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Hari Singh v. Ram Kumar
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-petitioner instituted a suit on 27-11-1989 seeking a permanent injunction restraining the defendants (non-petitioners) from interfering with access along a way, from constructing buildings so as to obstruct the way, and for removal of an obstruction created by digging a foundation.
The defendants filed a written statement on 04-12-1989 denying the plaintiff's allegations and seeking dismissal of the suit. Before issues were framed, the plaintiff moved an application under Order 23, Rule 3 read with Section 151, C.P.C. on 31-05-1990, asserting that the parties had entered into a compromise dated 29-11-1989. The plaintiff produced a typed copy of the compromise (signed by the parties and identified by the defendants' advocate) and sought a decree in terms of that compromise.
The defendants replied (10-07-1990) denying any compromise, alleging fabrication of the compromise document and asserting that if any compromise existed it should have been filed and verified in Court; they even suggested prosecution for fabrication.
The trial Court recorded evidence from witnesses for both sides: for the plaintiff (including the advocate who identified signatures, the petition-writer who typed the compromise, another advocate, and the plaintiff himself) and from the defendants (the defendants themselves and three mediators). The trial Court concluded that although some form of compromise had been arrived at and the parties were initially willing, the defendants subsequently resiled when the compromise was produced before the reader of the Court. The trial Court therefore dismissed the plaintiff's application and refused to record the compromise. The plaintiff filed the present revision petition challenging that order (dated 16-11-1991).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court erred in refusing to record and give effect to an alleged compromise produced under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C., where a written copy signed by the parties was filed and the signatures were identified.
- Whether, once a compromise is admitted or produced under Order 23, Rule 3, the Court is entitled to inquire into allegations of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation that are said to vitiate the compromise, or whether such allegations must be left to a separate proceeding.
- Whether the statutory requirements for recording a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 (i.e., that the compromise be in writing and signed by the parties) were satisfied in the present case.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The plaintiff submitted that a compromise dated 29-11-1989 existed, was typed and signed by the parties, and a copy was filed with the application under Order 23, Rule 3.
- Counsel relied on authorities (including Govindarajan v. K.A.N. Srinivasa Chetty and Bhaja Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei) to submit that when a compromise is filed under Order 23, Rule 3 the Court should not probe allegations of fraud or undue influence but should record and give effect to the compromise if satisfied it was made.
- It was submitted that the trial Court's factual finding that parties arrived at a compromise meant the trial Court was bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in its terms.
Defendants' (Non-petitioners') Arguments
- The defendants contended that no compromise had taken place — the plaintiff fabricated the document — and the signatures, if any, were not admitted to be genuine in the sense of being freely given.
- They pointed to inconsistencies in dates pleaded by the plaintiff (plaint had alleged an earlier compromise on 25-11-1989 and subsequent obstruction on 26-11-1989) and questioned why the Order 23, Rule 3 application was only filed on 31-05-1990 if the compromise was dated 29-11-1989.
- Counsel relied on authorities (including K. Chandrahass Shetty v. Jayaram Sasani; B.D. Mohan Rao v. Co-operative Industries Estates; Smt. Sumitra Devi Agarwalla v. Sulekaha Kundu; and Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel) to submit that a court may, and in some circumstances must, examine allegations that a purported compromise is vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion, and that recording a compromise is not merely a formal step but a substantive enquiry.
