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Parkash Chand And Others Petitioners v. Thakur Dass And Others S
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under sub-section (5) of section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 challenges concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the tenant-petitioners made material alterations and additions to the demised premises without the landlord's permission, resulting in impairment of its value and utility. The premises were let to tenant-petitioner No. 1 (Sh. Parkash Chand) under a rent note dated 1 June 1969 at Rs. 750 per month and the tenancy acquired statutory character after continuation beyond the one-year rent note. The landlord-respondents filed an ejectment petition under section 13 of the Act alleging multiple grounds; only the ground alleging material and unauthorised additions/alterations affecting utility and value survived for consideration by this Court. The tenant-petitioners contested the ejectment; all grounds were decided in their favour except the one concerning unauthorised structural changes. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority both found material structural additions/alterations and impairment of value and utility; this petition challenges those concurrent factual findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the tenant-petitioners made material and unauthorised additions/alterations to the demised premises without the landlord's permission.
- Whether such additions/alterations materially impaired, or were likely to impair, the value or utility of the demised premises within the meaning of section 13(2)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
- Whether the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are sustainable on the evidence and should be interfered with by this Court under sub-section (5) of section 15 of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Tenant-Petitioners' Arguments
- Challenged the factual finding as conjectural; submitted that the evidence (notably the statement and site-plan of Sh. Hem Raj, PW2, and report Ex. A2) does not sustain the conclusion of material impairment.
- Contended that certain additions (for example, bathrooms) were not pleaded; therefore the expert went beyond pleadings and such evidence should not support the finding.
- Alleged manipulation of municipal notices (Exhibits A5, A6) and reports (Ex.A9, A10) shortly after an agreement to sell (Exhibit R2) to engineer the ejectment — asserting a motive for fraudulent issuance of notices.
- Argued that the Division Bench ratio in Narayan Singh v. Bakson Laboratories (relied upon by the Appellate Authority) has been overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh, thereby undermining the Appellate Authority's basis.
- Maintained that the landlord must prove alterations impair value/utility under section 13(2)(iii), and that mere changes or repairs do not amount to material impairment; relied on various authorities (including Om Pal v. Anand Swarup, Bhupinder Singh v. J.L. Kapur, Brijendra Nath Bhargava v. Harsh Vardhan) for propositions on burden and nature of alterations.
- Relied on Privy Council authority (Sidil Mohammed Shah v. Mt. Saran) for the proposition that in absence of pleadings, evidence alone should not sustain findings.
Landlord-Respondents' Arguments
- Pointed to specific averments in the ejectment application (para 2(D)) alleging construction of a kitchen and flush latrine, breaking walls to lay pipes, absorption of an arched doorway into the latrine wall, replacement of old floors, erection of new walls in the courtyard, and alteration of doors — contending these facts were not specifically controverted in the tenant's reply.
- Stressed that the tenant's reply admitted fitting a flush seat but did not controvert construction of kitchen, closing/opening of doors, erection of walls, or increase in number of rooms; thus several allegations amounted to admissions in pleadings.
- Relied on oral and documentary evidence before the courts below: statements of municipal/technical witnesses (e.g., Malvinder Singh, Overseer PW; Sh. Hem Raj, PW2), municipal notices/orders Ex.A5–A8, reports Ex.A2, site-plan Ex.A3, and the absence of effective cross-examination on certain municipal witnesses.
- Argued that impairment of utility and value must be judged from the landlord's point of view; even if value was enhanced, impairment of landlord's utility suffices — citing multiple authorities and submitting that concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with.
