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Padmaram And Others v. Surja And Others

Rajasthan High Court
Dec 17, 1959
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Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation arises from a suit for partition and possession filed by Nanak (plaintiff) claiming a half share in certain land in village Chhapawali, Tehsil Hanumangarh. Nanak died and is represented in the appeal by his five sons (Surja and others). The defendants in the suit were Padmaram and five other sons of Shriram and Gopi (a grandson of Shriram).

The suit was instituted in a revenue court (Deputy Commissioner, Hanumangarh), later transferred to the Collector, Ganganagar, who referred it to the District Judge, Ganganagar under the view that a question of proprietary title was raised. The District Judge decided issues within Section 36 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, returned the matter to the Collector, and the Collector decreed that plaintiffs were entitled to possession of a half share (1981 Bighas) with directions for partition.

The defendants (Padmaram and others) appealed to the High Court on 17 October 1957. During the pendency of the appeal Padmaram died on 1 November 1958. An application for substitution of his legal representatives in the appeal was filed in this Court on 4 July 1959, well beyond the statutory period of 90 days under Article 176 of the Limitation Act; the respondents opposed the application. Meanwhile, in the trial court proceedings for passing the final decree the respondents had applied on 14 November 1958 to substitute Padmaram's legal representatives; that application was allowed on 4 March 1959, bringing Padmaram's widow and son Maniram on the record of the trial court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the abatement of the appeal qua the deceased appellant (Padmaram) should be set aside under O. XXII, R. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) where substitution of legal representatives in the appeal was applied for after the statutory period, and where substitution had been made in the trial court.
  2. Whether the abatement of the appeal in respect of one appellant (Padmaram) results in the total abatement of the appeal as against all co-appellants, given the nature of the rights in issue (joint and indivisible) and the risk of producing two inconsistent decrees.
  3. How Order 41, Rule 4 (O.41 R.4) of the CPC (allowing an appeal by one of several plaintiffs/defendants to operate for all where the decree proceeds on a ground common to them) should be interpreted in relation to the mandatory provisions of Order 22 (which govern abatement on death of a party).
  4. Whether the exceptional power under Order 41, Rule 33 (O.41 R.33) should be exercised to avoid the consequences of abatement where substitution was not made in time.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The late substitution in the appeal should be allowed because the legal representatives of Padmaram were already put on the record of the original suit (trial court) at the instance of the respondents; thus their being on the record of the trial court made substitution in this appeal a formal matter.
  • Their local counsel at Hanumangarh had advised the legal representatives that no separate application in this appeal was necessary since they had been substituted in the trial court, and reliance upon this advice explains the delay.
  • Alternatively, under O.41 R.4 an appeal filed by one of several defendants on grounds common to all may be treated as an appeal for all; therefore the abatement qua Padmaram should not defeat the appeal of the other co-appellants.
  • Counsel cited numerous authorities supporting the proposition that O.41 R.4 can operate so as to permit continuation of an appeal for all even if one appellant later dies or is not substituted.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The application for substitution in this appeal was filed well beyond the statutory period of limitation (90 days) prescribed by Article 176 and should be rejected; the appeal abated automatically as to the deceased Padmaram when his legal representatives were not brought on record within time.
  • The substitution effected in the trial court cannot avail the appellants in the separate appellate proceedings pending in this Court; proceedings in two different courts cannot be conflated for this purpose.
  • Because the rights of Padmaram and the other defendants were joint and indivisible, if this Court were to allow the appeals of the remaining defendants in Padmaram's absence, two inconsistent decrees would arise (one final decree against Padmaram and his legal representatives in the trial court and a varying decree in favour of the other defendants from this Court). Therefore the abatement in respect of Padmaram must result in total abatement of the appeal.
  • Counsel relied on authorities supporting the proposition that O.41 R.4 should not be permitted to defeat the mandatory scheme of O.22 where a party to the appeal has died without timely substitution.