- They also argued the compromise was not read over to the defendants and that they only realized its contents when it was produced; accordingly, they were justified in resiling and no decree should be passed on that basis.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in this Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Govindarajan v. K.A.N. Srinivasa Chetty, AIR 1977 Mad 402 (1977 Lab IC (NOC) 158) | Where a compromise is filed under Order 23, Rule 3, the Court should not go into allegations of fraud or undue influence incidentally; it should record the compromise if satisfied it was made. | The petitioner relied on this decision; the Court treated it as supporting the proposition that the Court should not probe incidental allegations of fraud when an admitted compromise is presented under Order 23, Rule 3. |
| AIR 1975 SC 2202 | Referred to by the Madras High Court in support of the above proposition (as cited in the opinion). | Mentioned as an authority on which Govindarajan drew; used by petitioner in arguing that the trial Court should not have inquired into fraud once compromise was produced. |
| Bhaja Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei, AIR 1980 Orissa 108 | Order 23, Rule 3 empowers the Court to decide, as a matter of fact, whether an alleged agreement or compromise was made and, if satisfied, to record it. | The petitioner relied on this authority to argue the trial Court should have recorded the compromise; the Court acknowledged this line of authority but assessed its interplay with other precedents. |
| AIR 1930 PC 158 | Earlier authority considered in Bhaja Govinda Maikap (referenced in the opinion). | Mentioned as part of the chain of decisions considered in support of the proposition that the Court has power to decide whether a compromise was actually made. |
| K. Venkata Seshiah v. Kanduru Ramasubamma, 1991 (1) JT 642 | Noted in the opinion as approving the Orissa High Court authority. | Cited by petitioner as reinforcing the Orissa High Court view; the Court took note of this approval when considering competing authorities. |
| K. Chandrahass Shetty v. Jayaram Sasani, AIR 1970 Mys 209 | Held that a party can take the defence that an agreement is vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation and the Court has the power to examine such allegations. | Relied upon by the defendants; the trial Court and parties referred to this Mysore High Court view, but the revising Court considered it inconsistent with binding Division Bench authority of the Rajasthan High Court. |
| B.D. Mohan Rao v. Co-operative Industries Estates (Ltd.), AIR 1975 AP 308 | Recording of a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 is not merely formal; the Court must determine whether there is any agreement between the parties for compromise. | Relied on by the defendants to argue that the trial Court was correct to examine the substance and refuse to record the compromise; the revising Court considered this contention against other binding decisions. |
| Smt. Sumitra Devi Agarwalla v. Sm. Sulekaha Kundu, AIR 1976 Cal 196 | The term "lawful agreement" under Order 23, Rule 3 does not include agreements vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion; the Court must inquire into allegations that consent was obtained by such vitiating factors. | Defendants relied upon this authority to support a substantive enquiry into alleged vitiation. The revising Court noted the position but reconciled it with the binding Division Bench authority it followed. |
| Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, AIR 1988 SC 400 | Under Rule 3 (as it stood), a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. | Although cited by defendants, the revising Court observed that in the present case the compromise was in writing and signed and that this requirement was satisfied; therefore the Court considered the authority less relevant to the facts before it. |
| Budha Lal v. Sri Ram Chand, AIR 1992 All 360 | Relied upon for the requirement that a compromise must be in writing and signed; part of the line of authorities stressing formal requirements. | Cited by the defendants; the revising Court concluded the formal requirements were met in the present case and therefore treated this authority as not undermining its conclusion. |
| Putto Lal v. His Highness Maharaja Dhiraj Sumersinghji of Kishengarh, AIR 1963 Raj 63 | Where allegations of fraud or misrepresentation are incidental to an admitted agreement between parties, the Court should not entertain an enquiry into those incidental matters while recording the admitted agreement; such matters should be left to a separate suit. | The revising Court treated this Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court as binding and followed its principle. On that basis the Court held it was not competent to investigate incidental allegations of fraud and directed recording of the compromise and decree in its terms. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed the trial Court record, the evidence led before it, and the authorities cited by both sides. The core elements of the Court's step-by-step analysis were:
- Evaluation of evidence: The revising Court observed that the evidence recorded at trial showed that the parties did, in fact, enter into a compromise. A written copy of the compromise deed was filed with the application and was signed by the defendants; those signatures were identified by the defendants' advocate (P.W.1). The defendants did not deny the signatures in evidence.
- Reconciliation of factual sequence and pleadings: The Court noted some apparent inconsistencies in the defendants' pleadings — the defendants' reply initially asserted no compromise had ever been reached and accused the plaintiff of fabrication, while in evidence the signatures were not denied and identification was given by counsel.
- Consideration of procedural steps and missed opportunities by defendants: The Court observed that the defendants failed to examine the reader of the Court, who was alleged to have read over the compromise to them and upon whose reading they claimed to have realized they were cheated; the Court treated this omission as weakening the defendants' claim that they only discovered coercion or misrepresentation when the compromise was presented.
- Assessment of competing authorities: The Court considered both lines of authorities. It recognized the decisions (from Mysore, Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta High Courts, and some Supreme Court pronouncements) that allow a Court to inquire into allegations that a compromise is vitiated by fraud/undue influence and that recording a compromise is not a purely formal act. However, the revising Court held itself bound by a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court (Putto Lal) which states that where an agreement is admitted, incidental allegations of fraud or misrepresentation are not to be inquired into in the exercise of Order 23, Rule 3; such questions should be left to a separate suit.
- Application of statutory/formal requirements: The Court acknowledged that after amendment, Order 23, Rule 3 requires the compromise to be in writing and signed. It found that the plaintiff had filed a written copy duly signed by the parties and identified by counsel; accordingly the formal statutory requirements were satisfied in the present case.
- Conclusion drawn from facts and binding precedent: Because the parties had admitted or had their signatures on the compromise identified in Court and because the Court considered itself bound by the Division Bench view that incidental allegations of fraud should not prevent recording of an admitted compromise, the revising Court concluded that the trial Court erred in refusing to record the compromise and in dismissing the plaintiff's application.