- Urged that this Court should not disturb the concurrent factual findings since they are supported by cogent evidence, invoking Supreme Court authority on limited scope of interference in such petitions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayan Singh v. Bakson Laboratories, I.L.R (1982) 1 Ph. & Hr. 462 | The Appellate Authority relied on its ratio to assess whether alterations affected value and utility. | The Appellate Authority used this decision to support its conclusion that the alterations adversely affected the building's value/utility; the tenant contended later that this authority had been overruled. |
| Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2002 (2) RCR (Rent) 594 (SC) : (2003-1) 133 P.L.R 154 | Asserted (by tenant) to have overruled the Division Bench ratio in Narayan Singh. | The tenant relied on this Supreme Court decision to argue that Narayan Singh's ratio was no longer good law; the Court noted the argument but proceeded on other Supreme Court authorities. |
| Om Parkash v. Amar Singh, 1987 (1) RCR (Rent) 326 (SC) : A.I.R 1987 SC 617 | Laid down tests to determine whether tenant's alterations materially impair value/utility (listed as (a)–(e) in the opinion). | The Court applied these tests as authoritative guidance when assessing whether alterations (e.g., merger of arched doorway, construction of kitchen) materially impaired utility/value. |
| Brijendra Nath Bhargava v. Harsh Vardhan, 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 86 (SC) : 1988 (1) S.C.C 455 | Illustrated application of principles relating to structural alterations and burden of proof on landlord. | Referenced as a Supreme Court authority affirming the tests/principles in Om Parkash and as support for the Court's view on burden of proof and impairment. |
| Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lal Anand, 1993 (1) RCR (Rent) 675 (SC) | Followed Om Parkash; emphasized viewpoint of landlord in assessing impairment. | The Court relied on Vipin Kumar as follow-up authority and applied its principle that impairment is judged from the landlord's standpoint. |
| Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalik Rubber Industries, 1996 (1) RCR (Rent) 398 (SC) | Interpreted section 13(2)(iii): 'impair materially' means considerable diminution of quality/value judged from landlord's standpoint. | The Court quoted and applied the interpretation in concluding that the tenant's works materially impaired utility/value from the landlord's point of view. |
| Massa Singh v. Ch. Baru Mal Charitable Trust, 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 695 (SC) | Admissions in pleadings are strong evidence; admissions are "best evidence" when against interest of the party. | The Court relied on this authority to treat uncontested averments in the tenant's reply as admissions supporting the finding of unauthorised alterations. |
| Resham Singh v. Raghbir Singh, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 216 (SC) | Principle that courts should not lightly interfere with concurrent findings of fact. | The landlord invoked this authority to support non-interference with the concurrent factual findings; the Court adhered to the settled limited scope of review. |
| Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal, 2001 (1) RCR (Rent) 168 (SC) | Affirmed limited scope of interference with concurrent findings of fact. | Relied upon (by landlord) as supporting the proposition that this Court should not disturb the concurrent findings on evidence. |
| Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, 2000 (1) RCR (Rent) 507 (SC) | Reiterated principle restricting interference in concurrent findings where evidence exists to sustain them. | The Court cited this authority among Supreme Court decisions which limit interference under s.15(5) where evidence sustains findings. |
| Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1998 (2) RCR (Rent) 533 (SC) : 1998 8 SCC 119 | Authority on appellate interference with findings of fact (cited to support limited intervention). | Included among authorities the Court relied upon to justify non-interference with concurrent factual conclusions supported by evidence. |
| Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 141 (SC) : 1999 6 SCC 222 | Affirmed settled approach that appellate courts should not reappraise evidence to disturb concurrent findings. | Relied on to reinforce the restricted review standard under subsection (5) of section 15 of the Act. |
| Brijendra Nath Bhargava and another v. Sh. Harsh Wardhan and others (duplicate citation earlier) | Demonstrated that landlord's burden in structural alteration cases is lighter and tests of impairment. | Used as supportive authority; the Court observed the principles in these decisions applied to the facts at hand. |
| Subhash Chander v. Valaiti Ram, 1994 (1) R.C.R 630 | Examples where tenants made constructive alterations for specific professional use (contextual authority cited by tenant). | Tenant relied on it to argue legitimate alterations can be necessary for enjoyment; Court noted the argument but distinguished the present facts. |
| Dr. J.S. Sodhi v. Mela Ram, 2001 (2) RCR (Rent) 168 (SC) | Illustrates circumstances where alterations were made for necessity of use (cited by tenant). | Referenced by tenant to contend some alterations may be permissible; the Court did not find this reasoning applicable to the present structural changes. |
| Gurmit Singh… v. Smt. Kirpal Kaur…, 1992 (2) R.C.R 380 | Authority on circumstances where alterations were treated in assessing utility (cited by tenant). | Tenant relied on such precedents to argue for a broader view of permissible changes; Court distinguished based on nature/extent of alterations here. |