Table of Precedents Cited

The following table catalogs the cases and authorities mentioned in the opinion and, where the opinion states their use, the rule or principle for which they were cited and how the Court treated them in this decision. Entries reflect only what is stated in the provided opinion.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in opinion) Application by the Court (as stated in opinion)
Shambhu Nath v. Mt. Ralli, ILR 1919 Lah. 318 Cited to show that substitution in one proceeding does not avail in another separate proceeding. Referenced as authority for the proposition that substitution in the trial court does not automatically benefit the defendant in a separate appeal.
Shankarnaraina Saralaya v. Laxmi Hengsu, AIR 1931 Mad 277 Cited to similar effect as above. Used by the Court to support the position that proceedings in different courts cannot be confused for purposes of substitution.
Chandarsang v. Khimabhai, ILR 22 Bom 718 Cited by appellants in support of broad operation of O.41 R.4. The Court stated it would not accept the view expressed in this case as sound for the present matter.
Chintaman v. Gangabai, ILR 27 Bom 284 Cited by appellants to support the applicability of O.41 R.4. Court declined to follow this authority in the circumstances of the present case.
Ram Sewak v. Lambar Pande, ILR 25 All 27 Cited by appellants for the same general proposition. Not accepted by the Court as sound for resolving the present conflict between O.22 and O.41 R.4.
Piyare Lal v. Chura Mani, AIR 1918 Lah 227 Cited by appellants in support of treating an appeal by one as operating for all. Court did not regard this authority as persuasive for the present conclusion.
Jamna Bhagat v. Oudh Behari Mai, AIR 1933 All 733 Cited by appellants in support of their contention on O.41 R.4. Not accepted by the Court as establishing a correct rule for situations where a party dies during the appeal.
Chenchuramayya v. Venkatasubbayya, AIR 1933 Mad 655 Cited by appellants. Court did not follow this case as sound for present purposes.
Satulal v. Asiraddi, AIR 1934 Cal 703 Cited by appellants on O.41 R.4 application. Not accepted by the Court.
Guruprasad v. Tarini Charan, AIR 1938 Cal. 634 Cited by appellants. Court indicated it would not accept the view in this decision as sound for current controversy.
Sakkarai Chettiar v. Chellappa Chettiar, AIR 1938 Mad 374 Cited by appellants. Court declined to follow as authoritative for the proposition urged by appellants.
Mahadeo v. Baleshwar Prasad, AIR 1939 All 626 Cited by appellants. Court did not accept this authority as determinative for present issues.
Dhondo Khando v. Waman Balwant, AIR 1945 Bom 126 Cited by appellants. Not accepted by the Court as sound in this context.
Balaram v. Kanysha Mashi, AIR 1919 Cal 410 Cited by respondents to support restricting O.41 R.4 when O.22 applies. Included among authorities relied on by respondents; Court treated it as part of supporting line of cases for the respondents' view.
Naimuddin Biswas v. Maniruddin Lashkar, AIR 1928 Cal 184 Cited by respondents. Regarded as one of the authorities favouring the respondents' interpretation.
Amin Chand v. Baldeo Sahai, AIR 1934 Lah 206 Cited by respondents. Taken as supporting the respondents' position.
Pir Bakhsh v. Kidar Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 478 Cited by respondents. Noted by the Court among authorities favouring respondents' view.
Ramphal Sahu v. Satdeo Jha, AIR 1940 Pat 346 (Full Bench) Cited by respondents; Full Bench authority supporting restriction of O.41 R.4's operation where O.22 applies. Cited by the Court as a Full Bench decision consistent with the Court's conclusion.
Malobi v. Gaus Mohamad, AIR 1949 Nag 91 Cited by respondents / in support of limitation of O.41 R.4 when O.22 attracts. Court regarded this decision (Nagpur) as aligned with the view the Court accepted.
Sonahar Ali v. Mukbul Ali, AIR 1956 Assam 164 Cited by respondents. Regarded by the Court as one of the supportive High Court authorities for its conclusion.
Reghu Sutar v. Nrusingha Nath, AIR 1959 Orissa 148 Cited by respondents. Noted by the Court as confirming the view limiting O.41 R.4's scope where O.22 applies.
Haidar Husain v. Md. Subhan Khan, AIR 1940 All 428 Cited in relation to whether non-appealing co-parties must be impleaded. Referenced as authority supporting the view that non-appealing co-parties should be impleaded; part of the Court's discussion of O.41 R.4.
Girija Prasanna Deb v. N.M. Khan, AIR 1942 Cal 257 Cited on party impleading under O.41 R.4. Noted by the Court among cases discussing whether non-appealing parties must be impleaded.
Harbans Singh v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1942 Oudh 139 Cited on party impleading under O.41 R.4. Included among the authorities for the view favouring impleading non-appealing co-parties.
Mukandi Ram v. Asaram, (S) AIR 1955 Pepsu 73 Cited in the same context of impleading co-parties. Noted by the Court as part of the jurisprudence on O.41 R.4's practical operation.
Jitendranath Chatterji v. Jaku Mandar, AIR 1922 Pat 4 Cited as authority taking the opposite view on impleading. Cited by the Court as representing a contrary line of authority; Court noted divergence between High Courts.
Ambika Prasad v. Jhinak Singh, AIR 1923 All 211 Cited as another authority on impleading question. Referenced by the Court in describing divergent jurisprudence on whether non-appealing parties must be impleaded.
Nanak v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1946 Lah 399 (Full Bench) Cited as part of contrary authorities on impleading under O.41 R.4. Noted among cases taking a different view; Court observed preponderance favoured the other view (i.e., impleading advisable).
Baij Nath v. Ram Bharose, AIR 1953 All 565 (Full Bench) Cited as adopting the view that supports restricting O.41 R.4 where O.22 applies. Court explicitly stated it agreed, respectfully, with this Full Bench decision and relied on it for the approach adopted.
Md. Sher Khan v. Swami Dayal, AIR 1922 PC 17 (Privy Council) Cited for the interpretive principle that one provision of a statute should not be used to defeat another if reconciliation is possible. Relied on by the Court as authority for harmonising apparently conflicting provisions (used to argue O.22 and O.41 should be read compatibly).
Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 Cited for the same statutory interpretation principle (harmonisation of provisions). Used by the Court to support the duty of courts to harmonise conflicting provisions where feasible.
Arjun Singh v. Matukdhari Singh, AIR 1955 Pat 391 Cited as illustrative authority on the test whether an appeal can be decided in absence of legal representatives without producing inconsistent decrees. Cited by the Court as part of the line of decisions applying the test the Court adopted.
Chokalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache, AIR 1927 PC 252 Cited in relation to the exceptional and narrow use of O.41 R.33. Referenced by the Court when rejecting the application of O.41 R.33 to the present negligence-based case.
Ramdhari v. Rambharosa, AIR 1955 Pat 237 Cited in connection with the limited, exceptional exercise of O.41 R.33. Used by the Court to justify refusal to exercise O.41 R.33 where negligence had caused loss to the opposite party.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of logical steps, grounded in the text of the Civil Procedure Code and in the principle that courts cannot make orders for or against a dead person unless the law provides. The main elements of the reasoning were:

  1. Abatement occurred automatically as to Padmaram: The Court found that the right to sue did not survive solely in the remaining defendants because the rights of Padmaram and the other defendants were joint and indivisible. Since the legal representatives of Padmaram were not brought on record within the statutory/limitation period (90 days under Article 176), the appeal abated as to Padmaram automatically under O.22 Rules 3 & 4 (as applied to appeals by Rule 11).
  2. The reasons for delay were insufficient: The appellants' explanation — that substitution in the trial court and local counsel's advice obviated the need for substitution in this appeal — was rejected. The Court held that substitution in one court cannot substitute for substitution in another separate proceeding. The asserted legal advice (initially unnamed) that no application in the High Court was necessary was not a sufficient cause under O.22 R.9 for setting aside abatement; the Court described the conduct as gross negligence and found no sufficient cause for the delay.
  3. Mandatory nature of O.22 vs enabling nature of O.41 R.4: The Court emphasized that the provisions in Order 22 (Rules 1–4, 9 and 11) are mandatory, use the word "shall", and form a complete code dealing with death of a party. Order 41, Rule 4 is an enabling/discretionary provision that allows an appellate court, in certain circumstances, to reverse or vary a decree in favour of all plaintiffs or defendants where the decree rests on grounds common to them. The Court held that O.41 R.4 must not be read so as to defeat or undermine the mandatory provisions of O.22.
  4. Principle of harmonisation: Applying well-established interpretive principles (as in Md. Sher Khan v. Swami Dayal and Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo), the Court sought to harmonise O.22 and O.41 R.4 by limiting the operation of O.41 R.4 to cases where the appellants (or all parties who would benefit) are alive at the date of the appellate decision. Where a party has died and substitution has not been effected in time, the peremptory rules of O.22 apply and cannot be subordinated to the enabling rule of O.41 R.4.
  5. Test for total abatement: The Court applied the practical and accepted test — whether the appeal can be properly and finally decided in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased without creating two mutually inconsistent decrees in respect of the same subject-matter. If allowing the appeals of the surviving appellants while the appeal has abated as to the deceased would produce inconsistent decrees (one final in the trial court against the deceased and another varying decree in the appellate court), the whole appeal must abate.
  6. Application to the facts: Because the defendants' rights in the suit land were joint and indivisible and the trial court's decree had become final against Padmaram (upon abatement), allowing the appeals of the surviving defendants would create two inconsistent outcomes. Consequently, the Court concluded that the abatement as to Padmaram mandated abatement of the appeal in its entirety.
  7. O.41 R.33 considered and rejected: The Court noted O.41 R.33 is a narrow and exceptional provision, not to be exercised in ordinary cases nor where negligence by a party has caused a valuable right to accrue to the opponent. No special circumstances were made out to invoke that extraordinary power, so it was not exercised.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the appeal abated as a whole and therefore the appeal is dismissed. The application to set aside the abatement in respect of the deceased appellant Padmaram was refused.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The abatement in relation to Padmaram was automatic because his legal representatives were not brought on record within time; the reason advanced for the delay did not constitute sufficient cause under O.22 R.9 CPC.
  • Because the rights asserted by the defendants were joint and indivisible, proceeding with the appeal in the absence of Padmaram's legal representatives would have produced two inconsistent decrees — one final decree against Padmaram (trial court) and a potentially contradictory appellate decree in favour of the other defendants. For that reason the appeal abated in its entirety and could not be proceeded with as to the remaining appellants.
  • The Court held that Order 41, Rule 4 is an enabling provision and must be confined to cases where all appellants are alive at the date of the appellate decision; it cannot be used to displace the mandatory provisions of Order 22 where a party has died during the pendency of the appeal.
  • Order 41, Rule 33 was not invoked because no exceptional circumstances were shown; the Court observed the rule is to be exercised sparingly and not where the applicant's negligence produced a loss to the opposite party.
  • Direct outcome for parties: The appeal is dismissed (abatement as a whole) and the respondents are entitled to one set of costs from the appellants, as ordered by the Court.

LD/R.G.D — Judgment concluded: "Appeal dismissed."

Show all summary ...

1. This is a regular first appeal by the defendants Padmaram and six others in a suit-for partition and has come up for arguments before me on a question relating to the abatement of the appeal in circumstances presently to be mentioned. The parties are Jats and are descendants of a common ancestor. Nanak and Shriram were two brothers. Nanak brought the suit out of which this appeal arises for possession by partition of certain land situate in village Chhapawali, Tehsil Hanumangarh, in which he claimed a half share. Nanak having died is now represented by his five sons Surja and others in this appeal. The defendants in the suit were Padmaram and five others, sons of Shriram, and Gopi, a grandson of Shriram.

2. The suit was filed in a revenue court, namely, that of the Deputy Commissioner, Hanumangarh, and was later transferred to the court of the Collector, Ganganagar, who having been of the opinion that a question of proprietary title was raised in the case referred it to the District Judge, Ganganagar. The correct procedure for the Collector should have been to refer the specific issue or issues relating to proprietary title to the District Judge instead of referring the whole case to him.

3. Be that as it may, the learned District Judge decided the issues which fell within the scope of Section 36 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No. I) of 1951, and sent the case back to the Collector. Thereupon the latter held that the plaintiffs were entitled to get possession of half share by partition of the land measuring 1981 Bighas and gave certain directions for the actual partition of the land by metes and bounds with which we are not concerned for the purposes of the present appeal.

4. Aggrieved by this decree, the defendants appellants Padmaram and others filed the present appeal in this Court on the 17th October, 1957, fadmaram, however, died on the 1st November, 1958, during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. An application to bring the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram was made here on the 4th July, 1959, long after the period of limitation of 90 days prescribed by Article 176 of the Limitation Act. This application is opposed by the respondents.

5. It may be mentioned here, before proceeding further that proceedings were in the meantime going on in the trial court for the passing of a final decree and in those proceedings the respondents Surja and others had made an application to the trial court on the 14th November, 1958 for substituting the legal representatives of Padmaram in his place, and this application was allowed on the 4th March, 1959, with the result that the widow and the only son of Padmaram, namely, Maniram, were brought on the record of the trial court.

6. The sole ground on which reliance was placed the appellants for making their application for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram in his place so late as the 4th July, 1958, in his appeal was that in fact Padmaram's legal representatives had been brought on record in the trial court at the instance of the respondents themselves on the 4th March, 1959, and, therefore, it was merely a formal matter so far as their sub-stitution in this appeal was concerned.

7. In the affidavit which was filed in support of this application by Maniram, son of Padmaram, it was stated that their counsel at Hanumangarh had advised the legal representatives of Padmaram that as their names had been brought on the record of the original suit at the instance of the respondents, it was not necessary for them to make any application in this appeal for bringing them on record in place of the deceased.

8. Later, however, when the appellant Momenram brother of Padmaram came to Jodhpur on the 30th June, 1959, in connection with the obtaining of a stay order in this appeal, their counsel who was in-charge of the appeal advised the appellants that it would be better for them to make an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of Padmaram in this appeal also, and, therefore, the application was made soon after on the 4th July, 1959.

9. The question to consider in these circumstances is whether this constitutes a sufficient reason within the meaning of O. 22, R. 9 of the CPC for setting aside the abatement. For, the law is indeed well established that if the right to sue does not survive to the remaining plaintiffs or appellants alone but to them and to the legal representatives of the deceased party, then an application must be made to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on the record within the time prescribed by law, and where no such application is made the suit or appeal, as the case may be, automatically abates so far as that deceased party is concerned and no specific order as to the abatement of the suit or appeal is as such necessary.

10. There is hardly any doubt that the right to sue in the present case did not survive only to the defendants who remained on the record after the death of Padmaram, inasmuch as the rights of Padmaram and other defendants were joint and indivisible and there was no question of any division, inter se, between them so far as the present litigation was concerned. The appeal, therefore, undoubtedly abated qua Padmaram deceased, and the further question which arises is whether this abatement should be set aside. R. 9(2) of O. XXII of the CPC provides for the setting aside of the abatement where it is proved that the applicant was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit or the appeal.