The Court also expressly rejected the persuasive value of the Mysore High Court authority relied upon by the defendants (and noted the Calcutta High Court's contrary stance), because it was inconsistent with the binding Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court which the Court followed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revising Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the trial Court's order dated 16-11-1991, and directed the trial Court to pass a decree in terms of the compromise produced before it by the plaintiff along with the application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the C.P.C.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The trial Court's refusal to record the compromise was overturned and the trial Court was directed to pass a decree in accordance with the compromise document filed and identified in Court. Parties were directed to bear their own costs.
- Broader precedent: The Court treated itself as bound by a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court (Putto Lal) which holds that when an agreement is admitted, incidental allegations of fraud or misrepresentation should not be inquired into under Order 23, Rule 3 but be left to a separate suit. The opinion does not announce any new legal principle beyond applying that binding authority to the facts of the case.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.
1. This is a civil revision petition against the order of the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Kishangarhbas dismissing the application of the petitioner under Order 23, Rule 3 and refusing to record the compromise arrived at between the parties.
2. Plaintiff petitioner had filed the present suit on 27-11-1989 seeking a permanent injunction against the defendant non-petitioners restraining them from interfering with the coming and going in the way and that they should not construct any building so as to obstruct the way and further the obstruction which has been created by digging the foundation should be removed. The defendants filed the written statement on 4-12-1989 controverting the facts alleged by the plaintiff-petitioner and praying that the suit be dismissed. Even before the issues were framed plaintiff petitioner filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3 read with Section 151, C.P.C. on 31-5-1990 praying that the parties had entered into a compromise on 29-11-1989 which was typed by the petition writer and original of which was in the possession of the defendants which they have failed to produce in Court and which is duly signed by the parties, who were identified by Shri Ummed Singh Chaudhary, Advocate. A copy duly signed by the parties which was in his possession was also produced along with the application and it was prayed that the decree be passed in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
3. Reply was filed to this application by the defendants on 10-7-1990 stating that no compromise ever took place between the parties nor they are aware of any compromise dated 29-11-1989. The plaintiff might have prepared so-called fabricated compromise by which the defendants are not bound if any compromise had been arrived at it ought to have been filed in the Court and duly verified. Since the plaintiffs have prepared a fabricated compromise he should be prosecuted for the offence. The learned trial Court recorded the evidence of the parties. Plaintiff examined Shri Ummed Singh Chaudhary, Advocate (P.W. 1) on behalf of the defendants, Shri Hukam Chand (P.W. 2) a petition-writer who had typed the compromise deed. Shri Rati Ram Chaudhary, Advocate (P.W. 3) on behalf of the plaintiff. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 4. Whereas the defendants have been examined themselves as Ram Pal as (D.W. 1) and Shri Humam Singh (D.W. 2) and Mularam (D.W. 3) who were mediators and responsible for the compromise between the parties. The learned trial Court after hearing the arguments and considering the record of the case has come to the conclusion that some compromise was arrived at between the parties and they were willing for the compromise but when the defendants produced the compromise before the reader of the Court, the defendants resiled and were not willing to do the compromise nor abide by its conditions and, therefore, he dismissed the application and refused to record the compromise. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been filed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to my notice the case in Govindarajan v. K.A.N. Srinivasa Chetty, AIR 1977 Mad 402 : (1977 Lab IC (NOC) 158) wherein it has been observed that (at page 406 of AIR):
"If a compromise was in fact arrived at though it may be voidable at the instance of one of the parties on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, when the compromise is filed under Order 23, Rule 3 with a request to record the same by the opposite party, the Court could not go into the question of fraud or undue influence".
5. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court while making the above observations placed reliance on its earlier decisions and AIR 1975 SC 2202.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on Bhaja" Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei, AIR 1980 Orissa 108, their Lordships after considering several authorities including AIR 1930 PC 158 has observed as under:
"The words "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part" in Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. clearly show that the Court has power under this rule, where an agreement or compromise denied to decide whether as a fact the alleged agreement or compromise was made and if it is satisfied that it was made to record it."
7. Relying on this authority it is very vehemently submitted that since the trial Court has given the finding of fact that the parties did arrive at the compromise, it was incumbent upon the Court to record the same and passed the decree in terms thereof.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the authority of Orissa High Court has been approved by the Supreme Court in K. Venkata Seshiah v. Kanduru Ramasubamma (dead) by Lrs., 1991 (1) JT 642.
