the pay scales. For the purpose of implementation of the said rationalisation scheme, all the employees of the appellant-Company were asked either to opt for re-fixation from 1.4.1983 or from 15.10.1985 Consequences/advantages/benefits of opting for refixation with effect from 1.4.1983 and from 15.10.1985 were made clear and explained. Employees including the respondent, after making their own calculations/assessments of the advantages and dis-advantages and examining the pros and cons of both the dates to opt for refixation, made their options. Respondent opted for implementation of the scheme with effect from 1.4.1983 and he was given the benefit of the scheme accordingly in 1985 itself. Respondent made a grievance by his representation dated 22.6.1989 contained in Annex. 2 to the writ petition that acceptance of Scheme with effect from 1.4.1983 has caused him financial loss, as persons junior to him who had opted re-fixation from 15.10.1985 were in a gainful position. He also furnished dates giving the difference of such gains and losses had prayed that such an anomaly should be removed. He made the following prayer in his representation:
“I, therefore, request your goodself to kindly provide appropriate relief for fixation and in that case I am prepared to re-opt the date of fixation and to refund the arrears, if required”.
(emphais added)
3. Matter was referred to the national management and subsequently his representation was rejected and the order was communicated to him vide letter dated 7.11.1990 Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied, respondent preferred the writ petition which has been allowed. Hence, the instant appeal by the employer Company.
4. Heard Shri N.P Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri N.M Lodha and Shri Manish Singhvi, for the sole respondent.
5. Shri Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that once the respondent had opted the rationalisation scheme, with effect from 1.4.1983, with his eyes open, he cannot make grievances after enjoying the benefits for several years.
6. Shri Gupta has vehemently argued that after the promulgation of the rationalisation scheme of 1985, the employees had opted for different dates. Thus, the employees who opted for refixation from 1.4.1983 belong to an entirely different category from those who opted for refixation from 15.10.1985 and, being two distinct and separate classes, a person belonging to one category has no right to claim parity with a person belonging to another category. Thus, the question of giving a hostile treatment, violating the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution does not arise in such a case. Shri Gupta has submitted that no person belonging to category of the respondent i.e who opted for refixation from 1.4.1983, has been given the benefit to such an extent that may create an anomaly qua the respondent.
7. Shri Manish Singhvi has argued that it was solemn duty of the appellants to remove the anomaly as the treatment given by the rationalisation scheme has created hostile discrimination, which is violative of mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution and to protect the salary of the respondent bearing in mind the salaries of persons junior to him, as a senior employee is bound to get higher or equivalent salary of persons junior to him. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. P. Jagdish, (1997) 3 SCC 176 : [1997 (2) SLR 268 (SC)], wherein the principle of stepping up of pay has been explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court.
8. The factual gamut of the said case reveals that some employees were promoted as Head Clerks and subsequently other persons, working as Senior Clerks, were also promoted as Head Clerks. Though, persons promoted latter were juniors to employees promoted earlier as Head Clerks were getting higher salary as they were withdrawing a sum of “special pay” on the post of Senior Clerks and it resulted in anomaly in pay scales. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if an additional or special pay is attached to a particular post, person not holding such post cannot claim such additional/special pay, however, in such a case of anomaly, the pay of the senior employee in the higher post is required to be stepped up to a figure equal to the pay of junior employee on that post. The Hon'ble Court further explained that the principle of stepping up of pay is applicable only when both such employees i.e senior and junior, belong to the same category and on promotional post junior employee gets a higher salary. In the said case, the principle of stepping up of pay was applied to remove the anomaly resorting to the fundamental rules providing for removal of such anomaly therein and the Court held that the stepping up of pay should be done in such a way that the anomaly of juniors getting higher salary than seniors on the promotional post would be removed by stepping up the salary of senior employee to a figure equal to the pay as fixed for junior employee. The Court further observed that the principle of stepping up the pay on notional basis is consonance with Article 39(d) of the Constitution, however, it can be made applicable only prospectively. The Court did not lay down any principle of Universal application. The same Hon'ble Judges, in State of Punjab v. Dharam Paul, (1996) 7 SCC 295 : [1996 (1) SLR 759 (SC)], had taken a contrary view holding that the fact of an individual case should be strictly adhered to and as other employees, though juniors, got higher pay by addition to their personal pay, the rule of stepping up cannot be resorted for the reason that “Special Pay” given to juniors is part of their pay, which is personal to them. Thus, each case is required to be examined on its own merit.
9. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the principle of stepping up of pay is not applicable. Moreover, mere difference is not discrimination [vide Associate Bank Officers Association v. State Bank of India, JT 1997 (8) SC 422] : [1997 (5) SLR 778 (SC)]. In the instant case, respondent had given an option, with his eyes open and after making his calculations considering the gains and losses and examining the pros and cons of both the dates for re-fixation. Once he had opted for refixation with effect from 1.4.1983 and same was acted upon, after taking benefits for a period of four years, it was not open for him to dispute the same in 1989.
10. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati etc., AIR 1969 SC 329, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the concept of acquiescence holding that once the order is passed, it is accepted by the other party, acted upon, benefits/advantages driven out of it, it is not open for the party to challenge the same. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Ajit Singh v. State Of Punjab & Another, AIR 1967 SC 856, Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397; and State of Punjab v. Krishan Niwas, (1997) 9 SCC 31 : AIR 1997 SC 2349 : [1997 (2) SLR 514 (SC)].
11. In R.N Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 : AIR 1993 SC 352, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that “a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage”.
12. In Action Committee, South Eastern Railway v. Union of India, JT 1991 (5) SC 8 : [1991 (1) SLR 771 (SC)], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with issue of option and held that if an option has been given and it is acted upon, it is not open to the party to withdraw the same at a latter stage.
13. In fact, restructuring the pay scales by bracketing the consecutive grades together is a policy decision and Courts cannot interfere in such cases unless it is alleged and established that the policy itself is arbitrary or irrational. There is no scope of judicial review so long the method is within the Constitutional and legal limits. The Courts cannot examine the merits and demerits of the policy.
14. In Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Service Association etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1980) 3 SCC 97 : AIR 1980 SC 379 : [1980 (1) SLR 159 (SC)], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“Sri Govind Swaminathan drove home the point that in some cases even a few hundred ‘A’ wing members have been passed over by some one in the ‘B’ wing far junior to them. Once the principle is found to be rational the fact that a few freak instances of hardship may arise on either side cannot be a ground to invalidate the order or the policy. Every cause claims a martyr and however unhappy we be to see the seniors of yesterday becoming the juniors of today, this is an area where, absent arbitrariness, and irrationality, the court has to adopt hands off policy”.
15. Same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maharashtra S.B.O.S & HS. Education v. P.B Kurmarseth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543; G.B Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91; State of Bihar v. Mohd. Kalimuddin, (1996) 2 SCC 7 : [1996 (1) SLR 676 (SC)]; U.P Kattha Factories Association v. State of U.P, AIR (1996) 2 SCC 97;, 1996 SC 1356; S.B International Ltd. v. Asstt. Director General of Foreign Trade, (1996) 2 SCC 439; and Tata Iron & Steel CO. Ltd. v. Union of India., (1996) 9 SCC 709.
16. The respondent in the instant case has not challenged the validity/rationality of the rationalisation scheme of 1985. No material has been placed to substantiate that it is arbitrary nor a prayer was made in the petition for quashing of the said scheme. His entire case has been confined to the opportunity to re-opt, just to remove the anomaly in salaries. We find no jurisdiction for moving such an application by the respondent after several years of opting for refixation from 1.4.1983 and the same is liable to be rejected. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge under challenge, dated 10.7.1995, is hereby set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
17. Appeal allowed.
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