| Sidil Mohammed Shah v. Mt. Saran, A.I.R 1930 P.C 57 | Privy Council authority: absence of pleadings limits the efficacy of evidence to sustain findings. | Tenant invoked this to argue evidence on unpleaded items (bathrooms) should not be admitted; the Court rejected this submission, observing pleadings require material facts, not evidence particulars. |
| Satish Kumar and Company v. Krishan Gopal, 1998 (2) RCR (Rent) 386 (P&H) | Supports viewpoint that impairment must be assessed from landlord's perspective. | Relied on by landlord to bolster the proposition that landlord's viewpoint governs assessment of impairment; Court applied that principle. |
| Suhhash v. Ganga Devi, 1996 (2) Rent L.R 519 | Also supports assessment from landlord's standpoint. | Invoked by landlord; Court treated it as consistent authority for weighing landlord's viewpoint. |
| Union of India v. Joginder Singh, 1983 (2) Rent L.R 464 | General authority cited in support of the landlord's position on impairment assessment. | Referred to by landlord as part of an array of cases emphasizing landlord-centric evaluation of impairment. |
| Kharar Saw Mill v. Prem Katir, 1995 (2) RCR (Rent) 668 (P&H) : 1995 (2) Rent L.R 729 | Authority on impairment/utility considerations cited by landlord. | Used by landlord to reinforce the landlord-perspective rule; the Court accepted the consolidated principle. |
| Mohan Lal Ashok Raj v. Lajwanti Devi, 1997 (2) Rent L.R 197 | Another supporting authority on landlord-centric assessment. | Included among cases cited by landlord; Court treated it as consistent with the established line of authority. |
| Manohar Lal Mulwani v. Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., 1984 (2) RCR (Rent) 358 (P&H) : 1984 (2) Rent L.R 190 | Supporting precedent on impairment/utility issues (cited by landlord). | Part of the body of case law the Court acknowledged in applying the landlord-perspective test. |
| Kali Prashad v. Bharat Cooking Coal, AIR 1989 SC 1530 | On pleadings: law requires pleadings to state material facts and not evidence; courts may consider evidence if pleadings sufficiently identify material facts. | The Court relied on this to reject tenant's objection that details (e.g., addition of bathrooms) being unpleaded prevented their consideration; held parties were aware and Courts below considered the evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court approached the matter in sequential analytical steps grounded in the record and authoritative principles:
- Findings below: Both the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority had recorded detailed findings (drawing on reports Ex.A2, site-plan Ex.A3, municipal reports Ex.A9/A10, and testimony such as that of Sh. Shanti Sarup and Sh. Hem Raj) that structural alterations and unauthorised additions had been made and that the number of rooms increased from seven to eleven after 1978–79.
- Admissions in pleadings: The Court examined the pleadings and observed that the landlord's para 2(D) alleged specific alterations (kitchen, flush latrine, breaking wall for pipe, absorption of arched doorway, replacement of floors, new walls, alteration of door). The corresponding reply did not specifically controvert many of these averments; the Court treated such non-disputation as admissions and therefore strong evidence (relying on Massa Singh).
- Burden of proof and evidentiary standard: The Court noted that in cases of structural alterations without landlord permission the landlord's burden to show impairment is "much lighter." The Court relied on statutory provision section 13(2)(iii) and Supreme Court authorities (Om Parkash, Vipin Kumar, Gurbachan Singh) that set out tests for what constitutes material impairment.
- Application of tests: The Court applied the tests from Om Parkash (presence of unauthorised constructions; major/substantial alterations; material impairment judged from nature/character of construction and intended purpose; viewpoint of landlord) to the facts — identifying merger of arched doorway into latrine, construction of kitchen, erection of new walls, closing/opening doors, addition of stores and bathrooms, and reduction of open courtyard area as substantive changes.
- Pleadings versus evidence: The Court rejected the tenant's contention that unpleaded particulars (e.g., addition of bathrooms) could not be considered, observing that pleadings must set out material facts, not evidence details (citing Order VI Rule 2 and Kali Prashad). The Court noted parties were aware of the factual matrix and Courts below had considered the evidence.
- Standard of review in s.15(5) petition: The Court reiterated that under subsection (5) of section 15 it will not act as an appellate court reappraising factual findings; where evidence exists to sustain concurrent findings, interference is not warranted (citing Vaneet Jain, Sarla Ahuja, Shiv Sarup Gupta).
- Conclusion on evidence sufficiency: Combining admissions in pleadings, municipal reports/notices, expert/site-plan evidence, and eyewitness statements, the Court held there was adequate evidence to uphold the concurrent findings that the tenant-petitioners made material unauthorised alterations which materially impaired the utility (and thus the value) of the premises from the landlord's viewpoint.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
Implications:
- The concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority — that the tenant-petitioners made unauthorised material alterations/additions and that such works materially impaired the utility (and thereby the value) of the demised premises from the landlord's point of view — are upheld and not interfered with by this Court.
- The Court applied and followed established Supreme Court principles (notably Om Parkash, Vipin Kumar, Gurbachan Singh) about the tests for material impairment and the landlord-centric perspective for assessing utility and value; it also treated uncontested averments in pleadings as admissions supporting the factual findings.
