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Sudeepti Sharma Petitioner v. State Of Punjab & Others S

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aug 19, 2013
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a batch of writ petitions filed by candidates who participated in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service (PSJS) recruitment process initiated by a notification dated 02.02.2008 inviting applications to fill 21 posts across categories (General, Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes, Ex-servicemen and Physically Challenged).

The notification included minima and short-listing criteria (including a condition that candidates obtain 40% marks in each paper to be called for viva voce and specified aggregate qualifying marks). After written tests and viva voce, appointments were made: 10 candidates from General category (including one Scheduled Caste candidate), 2 Backward Class candidates and two officers earlier manning Fast Track Courts were absorbed against direct recruit General category posts. No candidate from Scheduled Castes or Physically Challenged category qualified for appointment.

Aggrieved candidates (listed in the order-sheet with their case numbers and categories) challenged the selection and appointment process before the Court. The petitions raised multiple grounds including statutory interpretation of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006, the applicability of Ex-servicemen rules, the validity of the 40% per-paper qualifying condition, de-reservation rules for Physically Challenged posts, absorption of Fast Track Court officers, the effect of termination of an appointed candidate, and the failure to advertise anticipated vacancies.

The Court heard counsel at length, considered the arguments and applicable law and dismissed the writ petitions (see final part of this summary).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 (the Act) provides for reservation for Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service (i.e., whether PSJS is an "establishment" under the Act).
  2. Whether the reservation for Ex-servicemen (as treated in the notification) was legally permissible and, if not, whether the posts reserved for Ex-servicemen should be filled from the respective parent category (General/Backward Classes).
  3. Whether the condition in the notification requiring candidates to secure at least 40% marks in each paper to be called for viva voce (and other minimums) is unlawful because it is not prescribed in the statutory Rules.
  4. Whether a post reserved for Physically Challenged persons can be de-reserved and filled from General category candidates in the circumstances of this recruitment (having regard to Government instructions dated 02.05.1997 and the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995).
  5. Whether officers manning Fast Track Courts could be absorbed against direct recruit cadre posts or require creation of superannuary posts (the scope of the Brij Mohan Lal decisions).
  6. Whether a vacancy created after termination of a selected appointee (Ms. Praveen Bali) can be filled from the waiting list/panel prepared in the earlier selection.
  7. Whether the High Court was obliged to take into account anticipated vacancies in the advertisement and whether failure to do so entitles candidates to appointment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Act contemplates reservation only in the "establishment" meaning the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes, so reservation cannot be applied to PSJS.
  • The reservation for Ex-servicemen purportedly applied in the notification is governed by Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules, 1982 which do not cover PSJS; therefore the two posts reserved for Ex-servicemen should be filled from General category candidates on merit.
  • Certain petitioners were disqualified from interview for not securing 40% in each paper by a narrow margin; they should be permitted viva voce by relaxation or grace marks and some sought re-evaluation of answer-sheets.
  • The 40% per-paper eligibility to appear in viva voce is not a condition found in the Rules and therefore the advertisement-imposed condition is unenforceable.
  • A post reserved for Physically Handicapped should be de-reserved to General category if no handicapped candidate qualifies; further, Government instructions dated 02.05.1997 about carrying forward reservations were asserted but petitioners claimed de-reservation was appropriate in the circumstances.
  • Based on Brij Mohan Lal precedents, officers manning Fast Track Courts cannot be absorbed against cadre posts (they should be absorbed via superannuary posts), so two posts filled by such officers should not have been used against direct recruit General category vacancies.
  • Termination of the services of Ms. Praveen Bali (appointed earlier against a General category post) created a vacancy which petitioners in the waiting list should have a right to fill on the basis of the earlier merit list.
  • The High Court failed to account for anticipated vacancies in the advertisement for 21 posts and, had it done so, additional General category candidates could have been appointed; the calculation of vacancies was thus irregular (relying on Malik Mazhar Sultan).

