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Lakshmi Narayan v. The State Of Rajasthan
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter is a revision application under Section 18(3) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, challenging an order of the District Judge, Kota, which rejected a reference (made under Section 18 by the Collector) on the ground that the application for reference was barred by limitation.
Key chronological facts stated in the opinion: the Collector's award was made on 21-1-1961; the applicant applied for a copy of the award on 23-1-1961; the certified copy was delivered on 13-4-1961; the applicant on 1-5-1961 applied under Section 18(1) requesting that a reference be made to the court. The Collector, relying on the Rangoon decision Burjorjee v. Special Collector (AIR 1926 Rang 135), allowed exclusion of the period required to obtain a certified copy and forwarded the reference to the District Judge.
Before the District Judge the applicant filed a written statement asserting the reference was within limitation, and the State's reply expressly admitted that the reference was within limitation. Ten issues were framed; none specifically addressed limitation. After evidence on all issues had been recorded, the State raised an objection that the application for reference was time-barred. The District Judge upheld the objection and rejected the reference as barred by limitation. The applicant filed the present revision challenging that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a revision under Section 18(3) challenging a District Judge's order rejecting a reference as time-barred is entertainable given the existence of an appeal provision under Section 54.
- Whether the District Judge has jurisdiction to examine the validity of a reference made by the Collector — specifically whether the District Judge may inquire into whether the reference was barred by limitation (conflict between the "Allahabad view" and the "Bombay view").
- Whether the applicant was entitled, for limitation purposes, to exclude the period taken to obtain a certified copy of the award (relying on the Limitation Act, notably Section 12(2)), thereby making the application for reference within time.
- Whether factual assertions (or admissions) in pleadings precluded the State from later raising the limitation objection before the District Judge.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The District Judge had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the application for reference was within limitation; that was not open to him.
- The applicant was not present when the award was made and the award was not communicated to him as required by Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act; therefore the proviso to Section 18(2) (second part of clause (b)) applied and the reference was within limitation.
- The applicant relied on the Collector's reliance on Burjorjee (AIR 1926 Rang 135) to exclude the time taken in obtaining a copy of the award.
- The applicant argued the State, having admitted in its reply that the reference was within limitation, could not later raise the limitation objection before the District Judge.
State / Government Advocate's Arguments
- A preliminary contention that this revision is not entertainable because an appeal lay under Section 54 to the High Court from an order of the District Judge; thus the revision should be precluded.
- The State maintained that the application for reference was barred by limitation and pressed that objection before the District Judge (despite prior pleading that admitted limitation).
- The State filed counter-affidavits in this Court asserting that the applicant had in fact signed the award on 21-1-61 (i.e., was present when the award was made), contrary to the applicant's affidavit claiming absence on that date.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Burjorjee v. Special Collector, Rangoon, AIR 1926 Rang 135 | Authority relied upon by the Collector to exclude the period for obtaining a certified copy when computing limitation. | The Collector followed this decision to find the applicant's Section 18(1) application within time; the Court noted the Collector's reliance but later held Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 18(1) applications under the Rajasthan Act. |
| Dembeswar Sarma v. The Collector of Sibsagar, (1917) 39 Ind Cas 637 (AIR 1918 Cal 445) | Authority supporting that an appeal under Section 54 lies only from an award and not from a District Judge's rejection where no award is made. | Relied upon to reject the Government Advocate's preliminary objection that revision was not entertainable because an appeal lay under Section 54. |
| Ghulam Muhyuddin v. Secy. of State for India, 24 Ind Cas 379 (AIR 1914 Lah 394) | Authority supporting the same proposition as Dembeswar Sarma regarding non-applicability of Section 54 where there is no award. | Cited in support of the Court's conclusion that Section 54 does not bar the present revision. |
| Nafis-ud-din v. Secy. of State, AIR 1927 Lah 858 | Authority in the same line as Dembeswar Sarma and Ghulam Muhyuddin regarding appealability under Section 54. | Referred to in support of the view that Section 54 does not apply where the District Judge has not rendered an award (so appeal to High Court under Section 54 is not available). |
