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Dr. Ram Parkash v. Dayal Chand And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The revision challenges the permission granted to the respondents, Dayal Chand and others, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) to institute a suit for declaration concerning the alleged misuse of authority by the petitioner, Dr. Ram Parkash, as Trustee of the Trust known as ‘Dharamshala Baba Sunder Dass, Pull Telian, Hissar’. The respondents applied for permission to sue, claiming an interest in safeguarding the Trust’s interests and proper administration. The trial court granted permission, which the petitioner contested by filing this revision petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents fulfilled the essential requirements under Section 92 of the Code, specifically that the Trust is for a public charitable or religious purpose.
- Whether the respondents demonstrated that they had a real interest in the Trust as required under Section 92 of the Code.
- Whether an order granting permission under Section 92 of the Code, which allegedly does not satisfy its provisions, is open to challenge by revision under Section 115 of the Code.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The permission granted by the trial court was unwarranted as the respondents failed to prove that the Trust was a public Trust as required by Section 92 of the Code.
- The respondents did not establish that they had an interest in the Trust as envisaged by Section 92.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The nature of the Trust as public and the respondents’ interest were matters to be decided during the suit, not at the stage of granting permission under Section 92.
- The court’s role under Section 92 is administrative, and the permission order should not be subject to revision under Section 115 of the Code.
- Reliance was placed on the High Court of Delhi’s decision in S.S Bhagat v. N.S Ahluwalia, AIR 1978 Del 14, which held that the Advocate General’s role under Section 92 is to see if there is a prima facie case to proceed to court, not to decide rights finally.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.S Bhagat v. N.S Ahluwalia, AIR 1978 Del 14 | Clarified the role of the Advocate General under S. 92 of the Code as an administrative function to assess prima facie case. | The court held that this precedent does not immunize an order granting permission without fulfilling essential requirements of S. 92 from revision. |
| Farman Ali Khan v. Mohd. Raza Khan, AIR 1950 All 62 (p. 65) | Defined "interest in the Trust" as a substantive interest affected by mismanagement warranting court intervention. | The court applied this interpretation to conclude that respondents failed to show such interest. |
| Vaidyanathan Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 221 | Approved the principle that only persons with real interest can interfere in charitable trust administration under S. 92. | The court relied on this to emphasize the necessity of real, substantive interest for permission under S. 92. |
| Ramachandra Aiayar v. Parameswaran Unni, ILR 42 Mad 360 (AIR 1919 Mad 384) | Statement that S. 92 aims to prevent interference by persons without real interest in charitable trusts. | Supported the court’s reasoning on the nature of interest required under S. 92. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the essential requirements of Section 92 of the Code: the Trust must be for a public charitable or religious purpose, and the applicant must have an interest in the Trust. It noted that the respondents’ application failed to establish either requirement, as the nature of the Trust was not demonstrated beyond a mere heading, and the respondents’ claimed interest was vague and insufficient. The court rejected the respondents’ contention that the permission order is merely administrative and immune from revision, clarifying that such orders are challengeable under Section 115 of the Code if they do not comply with Section 92’s provisions. The court relied on authoritative precedents to define the requisite "interest" as a substantive and real interest affected by mismanagement, not merely a general concern. Finding no prima facie material to satisfy these conditions, the court held the grant of permission unlawful.
Holding and Implications
The court set aside the impugned order granting permission under Section 92 of the Code and allowed the revision petition with costs.
The direct effect is that the respondents are not permitted to institute the suit under Section 92 as the required conditions were not met. No broader precedent was established beyond affirming that orders granting permission under Section 92 must comply with its statutory requirements and are subject to revision under Section 115 of the Code.
The challenge in Revision here is to the permission granted to the respondents Dayal Chand and others under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) for the institution of a suit for declaration relating to the alleged misuse of authority by the petitioner Dr. Ram Parkash as Trustee of the Trust known as ‘Dharamshala Baba Sunder Dass, Pull Telian, Hissar’.
2. A reading of the provisions of S. 92 of the Code would show that two of the essential requirements thereof are one that the person applying for permission to institute the suit must have an interest in the Trust and second, that the Trust must be for a public purpose of a charitable or religious nature.
3. There was no mention in the body of the application, filed by the respondents, of the Trust here being of the nature specified in S. 92 of the Code. It was only in the heading thereof that it was described as a public Trust, but that too without there being any indication of the nature thereof.
4. As regards their interest in the Trust, what was stated by the respondents in their application was :—
“That the applicants are persons interested in safeguarding the interest of the Trust as also to secure the proper administration thereof.”
5. It was the contention of Mr. M L. Sarin, counsel for the petitioner that the permission granted by the Trial Court for the filing of the suit was wholly unwarranted, both on the ground that the respondents had failed to show that the Trust in question was a public Trust and also that they had an interest in the Trust as envisaged by the provisions of S. 92 of the Code.
6. Mr. J.S Khanna, counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that the question whether the Trust was a Public Trust or that the respondents had the requisite interest in it, were matters to be raised and tried in the suit and that the Court acting under S. 92 of the Code exercised merely an administrative function and its order was thus not open to, question in revision under S. 115 of the Code. This contention was founded upon the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in S.S Bhagat v. N.S Ahluwalia, AIR 1978 Del 14, where it was held that under S. 92 of the Code the Advocate General does not decide the rights of a person against whom the suit is intended to be filed, as such person would have full opportunity to present his case before the Court in which the suit is filed, but is merely to see whether or not there is a prima facie case that should be allowed to go to Court. This statement of law obviously cannot be read as a precedent for the point canvassed, rather it spells out, fulfilling prima facie the requirements of S- 92 of the Code as an essential precondition for the grant of permission to institute a suit thereunder.
7. An order granting permission to institute a suit without fulfilling the, essential requirements of S. 92 of the Code is not rendered immune from challenge in revision, merely on the ground that such an order is an administrative order which does not finally decide the rights of the parties. An order of this type would clearly be covered by Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 115 of the Code read with proviso (a) thereto. It follows, therefore, that revision would lie against an order granting permission under S. 92 of the Code to institute a suit which does not comply with the provisions thereof.
8. In the present case, interference in revision is clearly warranted, there being no material on record to show that the Trust in question was of the type and nature which could atract the provisions of S. 92 of the Code.
9. As regards the respondents being persons interested in the Trust, the words ‘interest in the Trust’ were interpreted in Farman Ali Khan v. Mohd. Raza Khan, AIR 1950 All 62 (at p. 65) to mean “some such interest which is affected by mismanagement so that the person is interested in having the affairs of the trust set right by Court”. It would also be pertinent to advert to the judgment of the Privy Council in Vaidyanathan Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 221 (2) where the statement of Sir John Wallis in Ramachandra Aiayar v. Parameswaran Unni, ILR 42 Mad 360 : (AIR 1919 Mad 384) was approved “that the object was to prevent people interfering by virtue of S. 92 of the Code in the administration of charitable trusts merely in the interest of others and without any real interest of their own.”
10. The interest required by S. 92 of the Code must thus be a real, substantive and existing interest in the particular Trust. Something more than, for example, merely being a resident of the locality or belonging to the same religion. The requirement, of course, is merely to show the existence of such interest prima facie only.
11. This, thus, being the law on the subject, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the respondents failed to show even prima facie what interest, if any, they had in the Trust in question nor that the Trust was of the nature mentioned in S. 92 of the Code. In this situation, it must indeed be held that the grant of permission to the respondents to institute a suit against the petitioner was contrary to law.
12. The impugned order is consequently hereby set aside and this Revision Petition is accepted with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 300/-.
Revision allowed.
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