- No new legal precedent was propounded by this decision; the Court applied existing authorities and the direct effect is the dismissal of the tenant's petition — leaving the concurrent factual determinations intact.
This summary is strictly limited to the content and citations contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond that text.
M.M Kumar, J. — This petition filed by the tenant-petitioners under sub-section (5) of section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for brevity, ‘the Act’), challenges concurrent finding of fact on the issue as to whether the tenant-petitioners have made material alterations in the demised premises resulting in impairment of its value and utility. Both the courts below have concurrently found that there are material alterations and additions made by the tenant-petitioners in the demised premises without the permission of the landlord-respondents resulting in impairment of its value and utility.
2. The landlord-respondents are owners of the demised premises which were let out to tenant-petitioner No. 1 Sh. Parkash Chand, at a monthly rent of Rs. 750/-. A rent note dated 1st June, 1969 for a period of one year was executed. The tenancy having continued even after the period of one year, acquired a statutory character. The landlord-respondents filed ejectment petition under section 13 of the Act on the grounds of non-payment of rent w.e.f 1st October, 1980, personal necessity of one of the landlord-respondent, namely, Shri Jagdish Chand, subletting by tenant-petitioner No. 1 to tenant-petitioner No. 2 to 7 and that the tenant-petitioners Nos. 3 to 7 have made material and unauthorised additions and alterations affecting the utility and value of the demised premises. The only ground which survives for consideration of this Court is the last one.
3. The tenant-petitioners contested the ejectment petition and all other pleas were decided in their favour except the ground of material and unauthorised additions affecting the value and utility of the demised premises. The stand of the tenant-petitioners on the aforementioned plea was that they had not made any unauthorised additions or alterations which might have affected the value and utility of the premises. It was, however, admitted that one dry latrine was controverted (converted?) into a flush latrine. The Rent Controller, after thorough examination of the evidence produced, recorded a finding that structural changes have been made by the tenant-petitioners adversely affecting the value and utility of the property. The Appellate Authority also concurred with the finding recorded by the Rent Controller. After discussing the evidence produced in considerable details in paras 13, 14 and 15, the learned Appellate Authority concluded that the material alterations and additions in the demised premises have been made in its opinion reads as under :—
“In my opinion, from the evidence adduced by the applicants-landlords on the file, it can be safely concluded that the appellants had made material additions/alterations in the property in dispute. Admittedly, a flush latrine has been constructed. It is not proved that any dry latrine would have been provided at the place where the flush latrine now exists because it immediately abuts the passage and the Deorhi. From the statement of Sh. Hem Raj coupled with his report Ex.A-2 and the statement of Sh. Shanti Sarup, it is further apparent that various structural alterations and additions have been made in the property as detailed in the report Ex.A2 and the plaint Ex.A3
The fact that unauthorised additions/alterations have been made is further strengthened from the fact that there now exist 11 rooms and a verandah as admitted by Sh. Shamsher Singh as well as by Sh. Parkash Chand RWs, whereas only seven rooms and a verandah existed in the property in the year 1978-1979 indicating the additions/alterations were made thereafter. Then there is no reason to disbelieve the dis-interested testimony of Sh. Malvinder Singh Overseer, Municipal Committee, Sunam who had detected the unauthorised additions/alterations being made and had made his reports, the copies of which are Ex.A9 and Ex.A10 The notices were issued on the basis of those reports under the signatures of Sh. Shiv Kumar Mittal, Executive Officer (PW6) under sections 195, Punjab Municipal Act. Ex.A5 to Ex.A8 are the copies of those notices/orders.”
4. Apart from the finding that there were structural alterations and additions, learned Appellate Authority also raised adverse inference from the fact that only tenant-petitioner No. 1 had appeared as a witness in support of the defence. His statement has not been considered significant for the reason that he has not been staying in the premises and as such the first hand knowledge and information which could have come forward from those who were staying in the demised premises, did not come forward. This fact further fortified the conclusion that material alterations and additions have been made in the demised premises.
5. The next question considered by both the Courts below is whether the additions and alterations made have materially affected or likely to affect the value and utility of the demised premises, because it was claimed that the alterations and additions made by the tenant-petitioners have enhanced the value and utility of the property. The basis of the aforementioned claim was the statement made by one Sh. Hem Raj Singla who has appeared as PW2 and was working as Sectional Officer, PWD (B and R) Sunam. On the basis of the ratio of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Narayan Singh v. Bakson Laboratories, I.L.R (1982) 1 Ph. & Hr. 462 the learned Appellate Authority concluded that the value and utility of the building had been adversely affected. The statement of Sh. Shanti Samp, who appeared as PW-1, has been rightly relied upon by both the Courts below to reach the aforementioned conclusion.