| State of U.P. v. Abdul Karim, AIR 1963 All 556 (FB) | Held that the District Judge cannot go into the question of the invalidity of the reference (the "Allahabad view"). | Listed among authorities taking the Allahabad view; the Court contrasted this view with others and ultimately rejected it for the Rajasthan Act. |
| Madansinhji Saheb v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 Guj 175 | Authority adopting the Allahabad view (District Judge cannot examine validity of reference). | Cited as part of the line of cases adopting the Allahabad view; mentioned in the Court's survey of authorities. |
| Kaliyanchand v. Kanchanbai, AIR 1963 Madh Pra 220 | Another case adopting the Allahabad view. | Included in the list of authorities representing the Allahabad view criticized by the Court. |
| Hari Krishan v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1958 Punj 490 | Another authority for the Allahabad view. | Cited among decisions holding that District Judge cannot go into reference invalidity. |
| Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, AIR 1929 All 769 | The case in which the Allahabad view was first taken (as referred to by the Court). | Noted as the origin of the Allahabad view; used to describe the provenance of that position. |
| Mahadeo Krishna v. Mamlatdar of Alibag, AIR 1944 Bom 200 | Authority adopting the opposite position (the "Bombay view") that the District Judge may inquire into the validity of a reference. | Cited among cases supporting the Bombay view; Court found this view preferable for the Rajasthan Act. |
| Subramania v. Collector of Coimbatore, AIR 1946 Mad 184 | Authority adopting the Bombay view. | Cited as part of the Bombay line of authorities; relied upon by the Court in favoring that approach. |
| Kochukunju Padmanabhan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 3 (FB) | Authority adopting the Bombay view. | Listed with other Bombay-view cases to show conflicting judicial opinions; cited in the Court's survey. |
| Swami Sukhanand v. Samaj Sudhar Samiti, AIR 1962 J and K 59 | Authority adopting the Bombay view. | Cited among decisions supporting the Bombay view. |
| State of Rajasthan v. L. D'Silva, 1958 Raj LW 113 (AIR 1957 Raj 44) | A Division Bench of this Court followed the Bombay view (that the District Judge can examine invalidity of reference). | The Court relied on and treated this decision as binding (or at least persuasive) on the question for the Rajasthan Act and adopted the Bombay view for the present matter. |
| AIR 1927 Lah 858 (referred to again later) | Cited in connection with limitation issues and the non-applicability of certain Limitation Act provisions to special/local laws. | Referred to among authorities considered when discussing applicability of the Limitation Act; the Court concluded Section 12(2) Limitation Act does not apply to Section 18(1) applications under the Rajasthan Act. |
| Kashi Prasad v. Notified Area, Mahoba, AIR 1932 All 598 | Referred to in the context of limitation authorities. | Listed by the Court as a decision to be noted in connection with limitation issues; the Court's ultimate conclusion was that Section 12(2) Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 18(1) applications under the Rajasthan Act. |
| Kunhibi v. Land Acquisition Officer Kozhikode, AIR 1960 Ker 80 | Referred to in the Court's consideration of limitation authorities. | Referred to in support of the Court's conclusion on limitation; the Court nonetheless held Section 12(2) Limitation Act does not apply to Section 18(1) Rajasthan Act applications. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, each tethered to material in the opinion:
- Appealability under Section 54 — The Court examined Section 54 and concluded that it permits appeal only from an award of the court. If the District Judge rejects a reference as invalid because the application for it was time-barred, there is no award by the District Judge and therefore no appeal lies under Section 54 to the High Court. The Court relied on earlier authorities (e.g., Dembeswar Sarma, Ghulam Muhyuddin, Nafis-ud-din) to support this conclusion and rejected the Government Advocate's preliminary objection to the entertainability of the revision application.
- Jurisdiction of the District Judge to inquire into validity of the reference — The Court acknowledged conflicting judicial authorities: the "Allahabad view" (District Judge cannot examine reference validity) and the "Bombay view" (District Judge can). The Court observed that a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in State of Rajasthan v. L. D'Silva had followed the Bombay view. The Court analysed the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act and noted differences with the Indian Land Acquisition Act: under the Rajasthan Act a government department can apply for a reference and a revision lies to the High Court under Section 115 CPC against an order of the Collector on an application for reference. The Court reasoned that the Collector is regarded as a judicial authority under the Rajasthan Act and that his power to make a reference is conditional on the application being within the statutorily prescribed limitation period. For these reasons the Court found the Bombay view preferable for the Rajasthan Act and held that the District Judge does have jurisdiction to examine whether the reference made by the Collector was valid.