Respondents' (State/High Court) Arguments

  • The definition of "State Government" in Section 2(h) of the Act is contextual and indicates the department responsible for implementing the Act, not that reservation is limited to that single department. Section 2(c)'s definition of "establishment" is wide and includes PSJS; Sections 4 and 7 make reservations mandatory and prohibit de-reservation generally.
  • The horizontal reservation for Ex-servicemen in PSJS was not legally permissible under the Ex-servicemen Rules; once that reservation is impermissible, the posts were properly filled from the categories for which those posts were meant (General and Backward Classes respectively).
  • The 40% per-paper condition was part of the notification and known to candidates; it is not inconsistent with the Rules, and executive instructions/supplemental conditions filling gaps in Rules are permissible where Rules are silent. Petitioners are estopped from challenging the condition after participating in the selection process.
  • With respect to Physically Handicapped posts, instructions dated 02.05.1997 envisage carry-forward for up to three recruitment years, and the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 requires 3% reservation and carry-forward of unfilled vacancies; nevertheless the decision to de-reserve is an enabling administrative discretion and the petitioners have no right to compel conversion of a reserved post into General category.
  • The Brij Mohan Lal-II judgment requires absorption of Fast Track Court officers into the regular cadre by a prescribed written test and interview and, if posts are not available, the State is to create additional posts; thus officers were properly absorbed against direct recruit posts in the manner mandated by Brij Mohan Lal-II and related decisions (and analogous absorption in Haryana was judicially upheld and affirmed by the Supreme Court).
  • The termination of Ms. Praveen Bali does not revive a right in the earlier waiting list; once a candidate appointed to the advertised vacancy joins, the selection process as to that vacancy is exhausted and subsequent vacancies must be filled in a later recruitment process (relying on Raghbir Chand Sharma, Rakhi Ray and related authority).
  • Rule-making and employer discretion permit advertising anticipated vacancies but candidates derive no vested right from the failure to advertise anticipated vacancies; the employer's decision on how many seats to fill is final (relying on earlier decisions including those cited by the Court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 2096 (Brij Mohan Lal-I) Authority concerning officers manning Fast Track Courts and their absorption. Referenced among Brij Mohan Lal decisions; used with Brij Mohal Lal-II to address absorption of FTC officers into regular cadre.
Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 502 (Brij Mohal Lal-II) Procedure for absorption of FTC Judges into regular cadre (written test, interview, marks, creation of posts if necessary). Applied to validate absorption of officers manning Fast Track Courts against direct recruit General category posts and to permit creation of posts if required.
Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703 Authority referenced concerning anticipated vacancies and how advertisement should consider them. Cited by petitioners to challenge vacancy calculation; Court addressed and rejected petitioners' reliance on it in the circumstances.
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 Principle that statutory definitions are to be read in context and are subject to the qualifying phrase "unless the context otherwise requires". Applied to interpret the definitions in the Act (Section 2) so as to read "State Government" and "establishment" contextually and widely, supporting reservation applicability to PSJS.
Vanguard Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fraser Ross, AIR 1960 SC 971 Support for reading definitions in context (cited within Whirlpool discussion). Used as part of reasoning that definitions may vary in different sections depending on subject/context when construing the Act.
Gurleen Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2009) 3 RCR (Civil) 324 (Full Bench) Principle of estoppel: candidates cannot challenge a precondition shown in prospectus after participating and failing selection. Applied by the Court to support that petitioners who participated knowing the 40% condition are estopped from challenging it after result.
Madan Lal v. State of J & K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 Authority for the proposition that candidates who took part in process cannot later challenge the selection when results are unfavorable. Relied upon to support estoppel principle against petitioners challenging the notification condition after participating.
Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 Supp SCC 285; AIR 1986 SC 1043 Proposition that candidates who participate without protest cannot later challenge the process if unsuccessful. Cited in support of estoppel and refusal to entertain challenge to notified condition post selection.
Dr. R. Murali v. Dr. R. Kamalakkannan, 2000 (2) SCT 371 (Full Bench, Madras HC) Estoppel in relation to candidates applying under a prospectus/quota and later challenging the conditions. Used as authority confirming court's approach that petitioners who applied with knowledge of condition cannot later contest it.
Dinesh Kumar v. Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, (1986) 3 SCC 727 Cases addressing challenge to selection processes after participation. Referenced in support of estoppel theme applied to petitioners.
Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594; AIR 1992 SC 1 Authorities concerning acceptance of selection process and estoppel-related principles. Relied upon where relevant to preclusion of post-facto challenges by candidates who participated.
Ritesh R. Sah v. Y.L. Yamul, (1996) 3 SCC 253; AIR 1996 SC 1378 Authority cited among selection/estoppel jurisprudence. Referred to as part of the body of precedent denying relief to after-the-event challengers.
Union of India v. N. Chanderasekaran, (1998) 3 SCC 694 Part of cited precedents dealing with selection/process principles. Cited in the panel of authorities supporting the Court's estoppel analysis.
Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 (4) SCT 133 (SC) Cited in the sequence of selection/estoppel authorities. Included among authorities confirming non-entitlement to challenge selection after participation.
Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 Principle that executive instructions can supplement statutory rules when the rules are silent, provided instructions are not inconsistent with statutory provisions. Applied to hold that the notification's qualification (40% per paper) can supplement the Rules because the Rules do not prescribe qualifying marks for viva voce; therefore the notification condition was valid.
District Registrar v. M.B. Koyakutty, (1979) 2 SCC 150 Executive instructions may fill gaps in statutory rules but must be subservient to statutory provisions. Relied upon to support validity of administrative supplementation of Rules where not inconsistent.
State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma, (2002) 1 SCC 113 Panel ceases to exist after appointment and joining; subsequent resignation or later vacancy does not entitle waiting list candidates to appointment. Applied to reject petitioners' claim based on termination of Ms. Praveen Bali; Court held the select list was exhausted when she joined.
Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 2 SCC 637 Appointments beyond the number of vacancies advertised are without jurisdiction; waiting list cannot be used to fill vacancies arising after advertisement. Applied to hold that subsequent vacancies arising after the advertised process cannot be filled from the earlier waiting list.
Abhishek Goyal v. State of Haryana, LPA No.1903 of 2011 (09.01.2012) Illustrates exhaustion of select list and effect of appointments beyond advertised vacancies. Referred to support the proposition that resignation/termination after joining does not entitle waiting-list candidates to appointment.
Keshav Kaushik v. State of Haryana (CWP No. 9157 of 2008) and Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik, (2013) 5 SCC 277 Judicial treatment upholding absorption of FTC officers in Haryana and Supreme Court dismissal of appeals. Used to corroborate that officers were absorbed in a similar common process in Punjab and Haryana and that such absorption was judicially sustained.
Mayank Khosla v. State of Punjab, CWP No.14467 of 2011 (28.03.2012) Addresses anticipated vacancies and Rule 8; employer's discretion in advertising anticipated vacancies does not create enforceable rights for candidates. Relied on to reject petitioners' contention that failure to advertize anticipated vacancies conferred a right to appointment.
State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220; S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479; State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, (2008) 1 SCC 456 Authorities cited concerning anticipated vacancies and the employer's prerogative in advertising/filling vacancies. Collectedly cited to support conclusion that non-advertisement of anticipated vacancies does not give candidates a legal right to appointment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of discrete steps, each tied to statutory language and precedent cited in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of "State" and "establishment": The Court invoked Article 12 and the Act's definitions (Section 2). It held that "State" for constitutional purposes includes the Government of Punjab and its departments. Section 2(c)'s definition of "establishment" is broad and intended to include offices of the State Government, local authorities, statutory authorities, boards and corporations — thus encompassing the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The contextual definition in Section 2(h) (defining "State Government" as the Government in the Department of Welfare of SC/BC) was held to be contextual and limited to the purposes of Section 5 (notification of backward classes) rather than a restriction limiting reservation to that single department.
  2. Statutory reading and contextual construction: The Court relied on the principle (from Whirlpool and related authorities) that statutory definitions must be read in context ("unless context otherwise requires") and that definitions may vary by subject-matter. Applying that methodology, the Court rejected the petitioners' narrow reading that would confine reservation only to the Department of Welfare.
  3. Effect of Sections 4, 7 and 13 of the Act: Section 4 makes reservation mandatory in all establishments; Section 7 prohibits de-reservation of reserved vacancies (subject to the Act's scheme). Section 13 provides that the Act shall prevail notwithstanding other laws or court decisions. Taken together, these provisions were used to reinforce that reservation under the Act applies across establishments and cannot be read down to a single department.
  4. Reservation for Ex-servicemen: The Court found that reservation for Ex-servicemen in PSJS was not provided for under the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules, 1982, so that horizontal reservation in the notification for Ex-servicemen was legally impermissible. Once that reservation was impermissible, the Court held that the posts were appropriately filled from the parent categories (General and Backward Classes) for which those posts were intended.
  5. Validity of the 40% per-paper condition and estoppel: The Court held that although the Punjab Superior Judicial Services Rules do not prescribe qualifying marks for viva voce, executive instructions or advertisement conditions can supplement gaps in Rules so long as they are not inconsistent (cited Sant Ram Sharma and M.B. Koyakutty). Because the 40% per-paper condition was published in the notification and known to candidates who participated, the Court applied established estoppel principles (authorities like Gurleen Kaur, Madan Lal and others) and refused to permit challenge to the condition after the process concluded.
  6. Physically Handicapped reservation and de-reservation: The Court observed that while the notification provided for filling a Physically Challenged post from General category if no suitable handicapped candidate was found, that clause conflicted with Government instructions dated 02.05.1997 (carry forward for up to three recruitment years) and the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 (3% reservation and carry-forward). Nevertheless the Court held that the decision to de-reserve is an enabling administrative decision and a candidate has no right to compel conversion of a reserved post to General category; a competent authority may choose not to fill a reserved post in a given recruitment year and carry forward the reservation.
  7. Absorption of Fast Track Court officers: The Court applied Brij Mohal Lal-II and related jurisprudence to hold that officers manning Fast Track Courts must be considered for absorption into the regular cadre by the process (written exam and interview) prescribed by Brij Mohal Lal-II; if regular posts are unavailable, the State must create additional posts. Accordingly, the absorption of Fast Track officers against direct recruit posts in this process was held to be in conformity with Brij Mohal Lal-II and related decisions, and prior judicial treatment (including in Haryana) was noted.
  8. Effect of termination of a previously-appointed candidate (Praveen Bali): Applying Raghbir Chand Sharma and Rakhi Ray, the Court held that once an advertised vacancy is filled and the appointee joins, the select panel in respect of that vacancy is exhausted. Subsequent resignation or termination of the appointee does not revive rights for waiting-list candidates to claim appointment from the earlier panel; the resultant vacancy must be filled in a future recruitment.
  9. Anticipated vacancies and Rule 8: The Court reiterated precedent that advertising "anticipated vacancies" does not confer an enforceable right on candidates if such anticipated vacancies are not advertised or later arise; the employer's decision about the number of seats to fill is determinative. Reliance was placed on Mayank Khosla and other authorities to reject the petitioners' contention that failure to consider anticipated vacancies created a right to appointment.
  10. Conclusion from analysis: Considering statutory text, context, executive supplementation where permissible, and the body of precedent regarding estoppel, panels and absorption of FTC officers, the Court found no merit in the writ petitions and dismissed them.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