6. I have heard Sh. M.L Sarin, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioners who has argued that on the basis of the statement of Sh. Hem Raj, who has appeared as PW2 along with his site-plan, Ex. A3 and the report, Ex. A2 produced by him the finding that there are material alterations affecting the value and utility of the dernised premises, cannot be accepted. According to the learned counsel, the finding is conjectural and there is no evidence to sustain that finding. The learned counsel has also pointed out that addition of bath room which has been taken into considerations, have not even been pleaded and the expert, Sh. Hem Raj, has gone beyond the pleadings by making a statement to that effect. Learned counsel has then argued that perusal of Exhibits A5 and A6 which are notices dated 14th January, 1981 and 11th February, 1981 under section 195 of Municipal Act, 1911 issued to the tenant-petitioners and also the report, Exhibits A9 and A10 are manipulated at the instance of the landlord-respondents. It has been pointed out that this happened soon after an agreement to sell dated 26th November, 1980, Exhibit R2 was entered into. Therefore, the whole effort was to get the tenant-petitioners ejected and notices, Exhibits A5 and A6 were manipulated. Learned counsel has also pointed out that the Division Bench judgment in the case of Narayan Singh (supra) on which heavy reliance has been placed by the Appellate Authority stands over-ruled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh., 2002 (2) RCR (Rent) 594 (SC) : (2003-1) 133 P.L.R 154 and, therefore, the basis of the judgment of the Appellate Authority is completely knocked out. It is urged that the landlord-respondents should have proved within the meaning of section 13(2)(iii) of the Act that alterations and additions affecting the utility and value of the demised premises have been made. In the present case, even dates of such alterations and additions have not been mentioned. The counsel maintained that it is not every change or repair in the demised premises which would result into material alterations affecting the utility of the demised premises. For this proposition, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Sh. Om Pal v. Anand Swarup, 1988 (2) RCR (Rent) 419 (P&H) : (1988-2) 94 P.L.R 699 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh v. J.L Kapur, 1992 (2) RCR (Rent) 364 (P&H) : 1992 (2) Rent L.R 104. He has also placed reliance on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Sh. Brijendra Nath Bhargava and another v. Sh. Harsh Wardhan and others, 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 86 (SC) : 1988 (1) S.C.C 455 to stress that burden of proof even in cases of structural alterations has to be discharged by the landlord. The learned counsel has further submitted that for proper enjoyment of the demised premises, kitchen and bath rooms are necessary in residential accommodation and for that matter, he has referred to various judgments where here the building was rented to Radiologist who constructed a dark room or the floor was lowered for proper utilisation of the demised premises. Those judgments are Subhash Chander v. Valaiti Ram, 1994 (1) R.C.R 630, Dr. J.S Sodhi v. Mela Ram, 2001 (2) RCR (Rent) 168 (SC) : (2001-1) 124 P.L.R 684 and Gurmit Singh… v. Smt. Kirpal Kaur…., 1992 (2) R.C.R 380. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Privy Council in the case of Sidil Mohammed Shah v. Mt. Saran, A.I.R 1930 P.C 57 (1) for the proposition that in the absence of pleadings no evidence could help to support the findings
7. Sh. R.K Battas, learned Counsel for landlord-respondents has drawn my attention to ground 2(D) of the ejectment application wherein it is averred that the tenant-petitioners have constructed a kitchen and a flush latrine. It has further been averred that the pipe has been laid down after breaking the wall and some portion of the arch-door way has also been included in the wall of the flush latrine. The old floors of entire courtyard and the rooms have been changed with the new one and a new wall has been erected in the courtyard which has impaired the value and utility of the premises. The learned counsel has further submitted that in the reply filed by the tenant-petitioners, the averments made in para 2(D) have not been even specifically controverted. The only reply which has been given by the tenant-petitioners is that they had got fitted a flush seat in the latrine which was already in existence. He has then pointed out that Sh. Shamsher Singh, PW2 who was their expert, has admitted that one kitchen, two small stores and one bath room, have been constructed at a later stage. Similar statements have also been made by Sh. Hem Raj, PW2 produced by the landlord-respondents. The learned counsel maintained that one Malvinder Singh, Overseer, Municipal Committee, Sunam has appeared and no cross-examination was conducted on him regarding preexisting dry latrine because he had mentioned in his report dated 9th January, 1981, Exhibit A9 that new flush latrine and kitchen were constructed. According to the learned counsel, similar statement has been made by Satish Kant, Clerk, Municipal Committee, Sunam (PW8) and PW6 Sh. Shiv Kumar Mittal, Executive Officer. A reference has also been made to the notices, Exhibits A5 and A6 issued under section 195 of the Municipal Act, 1911. On the basis of the aforementioned evidence, learned counsel submitted that this Court would not be inclined to interfere in concurrent findings of fact, as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Resham Singh v. Raghbir Singh, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 216 (SC) : 1999 (2) Rent L.R 654 and Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal, 2001 (1) RCR (Rent) 168 (SC) : 2001 (2) Rent L.R 5.