11. The only reason adduced in the present case on behalf of the defendants is that the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram had been brought on the record of the trial court during the course of the proceedings for the final decree at the instance of the respondents themselves, and, therefore, the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram were advised by their legal adviser at Hanumangarh that it was not necessary for them to make any application for being substituted in place of the deceased Padmaram, and, therefore, they had not made the application earlier and decided to make it later when learned counsel in charge of their appeal in Jodhpur later impressed upon them the desirability of making an application in this Court also.

12. This, in my opinion, does not constitute any sufficient reason for the defendants' failure to make the application for the substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram at the proper, time. I am unable to accept that because the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram had been substituted in his place in the trial court, this was enough for the purposes of the present appeal also.

13. There is authority for the view that where there are two independent cross-appeals pending in the same court and one appeal has been filed by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant and where the appeal by the defendant appellant abates, he having not brought on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondent in tune, the defendant appellant cannot claim the benefit of the fact that the legal representatives of the deceased plain-tiff respondent in the appeal filed by him had been brought on the record within the time allowed by law, on the fallacious assumption that because the plaintiff's legal representatives were added in the appeal filed on his behalf that would automatically tenure for the benefit of the defendant appellant also for the purposes of his appeal. See Shambhu Nath v. Mt. Ralli, ILR 1919 Lah. 318 and Shankarnaraina Saralaya v. Laxmi Hengsu, AIR 1931 Mad 277. The case in hand is a far worse one. Here we are concerned with two proceedings not in the same court but in two different courts. The suit wherein the legal representatives of the deceased defendant Padmaram were brought was pending in the trial court for the purpose of a final decree and had been instituted by Nanak. The appeal was pending in this Court and had been brought by the defendants Padmaram and others and the two proceedings cannot possibly be allowed to be confused with each other, and, therefore, the bringing in of the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram in the suit cannot enure for the benefit of the defendants so far as the present appeal is concerned. I hold accordingly.

14. Then again, the name of the lawyer who advised the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram at Hanumangarh was not mentioned in the first affidavit filed in this Court on the 4th July, 1959, in support of the application for setting aside the abatement. Thereafter, a further affidavit was however filed by Mr. Birbaldas Gupta, a pleader practising at Hanumangarh, who has sworn that he had advised defendant Momenram, and Maniram, a brother and the son of the deceased Padmaram respectively, that no application need be filed in the High Court to bring the legal representatives of Padmaram in the appeal as they had already been brought on the record of the trial court at the instance of the plaintiffs themselves.

15. Be that as it may, I am definitely of the opinion that the defendants or the legal representatives of the deceased Padmaram had no business to consult their lawyer at Hanumangarh in preference to their learned counsel at Jodhpur who was in charge of the appeal, and I have no doubt that if the latter had been consulted at the proper time as he should have been in ordinary diligence, he would not have failed to have the advice earlier which he gave when he was consulted. In my opinion, this is a case of gross negligence, and I am far from satisfied that it discloses sufficient reason within the meaning of.

16. The result must inevitably be that the appeal, so far as the defendant Padmaram is concerned, abated, as soon as the statutory period of 90 days to bring in his legal representatives on record expired without their being so brought, and that abatement does not deserve to be set aside.

17. The further question which is however both interesting and intricate is whether the abatement of the appeal, in so far as Padmaram is concerned, should be confined to him in the circumstances, or it results in the total abatement of the appeal. On the side of the respondents it is strenuously urged that the decree having become final against the deceased Padmaram and his legal representatives and the interests of Padmaram and the other defendants being joint and indivisible, the abatement of the appeal qua Padmaram must inevitably result in the total abatement of the appeal so far as the other defendants appellants are concerned, because, assuming that this Court were to allow the appeal of the remaining defendants, two inconsistent and contradictory decrees would come into existence, the one against Padmaram and his legal representatives having become final as passed by the trial court, and another decree which should be a varying one so far as the remaining defendants would be concerned.

18. With equal strenuousness, it was contended on the side of the defendants appellants that the abatement in this case should be limited to the case of the deceased Padmaram only, and that, that notwithstanding, the appeal of the remaining defendants could and should be proceeded with unaffected thereby. It is further submitted in this connection that it was open to each of these defendants to have filed their appeals separately without impleading the rest of the defendants as parties thereto, and that being so, if one of the defendants died and his appeal abated, it would be scarcely just and proper to hold that the appeals of the other defendants should also abate.

19. Developing this argument, it is further urged that where the decree appealed from proceeds on grounds common to all the plaintiffs or defendants, the law is that any one of the plaintiffs or the defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the appellate court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants as the case may be. Strong reliance is placed in support of this contention on Rule 4 of Order 41 of the CPC.

20. This at once brings me to the question of the proper interpretation of O. 41, R. 4 of the CPC and O. 22, R. 3 read with R. 11 thereof, in relation to each other. I am indebted to learned counsel on both sides for the thoroughness and ability with which they supported their respective cases by relying on numerous authorities of the various High Courts which unfortunately show that there is a considerable divergence of judicial opinion between the various High Courts on this question and occasionally one finds divergence of opinion on this question within one and the same High Court also.

21. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the defendants appellants on Chandarsang v. Khimabhai, ILR 22 Bom 718, Chintaman v. Gangabai, ILR 27 Bom 284, Ram Sewak v. Lambar Pande, ILR 25 All 27, Piyare Lal v. Chura Mani, AIR 1918 Lah 227, Jamna Bhagat v. Oudh Behari Mai, AIR 1933 All 733, Chenchuramayya v. Venkatasubbayya, AIR 1933 Mad 655, Satulal v. Asiraddi, AIR 1934 Cal 703, Guruprasad v. Tarini Charan, AIR 1938 Cal. 634, Sakkarai Chettiar v. Chellappa Chettiar, AIR 1938 Mad 374, Mahadeo v. Baleshwar Prasad, AIR 1939 All 626 and Dhondo Khando v. Waman Balwant, AIR 1945 Bom 126; while learned counsel for the respondents placed equally strong reliance on Balaram v. Kanysha Mashi, AIR 1919 Cal 410, Naimuddin Biswas v. Maniruddin Lashkar, AIR 1928 Cal 184, Amin Chand v. Baldeo Sahai, AIR 1934 Lah 206, Pir Bakhsh v. Kidar Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 478, Ramphal Sahu v. Satdeo Jha, AIR 1940 Pat 346 (FB), Malobi v. Gaus Mohamad, AIR 1949 Nag 91, Sonahar Ali v. Mukbul Ali, AIR 1956 Assam 164 and Reghu Sutar v. Nrusingha Nath, AIR 1959 Orissa 148.