All writ petitions are dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The Court held that the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 applies to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service; reservation could be and was applied in that establishment.
  • Two posts that were reserved horizontally for Ex-servicemen (which reservation was not legally permissible) were correctly filled from the parent categories (General and Backward Classes) as appropriate.
  • The qualifying condition in the advertisement (including 40% per paper to be called for viva voce) was valid as a permissible supplementation of the Rules and petitioners who participated are estopped from challenging it after failing to qualify.
  • The vacancy resulting from termination of an appointed candidate (Ms. Praveen Bali) does not entitle waiting-list petitioners to appointment from the earlier select list; such vacancies must be dealt with in subsequent recruitment.
  • The Court upheld the absorption process for Fast Track Court officers as conforming to Brij Mohal Lal-II (including the principle that additional posts may be created if regular cadre posts are unavailable).
  • The petitioners have no enforceable right arising from alleged non-inclusion of anticipated vacancies in the advertisement; the employer's decision on vacancies is conclusive in that respect.

Broader precedent setting: The Court applied and explained existing statutory interpretation principles and a body of precedents (as cited above) but did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; the decision resolves the parties' disputes by applying established doctrine to the facts of this recruitment.

This HTML summary was prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or legal citations beyond those present in the opinion were invented or inferred.

Show all summary ...

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

This order shall dispose of afore-mentioned writ petition along with other writ petitions, as mentioned in the foot note of this order, preferred by the candidates, who appeared in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service examination process set in motion vide notification dated 02.02.2008 (Annexure P-1).

The above said notification was published by this Court inviting applications for filling up 21 posts i.e 10 from General category; 6 from Scheduled Castes category; 2 from Backward Classes category; 2 posts from Ex-servicemen category (one each from General and Backward Class) & 1 from Physically Challenged category having locomotive or orthopedic disability, for appointment of Punjab Superior Judicial Service by direct recruitment through competitive examination under Rule 7(3)(c) of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 2007 (for short “the Rules”). There was relaxation in age contemplated for Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes as well as Physically Challenged persons. For deciding the present set of writ petitions, the relevant Clauses from the Notification read as under:

“4. The candidates belong to physically challenged category will cover the candidates, who are suffering from locomotor disability and orthopaedic disability. They will be eligible to apply, but their candidature would be provisional. The successful physically challenged candidates will be subjected to medical examination by the Medical Board appointed by the High Court, in order to see if they are medically fit to perform the duties of District Judge or not. If no candidate is found suitable or medically fit under this category, the post shall be reverted to the General category candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

9. No candidate will be called for the viva voce unless he/she obtains 40% marks in each paper and 50% marks (45% for the SC/BC category candidates, instead of 50%) in the aggregate. Further, no candidate will be considered to have successfully qualified the Punjab Superior Judicial Services Examination unless he/she obtains 50% marks (45% marks for the SC/BC category candidates) in the aggregate out of the total marks fixed for the written examination and viva voce. It is made clear that merely having obtaining 50% marks (read 45% for the SC/BC category candidates) in the written examination will not confer a right on a candidate to be called for the viva voce and the High Court may short list the candidates equal to 3 times the number of vacancies to be called for the viva voce. It is also made clear that no candidate will get the right to be appointed even if he/she Kumar Vima l19-08-2013 13:48:27 obtains 50% marks (45% marks for the SC/BC category candidates) in the aggregate of the written examination and viva voce. However, candidates will be appointed strictly in the order of merit (category wise) in which they are placed after the result of written examination and viva voce.”