8. Sh. Battas has also pointed out that the question of impairment of utility and value of the demised premises has to be examined from the point of view of the landlord and not that of the tenant-petitioner. For the aforementioned proposition, he has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the case of Satish Kumar and Company v. Krishan Gopal, 1998 (2) RCR (Rent) 386 (P&H) : 1998 (2) Rent L.R 237 and Suhhash v. Ganga Devi, 1996 (2) Rent L.R 519. For the same proposition, learned counsel has also placed reliance on various other judgments viz. Union of India v. Joginder Singh, 1983 (2) Rent L.R 464, Kharar Saw Mill v. Prem Katir, 1995 (2) RCR (Rent) 668 (P&H) : 1995 (2) Rent L.R 729, Mohan Lal Ashok Raj v. Lajwanti Devi, 1997 (2) Rent L.R 197 and Manohar Lal Mulwani v. Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., 1984 (2) RCR (Rent) 358 (P&H) : 1984 (2) Rent L.R 190. On the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as Supreme Court learned counsel has argued that even if the additional construction or alterations have increased the value of the building, it would not make any material difference because the impairment in the utility of the building has to be viewed from the point of view of the landlord alone. According to the learned counsel, there is no escape from the conclusion that construction of a flush toilet by removing the arch door and merging the same for constructing the toilets and the construction of a kitchen, are such constructions which have impaired the utility of the building. He has also submitted that no interference in the finding of fact based on cogent evidence would be warranted by this Court.
9. I have thoughtfully considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have also minutely perused the record. In my opinion, this petition is liable to be dismissed because a look at the pleadings of the parties in para 2(D) would make it evident that even the averments made in that para, have not been controverted by the tenant-petitioner in the corresponding para. The averments made in para 2(D) by the landlord-respondent read as under :
“That the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 who are in possession of the compound, have made material alteration therein. They have constructed a kitchen and a flush latrine. The pipe has been laid down after breaking the wall. There was a Daat (arched door-way) in the Deodhi. Some portion of the Daat has been included in the wall of flush latrine. The old floors of entire courtyard and the rooms have been changed with the new ones. Brick flooring has been made in the roofs of compound. The door of the room constructed in the courtyard has been closed and it has been opened towards other side. A new wall has been erected in the courtyard, which has impaired the value and utility of the compound.” [emphasis (in italics) added]
10. The aforementioned averments have been repelled in the corresponding para of the reply which reads as under :—
“That the para No. 2(D) is wrong and denied. This fact is denied that the respondents have made any material alterations in the compound in dispute and that it has impaired the value and utility of the premises. However, it is correct that the respondents have got fitted a flush seat in the latrine, but the latrine was already constructed. Only the flush seat has been got fitted in the latrine.
11. A perusal of the aforementioned averments made by the parties makes it evident that the tenant-petitioners have not even disputed the construction of a kitchen. The averments that the arched doorway has been included in the wall of the flush latrine, have also not been disputed. The averments, emphasised in para 2(D) (supra) including new wall has been erected in the courtyard or the door has been closed, have not been controverted. Once the fact has not been controverted in the written statement it would amount to admission. The construction of flush latrine has been conceded by the tenant-petitioner himself and these fact have not been controverted. Admissions are regarded as the best evidence because it is the statement made by the party against his own interest. In this regard reliance can be placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Massa Singh v. Ch. Baru Mal Charitable Trust, 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 695 (SC) : (1988) 2 Rent L.R (S.C) 1. It is further clear from the judgments of both the Courts below that huge evidence has been adduced against the tenant-petitioners showing that material alterations have been affected and those alterations have adversely affected the utility of the demised premises, if the same are examined from the point of view of the landlord-respondent. It is well settled that in cases involving structural alterations without permission of the landlord, the burden of proof on the landlord to show that the value has been impaired or the utility has been decreased is much lighter. section 13(2)(iii) of the Act reads as under :
“13. Eviction of tenants. — (1) *** *** ***
(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied
(i) *** *** ***
(ii) *** *** ***
(iii) that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land.”