22. I am of opinion that no useful purpose can be served by discussing each one of these cases in detail, and I would, therefore, not undertake this stupendous task, but would instead endeavour to address myself to the controversy before me more or less on first principles.

23. Now what is the principle behind the rules relating to abatement of suits and appeals and the setting aside thereof? I think it can be premised without any fear of contradiction that, broadly speaking, the principle is two-fold. The first is that the Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for or against a dead man unless the law has by a special provision provided otherwise. (See Rule 6 of O. 22, for instance). The second is that the legal representatives of a party who is dead, and whose presence may be essential for a proper decree to be passed, must be substituted for him so that the possibility of two contradictory decrees in the same proceeding be avoided.

24. It seems to me that the principal provisions enacted in O. 22 with which we are concerned can be basically traced to the aforementioned two principles. Let me illustrate this by a simple example. A sues B. dies during the pendency of the suit. The right of suit does not according to the law applicable end with the death of B, but survives against the legal representatives of B. No decree can be passed against B, he being a dead man. B's legal representatives must, therefore, be brought on record within the time allowed by law.

25. If that is not done, the suit must abate and abate entirely for there is no person against whom it can be proceeded with. Let us now take another example. A sues both B and C. The suit is dismissed. A files an appeal against both B and C.B dies during the pendency of the appeal. The right of suit does not survive against C alone. B's representatives must, therefore, be brought on record within the period of limitation. But suppose they are not substituted. Then no decree can be passed against a dead man and so the appeal abates against B. The effect of the abatement is that no fresh appeal can thereafter be brought against the legal representatives of B against the decree of the trial court.

26. On the abatement of the appeal against B, however, a further question may arise whether the appeal abates against C also. The answer to this question depends upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Thus, where in the event of a decree being passed against C by the appellate court, two contradictory decrees would come into existence, the one being the decree of the trial court enuring in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent B, the appeal having failed owing to abatement, and the other being a decree against C to be passed by the appellate court, both relating to the same subject-matter, the entire appeal must abate.

27. The usually accepted test is that if two mutually contradictory decrees is the resultant effect of the situation that has developed, then the whole appeal must abate on the principle that law does not favour any such incongruous result. The two decrees militating against each other could only result in a futility or to put it differently they would, as it were virtually cancel themselves.

28. Such a situation may result, for example, where the rights of B and C are joint and indivisible and to touch the rights of C would be inevitably to touch the rights of the other. But where these rights are distinct and separate or even separable, the abatement would be partial only, that is, qua B only and not against C. This to my mind is the general effect of the Rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 11 of O. 22 of the CPC.

29. The second point to note is that the rules relating to abatement though procedural are mandatory and therefore they must be obeyed. That they are mandatory is, to my mind, obvious from the combined effect of Rules 3 and 4 read with Rule 9 of O. 22. Rules 3 and 4 are in these terms:

“Rule 3.(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.

Rule 4. (1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.

(3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.”

30. Thus Rules 3 and 4 unmistakably lay down that where there are more than one plaintiff and one defendant, and one of them dies and the right of suit does not survive in favour of or against the remaining plaintiffs or defendants by themselves, as the case may be, then an application has to be made within the time allowed by law to bring on record the legal representative or representatives of the deceased party and they must be made parties to the suit.

31. Then come sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 and sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 which further provide that where within the time limited by law such application is not made under sub-rule (1) of either rule respectively as the case may be, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff or defendant is concerned and costs may also be awarded under sub-rule 3(2) on an application to that effect by the opposite party. It may be as well to point out here that under the old Code a specific order of abatement was necessary and it was also held that such an order ought not to be passed without notice to the opposite party.

32. It is well settled however that under the present Code no separate or specific order that abatement has taken place is necessary at all and once a failure of compliance with the provisions of O. 22, Rule 3 or 4, as the case may be, comes about, the suit abates against the deceased party forthwith or automatically. But in plain language, this means that the suit stops ??? or comes to an end so far as the deceased party is concerned.

33. The next important provision to note in this connection is Rule 9, O. 22 of the CPC which provides that where a suit abates or is dismissed under O. 22, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action. This means that the abatement cannot but have the effect of a judgment in favour of the opposite party, and unless the abatement is set aside on an application to that effect, it must be held to be conclusive of the rights of the parties as determined by the court below.

34. The combined force of Rules 3 and 4 and 9 of O. 22, in my opinion, clearly is that they are mandatory. Not only the word ‘shall’ has been used in all these rules, but the consequence of the failure of compliance with the requirements thereof has been mentioned, and, that being so, there cannot be two opinions on the question that the rules are mandatory.

35. It may also be pointed out in this connection that although the rules discussed above are primarily worded so as to apply to suits, they have been made applicable to appeals as well by virtue of Rule 11, which provides that, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be held to include an appellant, the word “defendant” a respondent and the word “suit” an appeal.

36. Therefore, a decree passed without impleading the legal representatives of a sole appellant who may have died during the pendency of the appeal is a nullity and so also where there are more than One appellant or respondent in an appeal and one of them has died during the pendency of the appeal, the result of not impleading in time the legal representatives of the deceased party, generally speaking, will be to cause an abatement of the appeal so far as he is concerned.

37. It must also be pointed out here that where the nature of the case is such that the appeal cannot proceed against the remaining respondents in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent on the ground that if the appeal is allowed as against the remaining respondents, there would be two contradictory decrees in the same litigation with respect to the same subject-matter, then the abatement which was initially partial with respect to the deceased party only is bound to lead to the abatement of the appeal in its entirety. Where, however, there is no likelihood of two inconsistent decrees coming into existence with reference to the same subject-matter, the appeal would not fail as a whole and should be proceeded with against the remaining respondents.

38. This brings me to the question where the appeal is by several plaintiffs or defendants on a ground common to all of them and one of them dies and his legal representatives have not been impleaded within time, does the appeal abate only with respect to the appellant whose legal representatives have not been brought on record or it abates as a whole? Order 41, R. 4 of the CPC immediately arises for consideration in this connection. This rule reads as follows:

“Rule 4. Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.”

39. The plain effect of this provision is that where the decree appealed from is founded on a ground common to all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, it is open to any one of the plaintiffs or the defendants by himself to appeal from the whole decree, and it is not necessary for all of them to join in the appeal and when such an appeal has been filed by one of the plaintiffs or the defendants, as the case may be, thereupon the appellate court could have power to reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants even though they may not have appealed.