In pursuance of such notification, some of the petitioners were called for interview in view of the satisfaction of the condition of obtaining 40% marks in each paper and 50% marks in aggregate, which was 45% for the SC/BC category candidates. After considering the marks obtained and in terms of the conditions in the advertisement, 10 candidates from General category including 1 candidate from Scheduled Castes category, who has obtained more marks than the last candidate from the General category candidates, were appointed and 2 candidates from Backward Classes were appointed. However, none from the Scheduled Castes category or Physically Challenged category could qualify for appointment. Aggrieved against non-appointment of the petitioners, the following writ petitions were filed:

Sr.

No.

Case No. Petitioner Category Merit No.

1. CWP No. 1999 of 2009 Gurmeet Pal General 10

2. CWP No. 2246 of 2009 Anuradha General 11

3. CWP No. 21249 of 2008 Kadambini General 12

4. CWP No. 4339 of 2010 Preeti General 14

5. CWP No. 3769 of 2009 Parmod Kumar General 15

6. CWP No. 12437 of 2009 Balkaran Singh General 16

7. CWP No. 2373 of 2009 Munish Kumar General 17

8. CWP No. 20729 of 2008 Sudeepti Sharma General 18

9. CWP No. 4180 of 2009 Dharaminder Singh General 20

10. CWP No. 1568 of 2009 Jaswant Rai General 24

11. CWP No. 21410 of 2008 Vishal Sharma &

another

General Not called for

interview

12. CWP No. 19033 of 2008 Narinder Chhibba Handicap

Candidate

Not qualified

for interview

13. CWP No. 21065 of 2008 Sukhwinderjit Singh Backward Not qualified

Class for interview

Candidate

14. CWP No. 6441 of 2009 Balvinder Kaur Scheduled Not qualified

Dhaliwal Caste for interview

Candidate

The challenge in the present writ petitions is on the following grounds:

(1) That the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes has been done in terms of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006. Such Act provides for reservation in the ‘establishment’, which has been defined to mean any office of the State Government etc., whereas the ‘State Government’ has been defined to mean Government of the State of Punjab in the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. It is, thus, contended that the reservation could be made only in the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes and not in any other Department of the State Government. The relevant provisions of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 read as under:

“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -

xx xx

(c) “establishment” means any office of the State Government, a local authority or a statutory authority constituted under any State Law for the time being in force, or a Board or Corporation in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up share of capital is held by the Government of the State of Punjab and includes University or colleges affiliated to the University, primary and secondary schools and other education institutions, which are owned by the State Government and also includes an establishment in public sector;

xx xx

(h) “State Government” means Government of the State of Punjab in the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes.

xxx xxx xxx

4. (1) While making appointments in services by any of the methods, provided under any Service Rules, reservation shall be made for the members off the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes in the services under all the establishments.

(2) The percentage of reservation for filling up the vacancies by direct recruitment or by transfer in Group ‘A’, Group ‘B’, Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ services, shall be twenty five per cent for Scheduled Castes and twelve per cent for Backward Classes.

xxx xxx xxx

5. (1) A candidate, who claims to be a member of Scheduled Castes, shall support his candidature as such by a certificate of caste identification, issued under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 notified by the President of India for the State of Punjab.

(2) A candidate, who claims to be a member of Backward Classes, shall support his candidature as such by a certificate of class identification as per the notification, issued by the State Government in this regard from time to time.

xxx xxx xxx

7. (1) There shall be no de-reservation of any reserved vacancy by any appointing authority in any establishment, which is to be filled up by direct recruitment or by promotion. In case, a qualified or eligible Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes candidate, as the case may be, is not available to fill up such vacancy, in that situation, such vacancy shall remain unfilled.

xxx xxx xxx

13. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any judgment, decree, order or decision of any court or any authority, the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall have effect.”

2. That the reservation for the Ex-servicemen is contemplated under the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules, 1982. It is contented that such Rules apply to all civil services except the Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat Service and the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. Thus, it is the stand of the petitioners that two posts reserved for Ex-servicemen could not be reserved for them and are required to be filled up from amongst the General category candidates on the basis of merit.

3. It is argued that some of the petitioners have been declared ineligible for the reason that they have not obtained 40% marks in the written examination to be eligible for interview. It is argued that they have missed the cut-off mark limit with nominal marks, thus the petitioners should be called for viva voce either by relaxation of such condition or by giving grace marks. Some of the petitioners have sought re-evaluation of the answer-sheets as well.

4. It is also contended that obtaining of such marks to become eligible for appearing in the viva voce is not a condition in the Rules. Therefore, such condition in the advertisement which is not based upon statutory Rules is not enforceable in law.

5. It is also argued that since no candidate from Physically Handicapped category has qualified, the post reserved for the Physically Handicapped category should in terms of the conditions of the advertisement be filled up from amongst the General category candidate. It is also argued that even if the instructions of Punjab Government dated 02.05.1997 providing that the post reserved for Physically Handicapped persons can be de-reserved only after three subsequent advertisements, but such clause cannot be enforced as there is no assertion on behalf of the respondents that three advertisements have not been issued and, thus, the condition of de-reservation of the vacancy in the advertisement cannot be said to be illegal. At this stage, condition No. 7 of the Instructions dated 02.05.1997 needs to be extracted. The same is as under:

“7. If a vacancy reserved for the handicapped persons is not filled, the reservation shall be carried over for a period of upto three recruitment years. Any recruitment of the physically handicapped candidates will first be counted against the additional quota brought from previous years if any, in their chronological order. If such candidates are not available for all the vacancies, the other vacancies carried forwarded should be filled first and the comparatively later vacancies carried forward.”