12. The aforementioned provision came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Parkash v. Amar Singh, 1987 (1) RCR (Rent) 326 (SC) : A.I.R 1987 SC 617 where various tests have been laid down to determine whether the alterations made by the tenant adversely affect the demised premises so as to lead to the eviction of the tenant. Those tests are as under :—
(a) the tenant has made constructions/alterations without the consent or permission of the landlord;
(b) the constructions and alterations are major and substantial in nature as distinguished from minor and temporary alterations;
(c) such constructions/alterations have materially impaired the value or utility of the demised premises;
(d) in determining as to whether the value or utility of the demised premises has been impaired, the Court must address itself to the nature and character of the construction and the extent to which the same have been made giving full regard to the purpose for which the premises were let out to the tenant;
(e) the view point of the landlord and not that of the tenant regarding utility and value of the building, has to be kept in view.
13. The principles laid down in Om Parkash's case (supra) were followed, applied and approved in the cases of Brijendra Nath Bhargava v. Harsh Vardhan, (supra) and Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lal Anand, 1993 (1) RCR (Rent) 675 (SC) : (1993-2) 104 P.L.R 349. The case of Vipin Kumar (supra) has also been followed and relied upon in the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalik Rubber Industries, 1996 (1) RCR (Rent) 398 (SC) : (1996-2) 113 P.L.R 694 (S.C). section 13(2)(iii) of the Act came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh's case (supra). The interpretation given by the Supreme Court of the aforementioned section reads as under :
“A plain reading will go to show that it contemplates that a tenant is liable to eviction who has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building of rented land. The meaning of the expression “to impair materially” in common parlance would mean to diminish the quality, strength or value substantially. In other words to make a thing or substance worse and deteriorate. The word ‘impair’ cannot be said to have a fixed meaning. It is a relative term affording different meaning in different context and situations. Here in the context the term “impair materially” has been used to mean, considerable decrease in quality which may be measured with reference to the antecedent state of things as it existed earlier in point of suggesting impairment. Further, the use of the word value means intrinsic worth of a thing. In other words utility of an object satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs or desires of a person. Thus, the ground for eviction of a tenant would be available to landlord against the tenant under section 13(2)(iii) of the Act, if it is established that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to diminish the quality, strength or value of the building or rented land to such an extent that the intrinsic worth or fitness of the building or the rented land has considerably affected its use for some desirable practical purposes. The decrease or deterioration, in other words the impairment of the worth and usefulness of the value and utility of the building or rented land has to be judged and determined from the point of view of the landlord and not of the tenant or any one else…..”
14. The Supreme Court further held that impairment of utility and value of the building has to be examined from the point of view of the landlord and not that of a tenant. The following para, in this regard in the case of Vipin Kumar's case (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh's case :
“The impairment of the value or utility of the building is from the point of the landlord and not of the tenant. The first limb of clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of section 13 is impairment of the building due to acts committed by the tenant and the second limb is of the utility or value of the building has (sic having) been materially impaired. The acts of the tenant must be such that by erecting the wall he had materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises.”
15. The Supreme Court after following the above principles ordered ejectment of the tenant in Gurbachan Singh's case (supra) and observed as under :
“that even if it is assumed that the tenant-respondents raised the construction of shed over the part of the open land of the demised premises with the written consent of the landlord as may be spelt out from the rent note Ext.A1, then the rest of the construction, additions and alterations of the five shops and the verandah in front of the said shops of a permanent nature, will certainly amount to acts as have or likely to have impaired materially the value or utility of the building/premises let out to them. The nature of the construction is a relevant consideration in determining the question of material impairment in the value or utility of the building or the demised premises. In the present case the removal of the roof of the shops, partition walls and the doors, laying of a roof, merging of the verandah with the shops, closing the doors and opening new doors and windows and converting the premises altogether, giving totally a new and different shape and complexion by such alteration would certainly be regarded as one involving material impairment of the premises affecting its fitness for use for desirable practical purposes and the intrinsic worth of the demised premises from the point of view of the appellant-landlords within the meaning of section 13(2)(iii) of the act…..”