40. It seems to me that in such a case, an appeal by one is virtually treated as an appeal on behalf of all, although they may not have joined in the appeal. This rule appears to be based primarily on the consideration that if there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one in a suit and they are aggrieved or affected by a decree passed for or against them, such a decree being based on a ground common to all of them, then it should be enough if one of such parties files the appeal from the whole decree, the reason being that some of the persons whether on the side of the plaintiffs or defendants as the case may be may not be willing to appeal at all.

41. But on that account alone, the party wishing to appeal need not be deterred from doing so. And it is further provided that on such an appeal having been filed it should he open to the appellate court in its discretion to reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, as the case may be, irrespective of the consideration that the other plaintiffs or defendants have not appealed.

42. A question arises in this connection whether even in such a case the parties who are not willing to appeal should have been impleaded as respondents to the appeal. It seems to me that it would always be better to do so to make the array of parties complete, although I confess that there is a difference of opinion on this point also and it has been held in some cases that this rule applies to a case where only one or some of the plaintiffs or defendants appeal without impleading the other plaintiffs or defendants as parties to the appeal while in other cases the view has been taken that this rule would have no application where the non-appealing plaintiff or defendant has not been impleaded in the appeal at all.

43. See Haidar Husain v. Md. Subhan Khan, AIR 1940 All 428, Girija Prasanna Deb v. N.M Khan, AIR 1942 Cal 257, Harbans Singh v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1942 Oudh 139, and Mukandi Ram v. Asaram, (S) AIR 1955 Pepsu 73 in support of the first view, and AIR 1919 Cal 410, Jitendranath Chatterji v. Jaku Mandar, AIR 1922 Pat 4, Ambika Prasad v. Jhinak Singh, AIR 1923 All 211 and Nanak v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1946 Lah 399 (FB) in favour of the other view. The preponderance of opinion, however, appears to be in favour of the earlier view and I would leave the matter here at that.

44. The second question which arises in connection with the interpretation of O. 41, R. 4 is whether this rule also applies where an appeal has been filed by all or some of the plaintiffs or the defendants and one or some of them have died during the pendency of the appeal and their legal representatives have not been brought on the record within the time allowed by law, so that in such a case it may not be necessary at all to comply with the provisions of O. 22 and the appeal may still be proceeded with, the ground being that the appeal has been filed from a decree which was founded on grounds common to the deceased party and those who were with him and, therefore, the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant or appellants becomes immaterial.

45. In other words, the question is whether the provision contained in R. 4 of O. 41 can legitimately govern the provisions contained in Order 22 relating to the abatement of suits and appeals on account of the death of one of the parties therein. The answer to this question is not free from difficulties. It may be said on the one hand that if in an appeal from a decree which proceeds on a ground common to all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, the law of procedure provides that it is open to one of the plaintiffs or one of the defendants by himself to file an appeal, and thereupon the appellate court will be within its bounds to reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants as the case may be, no rule of principle is violated if one of such parties having appealed subsequently dies and his legal representatives are not somehow brought on record within the time permitted by law and consequently an abatement of the appeal with respect to him has occurred; but, that notwithstanding, the appeal can be proceeded with, and it would still be possible for the appellate court to reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants as the case may be.

46. Putting the matter in another way, the pro-pounders of this view would have it said that the position is, as if, the party who died had not appealed at all, and even then the appeal would have been competent and a proper decree could have been passed in the case in favour of all the appellants including such party who may not have appealed. This argument has a degree of plausibility about it and has found acceptance in a number of cases. Nevertheless, on a balance of all the considerations, I am far from satisfied that it is sound.

47. It seems to me important to bear in mind in this connection that R. 4 of O. 41 is really an enabling one and all it does, after everything is said and done, is to vest a discretion in the court in cases falling within the scope of that provision to reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, as the case may be. But the court is not bound to do so. Fully recognising, therefore, that the rule is a permissive one and it invests the court with a discretion to reverse or modify a decree in favour of all the appellants (including those who may have not appealed) where the circumstances of the case so warrant, it cannot be overlooked that all judicial discretions have got to be exercised on certain well-recognised principles and not on the mere fancy or caprice of the deciding court.

48. It is a serious question whether an enabling provision like this can be allowed to govern and indeed outweigh the specific provisions of O. 22 which deal with the consequences of the death of a party or one of the parties to a suit or appeal during the pendency thereof. And it is further well to bear in mind in this connection, as I have discussed above, that these rules are mandatory in character judging by their very language and the effect of the failure to comply with the requirements thereof laid down in O. 22 itself.

49. It is very important to remember further that O. 41, R. 4 by its very language is properly applicable to that class of cases where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, as the case may be, who are appellants, are alive at the time the appellate court passes its decree, though the appeal may have been actually filed by only one or more of them. Indeed it seems to me that if it is held to be applicable in the case of an appellant who may have appealed and died during the pendency of an appeal, it is bound to render nugatory the provisions of O. 22 in a large class of cases falling within O. 41, R. 4 which in my opinion could have hardly been intended by the Legislature.

50. And I would add with all respect that if that was its intention, one should have expected it to say that in plain words and not left it to be inferred. It seems to me in these circumstances that to hold that O. 41, R. 4 can be resorted to even in cases where the application of O. 22 by reason of the death of one of the parties to the suit or the appeal is attracted would be to subordinate the positive and specific provisions of O. 22 which embody in themselves a complete Code on the subject dealt with by it to an enabling provision like the one contained in rule 4 of O. 41.

51. Again the correct approach where two provisions of a statute would appear to conflict with each other, is on the well-settled principles of the interpretation of statutes to harmonise them and not to subordinate the one to the other, if that can be done. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Md. Sher Khan v. Swami Dayal, AIR 1922 PC 17 that one provision of a statute ought not to be used to defeat another provision, unless it is impossible to effect a reconciliation between them. The same view has been approved by our own Supreme Court in Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202, where their Lordships have laid down that it is the duty of the courts to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise whenever it is possible to do so.

52. Looking at the provisions of O. 22 and O. 41, R. 4 in this way, it seems to me, with all respect, that the application of O. 41, R. 4 should be confined to that category of cases where the parties appealing whether plaintiffs or defendants, are alive at the date of the decision of the appeal, and should not be allowed to be resorted to where one of the parties appealing has died during the pendency of the appeal in which event the provisions of O. 22 are immediately attracted into application. O. 41 deals with appeals from original decrees.