- Effect of the State's prior admission in pleadings — The Court considered whether the State's admission in its reply (that the reference was within limitation) barred the State from later urging the limitation objection. The Court held that the facts upon which the applicant relied to establish timeliness were not pleaded by the applicant; had those facts been expressly pleaded and admitted by the State, estoppel might have applied. However, since the question involved one of law, the Court held there can be no estoppel on a question of law and it was open to the State to raise the limitation objection before the District Judge.
- Whether the applicant was present when the award was made — The applicant asserted by affidavit in the High Court that he was not present when the award was made on 21-1-1961 (claiming signatures were taken on 23-1-1961). The State filed counter-affidavits asserting the applicant signed on 21-1-1961. The Court attached limited weight to those affidavits and examined the earlier proceedings: before the Collector the applicant's representative had been heard on the limitation objection and the Land Acquisition Officer's order dated 18-5-61 indicated the applicant had "noted the judgment under protest on 21-1-61 when it was pronounced" and then sought a copy on 23-1-61. Similarly, before the District Judge the applicant had contended only that time to obtain a certified copy should be excluded, not that he had been absent on 21-1-61. On these bases the Court concluded the applicant was present when the award was made on 21-1-61.
- Applicability of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to exclude time for obtaining a certified copy — The Court examined Section 29 of the Limitation Act and noted that when a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the First Schedule, only certain provisions of the Limitation Act (Sections 4 and 9–18 and 22) apply except where expressly excluded. The Court observed that the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is such a local law prescribing a different limitation period and that there is no express exclusion in the Rajasthan Act of the applicability of Sections 4 and 9–18 and 22 of the Limitation Act. However, the Court found that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (which deals with leave to appeal and review) specifically refers only to applications for leave to appeal and review and therefore is not applicable to an application for a reference under Section 18(1) of the Rajasthan Act. The Court therefore held the applicant was not entitled to exclude the time taken in obtaining a copy of the award for computing the limitation period for a Section 18(1) application.
- Consequence on limitation — Having concluded (a) that the applicant was present when the award was made on 21-1-61 and (b) that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to a Section 18(1) reference application under the Rajasthan Act, the Court held the application for reference made on 1-5-61 was barred by limitation.
- Whether failure by the State to file a revision under Section 18(3) against the Collector's order precluded raising limitation before the District Judge — The Court rejected the contention that because the State did not seek revision against the Collector's order under Section 18(3) it could not raise the limitation objection before the District Judge. Given the Court's conclusion that the District Judge had jurisdiction to examine validity, it was unnecessary for the State to have filed such a revision and failure to do so did not make the Collector's order final.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision application is dismissed; the order of the District Judge holding that the reference was invalid because it was made on an application barred by limitation is proper and is upheld.
Implications and consequences:
- The District Judge's order rejecting the reference as time-barred stands; there is no award by the District Judge from which an appeal lies under Section 54.
- The Court declared that, for purposes of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, the "Bombay view" is preferable — i.e., the District Judge has jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of a reference made by the Collector.
- The applicant was found to have been present when the award was made on 21-1-61 and was therefore not entitled to exclude the period spent obtaining a certified copy when computing limitation for a Section 18(1) application; Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act was held inapplicable to applications under Section 18(1) of the Rajasthan Act.
- No broader or novel rule beyond the application of existing authorities to the Rajasthan Act is created; the direct practical effects are that the reference remains rejected as time-barred and the revision is dismissed.
- Costs: the Court directed that parties shall bear their own costs in this Court and in the Court of the District Judge.
ORDER Jagat Narayan, J.
1. This is a revision application under Section 18(3) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act 1953, against an order of the District Judge, Kota, rejecting a reference made to him under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Collector at his instance on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
2. The award by the Collector was made on 21-1-61. On 23-1-61 the applicant applied for a copy of the award. The copy was delivered to him on 13-4-61. On 1-5-61 he made an application to the Collector under Section 18(1) praying that a reference be made to the court. The application was opposed on the ground that it was barred by limitation as it was, not made within six weeks of the making of the award. The Collector was however of the opinion that the applicant was entitled to exclude the period from 23-1-61 to 13-4-61 which was requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the award and held that the application was within time. He followed the decision of the Rangoon High Court in Burjorjee v. Special Collector, Rangoon, AIR 1926 Rangoon 135. The Collector accordingly forwarded the reference to the District Judge for disposal.