6. It is also argued that in terms of the Supreme Court judgments in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of IndiaAIR 2002 SC 2096 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Brij Mohal Lal-I’) and Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India(2012) 6 SCC 502 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Brij Mohal Lal-II’), the officers manning the Fast Track Courts have to be absorbed by creating superannuary posts and cannot be absorbed against the cadre posts. Therefore, the two posts of General category granted to the Officers earlier manning the Fast Track Courts are not sustainable in law and such posts are required to be filled up on the basis of merit prepared.

7. Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram has raised another argument that the services of Ms. Praveen Bali, a Scheduled Castes candidate, appointed against the General category post, have been terminated during probation period, therefore, the vacancy so caused is required to be filled up from amongst the General category candidates on the basis of merit in the waiting list.

8. It is also argued that in terms of Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P Public Service Commission(2008) 17 SCC 703, while issuing the advertisement for filling up 21 posts of Punjab Superior Judicial Services, the High Court was not taken into consideration the anticipated vacancies. Had the anticipated vacancies taken into consideration, the General category candidates could have been appointed against such vacancies. Therefore, the action of the respondents in calculating the number of vacancies is irregular and has cause injustice to the petitioners.

In reply, on behalf of the respondents, it is submitted that the expression ‘State Government’ in Section 2(h) of the Act is contextual definition and that it refers to the department made responsible to implement the provisions of the Act. Section 5 of the Act empowers the State Government to issue notification in respect of the candidates from the backward class. The State Government as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act refers to the such powers of the State Government and not the mandate of the Statute to reserve posts in all departments of the State Governments, Local Authority; or any Statutory Authority constituted under any State law; Board and Corporations in which State has control. The reservations are mandatory in all establishments in terms of Section 4 of the Act, whereas, the de-reservation is again prohibited in all establishments in terms of Section 7 of the Act.

It is pointed out that the horizontal reservation for Ex-servicemen i.e one for General category and one for Backward Classes category was legally not permissible in terms of the Rules, therefore, two posts reserved for Ex-servicemen were ordered to be filled up from amongst one General category and one Backward Class candidates for which such posts were reserved from amongst the ex-servicemen category.

It is argued that the condition in the notification that a candidate should obtain 40% marks in each subject before, one is called for viva-voce or 45% marks, apart from condition of obtaining aggregate marks, to be eligible before appointment is a condition not contrary to the Rules. It is condition to ensure that only meritorious candidates alone are appointed to the post. Still further, the Petitioners participated in the selection process knowing fully well such condition; therefore they are estopped to challenge such condition at this stage. It is argued that the condition is the Rules of obtaining minimum marks cannot be relaxed or grace marks cannot be granted more so in competitive examinations. The relevant extract from the Rules read as under:

“7. Method of appointment -xx xx

(2) The direct appointment to the Service shall be made by the Governor on the recommendations of the High Court from amongst the eligible advocates on the basis of the written test and viva-voce conducted by the High Court.

xx xx xx”

“11. Test for direct appointment - (1) The High Court shall, before making recommendations to the Governor, invite applications by advertisement and may required the applicants to give such particulars as it may prescribe and may further hold written examination test and viva-voce for appointment under rule 7, in the following manner, namely:-

(i) Written Test 750 marks; and (ii) Viva-Voce 250 marks.”

It is contended, relying upon the averments made in CWP No. 19033 of 2008, that in terms of Government's instructions dated 02.05.1997, if a vacancy reserved for Physically Handicapped category is not filled up, the reservation shall be carried over for a period up to 3 recruitment years. It is averred that vacancy in the Physically Handicapped category was, in fact, not converted into General category. It is also contended that conversion of post meant for Physically Handicapped category to General category is an enabling provision and is not mandatory. Therefore, even if there is no specific assertion that the Physically Handicapped category was filled or not filled in for the last three recruitment years, it will not confer any right to the petitioners to seek filling up of such post from amongst the General category candidates. Since none qualified in the categories of Scheduled Castes or a Physically Handicapped, such posts were carry forward for the next selection process.

The candidates from the General category including Ms. Praveen Bali, a Scheduled Caste candidate, who secured more marks than the last General category candidate, were appointed against 10 advertised vacancies meant for General Category. The additional vacancies thus available on account of improper reservation for Ex-servicemen, was utilized for absorbing one Officer, who was manning Fast Track Court. Another General category vacancy became available due to elevation of one member of the Superior Judicial Service as Judge of this Court. Such vacancy was utilized by appointing another Officer, who was manning Fast Track Court. It is, thus, contended that 10 General category candidates on the basis of merit have been appointed as Members of the Punjab Superior Judicial Services, two Backward Classes candidates and two Officers against the direct recruit General category posts have been absorbed, who were earlier manning Fast Track Courts. It is argued that the judgments in Brij Mohan Lal cases (supra) mandate the consideration of officers appointed to man Fast Track Courts for regular appointment. Such officers can be absorbed against direct recruitment posts alone. The petitioners have no right to seek appointment against any post. The decision to fill post has to be of the employer in accordance with Rules.

It is argued that post falling vacant after termination of Ms. Praveen Bali cannot be filled up on the basis of merit prepared as such post was occupied with her appointment. The termination after almost two years of her appointment does not confer any right on the Petitioners to seek appointment against such vacancy.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and with their assistance gone through the judgments referred to by them. The primary issue, which is common in all the writ petitions, is whether the Act provides for reservation for Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service being an establishment of the State Government.