53. Rule 1 lays down how an appeal should be preferred and what the memorandum of appeal must contain. Rule 2 deals with the grounds which may be taken in appeal. Rule 3 deals with the consequences of non-compliance with Rule 1, or 2. Then comes R. 4, the interpretation of which has led to a good deal of trouble. What this rule provides in effect is an exception to the general rule that the appellate court can vary or reverse the decree of the trial court only in favour of the party appealing.

54. Rule 33 of O. 41 is another such exception. Leaving aside the last-mentioned rule, with which we are not really concerned in this case, what R. 4 provides as an exception to the general rule which has been referred to above is that where the decree under appeal proceeds on a ground common to all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the appellate court may reverse or very the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants as the case may be.

55. Having regard to the setting in which this rule appears, therefore, I am disposed to think that it was not at all dealing with those cases where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants appealing were not alive and some of them may have died during the pendency of the appeal. This rule has not been couched in a language to indicate what would be the effect where one or some of the parties, appealing may have died.

56. On the other hand, O. 22, as already stated, provides a complete Code dealing with the questions which may arise on account of the death of one of the parties to an appeal with which questions O. 41 has no concern. Consequently, it would be going too far, in my humble judgment, to interpret O. 41 R. 4 in such a way as to over-ride the peremptory provisions of O. 22. In my view, therefore, the correct approach to the interpretation of these two sets of provisions is not to interpret them in such a Way that the one impinges on the other but to give them a meaning where each may have its full scope within its proper limits without adversely affecting the provision contained in each one of them.

57. To interpret O. 41, R. 4 so as to govern the-provisions contained in O. 22 would, therefore, appear to me, with all respect, really born out of confusion as to the object and intendment of both these sets of provisions, and that should not be allowed. If the contrary view as to the impact of O. 41, R. 4 on appeals, where one of the appellants has-died and there has been no substitution of his legal representatives on the record within the time allowed by law, is accepted as correct and taken to its-logical conclusion, then it seems to me that it would be absolutely futile to say that the suit has abated; as respects even the deceased appellant and that the appeal was put an end to because of abatement ??? as where O. 41, R. 4 might come into-play on account of the decree appealed from having, been passed on a ground common to all the appellants including the deceased, it would be open to the appellate court to pass such decree as it thought against all the defendants or plaintiffs including the deceased as the case may be.

58. I should also like to add here that I have very-considerable hesitation in accepting the view that special provisions contained in O. 22 which are at once attracted into application on the death of a party to a suit or an appeal should be held to be more or less rendered ineffective in that class of cases which fall within the scope of O. 41 R. 4 by reason of a general enabling rule contained therein.

59. Summing up the position at which I have-arrived from the discussion made above, I would say that the two sets of provisions contained in O. 22 and O. 41, R. 4 of the CPC having regard to the objects behind the rules relating to abatement of suits and appeals and the necessity for setting them aside and the rules contained in O. 22 being mandatory in character and again having regard to the consideration that the rule contained in O. 41, R. 4 is an enabling general provision empowering; the appellate court in its discretion to vary or reverse a decree under appeal which was based on grounds common to all the plaintiffs or all the defendants and wherein all of them may not have appealed should be interpreted in such a way that they receive their due effect and force within their respective ambit without the one impinging upon the other, and the proper method to do so is to hold that where one of the appellants has died even where the judgment under appeal is founded on a ground common to all the appellants, the application of O. 22 cannot be brushed aside in subordination, as it were, to the provision contained in R. 4, and that the latter provision would not be attracted into application in such a case as it should really be limited to those cases where all the appellants are alive at the date of the decision by the appellate court and not where one or more of them have died and their legal representatives have not been brought on record in accordance with the requirements of O. 22. I hold accordingly.

60. In this view of the whole matter, I do not feel persuaded with all respect to accept the view taken in ILR 22 Bom 718, ILR 27 Bom 284, ILR 25 All 27, AIR 1918 Lah 227, AIR 1933 All 733, AIR 1933 Mad 655, AIR 1934 Cal 703, AIR 1938 Cal 634, AIR 1938 Mad 374, AIR 1939 All 626, and AIR 1945 Bom 126, as sound.

61. It may be pointed out, however, that the Allahabad High Court in its Full Bench decision in Baij Nath v. Ram Bharose, AIR 1953 All 565, veered round to the other view with which, if I may say so, I am in respectful agreement and which I have propounded above. Similarly the Lahore High Court refused to follow the view taken in AIR 1918 Lah 227 cited above in AIR 1934 Lah 206 and in AIR 1935 Lah 478.

62. It also seems to me that the Calcutta High Court had earlier taken the same view in AIR 1919 Cal 410 and AIR 1928 Cal 184. But these cases do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided, AIR 1934 Cal 703 & AIR 1938 Cal 634, although it must be admitted that the trend of the Calcutta decisions is definitely the other way about.

63. Again, the view which I have felt persuaded to accept as correct has found favour with a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in AIR 1940 Pat 346. Curiously enough, this has been strongly criticised in some of the later decisions of the Patna High Court but has nevertheless held the field for all these years in that court and is the accepted view there at this date. The same view has been upheld by the Nagpur High Court in AIR 1949 Nag 91, and by the Assam High Court in AIR 1956 Assam 1164 and in AIR 1959 Orissa 148 by the Orissa High Court.

64. It is only fair to conclude in these circumstances that the view which I have accepted as sound is the view which has been accepted by the majority of the various High Courts in our country and on the whole seems to me to be the view which should be preferred on first principles as discussed above.

65. The upshot of the entire discussion made above is that the appellants cannot legitimately be allowed to take advantage of O. 41. R. 4 of the CPC in the controversy which has arisen around the question whether this appeal has only abated as respects the deceased defendant Padmaram or it abates as a whole. Now learned counsel for the appellants has not questioned the abatement of the appeal so far as Padmaram is concerned.

66. The further question which, therefore, falls for determination on the principles discussed above is whether the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that this appeal has abated entirely is correct.

67. Now, it seems to me to be well established that one test which has been almost universally accepted by the courts to decide a question like this is whether it is possible to decide the entire appeal in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant appellant Padmaram without producing two inconsistent decrees in this very litigation. See in this connection AIR 1949 Nag 91, AIR 1953 All 565 (FB), Arjun Singh v. Matukdhari Singh, AIR 1955 Pat 391 and AIR 1956 Assam 164.