3. Before the District Judge the applicant filed a written statement of his claim. In para 11 of it he stated that the reference was within limitation. A reply to his written statement was filed on behalf of the State. In para 11 of if it was expressly admitted that the reference was within limitation. On the pleadings of the parties 10 issues were framed but none of them was on the point as to whether the reference was within limitation. After the evidence on all the issues had been recorded an objection was taken on behalf of the State that the application for reference was barred by limitation. This objection was upheld by the learned District Judge and the reference was rejected as time-barred. Against the above order the present revision application has been filed.
4. Two main contentions have been raised on behalf of the applicant. One is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the application for reference was within limitation or not. The other is that the applicant was not present when the award was made and it was not even communicated to him as provided under Section 12(2) and therefore the second part of Clause (b) to the proviso to Section 18(2) is applicable and the application for reference was within limitation.
5. A preliminary objection was taken by the learned Government Advocate that this revision application is not entertainable as an appeal lay under Section 54 against the order of the learned District Judge rejecting the reference on the ground that the application for it was barred by limitation. I am unable to uphold this preliminary objection. Section 54 runs as follows:
"Appeals in proceedings before Courts.--Subject to the provisions of the Code applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan from the award, or from any part of the award, of the court, and any decree of the said High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid shall be subject to further appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in Sections 109 and 110 and order XLV of the Code."
6. It is clear from the wordings of the above section that what is appealable is an award by the District Judge. If the reference is rejected as invalid being made on a time barred application there is no award by the District Judge and hence no appeal lies to the High Court under Section 54. I am supported in the view which I have taken by the following decisions: Dembeswar Sarma v. The Collector or Sibsagar, (1917) 39 Ind Cas 637: (AIR 1918 Cal 445 (2)); Ghulam Muhyuddin v. Secy. of State for India, 24 Ind Cas 379: (AIR-1914 Lah 394); Nafis-ud-din v. Secy. of State, AIR 1927 Lah 858(2).) Coming now to the first contention raised on behalf of the applicant there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question as to whether it is open to the District Judge to go into the question as to whether the reference was valid. In the following decisions it was held that the District Judge cannot go into the question of the invalidity of the reference: State of U. P. v. Abdul Karim, AIR 1963 All 556 (FB); Madansinhji Saheb v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 Guj 175; Kaliyanchand v. Kanchanbai, AIR 1963 Madh Pra 220; Hari Krishan v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1958 Punj 490. The view taken in the above cases is referred to as the Allahabad view as it was first taken by that High. Court in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, AIR 1929 All 769.
7. A contrary view was taken in the following decisions: Mahadeo Krishna v. Mamlatdar of Alibag, AIR 1944 Bom 200; Subramania v. Collector of Coimbatore, AIR 1946 Mad 184; Kochukunju Padmanabhan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 3 (FB); Swami Sukhanand v. Samaj Sudhar Samiti, AIR 1962 J and K 59. This is referred to as the Bombay view.