Article 1(2) of the Constitution provides that the States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule. In the First Schedule, Punjab is one of the States. As per Article 12 of the Constitution, the expression ‘State’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. Therefore, the ‘State’, which is recognized for the purposes of Constitution, is State of Punjab, which includes its numerous Departments. Section 2 of the Act states that unless the context otherwise requires, the definitions of the expressions as mentioned therein shall be as given in the said section. Section 2(c) of the Act defines ‘establishment’ to mean any office of the State Government, Local Authority; or any Statutory Authority constituted under any State law; Board and Corporations in which State has control. It does not refer to one single office. It even includes Boards and Corporations over which, the State has control. The definition of the establishment is in widest possible so as to include all departments, including Boards, Corporations and the Authorities created under a Statue. It does not state that the reservation shall be only in the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. The contextual interpretation of clause (c) would include all offices of the State Government, which will include the Punjab Superior Judicial Services as well.

Section 2(h) defining ‘State Government’ to mean Government of the State of Punjab in the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes, is in the context of Section 5 of the Act in respect of the notifying Backward Classes. The reservations are mandatory in all establishments in terms of Section 4 of the Act, whereas, the de-reservation is again prohibited in all establishments in terms of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, the definition of ‘State Government’ in Section 2(h) cannot be read as part of Section 2(c) of the Act defining ‘establishment’. It is the duty of Court to construe a statute in a manner so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner(s) is absurd leads to illogical results and cannot be accepted. Reservation cannot be and is not meant to be only in the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. Therefore, we are unable to accept the argument raised. In fact the similar provisions of the Constitution; the Central and State Statues has examined in few cases. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai(1998) 8 SCC 1, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“28. Now, the principle is that all statutory definitions have to be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses Kumar Vima l19-08-2013 13:48:27 which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words, similar to the words used in the present case, namely “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. Thus there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word had been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. In view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words “under those circumstances”. (see Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fraser RossAIR 1960 SC 971)

xxx xxx xxx

30. Since “Tribunal” is defined in Section 2 which, in its opening part, uses the phrase “Unless the context otherwise requires”, the definition, obviously, cannot be read in isolation. The phrase “Unless the context otherwise requires” is meant to prevent a person from falling into the whirlpool of “definitions” and not to look to other provisions of the Act which, necessarily, has to be done as the meaning ascribed to a “definition” can be adopted only if the context does not otherwise require.”

Therefore, we find that the expression “State Government” appearing in Section 2(c) and Section 2(h) of the Act, is required to be interpreted keeping in view the object of each of such clauses and in the context in which such expressions are used. Therefore, the reservation is not limited to one Department of the State Government.

There is another angle to examine the argument raised. Section 13 of the Act contemplates that the provisions of this Act or Rules made there under shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any judgment, decree, order or decision of any Court or any authority. If the argument of the petitioners is to be accepted then the reservation under the Act is contemplated only for the Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. Therefore, the reservations provided by the State Government in exercise of its executive power would stand in respect of all other departments. Thus, even in the absence of the Act, the reservations of the posts are contemplated under the circulars issued. In view thereof, we cannot accept the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the reservation is only contemplated in Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. In fact, Department of Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes is the relevant department of the State Government for implementing the provisions of the Act and not for the purposes of the reservation.

The reservation for the Ex-servicemen in the Superior Judicial Services is not provided in the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules, 1982. Therefore, the reservation for Ex-servicemen in the service, in question, is not legally permissible. Even after such illegal reservation, we need to examine, as to whether, the action of the respondents to fill up posts from amongst the General Category and the backward Category is proper. The reservation for ex-servicemen was horizontal; one post each reserved for general category and backward class. Once, the reservation for ex-servicemen was not contemplated or is illegal, the posts are required to be filled up from amongst the category for which such posts were meant from even amongst the ex-servicemen. Therefore, such posts were rightly filled up from amongst the General Category and Backward Class candidates.

The argument that condition of obtaining 40% marks to appear in the viva voce is excessive for the reserved categories such as Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes and Physically Challenged is devoid of any merit. The condition of obtaining 40% marks in the written examination has been applied to all categories and was known to all the petitioners, who appeared in the written examination. They had not disputed such condition before appearing in the written examination. They have taken a chance and having failed to qualify, have sought to dispute such condition. The petitioners are estopped to challenge such condition by way of the writ petitions after the declaration of the result.

Still further, the petitioners were aware of such condition in the advertisement, but have appeared in the selection process. Having remained unsuccessful, the petitioners are estopped to challenge such condition. Reference may be made to Full Bench judgment of this Court reported as Gurleen Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2009) 3 RCR (Civil) 324, wherein it was observed as under:

“207. ….Since the aforesaid precondition for eligibility was depicted in the prospectus itself, and since all the petitioners applied for admission under the Sikh minority community quota, without raising any contest or protest against the aforesaid precondition, they cannot now be allowed to contest the validity of the same when the entire process of selection is over, after their claim has been rejected on the ground, that they do not fulfil the aforesaid precondition. This contention was advanced during the course of hearing, by Shri Chetan Mittal, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, who inter-alia relied on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Madan Lal v. State of J & K, 1995 (2) SCT 880: (1995) 3 SCC 486, wherein the Apex Court held as under:-

“Before dealing with this contention, we must keep in view the salient fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting successful candidates being concerned respondents herein, were all found eligible in the light of marks obtained in the written test, to be eligible to be called for oral interview. Upto this stage there is no dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the concerned Members of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the Kumar Vima l19-08-2013 13:48:27 concerned contesting respondents. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, that they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 Supp SCC 285: AIR 1986 SC 1043, it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner.

208. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Dr. R. Murali v. Dr. R. Kamalakkannan, 2000 (2) SCT 371, wherein the question posed in paragraph 36, was to the following effect:-

“36. Learned counsel Mr. C. Selvaraj submitted that fixation of quota is in the nature of concession and writ petitioners have with open eyes applied for admission on the basis of prospectus and also have written examination are incompetent to challenge that policy, once they were not selected. Counsel submitted that principle of estoppel bars writ petitioners from challenging the same.”