68. Now let us look at the nature of the controversy in this litigation. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for a half share of certain land by partition. It may also be pointed out that the defendants share inter se was not in controversy at all. The latter resisted the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share for certain reasons into which it is not necessary to go; but it is sufficient to say that the defence was common.

69. The trial court eventually held that the plaintiffs were entitled to halt share of a portion of the land sued. Aggrieved by this decision, the defendants Padmaram and others came in appeal to this Court. The appeal so far as Padmaram is concerned has abated as held above, and no sufficient reason has been adduced to set aside that abatement. It is also beyond dispute that the share of Padmaram along with the other appellants in the suit land is joint and indivisible. The appeal by Padmaram having abated, the decree of the trial court so far as he is concerned became final and can no longer be questioned.

70. Now let us suppose that the appeal of the remaining defendants is heard and allowed and the plaintiffs suit dismissed. There is no doubt that this would result in two inconsistent decrees, the one against Padmaram standing intact as passed by the court below and the other in favour of the surviving appellants. As I understand the law, it is well established that no court of law can allow such an incongruous situation to devlop, or, in other words, to allow two inconsistent decrees to emerge out of one and the same litigation.

71. It would have been another matter if the rights of Padmaram in the suit land were separate and divisible in which case the abatement would have occurred only with respect to his share. But that is unquestionably not so. Therefore, the conclusion seems to me to be inevitable that the partial abatement qua Padmaram cannot but result in the abatement of the appeal as a whole even so far as the remaining appellants are concerned, it being impossible to proceed with the appeal in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant Padmaram without producing two inconsistent decrees. I therefore have no alternative but to come to the conclusion that the appeal abates as a whole.

72. An argument which was forcefully advanced on behalf of the appellants at the bar of this Court may be briefly noticed at this juncture. That argument is that it would have been open to each of the appellants to file a separate appeal against the decree of the trial court and in that appeal although all the plaintiffs would have been necessary parties the remaining defendants would be only proper parties and need not have been impleaded as parries to the appeal at all.

73. And it was further forcefully urged that in that case if in the appeal filed by Padmaram he had died and his legal representatives had not been brought on the record within time, it is Padmaram's appeal alone which could have abated and the appeals of the other appellants need not have been affected on account of the abatement of Padmaram's appeal only. The contention is that is good enough ground for the view that the abatement against Padmaram in a case like the present should not possess a larger effect than that it would have if Padmaram had brought a separate appeal and therefore this appeal should be capable of being proceeded with even though Padmaram's appeal had abated.

74. This argument is indeed attractive and seems at first sight plausible to a degree. But on careful consideration I do not think that it should really affect the conclusion at which I have arrived above to the present case. My reasons are these. In the first place, the view that Padmaram alone could file an appeal in such a case without impleading his co-defendants either as appellants or respondents is, to my mind, a highly doubtful view, and, in any case is not a view that should be preferred.

75. If I may say so, with all respect, it is the adoption of the view favouring this kind of procedure which is bound to be productive of a good deal of confusion and unnecessary complications. If the plain view that necessary parties to the suit are as a rule necessary parties to the appeal in the sense that all parties to the suit who are or would in all likelihood be affected by the decree under appeal should be made parties to the appeal, whether as appellants or respondents, is accepted as sound, this would save the courts lot of judicial time and energy in deciding questions relating to abatement which in my experience, some times consume frightfully more time than the decision of an appeal on the merits and for no appreciable advantage whatever.

76. On this view one of the appellants may appeal because he cannot compel the others to join in filing the appeal with him (and this is all O. 41 R. 4 precisely says) but, all the same, there can be nothing in the way of his impleading, as the case may be, the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants as respondents in the appeal. And if this view is accepted as a correct exposition of the meaning and intendment of O. 41 R. 4, then all parties which are to be affected by a decision of the appeal one way or the other must be made parties to the appeal, as respondents, if not, as appellants, and no complication is likely to arise in matters of abatement because all the parties would be parties to the appeal.

77. Again if I may say so, the argument that separate appeals can be filed by the various aggrieved parties in this type of cases is as a matter of practicality, more or less a theoretical possibility, because the filing of separate appeals would involve separate payment of court fees and other incidental expenses, and, may be, separate, counsel's fees by each one of the appellants, and rarely parties would or should be found so foolish as to adopt such a course.

78. Assuming, however, that such appeals may be filed and that in any case the filing of such appeals is permissible, and one of the appellants alone files such an appeal then this hypothetical position cannot in my opinion affect the correct position in a case where all the appellants have joined in filing the appeal and the application of O. 22 in such case cannot possibly be avoided merely on the ground that if the appeals had been filed in another way then the question of abatement could not have arisen.

79. This Court is concerned to decide a case which has arisen on its own facts and not on other facts which might have been but are not. And it seems to me that any opinion I may express on such a hypothetical state of facts would be in the nature of obiter dicta and I would, therefore, leave the matter at that. What I wish to say, however, is that in this case all the appellants had joined in filing the appeal and then one of them had died and his legal representatives had not been brought on the record as prescribed by law.

80. Therefore the application of the relevant provisions of O. 22 cannot legitimately be resisted, and, therefore, the appeal qua Padmaram unquestionably abated. Furthermore, when the doctrine of abatement does come into play and the allowance of the appeal of the surviving defendants is bound to be productive of two mutually contradictory decrees, the appeal of the surviving defendants also cannot but abate or in other words the appeal abates in its entirety. I therefore overrule this contention also.

81. Before concluding this judgment, I may briefly refer to the controversy which arose in this Court at the last stage as to the applicability of Rule-33 of O. 41 in this case. I may mention at once that this ground was not raised by learned counsel in his application for setting aside the abatement or even in his opening address. In these circumstances, the point may be disposed of very briefly. Order 41 R. 33 of the CPC is a very special provision, and can be exercised under exceptional circumstances only and not as a matter of course.

82. Again, broadly speaking, it should not be exercised in cases where a party has been guilty of negligence and an important and valuable right thereby has accrued in favour of the other party. I may also add that no special circumstances have been shown to me why the very extraordinary power embodied in this rule should be exercised in favour of the appellants. Reference may be made in this connection to Chokalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache, AIR 1927 PC 252 and Ramdhari v. Rambharosa*, AIR 1955 Pat 237. No case has, therefore, been made out for giving the appellants the benefit of O. 41 R. 33 of the CPC, and I consider it enough to say that I should leave the matter at that. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal abates as a whole and is dismissed accordingly. The respondents will be entitled to one set of costs from the appellants.

LD/R.G.D

83. Appeal dismissed.