16. When the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, it becomes evident that merger of arched door-way for construction of flush latrine, construction of kitchen, erection of new walls, closing of door and addition of stores, are the material alterations and additions which have been made by the tenant-petitioners without any permission of the landlord-respondents. Demolishing arched doorway and undertaking major construction activity would certainly impair the utility of the demised premises from the point of view of the landlord-respondents. The area of the courtyard has been considerably reduced. No explanation has come from the tenant-petitioners as to how the number of rooms has gone up from 7 to 11. Therefore, the findings recorded by both the courts below that the additions and alterations have resulted into impairment of the utility of the demised premises, cannot be interfered with.
The argument of the tenant-petitioners that no impairment of the value is to be inferred, does not require any detailed examination for the reasons that the substantial alterations and additions made would lead to irresistible conclusion that the structual design of the demised premises like arched doorway and merging the same for constructing the flush latrine, have been changed and the utility of the building from the point of view of the landlord-respondents has been impaired. Similar conclusion has to be arrived at if we examine the addition of kitchen. The report of the expert, Shri Hem Raj Singla, PW2 and the site plan, Exhibit A3 would clearly show that in the courtyard area, bath room Nos. 1 and 2 have been added and the side wall of the kitchen has been constructed. The floors of the Deodi and courtyard has been constructed new. Certainly, this type of construction raised by the tenant-petitioner would impair the utility of the courtyard which was left open by the landlord-respondents. Therefore, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Om Parkash's case (supra) and Vipin Kumar's case (supra) and Gurbachan Singh's case (supra) would fully apply to the facts of the instant case and argument that the utility has not been impaired, is liable to be rejected.
17. The argument of the tenant-petitioners that no impairment of the value is to be inferred, does not require any detailed examination for the reason that the substantial alterations and additions made would lead to irresistible conclusion that the structural design of the demised premises like arched doorway and merging the same for constructing the flush latrine, have been changed and the utility of the building from the point of view of the landlord-respondents has been impaired. Similar conclusion has to be arrived at if we examine the addition of kitchen. The report of the expert, Shri Hem Raj Singla, PW2 and the site plan, Exhibit A3 would clearly show that in the courtyard area, bath room Nos. 1 and 2 have been added and the side wall of the kitchen has been constructed. The floors of the Deodi and courtyard have been constructed new. Certainly, this type of construction raised by the tenant-petitioner would impair the utility of the courtyard which was left open by the landlord-respondents. Therefore, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Om Parkash's case (supra) and Vipin Kumar's case (supra) and Gurbachan Singh's case (supra) would fully apply to the facts of the instant case and the argument that the utility has not been impaired, is liable to be rejected.
18. The other argument that the conclusions are based on conjectures and surmises would also not require detail examination in view of the fact that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under sub-section (5) of section 15 of the Act, would not act as an Appellate Court on the findings of fact. It is now well settled that as long as there is evidence to sustain the findings, no interference by this Court under sub-section (5) to section 15 of the Act would be warranted. Such a view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the cases Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, 2000 (1) RCR (Rent) 507 (SC) : (2000-3) 126 P.L.R 263 (S.C), Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.., 1998 (2) RCR (Rent) 533 (SC) : (1998) 8 SCC 119, and Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 141 (SC) : (1999) 6 SCC 222. Similarly, the argument that kitchen and bath rooms are required for proper enjoyment of the demised premises does not deserve to be accepted because under the garb of utilising the demised premises a tenant cannot make wholesale additions so as to impair the utility of the demised premises by defacing the structure permanently. Therefore, I do not feel persuaded to take a view different view than the one taken by both the Courts below.
19. The other argument raised by Shri M.L Sarin, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner that no averments were made with regard to construction of bath-rooms and the statement made by Hem Raj PW2 alongwith his report/site plan cannot be taken into consideration would also not require any detailed consideration because under Order VI Rule 2 of the Code, the law of pleadings require to state material facts and not the evidence. It is true that the pleadings of parties being foundation of the case are necessary in their material parts. Substantive law in this regard has to be kept in view. In the present case, the provision of section 13(2)(iii) of the Act requires the landlord to state such acts as are likely to impair value or utility of the buildings or rented premises. Addition of bath rooms as elaborated by evidence would not constitute these material facts which are required to be stated by the law of pleadings read with the substantive law. Even otherwise, at this stage it cannot be argued that the evidence should not be looked into because both the Courts below have considered the evidence and the parties were aware of the case of each other. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kali Prashad v. Bharat Cooking Coal, AIR 1989 SC 1530. Moreover, no such argument has been raised before the Courts below. Therefore, there is no merit even in this contention raised by the learned counsels.
20. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
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