209. After referring to various judgments of the Apex Court, including Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 228: AIR 1970 SC 35, State of U.P v. Pradip Tandon, (1975) 1 SCC 267 : AIR 1975 SC 563, Om Parkash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 Supp SCC 285, Dinesh Kumar v. Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad, (1986) 3 SCC 727 : AIR 1986 SC 1877, Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, 1992 (1) SCT 546 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : AIR 1992 SC 1, Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of Madhya, 1994 (4) SCT 133 (SC), Ritesh R. Sah v. Y.L Yamul, 1996 (2) SCT 524.(1996) 3 SCC 253 : AIR 1996 SC 1378, Union of India v. N. Chanderasekaran, 1998 (1) SCT 631 : (1998) 3 SCC 694, the Full Bench in paragraph 55 answered the question by holding that the “writ petitioners are not entitled to challenge the selection process after having participated in the written examination on the principle of estoppel.” Reliance was also placed on a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Yoginder Singh Yadav v. State of Haryana, 2002 (2) SCT 281, wherein it was, inter-alia, held as under:-

“In the circumstances, the petitioners appear to have raised grievance to assail the result of the entrance test only when they did not find the result favourable to them. It is well settled that a candidate who has submitted to the selection process and has participated and was considered cannot challenge the same if subsequently the result of the selection is not favourable to him. It has been so held in the decision of the Supreme Court inMadan Lal v. State of J & K, (1995) 3 SCC 486: AIR 1995 SC 1088Mohan Lal Aggarwal v. Bhubaneswari Prasad Mishra, JT 2001 (9) SC 21.

210. We are in agreement with the view expressed by Shri Chetan Mittal, Advocate. We are satisfied that it is not open to the petitioners to raise the instant issue at this stage, as they acquiesced to the precondition for eligibility under the Sikh minority community quota. It does not lie now in their mouth to raise a challenge thereto, having been found unsuccessful.”

We do not find any merit in the fourth argument that the condition of eligibility to appear in the viva voce is not part of the Rules, therefore, the advertisement stipulating such condition is illegal. The Punjab Superior Judicial Services Rules do not contemplate the qualifying marks to be eligible to appear in the vivo voce. The Rules can be supplemented by executive instructions. The law prohibits supplanting of the Rules by executive instructions. Reference may be made to Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910, where the Constitutional Bench held to the following effect:

“7. We proceed to consider the next contention of Mr N.C Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed”.

Later, in a judgment reported as District Registrar v. M.B Koyakutty, (1979) 2 SCC 150, the Court held to the following effect:

“22. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that if the statutory rules framed by the Governor or any law enacted by the State Legislature under Article 309 is silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up that gap and supplement the rule by issuing administrative instructions not inconsistent with the statutory provisions already framed or enacted. The Executive instructions in order to be valid must run subservient to the statutory provisions. In the instant case, however, it could not be said that there was a gap or a void in the statutory provisions in the matter of promotion from the cadre of Lower Division Clerks to that of Upper Division Clerks.”

In view of the settled legal principles, the condition in the advertisement, which is not contrary to the Rules, cannot be said to be illegal and un-enforceable.

In respect of next argument, though the notification Annuexre P-1 contains a clause that if no candidate from Handicapped Challenged category is found suitable, the post shall be filled up from amongst the General category, but such clause is contrary to the instructions dated 02.05.1997, which contemplate that the post reserved for Physically Challenged category can be de-reserved only after three recruitment years. In fact, 3% of the posts are required to be reserved for Physically Challenged person as provided under Section 3 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Section 36 of the said Act provides that the unfilled vacancies shall be carried forward in the manner prescribed. Since the reservation for Physically Challenged person is to give effect to a Statute, the same could not be de-reserved only because in that particular recruitment year, no candidate from the Physically Challenged category was available. Though there is no categorical assertion that this was not the last of the three recruitment years to fill up the vacancies meant for Physically Challenged category, but the fact remains that there is not right to the petitioners to claim de-reservation of the vacancies. Even if, no candidate from Physically Challenged category is available, a competent authority is well within its jurisdiction not to fill up the said post from amongst the General category candidate. The de-reservation of the vacancy is enable provision on which the employer is required to take decision. A candidate has no right to seek conversion of a post of reserved category to a General category. The posts advertised for General category having been filled, the petitioners cannot claim that a post reserved for Physically Challenged category should be de-reserved and also given to a General category candidate.

The next argument that two posts of General category (one on account of wrong reservation for Ex-servicemen General category candidate and another on account of vacancy caused by the elevation of one of the Members of Superior Judicial Services as Judge of this Court) could not have been granted to the Officers manning Fast Track Courts is again without any merit. In Brij Mohal Lal-II case (supra), there is no direction that the State Government shall create superannuary posts. The direction was to absorb them in the regular cadre. It was held to the following effect:

“207.9 All the persons who have been appointed by way of direct recruitment from the Bar as Judges to preside over FTCs under the FTC Scheme shall be entitled to be appointed to the regular cadre of the Higher Judicial Services of the respective States only in the following manner:

(a) The direct recruits to FTCs who opt for regularisation shall take a written examination to be conducted by the High Courts of the respective States for determining their suitability for absorption in the regular cadre of Additional District Judges.

(b) Thereafter, they shall be subjected to an interview by a Selection Committee consisting of the Chief Justice and four senior most Judges of that High Court.

(c) There shall be 150 marks for the written examination and 100 marks for the interview. The qualifying marks shall be 40% aggregate for general candidates and 35% for SC/ST/OBC candidates. The examination and interview shall be held in accordance with the relevant Rules enacted by the States for direct appointment to Higher Judicial Services.

(d) Each of the appointees shall be entitled to one mark per year of service in the FTCs, which shall form part of the interview marks.

(e) Needless to point out that this examination and interview should be conducted by the respective High Courts keeping in mind that all these applicants have put in a number of years as FTC Judges and have served the country by administering justice in accordance with law. The written examination and interview module, should, thus, be framed keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases.

(f) The candidates who qualify the written examination and obtain consolidated percentage as afore indicated shall be appointed to the post of Additional District Judge in the regular cadre of the State.

(g) If, for any reason, vacancies are not available in the regular cadre, we hereby direct the State Governments to create such additional vacancies as may be necessary keeping in view the number of candidates selected.