9. On the other hand the learned counsel for the non-petitioners have submitted that the plaintiff in his plaint itself has mentioned that the parties had come to a compromise on 25-11-1989 in the presence of the villagers but they resiled and again obstructed on the next date i.e. 26-11-1989. He has further submitted that the suit had been filed on 27-11-1989 and if the parties had come to a compromise on 29-11-1989 there is no reason nor there is any explanation as to why the plaintiff moved the application under Order 23, Rule 3 as late as on 31-5-1990.
10. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners have placed reliance on K. Chandrahass Shetty v. Jayaram Sasani, AIR 1970 Mys 209 (V 57 C 54) wherein it has been held that a party can take a defence that the agreement arrived at between the parties has been vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation etc. and the Court has power to go into the merits of such allegations.
It has further been observed as under (at page 211):
"The agreement or compromise by this rule is intended to put an end to the whole litigation by an amicable settlement to the party's own free will and consent; it is not intended either to sow the seeds of fresh litigation or to leave the contentions raised by the parties to a further suit; undoubtedly in the latter event the object of the rule to put an end to the litigation by passing a decree in terms of agreement or compromise would stand frustrated."
11. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners have placed reliance in B.D. Mohan Rao v. Co-operative Industries Estates (Ltd.), AIR 1975 AP 308 wherein Their Lordships have observed as under (at page 309):
"The recording of compromise is not purely a formal matter, but a question of substance under Order 23, Rule 3 the Court has to find out if there is any agreement between the parties for compromise."
12. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners have further placed reliance on Smt. Sumitra Devi Agarwalla v. Sm. Sulekaha Kundu, AIR 1976 Cal 196 wherein it has been held that (paras 8, 9, and 10) :
"The term 'lawful agreement' in Order 23, Rule 3 does not include within it an agreement which is vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion........ In order to consider whether or not an agreement has been reached between the parties, the Court will of necessity embark upon an enquiry as to the allegations of a party that his consent to an agreement or his signature on the document containing the terms has been obtained by fraud, undue influence or coercion."
13. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners have placed reliance in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel., AIR 1988 SC400 where Their Lordships have held that (at page 403):
"Under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them."
14. This authority was relied in Budha Lal v. Sri Ram Chand, AIR 1992 All 360. Relying on these authorities the submission is, that looking to the evidence on record it cannot be held that so-called compromise was agreed upon without undue influence or misrepresentation. The compromise was never read over to the defendants and they came to know only when it was presented by them to the reader and, therefore, they were perfectly justified in residing from the same and no decree can be passed in terms thereof.
15. I have givem my thoughful consideration to the whole matter and I have carefully gone through the various authorities cited at the Bar as also the record of the case. The evidence which has been recorded by the trial Court shows that the parties did enter into a compromise. A copy of the compromise deed which has been filed in the Court is duly signed by the defendants who have been identified by their Advocate. It appears that originally the parties had come to a settlement on persuation of some people. But later on they want to resile from the said agreement. The defendants have failed to examine the reader of the Court who is alleged to nave read over the compromise to them and whereupon they came to know that they have been cheated and made to sign their compromise deed on the terms which they never wanted to agree. Moreover the defendants in their reply to the application under Order 23, Rule 3 has taken up a contrary plea that no compromise was ever arrived at between the parties. They never signed such an agreement and the plaintiff had fabricated the compromise deed. Whereas in evidence the signatures were never denied and their counsel also deposed that he had identified them and they had put their signature in their presence. It is not understandable that the advocate of the defendants will not explain the terms of the compromise to the defendants. The authority of Mysore High Court relied by defendants has disagreed with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Putto Lal v. His Highness Maharaja Dhiraj Sumersinghji of Kishengarh, AIR 1963 Raj 63 wherein it has been held that:--
"if the allegations of fraud or misrepresentation are incidental to an admitted agreement having been arrived at between the parties, it is not within the competence of the Court to enquire into such incidental matter but leave the parties to a separate suit to get an adjudication on the question whether the admitted agreement was voidable."
16. I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and, therefore, the authority of Mysore High Court is of no avail. Even the Calcutta High Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the decision of this Court in Putto Lal's case but taken a contrary view. I am in agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court and, therefore, this authority is also of no avail. There is no quarrel after the amendment of Order 23, Rule 3 that the compromise should be in writing and signed. In the present case, the plaintiff along with his application had filed a copy of the compromise which is in writing as well as duly signed by the parties who have been identified by their counsel. As such the authorities of the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh's case and of Allahabad High Court in Budha Lal's case have no relevance. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to allow this revision petition and set aside the order of the trial Court dated 16-11-1991 and direct him to pass a decree in terms of the compromise produced before him by the plaintiff along with his application under Order 23, Rule 3 of C.P.C.
17. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Revision
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