8. The question as to which view is preferable came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. L. D'Silva, 1958 Raj LW 113: (AIR 1957 Raj 44). This Court followed the Bombay view. In that case the contention was that there was no award and therefore the reference was incompetent. The contention on behalf of the applicant is that the reference was a nullity in that case because there was no award and that case is thus distinguishable. In my opinion the question which arose for decision in that case was whether it was open to the District Judge to go into the question of the invalidity of the reference and the decision cannot be regarded as obiter on the question. In any case so far as the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is concerned there is slight difference between its provisions and those of the Indian Land Acquisition Act. Under the Rajasthan Act a Government Department on whose behalf acquisition is being made can also apply for reference under Section 18(1) and under Section 18(3) a revision lies to the High Court under Section 115 C. P. C. against any order made by the Collector on an application for reference. That shows that the Collector making an award under Section 12 is not regarded as an agent of the State as has been held to be the case under the Indian Land Acquisition Act, but is regarded as a judicial authority. Further in my opinion even if the Collector is regarded as an agent of the State he is a public agent and the scope of his authority is defined by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and an act of the Collector cannot be regarded to be on behalf of the State if he exceeds the authority given to him. The Collector can only make a reference if the application for making it is filed within the limitation prescribed under Section 18(2). It is true that there is no express provision prohibiting him from making a reference on an application made beyond the period of limitation, but the Act confers on him authority to make a reference only if the application is made within the time so prescribed. I am accordingly of the opinion that so far as the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is concerned, the Bombay view is preferable and it must be held that the District Judge has jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the reference made by the Collector is valid or not,
9. Next it is contended that the State having admitted in its reply filed before the District Judge that the reference was within limitation it was not open to it subsequently to raise objection that the reference is made on a time barred application. I am unable to accept this contention. The facts on the basis of which the application for reference was alleged to be within limitation were not pleaded by the applicant. If those facts had been pleaded and they had been admitted then it would not have been open to the State to resile from them. But there can be no estoppel on a question of law. It was therefore open to the State to urge before the learned District Judge that the reference was made on a time-barred application and should not be entertained.
10. The next argument is that the reference is within limitation because the applicant was not present when the award was made and no notice of the award was served on him as required by Section 12(2). An affidavit was filed by the applicant in this Court stating that he was not present when the award was made by the Collector on 21-1-61 and that his signatures were taken on the award as well as the order-sheet dated 21-1-61 on 23-1-61. Two counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State to prove that the award was signed by the applicant on 21-1-61. Much value cannot be attached to these affidavits. As I have mentioned above an objection was taken before the Collector when the application for reference was made that it was barred by limitation. Shri Rameshwar Dayal who represents the applicant was heard by the Land Acquisition Officer whose order dated 18-5-61 goes to show that it was not contended before him on behalf of the applicant that he was not present on 21-1-61. On the contrary what is mentioned in this order of the Land Acquisition Officer is--
"Besides the applicant noted the judgment under protest on 21-1-61 when it was pronounced and on 23-1-61 made an application to obtain copy of the judgment in which he stated that the copy of the judgment was being obtained for filing an appeal."
11. Further when the question of limitation was raised before the learned District Judge there also it was not contended on behalf of the applicant that he was not present when the award was made. What was contended was that he was entitled to exclude the time taken by him in obtaining a certified copy of the award. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that the applicant was present when the award was made on 21-1-61.
12. Next it is contended that the applicant is entitled to exclude the time taken in obtaining, a copy of the award by virtue of the provision contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. Reliance is placed on, AIR 1926 Rang 135. No reason is given in this decision for holding that the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act are applicable to an application under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 29 of the Limitation Act runs as follows:
"Section 29(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law--
(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869).
(4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of "easement" in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882, (V of 1882) may for the time being extend."
13. The Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act 1953 is a local law prescribing a period of limitation different from the period prescribed under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. There is no provision contained in the Rajasthan Act expressly excluding the application of Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 of the Limitation Act. Therefore the provisions of these sections of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The only applications referred to in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act however are those for leave to appeal and for review of a judgment.
14. The section is not applicable to an application for a reference under Section 18(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. The applicant was therefore not entitled to exclude the time taken by him in obtaining a copy of the award. The application for reference made by him on 1-1-61 was therefore barred by limitation.
15. In this connection the following decisions may be referred to: AIR 1927 Lah 858(2); Kashi Prasad v. Notified Area, Mahoba, AIR; 1932 All 598; Kunhibi v. Land Acquisition Officer Kozhikode, AIR 1960 Ker 80. Lastly it is contended that if the State thought that the reference made by the Collector was on a time barred application it should have filed a revision application against the order of the Collector making the reference under Section 18(3) and as it did not do so it could not raise the question before the District Judge. I am unable to accept this contention. As I have held above the District Judge was competent to go into the question as to whether the reference was invalid. It was not necessary under the circumstances for the State to file a revision application against the order of the Collector under Section 18(3) because It could raise the question before the District Judge. Failure to file a revision application did not make the order of the Collector final in these circumstances.
16. I accordingly hold that the order of the District Judge holding that the reference was invalid as it was made on an application which was barred by limitation is proper and dismiss the revision application.
17. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this Court and the Court of the District Judge.
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