(h) All sitting and/or former FTC Judges who were directly appointed from the Bar and are desirous of taking the examination and interview for regular appointment shall be given age relaxation. No application shall be rejected on the ground of age of the applicant being in excess of the prescribed age.”(Emphasis Supplied)

In view thereof, the officers manning the Fast Track Courts are required to be absorbed in the regular cadre in manner prescribed by the judgment in Brij Mohan Lal - II case (supra). It is only in the event of non availability of regular posts, the State was to create additional posts for such officers. Therefore, the officers have been rightly absorbed against the direct recruit posts available for General category. In fact, the absorption of the fast track officers against the direct recruit quota in the State of Haryana has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in a judgment dated 18.05.2010 rendered in CWP No. 9157 of 2008 titled “Keshav Kaushik Applicant/ v. State Of Haryana & Others S”. The appeal against the said part of the order has been dismissed by the Supreme Court vide judgment reported as Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik(2013) 5 SCC 277. The officers in the States of Punjab and Haryana were absorbed in similar manner in the common process.

Another argument raised by Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram that a General category post has become available due to the termination of Ms. Praveen Bali is required to be filled up in order of merit is again misconceived. The services of Ms. Praveen Bali appointed against General category post came to be terminated on account of unsatisfactory completion of probationary period. The resultant vacancy cannot be filled up on the basis of selection in which she was selected. In State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma(2002) 1 SCC 113, the Supreme Court was considering a case, where a candidate resigned after joining. It was held that after the joining of candidate, the panel ceased to exist and has outlived its utility. It was held to the following effect:

“4. ….As rightly contended for the appellant State, the notification issued inviting applications was in respect of one post and the first candidate in the select panel was not only offered but on his acceptance of offer came to be appointed and it was only subsequently that he came to resign. With the appointment of the first candidate for the only post in respect of which the consideration came to be made and select panel prepared, the panel ceased to exist and has outlived its utility and, at any rate, no one else in the panel can legitimately contend that he should have been offered appointment either in the vacancy arising on account of the subsequent resignation of the person appointed from the panel or any other vacancies arising subsequently.”

Later in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi(2010) 2 SCC 637, which deals with appointment of Superior Judicial Services, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction and violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India and, thus, a nullity, in-executable and unenforceable in law. It is held that the waiting list etc. cannot be used as a reservoir to fill up the vacancy which comes into existence after the issuance of notification/advertisement. It observed as under:

“12. In view of above, the law can be summarised to the effect that any appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction, being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, thus, a nullity, inexecutable and unenforceable in law. In case the vacancies notified stand filled up, the process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list, etc. cannot be used as a reservoir, to fill up the vacancy which comes into existence after the issuance of notification/advertisement. The unexhausted select list/waiting list becomes meaningless and cannot be pressed in service any more.

13. In the instant case, as 13 vacancies of the general category had been advertised and filled up, the selection process so far as the general category candidates is concerned, stood exhausted and the unexhausted select list is meant only to be consigned to record room.”

After considering the said judgments, this Court in LPA No. 1903 of 2011 titled ‘Abhishek Goyal v. State of Haryana decided on 09.01.2012 held to the following effect:

“In the present case, the names of the appellants appear at Sr. No. 42 onwards. As against 28 vacancies advertised, 40 candidates have been appointed out of which 05 have resigned or not joined. Therefore, the candidates much more than the vacancies advertised already have been permitted to join. The select list stands exhausted with the joining of the candidates. The resignation of few candidates after their joining, does not entitle a waiting list candidate to claim appointment. In view of the said fact, the appellants cannot claim any legal right in the posts advertised in the year 2007. The appellants cannot claim any right of appointment in respect of vacancies which arose after advertisement or in respect of additional posts created after advertisement.”

In view of the aforesaid judgments, the post advertised stood filled up with the joining of Ms. Praveen Bali. The subsequent termination of services will not give rise to any right of appointment to the candidates in the waiting list, but such resultant post is required to be filled up in the subsequent selection process in accordance with law.

The last of the arguments is that the High Court has not taken into consideration anticipated vacancies while issuing advertisement for filling up 21 posts of Punjab Superior Judicial Services. Such argument has been considered and negated by this Court in CWP No. 14467 of 2011 titled “Mayank Khosla v. State of Punjab decided on 28.03.2012, wherein relying upon State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha(1974) 3 SCC 220, S.S Balu v. State of Kerala(2009) 2 SCC 479 and State of M.P v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak(2008) 1 SCC 456, it was held to the following effect:

“In view of the above judgments, the petitioners cannot claim any right of appointment relying upon Rule 8 of the Rules, when the advertised vacancies stand filled up. The decision is of the employer as to how many seats are filled up. The petitioners cannot seek any mandamus to seek appointments against the posts not advertised. Such Rule empowers the employer to advertise anticipated vacancies but no right accrues to a candidate only for the reason, such vacancies have not been advertised.”

In view of the above discussions, we do not find any merit in the present set of writ petitions. The same are dismissed.

Sr. No. Case No. Parties Name

1. CWP No. 19033 of 2008 Narinder Chhibba v. Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh & others

2. CWP No. 21065 of 2008 Sukhwinderjit Singh v. The State of Punjab & others

3. CWP No. 21249 of 2008 Kadambini v. The State of Punjab & others

4. CWP No. 21410 of 2008 Vishal Sharma & others v. State of Punjab & another

5. CWP No. 1568 of 2009 Jaswant Rai v. State of Punjab & others

6. CWP No. 1999 of 2009 Gurmeet Pal Singh v. The State of Punjab & another

7. CWP No. 2246 of 2009 Anuradha v. State of Punjab etc.

8. CWP No. 2373 of 2009 Munish Kumar v. State of Punjab & others

9. CWP No. 3769 of 2009 Parmod Kumar v. State of Punjab & others

10. CWP No. 4180 of 2009 Dharminder Singh v. The State of Punjab & others

11. CWP No. 6441 of 2009 Balvinder Kaur Dhaliwal v. The State of Punjab & others

12. CWP No. 12437 of 2009 Balkaran Singh v. State of Punjab & others

13. CWP No. 4339 of 2010 Preeti Bhargav v. State of Punjab & others